

**Rural-urban Migration of the Maasai Nomadic Pastoralist Youth and
Resilience in Tanzania:**

**Case studies in Ngorongoro District, Arusha Region and
Dar es Salaam City**

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List of acronyms

CSO	Civil Society Organizations
DC	District Councillor
DED	District Executive Director
DEO	Division Executive Officer
GCA	Game Controlled Area
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
MNRT	Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism
MSRF	Multi-layered Social Resilience Framework
MWLD	Ministry of Water and Livestock Development
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics
NCA	Ngorongoro Conservation Area
NCAA	Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority
NCCR North–South	Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research
NDC	Ngorongoro District Council
NELM	New Economics of Labour Migration
NGONET	Ngorongoro Non-Governmental Organizations Network
NGOs	Non Governmental Organisations
NPP	Ngorongoro Pastoralist Project
OBC, LTD	Ortelo Business Company Limited
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PC	Pastoralist Council
PINGOs	Pastoralist Indigenous Non-Governmental Organizations Forum
PRIDE	Promotion of Rural Initiative and Development Enterprises
RC	Regional Commissioner
SACCOS	Savings and Credit Cooperative Organizations
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SLF	Sustainable Livelihood Framework
SNP	Serengeti National Park
SRCS	Serengeti Regional Conservation Strategy
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
TBL	Tanzania Breweries Limited
UN	United Nations
UNCEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFIPA	United Nations
UNWFP	United Nations World Food Program
URT	United republic of Tanzania
URT	The United Republic of Tanzania
USD	United States Dollar
WB	World Bank
WEO	Ward Executive Officer

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Summary

Rural-urban migration is increasingly becoming an important livelihood strategy in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in Tanzania, and is in many ways viewed as a driving force behind the rapid urbanisation process within this region. Despite urbanisation being associated with benefits such as trade stimulation and the subsequent increase in governments' revenue, it is also accompanied by threats such as higher commodity prices, unemployment, alarming crime rates, inadequate shelter and governments' unpreparedness to combat them.

Maasai nomadic pastoralist youth, who started migrating to urban areas on a large scale from the 1990s onwards, are disadvantaged in many ways owing to their cultural, social, economic and political marginalisation since colonial times. In this context, important yet controversial questions include: What migration-related threats are likely experienced by the Maasai migrant youth and local households? How do they cope with these threats; indeed, do they manage to cope? How can migrants and households' capacities be strengthened to more competently cope with such threats?

To tackle the above-posed questions, this study explored the influences of the rural-urban migration of Maasai nomadic pastoralist youth on the resilience of both the migrants in Dar es Salaam and local households in Ngorongoro District, Northern Tanzania. It specifically documented factors for and patterns of the rural-urban migration of the Maasai nomadic pastoralist youth, investigating the impact of rural-urban migration on the local households' resilience and analysing migration-related threats encountered by the migrants in urban areas, as well as their coping strategies. Finally, this thesis suggests factors for enhancing migrants and households' resilience against migration-related threats.

A myriad of migration theories was employed to understand factors behind migration patterns, while the multi-layered social resilience framework of (Obrist et al. 2010) was deemed suitable to explore migration-related threats for migrants and households, as well as their strategies of coping with them. A qualitative approach was adopted, although data was both qualitatively and quantitatively analysed. Respondents were both randomly and purposely selected and in-depth interviews were conducted with 50 Maasai migrants, 30 households and 30 key informants, including private and public institutional officials and community members at various levels in Dar es Salaam and Ngorongoro. In addition, five focus group discussions (FGDs), observations and the review of secondary data were also carried out.

The study revealed that Maasai migrant youth have been migrating to Dar es Salaam city mainly due to the household poverty emanating from the decline of pastoralism and agriculture, prompted by climate change, insufficient access to land, livestock diseases, unemployment and resource conflicts.

Rural-urban migration was catalysed by inconsistent land and development policies, social networks, migrants and households' aspirations and technology, notably improved communication and transportation networks such as mobile phones and road networks.

Migration both positively and negatively influenced the households' resilience. For instance, remittances from migrants enhanced households' economic capital (notably livestock and agriculture), cultural capital such as food and health support, various household equipment and the improvement of formal education and skills. On the other hand, migration also subjected some households to threats related to financial constraints, inadequate human power and food insecurity. Household members coped with such threats by depending on informal affiliations (social capital), taking on extra work load, child labour and engaging in entrepreneurship activities (cultural capital), mainly at individual, household and community levels. However, they could rarely solicit support from meso, national and international levels.

Threats experienced by the Maasai migrants in Dar es Salaam chiefly concerned inadequate income and shelter, unemployment, oppression and exploitation, notably low and delayed labour returns and arbitrary job terminations, stigma and segregation, together with physical insecurity, notably falling victim to crime when working as security guards, typically due to a lack of proper equipment and security training.

On the one hand, migrants managed to solicit and utilise capitals from different social layers, thus developing 'reactive' and to a lesser extent 'proactive' capacities to competently cope with the aforementioned migration-related threats.

Specifically, migrants competently coped with the threats by utilising cultural capital at the individual level, such as migrants' local knowledge and physical strength. They employed social capital at community and household levels, particularly rural-urban linkages and strong social networks among migrants, which enabled the sharing of resources such as food, finance shelter and working in groups to cope with the insecurity threat. To a lesser degree, migrants also employed aspects of economic capital such as livestock and agricultural products at the household level, as well as symbolic capital such as the Maasai social reputation and identity springing from Maasai culture and local traditions.

However, both the Maasai migrants and household members lacked formal skills and education, as well as structures that could support resilience building at meso, regional and national levels. Thus, equipping Maasai migrants and households with formal skills, the changing of land tenure policies and making government and private institutions more responsive to the migration threats affecting Maasai can significantly improve both the Maasai migrants and local households' resilience against such threats.

Zusammenfassung

Die Land-Stadt-Migration als wichtige Strategie der Überlebenssicherung und als treibende Kraft der schnellen Urbanisierung gewinnt zunehmend an Bedeutung in Subsahara-Afrika, besonders in Tansania. Auch wenn die Urbanisierung Vorteile wie ein schnelleres Wirtschaftswachstum und folglich höhere Staatseinnahmen mit sich bringt, so ist sie auch mit negativen Auswirkungen wie höheren Preisen für Lebensmittel, Arbeitslosigkeit, wachsender Kriminalität, mangelndem Wohnraum und der unzureichenden Vorbereitung der Regierungen, um diese zu bekämpfen, verbunden.

Die jugendlichen Maasai, die insbesondere seit den 1990er Jahren in großem Stil in die Städte ziehen, sind in besonderem Maße kulturell, sozial, ökonomisch und politisch marginalisiert. In diesem Zusammenhang stellen sich einige wichtige, wenn auch kontroverse Fragen: Welche im Migrationskontext auftauchenden Bedrohungen sind dabei besonders relevant für die migrierenden Jugendlichen und die lokalen Haushalte? Kommen sie mit diesen zurecht und wenn ja, wie? Wie können die Kapazitäten der Migranten und Haushalte gestärkt werden, um diese besser zu bewältigen?

Um die hier gestellten Fragen zu beantworten, wurden in dieser Arbeit die Einflüsse der Land-Stadt-Migration auf die Resilienz der Migranten in Dar es Salaam und der Haushalte im Ngorongoro District in Tansania untersucht. Besonderes Augenmerk lag dabei auf Faktoren für und Muster von Land-Stadt-Migration. Darüber hinaus wurden die Auswirkungen der Migration auf die Resilienz der Haushalte in Ngorongoro sowie die im Zusammenhang mit der Migration entstehenden Bedrohungen für die Migranten und deren Bewältigungsstrategien untersucht. Abschließend werden Empfehlungen zur Stärkung der Resilienz der Migranten gegeben.

Eine Vielzahl von Migrationstheorien beschäftigt sich mit der Erklärung von Migrationsmustern. In dieser Arbeit wurden diese durch das von (Obrist et al. 2010) entwickelte *Multi-layered social resilience framework* ergänzt, um die im Zusammenhang mit der Migration entstehenden Bedrohungen für die Migranten und Haushalte und die jeweiligen Bewältigungsstrategien zu untersuchen. Dabei wurde ein qualitativer Zugang gewählt. Die Daten wurden darüber hinaus jedoch auch quantitativ ausgewertet. Die Befragten wurden teilweise zufällig, teilweise gezielt ausgewählt. In Dar es Salaam und Ngorongoro wurden ausführliche Interviews mit insgesamt 50 Migranten, 30 Haushalten und 30 Experten – darunter Offizielle aus privaten und öffentlichen Einrichtungen sowie Gemeinschaftsmitglieder verschiedener Ebenen – durchgeführt. Zusätzlich fanden fünf Gruppendiskussionen, Beobachtungen und eine Analyse von Sekundärdaten statt.

Durch diese Studie konnte gezeigt werden, dass die jugendlichen Maasai insbesondere wegen der Armut im Herkunftsgebiet nach Dar es Salaam zogen.

