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This paper is meant to be a contribution to the discussion on feudalism and an attempt to discern different stages in the development of the Ottoman feudal system.

The Nature of Ottoman Feudalism

It is only natural that the discussion going on about feudalism in general should have come to concern itself also with the world of Islam. Particularly the question to what degree it is admissible and justifiable to refer to Islamic social forms of past centuries as a more or less specific type of feudalism has aroused some interest.¹

In the first part of this paper, I shall not dwell on how the numerous views concerning these questions are interconnected historically, nor on such problems as are embodied in the phrases 'oriental despotism',² 'Asian system of

- 1 In addition to the articles of Cl. Cahen and N. Beldiceanu (see notes 5 and 6 for bibliographical details) we should mention the following titles: Bistra Cvetkova, 'Sur certaines reformes du régime foncier au temps de Mehmet II,' *JESHO* VI (1963): 104–120; Zdenka Veselá (–Přenosilová), 'On the Development of Ottoman Feudalism and the Problems of its Investigation,' *Orientalistický Sborník — Oriental Studies, Transactions of the Fifth Conference of Oriental Studies in Czechoslovakia*, Bratislava 1963; Ernst Werner, 'Einige Charakteristika des vorder- und mittelasiatischen Feudalismus,' *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* XI/5 (1963): 1134–1145; A.S. Tveritinova, 'Nekotorye neresënnnye problemy v charakteristike tureckogo feodalizma,' *Bližnij i Srednij Vostok*, Moscow 1968, pp. 160–171; Ernst Werner, 'Despotie, Absolutismus oder feudale Zersplitterung? Strukturwandlungen im Osmanenreich zwischen 1566 und 1699,' *Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte* III (1972): 107–128; Hakkı Keskin, *Die Türkei. Vom Osmanischen Reich zum Nationalstaat — Werdegang einer Unterentwicklung*, Berlin, no date, particularly pp. 11 ff. Cf. Karl August Wittfogel, *Die orientalische Despotie: Eine vergleichende Untersuchung totaler Macht*, Köln/Berlin 1962; Werner, 'Despotie, Absolutismus.'
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production'³ or 'rent capitalism.'⁴ I shall confine myself to arguing against some of the more noteworthy positions maintaining, on technical or organizational grounds, that the concept of feudalism is not applicable to our subject matter. The views of Claude Cahen⁵ and Nicoară Beldiceanu⁶ seem to me to represent this attitude particularly well. According to these scholars, feudalism is characterized, in short, by a fief system leading to decentralization of state power. It would follow that the Ottoman Empire, for instance, did not have a feudal system, at least not in its heyday, since its high degree of centralization would be a priori incompatible with the decentralization of state power *inherent* in feudalism.

According to this view, which largely follows in the footsteps of older historians,⁷ the feudal order is merely a way of organizing state authority. Such an approach is bound to concentrate on the superstructure, which is a secondary matter, and to disregard the essence of feudalism as a production system.

When viewing feudalism as a production system, political decentralization or even feudal anarchy turn out to be side issues which do not touch upon the real essence of feudalism. What is important in a feudal production system is the land rent, by means of which most of those who take part in production, in this case the peasants, are exploited. The feudal class, i.e., those who possess the right to dispose of arable land as they see fit, lease a parcel of land to the peasant

