

praxis wirkt sich sowohl auf das Verhalten und das Wesen der Arbeit der Verkäufer, als auch auf die individualisierte und anonymisierte Identität des Käufers aus. An dieser Stelle wird deutlich, dass das, was gemein hin als festgelegte, zugeschriebene und/oder angelegene Persönlichkeit definiert wird, auf einen ganz bestimmten Kontext begrenzt und an diesen zweckgebunden ist, d.h. eben keine Essenz des *Selbst* darstellt.

Im zweiten Teil des Buches konzentriert sich du Gay auf Personen im Organisationsfeld von Institutionen und Öffentlichkeitsmanagement, insbesondere auf Bürokraten und Berufsbeamte. Der normative Paradigmenwechsel vom Beamten im Sinne des Weberischen Idealtyps hin zur „eigennützigen Persönlichkeit“ (self interested personhood) veränderte nicht nur die Entscheidungspraxen und den damit verbundenen Status der Staatsbediensteten, sondern wirkte sich ebenfalls auf die Trennung des *Selbst* von der Rolle im Rahmen der Dienststelle aus. Moral und ethisches Verhalten dringen aufgrund der Personalisierung bzw. Individualisierung der *Person* nunmehr in den Raum staatlicher Institutionen ein. Dies betrifft auch die Autorität und das Selbstverständnis des gesamten institutionellen Staatsapparats. Das Streben nach einem „businesslike“ Management schwächt dabei den statischen, konstitutionellen Charakter der Bürokratie durch eine auf Marktgrundsätzen basierende und Unternehmertum ausgerichtete Verwaltungsrationalität (124). Die Chance dieser Organisationsform liegt dabei in der Flexibilisierung und der Nutzung versteckter Kapazitäten und Fähigkeiten innerhalb von Institutionen. Doch wie du Gay am Beispiel der öffentlichen Verwaltungsreform unter Clintons Präsidentschaft aufzeigt, verliert die Verwaltung dabei im Gegenzug ihre (unangefochtene) souveräne Stellung (Kap. 6).

Bis auf den Verweis auf eine differenzierte Prüfung und Implementierung von best practices zur Übertragung von unternehmerischen Ansätzen auf öffentliche Verwaltungen und Bürokratien bietet Paul du Gay bis zum Schluss leider keine erschöpfende Alternative oder Neukonzeption für die Übertragung neuer Identitätskonfigurationen in (fremde) Organisationslogiken an. Nach seinem Plädoyer für eine fallbezogene Betrachtungsweise möglicher Übertragungskomponenten an Stelle einer generalisierenden Mentalitätsreform fühlt man sich als Leser zur Ausgangsfrage zurückgeführt: Ermöglicht das Konzept der *Identität* nur noch deskriptive Aussagen oder kann es auch etwas erklären?

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Christoph Kucklick: Das Unmoralische Geschlecht. Zur Geburt der negativen Andrologie. Frankfurt a.M.: Edition Suhrkamp 2008.

Urgent social problems are associated with males. Whether we worry about violence, crime, ecological catastrophes, terrorism, financial speculations, profiteering, car accidents, warfare, rape, battery, paedophilia or bossiness – they seem the effects of unrestrained masculinity. Such connotations of maleness, argues Kucklick, are firstly relatively new – and secondly, came about at about the same time as European societies changed from being socially and hierarchically stratified to being functionally and heterarchically stratified. This, as well as some observations as to certain changes *not* happening, ought to make us rethink the functioning of gender by going beyond the usual social theories that concern the logics of gender.

Gender is a social system which functions by assigning roles to people; and by attaching moral values, characteristics, perspectives, politics and behavioural expectations to people differentially depending on their perceived role as women or men. So how do we know what men are like? We learn their “essence” via our basic socialisation processes. Christoph Kucklick supplements these perspectives on “what men are like” by telling us *why* they are what they are. This development of a causal perspective on gender typologies is far more interesting than usual: For, according to this study, masculinity is neither an expression of dominance and submission relations, nor a result of inevitable psychic processes. It is, rather, an attempt to correlate the social change attendant with modernity with the dichotomous schema of masculinity and femininity.

Men’s impetuosity, their tendency to violence, selfishness and their being driven by biological urges is opposed to women’s morality, their sense of family, solicitousness, empathy and their being driven by their emotiveness. Thus, men’s social and private destructiveness is complemented by women’s social competence and caring: in other words, the havoc created by the principle of masculinity is at least in part compensated for by the opposing principle of femininity. Or, to put it more bluntly, the ills of Man could be cured by Woman – a hypothesis developed by feminists as well as social conservatives – and, as Kucklick shows, endlessly repeated since the 1800s. In fact, feminists, despite popular claims to the contrary did not invent the negative discourse on men and masculinity. Rather, they did only took up the “negative andrology” that had already been dormant in ordinary thinking about men. The practical problem with the dichotomizing discourses on immoral men and moral women is shown in present society. For the very fact that feminists have been increasingly successful and have – slowly, painfully slowly – achieved a situation with more women in positions of power, in industry, science, politics and many social spheres disproves the point of their morality. The greater representation of women in positions of power has not served to change the basic organization of the modern world. On the contrary, women in positions of power seem to be perfectly compatible with the maintenance of the system as we know it.