Diese ist insbesondere bedingt durch den mit dem Klimawandel zusammenhängenden Niedergang des Pastoralismus und der landwirtschaftlichen Produktion, unzureichenden

Zugang zu Land, Tierseuchen, Arbeitslosigkeit und Ressourcenkonflikte. Die Land-Stadt Migration wurde dabei durch inkonsistente Land- und Entwicklungspolitiken, soziale Netzwerke, Sehnsüchte und technologischen Fortschritt – wie verbesserte Kommunikation und Transportnetzwerke – beschleunigt.

Es konnten positive wie negative Auswirkungen der Migration auf die Resilienz der Haushalte festgestellt werden. Einerseits verbesserten Geldsendungen durch die Migranten das ökonomische (insbesondere im landwirtschaftlichen Bereich) und das soziale Kapital der Haushalte (Nahrung, Gesundheit, Bildung). Andererseits wurden die Haushalte durch die Migration neuen Bedrohungen, wie finanziellen Einschränkungen, fehlender Arbeitskraft und Ernährungsunsicherheit, ausgesetzt. Die Haushaltsmitglieder bewältigten diese durch informelle Netzwerke (soziales Kapital), zusätzliche Arbeit, Kinderarbeit und unternehmerische Tätigkeit (kulturelles Kapital) besonders auf der individuellen, der Haushalts- und Gemeindeebene. Nur in seltenen Fällen konnte dagegen auf Unterstützung durch die meso-, nationale und internationale Ebene zurückgegriffen werden.

Die für die Migranten in Dar es Salaam relevanten Bedrohungen waren ungenügende Einkommen und Wohnsituation, Arbeitslosigkeit, Unterdrückung und Ausbeutung (z.B. geringe oder verspätete Entlohnung, willkürliche Entlassung, Stigmatisierung und Segregation) und physische Unsicherheit.

Die Migranten konnten Kapital aus verschiedenen sozialen Ebenen (*social layers*) nutzen und damit ‚reaktive‘ und zu einem geringeren Grad auch ‚proaktive‘ Kapazität entwickeln, um mit den beschriebenen Bedrohungen umgehen zu können.

In vielen Fällen schafften es die Migranten durch die Nutzung des kulturellen Kapitals auf der individuellen Ebene, beispielsweise des lokalen Wissens und der physischen Stärke, diese Bedrohungen zu bewältigen. Darüber hinaus machten sie sich das soziale Kapital auf Gemeinschafts- und Haushaltsebene zu Nutze. Hier sind insbesondere die engen Land-Stadt-Beziehungen und starke soziale Netzwerke zwischen den Migranten zu nennen, die das Teilen von Nahrung, finanziellen Mitteln, Unterkunft und Arbeiten in der Gruppe ermöglichten. In geringerem Maße griffen sie auf ökonomisches Kapital, wie Viehbestand und landwirtschaftliche Produktion, sowie auf symbolisches Kapital, wie die Maasai-Kultur und die damit verbundenen Traditionen, zurück.

Die migrierten Maasai und die im Ursprungsgebiet verbliebenen Haushalte hatten jedoch nur ein geringes Maß an formeller Qualifikation und Ausbildung, sowie unzureichende Strukturen zur Stärkung ihrer Resilienz auf der Meso-, Regional- und Nationalebene. Daher werden die Verbesserung ihrer Ausbildungssituation, die Anpassung von Landnutzungspolitiken und eine verstärkte Sensibilisierung öffentlicher und privater Organisationen für die Probleme der Maasai als wichtige Ansätze zur Stärkung ihrer Resilienz angesehen.

1. Introduction, problem background and justification

1.1 Introduction

The prevailing widespread rural-urban migration in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and particularly in Tanzania has among other things contributed to rapid urbanisation. Although the rapid urbanisation process in SSA is associated with benefits related to increasing national income, access to social services and employment opportunities, it also poses threats concerning unemployment, inadequate shelter, higher commodity prices and an insecurity situation marked by increased homicide and crime rates. However, governments and city authorities in SSA seem unprepared to respond to such threats.

Consequently, a significant number of urban dwellers and particularly rural-urban migrants drifting from nomadic backgrounds remain subject to the enduring threats of the urbanisation process. However, data is scarce concerning how migrants and households, particularly those migrating from nomadic backgrounds, respond to such threats, including their capacities to do so. The Maasai nomadic pastoralists in Tanzania represent the classic example of a disadvantaged nomadic ethnic group that has recently started migrating to urban areas on a large-scale basis.

Therefore, the leading question in this thesis is: How do the Maasai nomadic migrant youth and households cope with migration related threats; moreover, are they capable of coping? If yes, how and if no, why not, and how can their capacities be strengthened to more effectively cope with migration-related threats? To better respond to this question, this thesis intends to understand the influences of the rural-urban migration of the Maasai nomadic pastoralist youth on the resilience of both the migrants in Dar es Salaam and local households in Ngorongoro District, Northern Tanzania.

Accordingly, this thesis is organised as follows: this very first chapter provides an overview and background to rural-urban migration in sub-Saharan Africa, and particularly in Tanzania. Specifically, the background to the rural-urban migration of the Maasai nomadic pastoralists is reviewed, noting that the Maasai are culturally, socially and politically disadvantaged owing to their marginalisation history dating back to colonial times. A review of rapid urbanisation, its associated threats and the unpreparedness of governments and urban authorities to respond to them is underscored. A research problem is defined whereby the capacities of the Maasai migrants and local households in coping with migration related threats are logically challenged. The concept of resilience is introduced as a holistic approach to the research dilemma raised.

Based on this approach, the broad research objectives to be addressed by this thesis are stated, followed by a presentation of the research sites, research justification and significance. Subsequently, the scope of the study is declared and the chapter summary is presented.

Chapter two relates to the theoretical and conceptual framework underpinning this thesis, with a myriad of rural-urban migration theories summarised into neo-classical economic and structural-institutional models. The Sustainable Livelihood Framework (SLF) of the UK Department for International Development (DfID 2000) and the Multi-layered Social Resilience Framework (MSRF) of (Obrist et al. 2010) are reviewed. Based on the critical review of these frameworks, an analytical approach is stated, using a combination of migration theories as a lens in exploring migration patterns and factors. Moreover, the Multi-layered Social Resilience Framework is considered appropriate for examining the migration-related threats, migrants' strategies of coping with such threats and their capacity to do so. Finally, a chapter summary is provided.

Chapter three proceeds by reviewing selected empirical literature on rural-urban migration in Africa, focusing on Tanzania in the context of this thesis. The chapter concentrates on the migration patterns and factors, its impact on the sending households' resilience, the migration threats and coping strategies of migrants. The reviewed literature is central to the discussion, interpretation and strengthening of the primary data from the field. Finally, the chapter concludes by elucidating the research gap to be addressed by the thesis.

Chapter four discusses the research methods employed in this thesis, elaborating upon the research design, particularly the qualitative approach and its relevance to this thesis. The criteria for selecting research areas and the sampling of respondents are explained, while data collection and analysis techniques are detailed. Importantly, research drawbacks and challenges are stipulated, together with the role of the researcher in addressing them. Subsequently, research ethics, data reliability and validity issues are also underscored before the chapter concludes.

Chapters five to ten present the actual research findings based on the field data. Chapter five presents the Maasai nomadic migrants' patterns and factors of migration, systematically explaining the areas visited by the migrants and reasons for this. Chapter six presents the influences of the rural-urban migration of the Maasai migrant youth on the households' resilience. Remittances resulting from migration are assessed to establish its contribution to the households' resilience; moreover, household members' strategies of coping with migration (loss of households' members) are analysed to determine how they either enhance or deplete the households' resilience.

Chapter seven explores the financial constraints, unemployment and inadequate shelter threats among the Maasai migrant youth, their strategies of coping with such threats and their capacity to do so. Chapter eight investigates migrants' threats in terms of exploitation and oppression, their coping strategies and their capacities of doing so. Chapter nine examines migrants' threat to physical insecurity, particularly falling victim to crime while working as security guards in urban areas, how they cope with this threat and their capacity to cope with it.

Finally, chapter ten presents the thesis conclusions, summarising the key findings, discussing the theoretical implications, providing policy recommendations and identifying areas for further research.

1.2 Background to rural-urban migration in Africa: Focus on Tanzania

Migration in general and rural-urban migration in particular is becoming an increasingly important livelihood strategy worldwide (UNFPA 2011). Consequently, around 49% of the world population had settled in urban areas by 2005, and it is hypothesised that around 60% of the global population will migrate to urban areas by 2030 (United Nations 2012a).

In Africa, and particularly sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), over 50 million people are predicted to migrate from rural to urban areas in the decade after 2011, leading to the doubled growth of most African cities (Parnell 2011; Satterthwaite 2008). In Tanzania, around 35 % of the estimated 42 million people had already moved to urban areas by 2008, with most of them the desperate and youth; moreover, these trends are expected to increase (URT 2011a)¹.

The origins of internal and particularly rural-urban migration trends in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) can be found in the colonial era, starting in the 1880s and early-1900s (Yaro 2008). During this time, most of the Africans practiced internal migration mainly for the purpose of providing forcible and cheap labour to colonies or to earn money to pay the taxes required by some colonial governments (Yaro 2008; DfID 2004). In East Africa, Kenya and Tanzania in particular, the British colonial rule introduced the *kipande stytem*, literary meaning a tax identity card, which in many cases forced the locals to engage in rural-rural and rural-urban migration in search of wage labour (Karlsson 2008; Lugalla 1995).