- 3 The literature on this subject is very extensive; for our purposes, however, reference to one recent article will suffice: Huri İslamoğlu and Çağlar Keyder, 'Ein Interpretationsrahmen für die Analyse des osmanischen Reiches,' in Dieter Senghas (ed.), *Kapitalistische Weltökonomie, Kontroversen über ihren Ursprung und ihre Entwicklungsdynamik*, Frankfurt a. M. 1979, pp. 201–234, particularly pp. 208 f.
- 4 On this term, see also Gunter Leng, "'Rentenkapitalismus" oder "Feudalismus"? Kritische Untersuchungen über einen (sozial)geographischen Begriff,' *Geogr. Zeitschrift* 62 (1974): 119–137, and recently Bert G. Fagner, 'Der Rentenkapitalismus als islamwissenschaftliche Forschungsaufgabe,' lecture given at the 21st annual meeting of German orientalists, to appear in the *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, supplement V.
- 5 Claude Cahen, 'Au seuil de la troisième année: réflexions sur l'usage du mot de "féodalité": A propos d'un livre récent,' *JESHO* III (1960): 2–20.
- 6 Nicoară Beldiceanu, 'Recherches sur la réforme foncière de Mehmed II,' *Acta Historica (Societatis Academiae Dacoromanae)* IV (1965): 27–39.
- 7 See, among many other publications, Otto Hintze, 'Wesen und Verbreitung des Feudalismus,' reprinted in Otto Hintze, *Feudalismus—Kapitalismus*, Göttingen 1970; Otto Brunner, 'Feudalismus': *Ein Beitrag zur Begriffsgeschichte*, Wiesbaden 1959 (Akad. d. Wissensch. u. d. Lit. in Mainz; Abhandl. d. Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftl. Kl. 1958/10); Helmut Neubauer, 'Feudalismus,' in *Sowjetsystem und demokratische Gesellschaft: Eine vergleichende Enzyklopädie*, vol. II, Freiburg/Basel/Wien 1968, particularly pp. 477–490 (with bibliography).

and demand in return a share of the gain, the land rent just mentioned. When trying to decide whether a society is feudalistic or not, we consider the decisive criterion to be the existence of the land rent *as a major instrument for the acquisition of surplus product*. These features of feudalism quite conform to conditions which prevailed in the Ottoman Empire, particularly since in agriculture, the main branch of production here, slave labor was of little importance⁸ and hired labor of none at all.

Whether the feudal class appropriated the right to levy such land rent within the framework of a decentralized system of government — as was customary in Europe — or a highly centralized one, as matters stood for some time in the Ottoman Empire, is immaterial to the essence of a feudal system of production. It merely indicates which variety of feudalism is to be dealt with.

Obviously there existed considerable differences between the European and Ottoman varieties of feudalism. Such differences represent additional elements of variation, which are not part of the substance of feudalism. Contrary to their European counterparts, the Ottoman feudal lords were not vested with class privileges. Peasants were not held in personal bondage by them, nor were they in any kind of dependence. The Ottoman landlords did not have any jurisdiction over them, since this was within the exclusive competence of the *kadi*. The fundamental difference from European feudalism is to be found in the fact that, during the classical period of Ottoman feudalism, the Ottoman feudal lords did not receive their land as hereditary fiefs but as revocable benefices. Consequently, the Ottoman variety of feudalism is to be seen as benefice tenure (or prebendary feudalism)⁹ as distinct from European hereditary feudalism.

8 Slavery was far from unknown in the Ottoman Empire. However, as in Islam in general, slaves were used in the service sector, not in branches of production. For slavery in Islamic countries, see Hans Müller, 'Sklaven' (Slaves), in Klaus Kreiser, Werner Dienz, and Hans Georg Majer (eds.), *Lexikon der Islamischen Welt*, Stuttgart/Berlin/Köln/Mainz 1974, vol. 3, pp. 110 f., idem, 'Sklaven,' in *HdO* 1/6/6; *Wirtschaftsgeschichte des vorderen Orients in islamischer Zeit*, part I, Leiden/Köln 1977, pp. 53–83. On the few slaves who were put to use in agriculture, see A.D. Novičev, *Istorija Turcii. I. Epoha feodalizma (XI–XVIII veka)*. Leningrad 1963, pp. 27 ff.; Ömer Lütfi Barkan, 'Osmanlı imparatorluğunda toprak işçiliğinin organizasyonu şekilleri: Kulluklar ve ortakçıkullar' (Organizational Structure of Agricultural Labor in the Ottoman Empire: Slavery and Share-tenant Slaves). *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* (Journal of the Faculty of Economics, Istanbul University) I, 1/3 (1939/40): 29–74, 198–245, 397–447; Mustafa Akdağ, *Türkiye'nin İktisadi ve İçtimai Tarihi* (Social and Economic History of Turkey) II (1453–1559), Ankara 1971, p. 101; Ernst Werner, *Die Geburt einer Grossmacht — die Osmanen (1300–1481): Ein Beitrag zur Genesis des türkischen Feudalismus*, 2nd ed., Berlin 1972, particularly pp. 272 ff.; Bistra A. Cvetkova, *Les institutions ottomanes en Europe*, Wiesbaden 1978, pp. 67 f.