Furthermore, the usual post-modern theories concerning gender as a set of practices, a structure of interactions, a way of ordering the world and submitting to the attending epistemologies all lack, according to Kucklick, an explanation as to the irrepressibility of this order despite a hundred years attempt at change. This is why he suggests a new theory with respect to the functions of gender in the development of modernity. For with modernity arose an idea of the type of subject that was to be prevented: a self-sufficient male, without empathy, socially isolated, hypersexualised, amoral and antisocial as a wild man might well be expected to be. And yet, man is also free, decisive, autonomous – capable of abstraction, fragmentation, and rationality, all the facets needed in modern society. Negative and positive andrologies thus parallel negative and positive gynologies as they have always existed. And yet, this wild man is newly associated with modernity, as opposed to the previous wild man associated with the narrative of the state of nature. This new characterization of men (and women) was, according to Kucklick, closely linked to a fundamental shift in the way society was organized: Functional differentiation within European societies around 1800 supplanted the feudally stratified, hierarchical and guild-based societies hitherto dominating the European sphere. Thus subjects had to be moved from one sort of segmentation to another one. This new system disbursed neither privileges nor discursive positions in a hierarchical manner, and that change was met with ambivalence, not only by the individuals of whom such a move was expected, but by everyone who had much to lose by the change or by the failure of the change. To alleviate this fear of the new, the change was personified. And gender, with its dichotomies and

relatively empty signifiers, became, argues Kucklick, the very foil the personification could use. The pre-existing gender dimorphism could thus be applied to another dimorphism of modernity and tradition. Invisible hand theories – combining invisible, hard-to-grasp causes to explain the fast paced change – abounded in any case. They were easily associated with masculinity as the agency of social change; thus masculinity was associated with change, femininity with sameness. The great advantage of this foil is not only that “the problem” causing so much anxiety is personified – in the figure of the boundless male – but also that a solution simultaneously presented itself in the figure of the male-taming female.

Gender is thus a way of representing social change in a manner that makes it easier to assign responsibilities and solutions. And from the beginning of modernity, argues Kucklick, femininity and masculinity were represented as structurally deficient characteristics deeply dependent on each other to supplement each others’ incompleteness. The abstract problem of ungraspable social change was simplified to a behaviourist problem, attributed to males, who in turn could be managed with enough good will, family pressure, a tough education and good literature. And this managing of the male was the job of women.

And this is how the narrative goes: Man is born wild, ungoverned, dangerous, driven by selfish, biological and destructive urges. He then becomes dependent on woman – born with natural morality due to her potential motherhood – to civilize him. Paradoxically, his moral dependency on her went hand in hand with her inability to rule in the public sphere. The functional differentiation of society implied a distinction of male and female spheres in accordance with their “natural characters”. His natural tendencies are to rule wildly, and, if she succeeds in civilizing him, well. Her natural tendencies are to submit to him while yet trying to turn him into a decent person.

Thus, masculinity was related to those aspects of modernity that were deemed inhuman, driven by animalistic urges, and violent. If only men became more emotional, society itself could be changed. But, as Kucklick points out, the very successes of feminism, i.e., greater numbers of women entering spheres previously allocated to men, and the fact that this has not produced any fundamental changes, proves that femininity is not a centrally different principle, a different ethics, or a different perspective associated with women. Femininity does not save the world, just as masculinity does not destroy it.

The problem with functionalist arguments is of course that gender does not really fit into the system of functional differentiation, since gender is organized hierarchically in otherwise heterarchic modernity – which is a problem for system theory. Gender may determine inclusion and exclusion in functional systems, it is omnipresent and structured by everyday epistemology. System theory thus has two options: It can assume that gender becomes ever less relevant as it is a remnant of an atavistic, pre-functionalist society. Kucklick points out that there are very few signs of this as gender is not irrelevant but more important, more inexorable than ever because it is now universal and the schema underlying all communication. Or a system theorist can assume that there are different levels of social structures, and gender is less relevant at the social level than at the level of interaction and organization. But why is it all organized over gender, and why in this manner?

Kucklick’s answer to this puzzle: When the hierarchical system slowly changed to a heterarchical one, people needed to move from one subsystem to another. And so the ungraspable forces of change were associated with particular social actors. Men (representing the change) are relegated to the systems of politics, the economy and law. Male spheres are also the military, crime, sex and medicine, whereas women, re-

presenting constancy, are consigned to the segments of reproduction and civilisation. So the power differential between the social segments implies power differentials between men and women, not as such (based directly on gender), but as members of different social segments.

Kucklick may have provided an answer to the perpetual “why” question of male dominance in European societies by providing a challenging, complex and detailed textual analysis spanning a couple of hundred years of philosophies about gender. But it remains to be asked why gender wouldn’t wither away with the perpetuation of modernity – if Kucklick is right, it has served its function, and served it well, to assuage the fears of change. Negative andrology is probably increasing, rather than decreasing, however. Nevertheless – this is a fascinating contribution to the gender debates.

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