Soon after political independence in the 1960s and 1970s, owing to the stable global economic conditions most of the sub-Saharan African governments invested in some strategic productive sectors, notably import-substituting industrialisation and the improvement of social services such as health and education. Most of these developments occurred in the urban areas, thus leading to both the long- and short term rural-urban migration of individuals seeking to seize such opportunities (Potts 2008; Simone and Abouhani 2005).

Starting from the 1970s onwards, most of the sub-Saharan African countries' economies were severely shaken by the oil crises, which subjected them to heavy external debts and lost their central role in social and economic development processes. This reduced governments' spending and deteriorated investments and the employment base. Furthermore, it sharply reduced rural-urban migration, given that most of the formerly government-driven investments and social services were based in urban areas (Holm 1992; Potts 2008).

¹ See also, The Daily News online September (2012): rural-urban migration [in Tanzania] must be checked available at www.dailynews.co.tz

Shortly after colonialism, rural-urban migration in Tanzania was essentially discouraged in the 1960s and 1970s through the socialist ideology that urged people to settle in villages to facilitate the easier provision of social services and engage in a more meaningful development process. However, at the same time, a circular form of migration continued, mainly among young people in search of education (Lugalla 1990; Lugalla 1995).

In the 1980s, free market economy policies that came mainly in the form of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) almost reversed the rural-urban migration situation in Africa. On the one hand, these policies impoverished rural economies, especially rural agriculture, while on the other hand they relatively proliferated both formal and informal opportunities such as employment in urban areas (Bryceson; Potts 2008). Tanzania's rural economy and agricultural sector in particular also sharply declined as the nation was one of the victims of the free market economy policies (Karlsson 2008). The decline of rural economies evidently fuelled rural-urban migration among the Tanzanians in search of both formal and informal opportunities such as social services and employment in urban areas (Ndembwike 2006; Karlsson 2008).

It is worth noting here that, since the mid-1970s, African governments have increasingly adopted policies designed to discourage rural-urban migration, as evidenced by around 80% of African countries having enacted specific policies to prevent rural-urban migration in their particular countries. This campaign has also been supported by some non-state actors, notably international development organisations who have recently withdrawn support for urban development initiatives in favour of rural development projects. Such actors argue that improving the standards of living in rural areas would help to mitigate the growth of urban poverty (Fox 2011: 19).

Despite such interventions, rural-urban migration in SSA remains rampant, as noted at the beginning of this section. Moreover, a relatively new rural-urban migration scenario in African has involved indigenous groups, remarkably nomadic hunter-gatherers and pastoralists. Such indigenous groups include the Touaregs pastoralists of Mali, Bukina Faso and Niger in West Africa, the Turkana and Rendile of Kenya and Ethiopia, as well as the Karimajong of Uganda in East and Horn of Africa (Kipuri 2010; Ole Kaunga 2007). In Tanzania, rural-urban migration is also apparent among some nomadic groups such as the Hadzabe, Barbaik, Wamangati and the Maasai nomadic pastoralists, upon whom the main focus is adopted within this thesis (Kipuri 2010; Ole Kaunga 2007).

The rural-urban migration of indigenous groups such as the nomadic pastoralists has been largely due to land loss, as attested by the (UN-HABITAT 2010b: XIV).

All over Africa, pastoralists [indigenous groups] are losing access to their traditional lands and finding their movements increasingly restricted. More of their fertile lands are being taken-up by government and private interests for non-pastoral and commercial uses (mining, ranching, wildlife conservation, military training grounds etc.). Communal rangelands are being broken-up into discrete parcels for exclusive use. As a result, indigenous pastoralists are being pushed to urban areas.

However, owing to limited time and financial resources, this thesis discusses the rural-urban migration of the Maasai nomadic pastoralists in Tanzania, who have started to engage in large-scale rural-urban migration in recent years². This discussion is detailed in the subsequent sub-chapter.

1.3 Rural-urban migration of the Maasai nomadic pastoralists in Tanzania

The rural-urban migration of the Maasai nomadic pastoralists is a relatively new form of internal migration in Tanzania. The Maasai nomadic pastoralists originally hail from North-Eastern Tanzania and have traditionally practiced *transhumance*, a seasonal migration within their local areas, necessitated by searching for new pastures, water and avoiding areas with livestock diseases (Fratkin 2001; Lamprey 2008).

However, Maasai nomadic pastoralists started migrating to urban areas in large scale for wage labour in the 1990s, mainly due to poverty intensification resulting from the decline of the cattle economy, owing to unpredictable climatic variability that led to draughts and floods, as well as the loss of land to investments (May 2003; Fratkin 2001). Indeed, by 2007, around 5,000-6,000³ Maasai nomadic pastoralists, the majority of them young people (19-30), had migrated to Dar es Salaam city alone (May and Ole Ikayo 2007; Kweka 2011). Subsequently, in 2012 around 8,000 to 9,000 Maasai migrants were noticed in the Kinondoni District, Dar es Salaam (Riley et al. 2012)

Contrary to the majority of other Tanzanians, prior to migrating to urban areas Maasai pastoralists seem to have been economically, socially and politically disadvantaged due to their long history of marginalisation from the colonial period to present (AMREF 2010; Fratkin 2001).

Economically speaking, during colonialism in the 1880s and early-1990s, the Maasai nomadic pastoralists lost vast chunks of land to national parks, private ranches and colonial settlements (Goldman 2011; Ole Ndaskoy 2009). Moreover, this situation was fuelled by the specific post-colonial policies in Tanzania, namely the socialist ideology of the 1960s and 1970s that allowed government and non-Maasai people to encroach on the Maasai pasture-land (Shivji and Kapinga 1988; Kweka 2011).

² More detailed literature on rural-urban migration patterns, its impacts on migrants and households, migration-related threats and migrants coping strategies will critically be discussed in chapter three of this thesis.

³ The actual number of the Maasai migrants mainly in Tanzania is hard to determine due to the Maasai circular nature of migration and the fact that in Tanzania the census is not based on ethnicity.

Furthermore, top-down development policies such as the Tragedy of the Commons thesis in the 1960s ⁴(Kweka 2011) and free market economy policies adopted by the Tanzanian government starting in the 1980s catalysed investments such as large scale conservation and agriculture on Maasai land, leaving the Maasai with inadequate land for grazing and farming (Lugano 2007; Goldman 2011; Kweka 2011).

Extreme weather events such as droughts and floods⁵ have further devastated the Maasai livestock and agricultural activities from the 1950s to the 2000s (Fratkin and Mearns 2003; WFP 2003; UNEP 2009).

This situation has further diminished livestock and agriculture in the Maasai-land, thus exposing the Maasai to extreme food shortages among other miseries (Mbonile 2005).

Owing to the conservation programmes in the Maasai-land, most of the Maasai pastoralists, mainly in Ngorongoro District (Ole Ndaskoi 2006) and Manyara District (Goldman 2011), are incapable of investing in long term projects such as agriculture and modern shelter. For example, 51% of the whole land in Ngorongoro District is under Ngorongoro Conservation Authority (NCA), while 49% is subjected to Game Controlled Area (GCA), whereby inhabitants do not have full control over land (Goldman 2011; UNEP 2009). This situation is further confirmed by one of the key informants in Ngorongoro:

The Maasai of Ngorongoro have no ownership of land; they cannot therefore invest in the land as they are not sure of when it will either be taken away from them or even when they will be evicted from their villages to give way to conservation [investments]. The whole land there is either conserved or game controlled. How will they then make their future plans if they are not confident in investing in their own land? **(Male local NGOs official (39) Loliondo Division, Ngorongoro)**

Socially speaking, Maasai pastoralists' ways of living, coupled with the Tanzanian's national political and economic ideologies such as socialism have denied Maasai the right to important social services such as education, clean water and health facilities.

The semi-nomadic pastoralist lifestyle of the Maasai did not allow them to settle in socialist villages where they could receive these services during the 1970s (May 2003; Kweka 2011; Goldman 2009).

⁴The Tragedy of the Commons thesis stipulated the negative impacts of resource users on the environment when unguided by their respective governments. In this case it encouraged privatisation of the commonly owned natural resources such as the rangelands in Tanzania where most of the Maasai pastoralists live (Hardin 1968).

⁵ According to (Fratkin et al. 2011:2), "drought [in the Maasai land] has occurred with greater frequency in the second half of the 20th century compared to the first, with severe droughts reported in Kenya in 1960-61, 1968-69, 1974-76, 1979-81, 1991-93, 1996, 2000, 2008-09."

Formal education and skills among the Maasai pastoralists are extremely low, given that Maasai children of school-going age (7-15) are not motivated to attend schools due to the small number of schools in the Maasai land, poverty and Maasai culture, which encourages children to attend to household chores such as livestock grazing rather schooling (Bishop 2007; Drinkwater 2010).

Furthermore, low levels of education among the Maasai have also been attributed to the low quantity and quality of teachers and learning materials (Drinkwater 2010; EdQual 2009; Bishop 2007).