9 The term 'prebendal feudalism' was coined by Max Weber (*Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*.

The Stages of Ottoman Feudalism

While, as pointed out above, the feudal production system formed the main basis of Ottoman society until modern times, it is important to notice that this feudalism did not remain unchanged throughout the whole history of the Ottoman state. Obviously, Ottoman feudal organization was prone to changes, which brought about considerable modifications in its outward appearance without impairing its basic nature. The interaction of two factors appears to be particularly important here, namely (1) the restructuring of conditions of land ownership, as different kinds of strata within the feudal class, which had been heterogeneous in the first place, replaced one another, or, each in its turn, gained the upper hand, and (2) the changes which came about within the equally unhomogeneous class of peasants.

The fact that modifications did take place appears to justify a division by periods in the Ottoman feudal framework, although the two factors which have to be reckoned with pose difficulties for this undertaking. It can hardly be doubted that the changes inside the feudal class and those taking place within the class of peasants influenced each other noticeably; however, this interrelationship did not go so far as to cause simultaneous developments.

In this context, the structural changes in the situation of land ownership seem to have been more relevant than the fluctuations in conditions of the agricultural workers. Consequently, I shall, at whatever point the two sets of developments do not coincide, base my description of the different stages on the former set.

The first period of Ottoman feudalism lasted from the birth of the Ottoman state under Osman I (1289–1326) until the agrarian reform of Mehmed II, the Conqueror (1451–1481). Yet, before dwelling on the particulars of this first period, I would like to survey briefly conditions of land ownership prevailing in Anatolia at the time when the Ottoman state was established. The so-called *iktâ*-system¹⁰ ceased to exist together with the dissolution of the Anatolian Seljukid state. Under that system, land owned by the state was apportioned as benefice, i.e., on condition of revocation, to senior civil and military personnel. *Iktâ*-holders were not vested with any additional privileges. They were precluded from transferring or bequeathing their benefices or from giving them in inheritance, and were not entitled to assume sovereignty over the peasants.

Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie, 5th ed., Tübingen 1976, pp. 148–153 (English translation, *Economy and Society*. ..., New York 1968, pp. 259–262). Weber's concept of feudalism amounted to a principle of organization rather than a production system.

10 Concerning that system, see Claude Cahen: 'İktâ', in *EP*.

In the wake of the fall from power of the Seljuks in Asia Minor, fundamental changes took place in this setup of land ownership. Taking advantage of the weakness of the central government, an ever increasing number of *iktâ*-holders turned their benefices into private estates. When small states possessing de facto independence were born out of the ruins of the Anatolian Seljuk state, their ruling lords generally took possession of the land, of which they disposed, practically in all cases, as if owned personally.

Stage One


One of these numerous emirates was the Ottoman principality, which had developed from the shepherd tribe *Kayı*. This emirate, which excelled in strongly marked activities of expansion, adopted a double-tracked policy regarding the land in newly acquired territories. Provided they accepted Ottoman sovereignty without resistance, the owners of land were either permitted to retain their private possession (*mülk*) or were compensated by adequate land elsewhere in the Ottoman state. There were instances when the Ottoman emir confiscated the land as state owned (*mîrî*). This was rarely retained as state domain¹¹ (*has-i hümayûn*) and equally rarely presented to members of the emir's family or to his entourage as a gift in the form of privately owned land (*mülk*). Usually, the emir shared it out as benefices, not unlike the Seljuk *iktâ* system (without being the direct successor to that institution). Larger benefices (*has*) were accorded to senior commanders of the army; in time, numerous members of the cavalry, the *spahis*, were also given tracts of land as benefice. These so-called *timars* were considerably smaller, and were meant to enable their holders to devote themselves exclusively to their military tasks. The *timar* system assumed its final form in the second half of the fourteenth century, following the introduction of middle-sized benefices, called *ziamet*, for the benefit of intermediate cadres. The system was put to widespread use in the European acquisitions of the Ottoman Empire, where the previous Christian landowners had, as a rule, abandoned their possessions with the Ottoman conquest. In the incorporated former emirates of Anatolia, private land ownership remained predominant for the time being.

Apart from state domains, private ownership and benefices, land owned by charitable trusts (*vakıfs*) played a role, albeit of lesser importance.