Consequently, in 2002 only around 1.96% of males and 0.7% of females aged 20+ had completed primary education among the Maasai in Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA) (National Bureau of Statistics 2003). Moreover, in 2003, secondary education enrolment among the Maasai was noted at only 5%, which was the lowest in the world (EFA Global Monitoring Report 2003). Subsequently, in 2003 around 77% of the Maasai migrants mainly in Dar es Salaam city did not have primary education (May 2003).

Politically speaking, Maasai socio-political autonomy was significantly disrupted by the colonial process of re-drawing borders, which gave birth to the modern nations of Tanzania and Kenya in the early 20th century (Fratkin 2001; Goldman 2011).

Following the redrawing of political borders, some of the Maasai pastoralists belonged to Kenya and others to Tanzania. Indeed, this disrupted the Maasai's unity in terms of collectively fighting for their common interests, notably land, social services provision and political representation (Ole Ndaskoi 2006; Ole Kaunga 2007).

Consequently, as a small minority group in Tanzania, the Maasai nomadic pastoralists have long been subjected to continued domination by the mainstream social groups, notably other superior tribes and top-down development approaches (Ole Kaunga 2007). As a result, Maasai are disempowered in national politics (Ole Kaunga 2007; Goldman 2009; Fratkin and Mearns 2003).⁶

Moreover, over the past 20 years the Maasai nomadic pastoralist societies have been confronted with a serious state of insecurity resulting from conflict over resources, largely due to inconsistent national development policies such as the land tenure and extreme climatic events, as earlier noted.

Conflicts between the Maasai pastoralists and farmers, as well as between Maasai and some government authorities, have jeopardised the Maasai's personal and property security. This has further entailed the loss of human life, and distraction of homesteads, livestock and farms, as evidenced among the Maasai of Loliondo Division in Ngorongoro in 2009 (Ole

⁶ Pastoralists including the Maasai in East Africa are numerically small. They are represented only by about 1.5 million out of 35 million Tanzanians, 30 million Kenyans and 23 million Ugandans. Particularly, Maasai are about 300,000 in southern Kenya and about 150,000 in northern Tanzania (Fratkin 2001).

Ndaskoy 2009; Olungurumwa 2009) and the Maasai around the Mkomazi Game Reserve in Same district, Kilimanjaro region in the 1990s (Juma 1998; Kaare 1996).

Based on the above discourse, the Maasai have always migrated to urban areas in search of better livelihoods. However, little is known about the new experiences of the Maasai migrants, as well as their impact on both the migrants and local households' resilience. The following section reviews current urban environment, particularly rapid urbanisation and its related threats, in order to provide a fertile ground in questioning the capacities of the Maasai migrants to cope with such threats.

1.4 Rapid urbanisation in Africa: A major concern for the rural-urban migrants

A phenomenon intimately related to the rural-urban migration incident in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is rapid urbanisation, which springs from both rural-urban migration and a natural population increase (UN-HABITAT 2012). As will become clear later, this process presents a number of threats to urban dwellers and rural-urban migrants in particular. While there are numerous definitions of urbanisation, for the purpose of this thesis urbanisation refers to the process "by which cities grow or by which societies become more urban" (The American Heritage Dictionary 2001).

Africa, particularly the Sub-Saharan region, is urbanising at an annual rate of around 3.6% (United Nations 2012b). Specifically, although SSA is the least urbanised region of the world (UNFPA 2011: 5), its levels of population are set to double or triple in the next 40 years, marking SSA as the fastest urbanising region in the world (United Nations 2012b).

However, levels of urbanisation differ significantly across Africa. In 2007, West Africa's urban annual population growth rate stood at 2.3%, higher than the world average population growth rate of about 1.1%; moreover, it was estimated to more than double by 2050 (United Nations 2012b). Furthermore, countries in Southern African, notably Botswana and the Republic of South Africa, tend to be more urbanised, owing to their early urbanisation processes (United Nations 2010; UNFPA 2011). Indeed, urbanisation levels in these countries are between 40% and 60% (UNFPA 2011).

On the other hand, countries such as Ethiopia, Niger and Uganda have been categorised as rapidly urbanising, given that although their urbanisation levels are less than 20%, they report an annual growth of around 6%. This has been partly due to persistent political instability and the adoption of the Structural Adjustments Programs (SAPs) in the 1980s and 1990s (Potts 2012; UN-HABITAT 2012). In East Africa, urbanisation rates are estimated to be more than 3.5%, a rate that is considered very high, despite only around 20% of the population residing in urban areas (UNFPA 2011).

In Tanzania, rapid urbanisation is largely a result of rural-urban migration and to a lesser extent, a natural population increase (URT 2011a). This trend will continue to increase in the coming years, thus exasperating the proportion of the country's population living in urban

areas (URT 2011a). Dar es Salaam,⁷ Tanzania's largest city, has the highest percentage of people living in urban areas, evidenced by around 93.9% of people in urban areas and only 6.1% in rural areas (URT 2011a).

Dar es Salaam city has recently been ranked as having a growth rate of around 8%, making it one of the fastest growing cities in SSA (World Bank 2011). A brief historical overview of urbanisation process in Dar es Salaam city, Tanzania is depicted in the table below.

Table 1: Growth of the city of Dar es Salaam, 1964-2012

Year	Population
1967	356,286
1978	843,090
1988	1,360,850
2002	2,497,940
2012	4,364,541

Sources: (NBS, 1988, 2003, 2013)

One cluster of literature contends that, if well-managed, the urbanisation process in SSA may stimulate economic growth through trade and investments, revenue (GDP) and enhance social services, including employment (Gollin et al. 2012; World Bank 2005; United Nations 2007). However, advantages emanating from urbanisation have been criticised on the basis that the annual economic growth and urbanisation are not closely linked, given that urbanisation often continues even during periods of economic stagnation or decline. Secondly, urban growth as a result of urbanisation mainly stems from informal and small-scale sectors, while urban poverty is significant and likely to grow (World Bank 2005). Thirdly, the advantages of urbanisation to particular nations such as its contribution to national income can only be assessed indirectly, as very few developing countries, and none in Africa, provide spatially disaggregated national accounts (World Bank 2005).

Indeed, (UN-HABITAT 2012: 28) recently contended:

Urbanisation in Africa has not yet brought the economic development and degree of prosperity that might have been expected. Inadequate education and physical infrastructure, combined with poor governance, have constrained the efficient use of productive resources, and the industrial development that might have come with it. At the same time, the on-going urban economic momentum in Africa is a result of a number of the typical factors of prosperity at work in other regions of the world, such as economies of agglomeration, location advantages, and diversification of the economic base, albeit all in nascent form.

Another group of literature more explicitly associates rapid urbanisation in SSA with threats related to population increase, inadequate social services, the skyrocketing of commodity prices, unemployment and increase in the insecurity situation, particularly concerning higher crime and homicide rates (Fox 2011; United Nations 2007).

⁷ Dar es Salaam city has attracted migrants from all over Tanzania, including the Maasai nomadic pastoralists who are the case in point in this thesis.

Moreover, it also leads to inadequate shelter among urban dwellers, and particularly the newly arriving rural-urban migrants in search of better livelihoods (UN-HABITAT 2011b)⁸. Above all, governments and urban authorities are unprepared to combat such threats (Akrofi 2006; Potts 2012).

Specifically, social infrastructures such as schools, health, water and sanitation systems and shelter are insufficient in most SSA urban areas (UNFPA 2011), with around 72% of sub-Saharan Africa's urban population living in slum conditions (UN-HABITAT 2012).

In Tanzania, most urban dwellers live in unplanned human settlements, notably slums and squatters, most of which lack modern services and basic socio-economic services such as roads, water supply, electricity, sewage and drainage systems (URT 2011a). This situation is particularly acute in Dar es Salaam city, where 70% of population live in informal settlements (World Bank 2011; Kironde 2012).



Figure 1: Rapid urbanisation and unplanned settlements in Dar es Salaam

Picture: K. Lickert (2012)

In the wake of rapid urbanisation in SSA, unemployment is more prevalent in urban areas than rural areas, especially among the youth (Min-Harris 2010). According to (Potts 2012: 13), “GDP growth rates have improved in many African countries since 2002. However, this positive development has not proved a catalyst for job creation (...)”. Consequently, rapid increase in rural-urban migration in sub-Saharan Africa does not correspond with the existing formal job opportunities (Potts 2012: 13–14).

⁸ It is increasingly contended that sub-Saharan Africa is the only region of the world where urbanisation has not translated into the positive development.

In Tanzania, the unemployment rate amongst youth (15-34 years old) was 13.4% in 2006, including 14.3% among males and 12.3% among females (URT 2006) in (Mcha 2012). Urban areas were those hit hardest, with an unemployment rate of around 22.3%, compared with 7.1% in the rural areas. The situation is most critical in Dar es Salaam city, with an unemployment rate of 31.5% (URT 2006) in (Mcha 2012).

Owing to unemployment, a significant number of urban dwellers find themselves in a serious income crisis. In Dar es Salaam, over half of the city dwellers survive on approximately a dollar [or less] per day (World Bank 2011).

The hiking of commodity prices, particularly in urban areas, is yet another threat significantly determined by the rapid urbanisation process in SSA (UN-HABITAT 2012; World Bank 2010). In Tanzania, commodity prices in urban areas, particularly concerning food products, have been rising steadily due to higher production costs resulting from inadequate electricity supply and subsequent hiking fuel prices, together with unreliable weather, which does not guarantee sufficient agricultural yield.