11 The relationship between state-owned land (*mîrî*) and state domains (*has-i hümayûn*) follows clearly from Table 1. It would be wrong to consider these categories identical, as Röhrborn appears to do; see Klaus Röhrborn, *Untersuchungen zur osmanischen Verwaltungsgeschichte*, Berlin/New York 1973, p. 97.

In the first stage of Ottoman feudalism, then, two sets of land ownership existed side by side: privately owned land and benefices. At this stage, the productive rural population was made up mostly of farmers, each of whom would receive from his landowner (*sahip arz*) an inheritable parcel of land he was able to cultivate with a team of oxen.¹² For use of the land a fee was payable to the owner as prescribed by religious code and taxes went to the fiscal authority; statute labor played a quite subordinate part in all this. There was a difference, however, between the lot of peasants on privately owned land and on possessions of religious foundations on the one hand, and on state domains and benefices on the other: the former were more exposed to the whims of the owners. In addition, fees payable by peasants on state-owned land were lower and, moreover, more immutable than under the often despotic landlords.

Table 1 *The Types of Land Ownership in the Second Stage of Ottoman Feudalism*



12 For the situation of the rural population in the early Ottoman period, see Cvetkova, *Les institutions ottomanes*, pp. 44 ff.

Stage Two

The first stage of the Ottoman feudal system ended when, during the reign of Sultan Mehmed II, the Conqueror (1451–1481), a land reform was carried out.¹³ It was decreed therein that private owners or religious foundations could retain only vineyards, gardens, houses, corn mills, shops, and inns. The land, the primary means of production in a predominantly agricultural society, was transferred to state ownership in its entirety, most of it to be handed out within the framework of the *timar* system. Bayezid II (1481–1512) undid Mehmed's land reform to some extent by reinstating his favorites as owners of some confiscated land; this was particularly true of the Dervish orders, which he greatly esteemed. He did not manage to annul Mehmed's great reform entirely, however, since most land remained in state ownership with benefices outweighing the state domains. In this second stage of Ottoman feudalism the share of private owners and of religious foundations in land holdings was rather small.

As to the social class of the tillers of land, the husbandmen remained in the majority. The lot of these did improve, however, insofar as almost all of them were employed on lands owned by the state, be they benefices or state domains. Consequently, the legal code regarding duties and rights was now applied also to those who hitherto, having worked for private masters, had not enjoyed such rights.

Stage Three

The second stage of the Ottoman feudal system did not come to such an abrupt end as the first one had through Mehmed's land reform. The transition to the third stage continued over a period of time when, in the second half of the sixteenth century, the traditional *timar* system started falling apart. This is not the place to go into detail concerning the reasons for this dissolution. Two factors seem to have been more important than others in bringing about this development: (1) a growing shortage of money,¹⁴ created by a continuous outflow of precious metal coins, particularly to India and Persia, in connection with the Orient trade and (2) a growing scarcity of land distributable under the

13 See particularly Cvetkova, 'Sur certaines réformes'; Beldiceanu, 'Recherches sur la réforme foncière.'

14 See Ömer Lütü Barkan, 'The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in the Economic History of the Near East,' *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 6 (1975): 3–28.

timar system, when, mainly as a result of global political conditions, Ottoman expansion came to an end.

Owing to the severe shortage of funds, the state leadership — the Sublime Porte — was compelled to have cash revenue at any cost and to cut expenditure as far as possible. In line with this policy of retrenchment, a great number of government officials and hitherto salaried army personnel were given benefices instead of cash payment. Since disposable land was scarce, this could be done only by allocating half-sized or otherwise curtailed benefices, whereas even *timars* had hitherto been rather sizeable tracts of land. As a consequence, benefice holders were no longer able to retain their living standards, and the lesser *timar* lessees could not even eke out an existence from the *timar* yield. Therefore, some of them renounced their benefices altogether and turned to other occupations, while other *timar* holders, illegally and in contradiction to former usage, began to coerce their peasants into producing more; even statute labor was more and more met with. This, by the way, brought about a transition from an economy of payment in kind to monetary transaction, as benefice holders demanded to be paid in cash by the taxable peasants, instead of produce as hitherto. Ever worsening exploitation resulted in mounting indebtedness of the peasants, which led to growing migration from the land.