This situation has been further compounded by the poor road infrastructure, hindering the smooth transportation of such products to urban areas (REPOA 2009; URT 2011b, 2011c).

Another threat emanating from rapid urbanisation in SSA is the insecurity situation, marked by higher levels of crime and homicides in urban areas (Fox 2011; United Nations 2010). While the fear of crime is a daily reality in Tanzania, urban residents are around three times more likely to be victims of crime than their rural counterparts (World Bank 2013). Specifically, a significant number of urban dwellers in Tanzania experience various forms of crime such as robbery, personal theft, sexual offences or assault and consumer fraud (UNODC 2009: 8). Importantly, urban dwellers in major cities such as Dar es Salaam and Arusha are more vulnerable to insecurity situations resulting from political activities and demonstrations (UNODC 2009; URT 2011a)⁹.

Regrettably, governments and urban authorities in SSA are unprepared to respond to the aforementioned urbanisation threats (UN-HABITAT 2012; United Nations 2012b). In Tanzania, the government and city authorities are incapable of maintaining the current urban infrastructures, let alone responding to the ever-increasing need for urban services (UN-HABITAT 2012).

⁹ Over the past three years commodity prices in Dar es Salaam have been rising at an alarming rate mainly due to unreliable electricity supply and hiking fuel prices leading to extremely higher production costs and especially food-related products.

Moreover, the government's failure to address crime issues is evidenced by the fact that around 80% of households reporting offenses in 2011 claimed that the police failed to interview or arrest any suspects (World Bank 2013). This further subjects urban dwellers and particularly rural-urban migrants to an acute lack of social services, deprived conditions, insecure tenure and formal employment (United Nations 2012b; Akrofi 2006; Raleigh et al. 2008).

Evidence particularly shows that rural-urban migrants in search of better livelihoods in the urban areas are the most vulnerable victims to urbanisation related threats, most notably in SSA (Akrofi 2006; UN-HABITAT 2011b; United Nations 2008a). This is because rural-urban migrants are said to be disadvantaged in many ways prior to arriving in urban areas (Min-Harris 2010; Akrofi 2006). Accordingly, this situation further subjects migrants to detrimental living conditions (UN-HABITAT 2009; Melde 2012).

However, further evidence suggests that rural-urban migrants from indigenous backgrounds such as the nomadic pastoralists, gathers and hunters are hardest hit by the urban threats, compared to non-indigenous groups (UN-HABITAT 2010a). This group is said to face double jeopardy owing to their long history of marginalisation, entailing a lack of exposure and formal skills on the one hand and the apparent urban risks that accompany the rapid urbanisation process on the other (UN-HABITAT 2010a; Kipuri 2010; Ole Kaunga 2007).

Based on the above-presented discourse, it is fairly evident that rapid urbanisation in SSA, and specifically in Tanzania, is accompanied with a number of threats; moreover, rural-urban migrants, and especially those from indigenous backgrounds, are primarily and severely stricken by these threats, mainly owing to their disadvantaged nature. However, it remains unclear how migrants and households are likely to cope with such migration-related threats, as well as their capacity to cope. This situation calls upon a critical investigation of the migration-related threats encountered by the rural-urban migrants, including the extent to which the migrants are capable of competently reacting to such threats.

As previously stated, owing to the limited time and financial resources, this study concentrates on the rural-urban migration of the Maasai nomadic pastoralist youth in Tanzania, who are considered economically, socially and politically disadvantaged rural indigenous groups.

1.5 Research problem: questioning the Maasai migrants' and households' capacities to cope with migration-related threats

Building on the foregoing sections, it could be said that urbanisation-related threats such as population increase, the skyrocketing of commodity prices, unemployment, increased crime rates and inadequate shelter are evident among the urban dwellers and particularly the newly-arriving rural-urban migrants in search of better livelihoods in (Akrofi 2006; World Bank 2011, 2010).

This situation is not exceptional in Tanzania's urban areas, notably in Dar es Salaam, as one of the fastest urbanising cities in the sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2010b), to where most of the Maasai nomadic pastoralist youth are currently migrating (May 2003; Kweka 2011).

However, as noted from the background above, unlike other communities and migrants in Tanzania, the Maasai nomadic pastoralists have been economically, socially and politically disadvantaged owing to their history of marginalisation since the colonial period. This situation has denied the Maasai a number of important livelihood entitlements such as land, livestock, education and skills, health services and political representation (Kweka 2011; May 2003; AMREF 2010). Such entitlements are considered essential for coping with the aforementioned migration-related [urbanisation] threats.

In this context, important yet controversial questions include: what migration related threats are likely to be encountered by the Maasai nomadic migrants in the urban areas and local households in the sending areas? How do the Maasai migrants and local households cope with such threats and to what extent are they capable of doing so? What can be done to enhance the Maasai migrants' capacity to more effectively cope with such threats?

However, based on our common knowledge, we can also note that, like any other human beings, the Maasai migrants and their local households do not exist in a vacuum, given that their experiences are shaped or structured through changing institutional and organisational arrangements both in the rural areas from which they migrate and the urban areas to which they migrate. Apart from the personal resourcefulness of the Maasai migrants and local households' members, existing institutions may be useful in terms of both tangible and intangible support through the financial support, information, knowledge and skills necessary for coping with threats such as those mentioned above.

Therefore, this thesis makes the assumption that the Maasai migrant youth and households will not be passively occupied by the migration threats that they currently experience, but rather actively and proactively react to them based on their own personal resourcefulness and surrounding opportunities at different social levels.

Therefore, the recognition and assumption ascertained above suggests that a more-strength based approach that recognises Maasai migrants and local households' threats and capacities in coping with such threats should be employed.

Unfortunately, as will be discussed in the subsequent theoretical framework chapter, most existing migration research has been guided by the deficit approaches that place greater emphasis on the threats and actors' (migrants and households) defenceless to cope with them, as evidenced by the risk research (Blaikie et al. 1994) and vulnerability framework (Turner et al. 2003). Moreover, other frameworks such as the sustainable livelihood framework of the Department for International Development (DfID 2000) emphasise livelihood entitlements, notably the assets that enable actors (migrants and households) to cope with the threats ignoring the threats.

Based on the above-stated revelation, this study employs a more strength-based approach, notably the concept of resilience in understanding how the Maasai nomadic migrants and local households' members are capable of using an array of resources surrounding them at different social levels, including their own personal resourcefulness to cope with the migration-related threats encountered in urban areas. However, what is resilience and how can it be applicable to this thesis?

1.6 The concept of resilience and its application in this thesis

The concept of resilience essentially refers to positive trajectories and pathways. The concept originates from ecological (Carpenter et al. 2001; Holling 1973; Folke et al. 2000), socio-anthropological (Bourdieu 1986, 1984), and the Sustainable Livelihood Framework (DfID 2000) and Psychological (Luthar 2003; Masten 2001).

Based upon the ecological perspective, the Resilience Alliance (RA) defines resilience as follows:

(...) as applied to ecosystems, or to integrated systems of people and the natural environment, resilience has three defining characteristics: the amount of change the system can undergo and still retain the same control on function and structure, the degree to which the system is capable of self-organisation, the ability to build and increase the capacity for learning and adaptation (www.resalliance.org)

Moreover, disaster research perceives a considerable relationship between risk, vulnerability and resilience, viewing risk as bearing both a hazard (a potentially harming event or agent) and vulnerability (people's capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard) (Blaikie et al. 1994) in (Obrist et al. 2010: 287).

However, resilience research differs from risk research in that it places greater emphasis on capitals or assets and resources that enable actors to overcome the negative effects of risk exposure (Stevenson and Zimmerman 2005). The Sustainable Livelihood Framework (DfID 2000) suggests that access to and the ownership of human, physical, social, financial and natural assets reflect prerequisites for individuals' ability to cope with vulnerability (adverse condition).

The social anthropological school of thought also recognises material and non-material resources, notably economic, social, cultural and symbolic capitals, as prerequisites for the resilience building process (Bourdieu 1986, 1984). Specifically, the resilience building process should be understood in terms of social structuration, namely how society structures the resilience of an individual (actor) and how an individual structures resilience from society (Obrist et al. 2010). Accordingly, it focuses on practice rather than a system or action and examines the dialectic relationship between human capacity to act (agency, opportunities as well as constraints shaped by broader economic, political and social forces) (Ortner 1984) in (Obrist et al. 2010: 288).

Child Development Psychology relates resilience to a “dynamic process encompassing positive adaptation within the context of significant adversity” (Luthar 2003) or “to a category of phenomena characterised by good outcomes in spite of serious threats to adaptation or development” (Masten 2001). According to (Luthar and Zelazo 2003: 514–515) however, it seems more useful to think of “positive adaptation” in terms of “better than what would be expected given exposure to the risk circumstances being studied”. Moreover, the development of resilience can never be directly observed; rather, it should be indirectly inferred based on the judgment of its two components, notably “positive adaptation” and “significant risk” (Obrist et al. 2010: 290).

Taking an example of resilience development process among children involved in harsh conditions, three aspects tend to be critical: first, attributes of the children themselves [personal resourcefulness]; second, aspects of their families; and third, characteristics of their wider social environments [different social structures] (Werner and Smith 1992). Moreover, resilience should be regarded as a process (i.e. resilience building process) rather than a trait (Luthar et al. 2000).

Therefore, in summary, resilience is a process that is essentially determined by ownership of and access to assets (DfID 2000; Bourdieu 1986, 1984). This process cannot be studied directly, but rather must be studied by focussing on its two components, namely “positive adaptation” and “significant adversity”, in particular contexts. In this way, resilience thinking can provide researchers with a different way of thinking about individuals experiencing threat (Obrist et al. 2010). Therefore, any kind of framework employed in assessing the resilience of individuals or systems involved in threat(s) has to take the aforementioned aspects of resilience into account, as will be noted in the theoretical framework chapter. Based on the above-stated realisation, this thesis addresses the broad research objectives stated in the subsequent sub-chapter.

1.7 Research aim and objectives

1.7.1 Research aim

Following the above-presented reflection, the overall aim of this thesis is to gain a better understanding of the influences that the rural-urban migration of the Maasai nomadic pastoralist youth inflicts on the resilience of households in Ngorongoro District and migrants in Dar es Salaam city, as well as determining factors for enhancing the resilience of both migrants and households against migration-related threats. To achieve this main aim, the following specific objectives are tackled.

1.7.2 Research objectives

- To ascertain and systematically document factors for and patterns of rural-urban migration of the Maasai nomadic migrant youth in Tanzania;
- To understand the impact of rural-urban migration of the Maasai nomadic migrant youth on their local households' resilience;
- To investigate types of migration-related threats experienced by the Maasai migrant youth, as well as their ways of coping with such threats, including whether they manage to cope with them; and
- To recommend factors for enhancing the resilience of both the Maasai nomadic migrant youth and local households in coping with migration-related threats.

1.8 Study areas: Ngorongoro District and Dar es Salaam City

This study was conducted in Ngorongoro District, Arusha region in northern Tanzania, as one of the migrant sending areas and Dar es Salaam city, Tanzania's largest and rapidly growing city in sub-Saharan Africa, as a migrant receiving area. Some methodological reasons for selecting the two research areas are detailed in the research methods chapter.




Figure 2: Map of Tanzania: its location within Africa and study sites

Source: K. Lickert (2012)

1.8.1 Ngorongoro District: A Maasai migrants' sending area

Ngorongoro District belongs to Arusha Region in northern Tanzania and is located approximately 180 km west of Arusha in the far north of the country, adjacent the south-eastern edge of Serengeti National Park (SNP) (UNEP 2009).

The District is bordered to the north by Kenya, to the east by the Monduli District, to the south by Karatu District and to the west by Mara Region, as shown in the research sites map above. Ngorongoro is famous worldwide for its diversity of wildlife species and the Ngorongoro Crater, which has been declared one of the world heritage sites (UNEP 2009).



Figure 3: A view of Ngorongoro Crater in Ngorongoro District

Photo: E Munishi (2011)

Ngorongoro District is divided into three divisions, namely Ngorongoro, Loliondo and Sale Divisions. Ngorongoro and Loliondo Divisions are predominantly inhabited by the Maasai nomadic pastoralists, while the Sale Division is principally inhabited by the Wasonjo/Watemi, who are mostly agro-pastoralists (Ojalammi 2006). Ngorongoro District has a population of around 129,000, based on the 2002 National Population census (URT 2011a). There are around 98,000 people in the Ngorongoro Division and approximately 38,000 in Loliondo Division, most of whom are Maasai nomadic pastoralists (URT 2002) in (Ojalammi 2006: 61).

Brief historical population growth data in the Ngorongoro District is summarised in the table below.

Table 2: Population growth in Ngorongoro District 1988-2002

Division	1988 census	2002, National census based on annual growth of 3.9%
Ngorongoro	24,894	59,858
Loliondo	21,657	37,714
Sale	20,556	32,200
District total	69,107	129,776

Source: URT (2003) in Ojalami (2006:62)

The district consists of several wards and villages traditionally inhabited by the Maasai nomadic pastoralists, who have also recently started crop farming (UNEP 2009). Moreover, 59% of the district's landmass falls under the Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA), established in 1959, while 41% falls under the game Controlled Area, with the purpose of promoting wildlife, tourism and the wellbeing of indigenous Maasai pastoralists living in the area (Goldman 2011).

Ngorongoro Division has seven wards, namely Olbalbal, Enduleni, Nainokanoka, Nayobi, Kakesio, Irikepusi and Olorobi. Olbalbal ward has two villages, Meshili and Ngoile. Enduleni ward is divided into Enduleni, Esere and Enjoro Villages. Oloirobi has Misigiyo and Mokilal villages. Kakesio ward comprises Osinoni and Kakesio villages. Nainokanoka ward has Bulati, Alailalai and Nainokanoka villages. Irikepuse ward has Olchaniomelok and Sendwii. Nayobi ward consists of Kapenjiro and Nayobi villages (UNEP 2009).

The distinction between wards and villages in the Loliondo Division remained unclear during the time of this research in March-June 2011, given that the process of re-naming these administrative units was still in progress. For the sake of simplification, Loliondo Division was considered as covering the villages of Loliondo, Sakala, Ngwarrwa/Enguserosambu, Oloirien/Magaiduru, Soitsambu, Ololosokwan, Oloipir, Arrash and Maalon villages. Sale Division is mainly inhabited by the agro-pastoralists and constitutes the villages of Tinaga, Mgongo, Kisangiro, Samunge, Yasimdito, Digodigo, Malambo, Piyaya, Pinyinyi and Engaresero (Ojalammi 2006).

Ngorongoro Division is generally characterised by great temperature variation due to the relief and dynamics of its air masses. It is generally moist and misty in highlands, while temperatures in the semi-arid plains can fall as low as 2 Celsius degrees, while also reaching up to 35 Celsius degrees. The annual precipitation falls between November and April and varies from under 500 (mm) in the arid plains in the west to 1,700 (mm) in the forested slopes in the east, increasing with altitude (UNEP 2009).

1.8.2 Dar es Salaam city: A Maasai migrants' receiving area

Dar es Salaam is the largest and most popular and populous city in Tanzania, with a population of almost three million people and an area of 1,800 Sq Km (United Nations 2008b). The city is located between 6.36 degrees and 7.0 degrees latitude to the south of Equator and 39.0 and 33.33 longitude to the east of Greenwich. It is bounded by the Indian Ocean on the east and the Coast Region on the other sides. Dar es Salaam has three municipalities, namely Temeke, Kinondoni and Ilala. The Temeke Municipality has the largest surface area, followed by Kinondoni, while Ilala has the smallest surface area (National Bureau of Statistics 2003).

Dar es Salaam is characterised by a modified type of equatorial climate, given that it is generally hot and humid throughout the year, with an average temperature of 29 Celsius degrees.

The hottest season is from October to March, during which temperatures can reach 35 Celsius degrees. It is relatively cool between May and August, with temperatures around 25 Celsius degrees (United Nations 2008b).

1.8.3 Maasai cultural, social, economic and political organisation

Maasai are said to have originated from among the Nilo-Hamite tribes in North Africa, particularly in Sudan¹⁰, and by the 15th century they had migrated southwards, settling in northern and southern Kenya, notably in Kajiado and Narok Districts (National Museum of Tanzania 2004). By the 19th century, some Maasai progressed to northern Tanzania and settled in the five districts of Arusha region, namely Manayara, Longido, Ngorongoro, Monduli, Tarangire, Kiteto and Simanjiro (National Museum of Tanzania 2004).

The Maasai have traditionally occupied various locales of residence in southern Kenya and northern Tanzania and each Maasai group is known by its location name, including Il-Kisongo, Il-oitai, Il-purko, I-wasingishu, Il-dama, IL-larusa, Il-keekonyokie, Il-loodikilani, Il-matapato, Il-loita,-kitoki, Il-laitayoki, etc. (National Museum of Tanzania 2004).

The exact number of the Maasai is hard to determine due to their nomadic way of life, also because Tanzania does not conduct a population census based on ethnicity. Nevertheless, the total Maasai nomadic pastoralist population is estimated at 350,000 in Tanzania and 400,000 in Kenya (Ojalammi 2006).

Traditionally, the Maasai speak the *Maa* or *Kimaasai* language and belong to the Maa customary religion. Maasai's God is called *Enkai* or *Engai* and they believe that God gave all of their wealth, including cattle and children. The Maasai spiritual leader is called *Laibon*, who acts as the liaison between the people and *Enkai* [God].

However, the Maasai are increasingly joining Christianity and Islam as well as learning other languages, notably Kiswahili, the national language in Tanzania (Mung'ong'o 2010).

Maasai lifestyle centres on cattle or pastoralism as their primary source of food and income. While cattle are depended upon for milk, sheep and goats are mainly used for meat and donkeys as pack animals (transporting baggage) (Mung'ong'o 2010). Although the Maasai's traditional diet revolved around meat, milk and blood from cattle, Maasai are rapidly opting for other kinds of food, particularly cereals, vegetables and fruits, owing to the contemporary rapid social, economic and climatic changes taking place worldwide and more particularly among the Maasai (Mung'ong'o 2010).