Such ownerless land, be it a former *timar* or a farm, was sometimes taken into possession by holders of the largest benefices, the *has*; the latter were gradually turning into privately owned property, since the central authority was in the process of decline.

Some other unoccupied land was illegally purchased by wealthy individuals, particularly usurers and contracted tax collectors, without the knowledge of the authorities. In time another new kind of private landownership, called *çiftlik* (like the regular farm), came out of this, which of course had nothing at all in common with its namesake.

Once the government learned that a *timar* had been abandoned by its holder, the land was no longer leased out as *timar*, insofar as the *timar* system was in disintegration, but incorporated into state domains, and, as a rule, given out as tax lease (*iltizam*). The lessee (*mültezim*), an entrepreneur who had the necessary funds available, used to undertake the exaction of the levies against a fixed advance payment; by maximizing his profit, however, he was generally able to cash in much more than the amount of his advance payment to the treasury. Although the tax lease system¹⁵ was introduced much earlier, it became current

15 See Bistra Cvetkova, 'Recherches sur le système d'affermage (Iltizam) dans l'Empire Ottoman au cours du XVI^e-XVIII^e s. par rapport aux contrées Bulgares,' *RO* 27/2 (1964): 11-32.

only with the disintegration of the *timar* system.¹⁶ The Ottoman treasury was particularly happy with this practice as it was deemed most suitable to ameliorate the precarious financial situation of the state. The government even went so far as to cancel benefices, particularly the smaller ones (i.e., the *timars*), under some pretext, and to make them into tax-leased land.

Other measures adopted to meet the state's need for cash, which cannot be discussed here in greater detail, turned out to be boomerangs. Money clipping led to pushed inflation; recurring confiscation drives¹⁷ brought about feelings of insecurity before the law and hampered investments; excessive 'fees'¹⁸ for admittance to public offices furthered corruption and augmented the government's debt.

What marked this third stage of Ottoman feudalism, then, was the progressive disintegration of the *timar* system. As benefices continued to be abolished, state domains increased their share of land ownership, but private owners even more so. Whereas during the second stage the original form of privately owned land (*mülk*) had been of secondary importance, now other patterns became established, such as the ever more independent *has* as well as the private estate (*çiftlik*). In the last phase of the third stage, the difference between these three forms (*mülk*, *has*, *çiftlik*) appears to have faded away as well. The hitherto predominant feudal class, the benefice holders, were replaced by the new class of big landlords, called 'valley masters' (*derebeyi*) in Anatolia, while in Rumelia, i.e., in European possessions of the Ottoman Empire, they were called 'notables' (*âyân*).¹⁹

The *derebeyis* as well as the *âyân* complemented their economic power, which was largely independent of government authority, by extraeconomically coercive means: the abusive assumption of authorities of police and jurisdiction

16 Cf. Mustafa Akdağ, 'Tımar rejiminin bozuluşu (The Disintegration of the *Timar* System), *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi* (Journal of the Faculty of Linguistics, Geography and History, University of Ankara), second year, 3/4 (1945): 419–431; Röhrborn, *Untersuchungen*, particularly pp. 55 ff.; Cvetkova, *Les institutions ottomanes*, particularly pp. 78 ff.

17 See K. Röhrborn, 'Konfiskation und intermediäre Gewalten im Osmanischen Reich,' *Der Islam* 55 (1978): 345–351.

18 See Röhrborn, *Untersuchungen*, pp. 114 ff.

19 See Avdo Sućeska, 'Bedeutung und Entwicklung des Begriffes A'yân im Osmanischen Reich,' *Südostforschungen* XXV (1966): 3–26; Mustafa Akdağ, 'Osmanlı tarihinde âyanlık düzeni devri, 1730–1839' (The Period of the Notables (*âyan*) in Ottoman History, 1730–1839), *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* (Journal of Historical Research) 8–12, 14–23 (1970–1974 publ. 1975): 51–61.

over their peasants. The signing of the 'Deed of Accord' (*Sened-i İttifak*) can be considered the climax of the third stage of Ottoman feudalism. It was signed in 1808 by the Ottoman government on the one hand, and the most powerful 'notables' on the other. The Ottoman government, weakened through troubles within and without, could not help giving legal confirmation to the rights of the 'notables' and to the hereditary nature of their power and position. From now on, the 'notables' were considered as semi-autonomous vassals of the Sublime Porte.