¹⁰ See also <http://www.kenya-information-guide.com/maasai-tribe.ht>

The Maasai traditionally measure wealth in terms of cattle and children. For example, having over 50 cattle is respectable, while the more children one has the better. A man who has plenty of children or cattle but not the other is still considered less economically well-off.

Traditionally, the Maasai believe that they own all the cattle in the world. Indeed, this kind of belief among the Maasai has been used to justify their invasion and cattle-raiding from other communities (National Museum of Tanzania 2004).

The Maasai social organisation can further be understood in terms of three closely related institutions, namely household and relationships, clan (*oligata*), territory and the age set organisation (Mung'ong'o 2010). Household (*enkaji*) consists of a husband, wife and children. At times, a household may be extended to the *enkishomi* or *Boma* in Kiswahili, which literally means an extended family consisting of a man, his wives and dependents. This unit is responsible for livestock management (Mung'ong'o 2010).

Next is the clan (*olgilata*), to which all Maasai men are members, forming the basic unit for mutual aid and the redistribution of livestock. Next to the clan are the territorial sections (*Olosho*), comprising all members who share grazing resources. This is the largest political unit among the Maasai, with sections having engaged each other in wars in the past (Mung'ong'o 2010).



Figure 4: Maasai' traditional boma in Ngorongoro District

Photo: K. Lickert (2010)

Another social organisation among the Maasai is an age set unit, which is further subdivided into a boyhood stage from birth to the age of 15 or 16 years, the warrior-hood (Il-Muran) stage between 16 and 30 years and the elder-hood stage (Il-Moruak), which is further subdivided into junior and senior elder-hood (National Museum of Tanzania 2004).

Boyhood stage (the Layons): Between the age of 4 and 15 years old, the Maasai young men are simply regarded as boys, also traditionally known as the *Layon*, literally meaning they are uncircumcised ones. Specifically, the boys between 4 and 6 years of age start taking care of goats, sheep and calves around the household and perfect their spearing skills by hunting lizards, birds, etc. (National Museum of Tanzania 2004).

Senior boys¹¹: Moreover, after reaching the age of 10 and before the age of 15 years old, the boys can be entrusted to look after cattle and continue to sharpen their skills with spears on large targets by hunting jackals, gazelles, etc. (National Museum of Tanzania 2004).

Warrior-hood stage or the Il-Morans: Between the age of 14 and 30, boys undergo the *Emorata* initiation or (circumcision ceremony) and are named the *Il-Morans*. At this level, they are entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring the security of their society. Their basic role is to protect the community's wealth (cattle) from enemies, as well as increasing it through raiding (more cattle) from their neighbours. During the warrior-hood age, members acquire a name that identifies them throughout their life; moreover, this stage prepares them for the elder-hood stage and related responsibilities (National Museum of Tanzania 2004).

Elder-hood or (Il-Moruak): After serving as the *Il-Morans* for a period between 7 and 15 years, youth become junior elders (*Il-Moruak*). Accordingly, they are allowed to marry and start families of their own, although they are also required to listen to instructions from the senior elders, who also deliberate on the community's affairs in each location (National Museum of Tanzania 2004).

Senior elders are expected to listen to adjudicate various disputes, preside over ceremonial functions and act as readymade consultants on any subject in which their wisdom is required. Senior elders are revered and regarded as patriarchs watching over the growth and well-being of their flock, including teaching the young boys an oral history of their tribe (National Museum of Tanzania 2004: 23).

1.9 Justification of the study

This study is well-timed. Existing studies on the rural-urban migration of the Maasai nomadic pastoralists have generally not exhaustively touched on the Maasai rural-urban migration in relation to resilience. Some recent studies have concentrated on the Maasai rural-urban migration and the Maasai identity (Janinie 2008; May and Ole Ikayo 2007; Kweka 2011), exploring migration factors and how Maasai migrants managed to maintain their identity amidst challenging livelihoods in the urban areas. However, it has been unable to explicitly expose different migration-related threats facing the migrants, as well as their strategies employed to cope with such threats.

¹¹ This name has been added by the author for the sake of logic and simplification, but it does not explicitly exist in the Maasai traditional age-set groups.

Moreover, such research has mainly concentrated on physical and economic factors, notably including the decline of the cattle economy and drastic climatic variability, while neglecting to mention other non-physical and rationality migration factors relating to institutions, social networks, skills and technology.

Another research strand in relation to the rural-urban migration of the Maasai has explored the working and living conditions of the Maasai migrants in urban areas (Ole Kaunga 2002, 2000). Albeit not in a detailed manner, this research has revealed financial constraints, exploitation and oppression threats among the migrants, although it has overlooked some other threats, notably unreliable shelter and insecurity, as well as paying considerably little attention to strategies employed by the migrants in coping with these threats. Recently, (Genda and Kirway 2009) documented economic activities conducted by the Maasai nomadic migrants in urban areas, although this study only concentrated on the Maasai females as opposed to the Maasai migrant youth.

Another cluster of the research has also addressed the rural-urban migration of the Maasai nomadic migrants in relation to the HIV/AIDS pandemic (May 2003, 2002; Lukumay 2008). However, much as this research has elaborated on the Maasai migrants' ways of coping with the HIV/AIDS threat, it does not shed light on other health related threats among the Maasai migrants. Moreover, this strand of research has only concentrated on the migrants' coping capacity at individual levels.

In this respect, it has particularly examined the migrants' skills and knowledge in relation to protecting themselves against the disease, while neglecting other social levels and avenues, remarkably including the government and non-government institutions that would support migrants in coping with the pandemic.

The above-documented discourse shows that while there virtually no existing research that has examined the impact of rural-urban migration on the Maasai nomadic migrants households' resilience, some research efforts have inadequately attempted to holistically explore the migration-related threats experienced by the Maasai nomadic pastoralists youth in urban areas, their strategies of coping with such threats and the extent to which they are capable of doing so. This kind of realisation offers a fantastic justification for this thesis to explore these aspects towards the aim of suggesting factors for revitalising the migrants' and their sending households' resilience against such migration-related threats. Ultimately, this thesis intends to achieve the significance outlined below.

1.10 Significance of the study

In addressing the previously-stated objectives, this study generally aims to inform both researchers and policy-makers concerning effective ways of strengthening the resilience of Maasai migrants and households. In particular, it strives to provide researchers and policy makers with fresh insights into the debate on rural-urban migration and resilience among the Maasai nomadic pastoralists.

In particular, understanding the factors for and patterns of rural-urban migration helps us to unearth negative factors behind migration [e.g. forced migration] processes involved in migration, as well as the ways in which Maasai migrants can be supported to best benefit from the migration process.

Policy-wise, an understanding of migration related threats and coping strategies among the Maasai migrants and sending households could further facilitate perfection of existing or the formulation of more effective and culturally appropriate interventions in bolstering the resilience of both migrants and households in coping with migration-related threats.

At the theoretical level, this study contributes to validating the multi-layered social resilience framework of (Obrist et al. 2010). This is the newly-established conceptual framework that has recently emerged as useful in the context of development studies. Applying this framework in the context of this study will help us to confirm the extent to which it holds value in approaching migration-related threats and recommending viable policy options. Based on its usefulness and shortcomings, further recommendations towards its improvement and the enhancement of other migration-related theories and frameworks will be provided.

1.11 Scope of the study

As stated earlier, this study explores the migration-related threats experienced by the Maasai nomadic migrant youth, including financial constraints, unemployment, unreliable shelter, exploitation, oppression and physical insecurity, mainly falling victim to crime while working as security guards. Moreover, it also explores factors or aspects that can enhance the Maasai migrants and households' resilience.

Such factors could include the personal resourcefulness of the Maasai migrants and local households' members, as well as a tangible and intangible portfolio of resources such as financial, relationships, information, knowledge and skills surrounding the Maasai migrants at the different social levels, as elaborated in the concept of resilience [capitals]; indeed, these will be elaborated upon in the next chapter on the conceptual framework of this thesis.

However, this thesis is incapable of addressing health-related threats among the Maasai migrants, notably HIV/AIDS and malaria, owing to the time factor and scientific reasons. Generally, these issues would be too technical for the researcher to handle, owing to his limited time and partial knowledge concerning them. Moreover, HIV/AIDS issues among the Maasai migrants seem to have received considerable research attention, as evidenced by (May 2003; Lukumay 2008; Coast 2006). Nevertheless, these aspects have been earmarked as immediate further research priorities.

This study recognises migration as a permanent or semi-permanent change of residence and rural-urban migration as a sort of internal migration that involves the movement of people from rural to urban areas, or from relatively smaller mainly agricultural [pastoral] communities to larger mainly non-agricultural communities (Mabogunje 1970).

The thesis does not entertain international migration (cross-border), given that this kind of migration occurs in different environments and is thus guided by different institutions.

This thesis concentrates on the Maasai nomadic pastoralist youth. **Nomadic pastoralism** is a way of livestock production in which livestock keepers move their cattle, sheep and goats from place to place to take advantage of pasture and water, which are available at different times during the year¹². The [Maasai] semi nomadic pastoralist; in the dry-land planes of Tanzania engage in large-scale movements with their whole families and livestock to reach suitable pastures (Mkutu 2009).