The third stage of Ottoman feudalism saw a portentous change not only in the structure of the class of feudal lords but also in that of the peasants, with their increasing abandonment of the land, already commented upon. Farms, which were being abandoned in ever greater numbers, were no longer allotted to farmers, but leased in parcels to tenants (*ortakçı*)²⁰ who had to pay a much greater share of the yield than the former tenant farmers, usually 50 percent. They were not given any rights at all, could be installed and deposed according to the owner's whims, and were, to an increasing degree, exposed to his coercion in non-economic matters, particularly to his arbitrary power over public order. Because of the highly promising market for meat in Europe, part of the soil was turned into pasture land overseen by quite dependent herdsmen.

There is a certain affinity to be discerned between the third stage of Ottoman feudalism just described, and the European kind of feudalism with its vassals and fief system and its feudal anarchy. Frequently, therefore, this later stage of development is conceived of as the 'feudalization' of the Ottoman empire. This traditional attitude to the matter disregards the fact that feudalism is not so much a principle of public order as, first and foremost, a productive system.

Stage Four

After the contractual regulation of the privileges conferred on the big landlords in the 'Deed of Accord,' Ottoman feudalism continued its third stage only for a very short period. Under the rule of the progressive Sultan Mahmud II (1808–1839), the Ottoman government was unwilling to further tolerate the despotism of the 'notables' and 'valley masters,' who, in spite of the 'Deed of Accord,' would not dream of subordinating their own interests to those of the Ottoman state. They had to be eliminated gradually by means of sheer force, and by the end of the 1820s feudal anarchy was almost entirely abolished. The

20 These *ortakçı* ('share tenants') of new vintage are not to be confused with the labor slaves, also called *ortakçı*, referred to in note 8.

original centralized character of the Ottoman government was reinstated for a time. For our intents and purposes, this point is of major importance, since lands confiscated when the rule of the 'notables' was abolished were included in the state domains (*has-i hümayûn*).

In 1831, the whole institution of *timar* was finally abolished altogether. The importance of this measure is not diminished by the fact that its adoption was mainly due to fiscal-military considerations, aimed at the economic guarantee of military reforms. The government was able to bring together most of the land under its power in the form of state domains.

This measure was not at all intended to abolish the feudal system, however. Although statute labor, one of the feudal features, had been abolished as early as 1818, the production system in this fourth stage of Ottoman feudalism, viz, the service of dependent peasants or lessees in agriculture, continued its

Table 2 *A Survey of the Stages of Ottoman Feudalism*

Stages	Land Ownership System	Type of Peasantry
<i>First stage:</i> from the beginning of the state until the last quarter of the fifteenth century	private ownership and <i>timar</i> system concurrently	mainly husbandmen
<i>Second stage:</i> last quarter of fifteenth century to second half of sixteenth century	<i>timar</i> system predominates	mainly husbandmen
<i>Third stage:</i> second half of sixteenth century to 1830	<i>timar</i> fading out, private ownership and state domains increasingly predominate	mainly shared tenancy
<i>Fourth stage:</i> from 1830 to the fall of the Ottoman Empire	predominance of state domains; private ownership somewhat diminished, representing about one third	mainly shared tenancy

existence as before. In the course of the dissolution of the *timar* system, the private possession of estates (*çiftlik*), which until then had only been tolerated, became official; the owners of such estates were then usually called *aga*. The share of these estates was approximately one third of the total ground surface of the Ottoman Empire.

Only in the second half of the nineteenth century did a capitalist change take place in the Ottoman economic system, at first haltingly and only in the non-agricultural sector. In agriculture itself,²¹ hired labor, the primary symbol of the capitalist system of production, at first made itself felt hesitatingly, and then to a larger extent only with the coming of the Republic.

It follows that, right until its final collapse, the Ottoman Empire was unable to break through the barriers of feudalism. Small wonder, then, that its successor, the Turkish Republic, has not been able to eliminate many traits of feudalism to this very day.

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21 For conditions in Ottoman agriculture during this period, see V. Totomjanz and E. Toptschjan, *Die sozial-ökonomische Türkei*, Berlin 1901, particularly pp. 38–47.