Definitions of the term **youth** vary significantly. The United Nations defines youth as persons between (15 to 24 years) (UNDP 2012: 35), while the Commonwealth defines youth as persons between (15 to 29 years (Curtain 2001). However, some African nations such as Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and Tanzania have stretched the definition of youth to include persons from 15 to 35 years, in order to suit their policy requirements (Mkandawire, 2000) in (Curtain 2001).

There are several reasons why this thesis concentrates on the youth. Generally, the vast majority of rural-urban migrants in Africa are young [15-35 years old] (UNDP 2009). Specifically, around 15% (approximately 26 million) of the migrant population, mainly in sub-Saharan Africa, are youth (Truong 2006). Moreover, a large majority of migrants in Tanzania and particularly among the Maasai nomadic pastoralists fall under the age group of between 15 and 35 years old (Mung'ong'o 2010; Kweka 2011; May 2003) .

Indeed, the above-stated age group is the most depended upon in Tanzania and more especially among the Maasai nomadic pastoralists communities in terms of material production (May 2003, 2002; Lukumay 2008). Therefore, focusing on this age group is relevant for meeting the proposed research objectives, given that this work aims at proposing policy options for revitalising the resilience of Maasai migrant youth and local households, among other things.

1.12 Chapter summary

Conclusively, this chapter offered an introduction to this thesis by concisely stating its content. An overview of rural-urban migration in sub-Saharan Africa and particularly in Tanzania was provided, noting that rural-urban migration was accompanied by rapid urbanisation, which imposed a number of severe threats upon the urban dwellers and specifically the newly-arriving rural-urban migrants mainly from indigenous backgrounds.

¹² www.irishaid.gov.ie, Irish Aid Tanzania, visited on /22/12/2010

A background to the rural-urban migration of the Maasai nomadic pastoralists as one of the indigenous groups in Tanzania was provided, noting that, unlike other Tanzanians, members from this ethnic group were already disadvantaged owing to their long term cultural, social, economic and political marginalisation. One problem identified accordingly questioned the capacity of the Maasai migrants and households to cope with migration-related threats given their disadvantaged nature.

The concept of resilience was introduced as a holistic approach in addressing the stated research problem. The chapter subsequently presented the broad research objectives, study sites, justification and significance, prior to presenting the scope of the thesis and concluding with a chapter summary.

2. Theoretical and conceptual framework

2.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the theoretical and conceptual frameworks underpinning this thesis, reviewing a myriad of migration theories to provide a better exploration and understanding of rural-urban migration factors and patterns. The sustainable livelihood framework of the UK Department for International Development (DfID 2000) and the multi-layered social resilience framework of (Obrist et al. 2010) are discussed in terms of providing an analytical platform for understanding migration influences on the resilience of migrants and their sending households. Specifically, the frameworks facilitate an examination of migration-related threats encountered by the migrants and their sending local households, their strategies of coping with such threats and indeed, whether they are capable of coping with them. Most importantly, the frameworks also facilitate an understanding and recommendation of factors enhancing both the migrants' and local households' resilience against migration-related threats. Based on the discussed theories, an analytical approach is developed that guides data collection, analysis and discussion of the findings for this particular thesis.

2.2 Rural-urban migration models

While theories and models on migration are numerous, determining which of them effectively tackles migration patterns and factors reflects a challenge due to the complex and context-specific nature of migration. Therefore, this section reviews a number of migration theories in order to provide us with a more comprehensive and analytical arena in collecting and analysing data concerning rural-urban migration patterns and factors among the Maasai nomadic migrant youth. The section classifies the theories into neo-classical and structural-institutional models as below.

2.2.1 Neo-classical economic migration models

Theories under the neo-classical economic school of thought generally perceive migration patterns as resulting from physical factors and rational judgement and indeed reflect a matter of cost-benefit analysis. It justifies migration mainly as a development process that moves labour in places where it is needed.

In an effort to understand migration patterns and factors, (Ravenstein 1889: 12) argues that migration often occurs in a chain manner. First, a migrant moves from the rural area to the nearest small town and subsequently to a larger town. Moreover, migration declines as the distance increases, with people who move over a long distance tending to move to a commercial or industrial centre.

Ravenstein further adds that migration always occurs in both directions (i.e. rural-urban as well as urban-rural migration), meaning that migration is rarely unilateral. Furthermore, the rural population is more eager to move than the urban population, while migration increases due to technological change and the movements made by migrants over time (Ravenstein 1889).

Drawing mainly on Ravenstein's laws of migration, (Lee 1969: 12) proposes that rural-urban migration exists due to certain **push factors** in the sending areas, notably fewer life opportunities concerning social services, [education, health] and employment, as well as natural calamities such as droughts, famine political, insecurity and poor social services. On the other hand, **pull factors**, particularly the presence of employment; better living conditions, political and religious freedom and better social services attract migrants to urban centres (Lee 1969).

The **Harris-Todaro migration model (1970)** considers the migration scenario as a result of an individual's cost benefit analysis, according to which an individual migrates based on the likely benefits accrued from the destination point [urban area] in comparison to the current place [rural area] (Todaro and Smith 2006). Todaro's model is strongly supported by the **New economics of labour migration (NELM) theory**, which views migration as being determined by households and communities, given that these units play an important role in the migration decision-making process (Taylor 1999). In this case, migration is not only determined by the desire to maximise benefit, but is also catalysed by "needs to minimise risks and loosen constraints threatening individuals, families and communities" (Mafukidze 2006: 7).

On the other hand, the **Dual economy migration model** (Lewis 1954) maintains that modern [industrial] society [*urban*] attracts workers from traditional society [*rural areas*] due to attractive wages [employment] that guarantee migrants and households a higher quality of life as opposed to remaining in the rural areas. This generates surplus and savings in the sending households' [rural] area, while redirecting labour in the urban areas where it is needed (Lewis 1954).

However, neo-classical migration theories have been criticised for not paying sufficient attention to the diversity and internal stratification of societies in relation to migration. Specifically, push or pull factors may work out differently for different individuals and societies (Haas 2008). Moreover, they narrowly consider economic factors and rationality aspects as the only determinants of migration, neglecting other non-physical, economic or rationality aspects such as the role of institutions, individuals' skills and aspiration (Haas 2008). The models fail to acknowledge the social environment of the migrants' origin, while they also neglect unfavourable structural or institutional circumstances (Mafukidze 2006).

2.2.2 Structural and institutional migration models

Structural and institutional migration models emerged mainly as a critique to neo-classical economic models and drew hugely on the dependency models (So 1990; MacGowan and Smith 1978). They viewed migration as a result of the existing social structures or continued economic forces by the western-dominated systems leading to structural inequalities that developed the core (Western or urban) and underdeveloped the periphery [rural areas] (Mafukidze 2006) in (van der Kruk 2009).

One such theory is **the world systems theory**, which views migration as a “natural consequence of economic globalisation and market penetration across national boundaries” (Fussel and Massey 2004). In this context, capitalism growth and domination determines world economic structures, leading to “a mobile population that is prone to migrate abroad or to urban areas” (Massey et al. 1993: 444). Specifically, capitalism influences the periphery resources such as land, labour and raw materials in such a manner that they become part of the global market and only benefit the core [the western or urban areas]. This scenario unavoidably leads to migration trends, i.e. the push of individuals from periphery [rural or developing areas] to the core [urban centres or abroad] in search of better life opportunities (Massey et al. 1993).

On the other hand, **social networks theory** views networks as a form of social capital represented by a range of interpersonal ties that connect former migrants and non-migrants in the sending and receiving areas through ties of kinship, friendship and shared community origin (Massey et al. 1993: 448). These links further promote or maintain migration by reducing urban costs and the risks of migration, as well as increasing the ‘expected net returns’ of migration increase (Massey et al. 1993).

Closely related to the network theory is the **theory of the cumulative causation of migration**, which explains why migration continues to grow after having begun. It contends that migration is perpetuated by the social capital gained by the migrants’ community members, migration-related knowledge and resources through family members and friends who have already settled in the urban areas (Myrdal 1957; Massey and Zenteno 1996; Taylor 1999) in (Fussel and Massey 2004: 153).

It can thus be said that unlike the neo-classical economic migration models, the structural and institutional migration models pay greater attention to non-rational institutional and unavoidable migration factors. However, the models tend to describe migrants as vulnerable victims of historical, national and international processes. Moreover, they also perceive migration as resulting from a lack of other options (Tacoli 2001). They hardly acknowledge migration as a multi-faceted interaction and interconnection of structures, agency and consciousness (Amin 1995; Akin 1995). These aspects appear to be greatly acknowledged by **the migration systems theory** (Mabogunje 1970) detailed below.

Rural-urban migration systems theory: Finally, the **rural-urban migration systems theory** (Mabogunje 1970) views a migration scenario as a system with various interrelating components that influence environment, as well as being influenced by the environment. Firstly, a potential rural-urban migrant's decision to migrate is influenced by their own aspirations as well as other systems' components, namely rural adjustment and control mechanisms such as households, clans, villages, cooperatives and other institutions and their direct and indirect roles in promoting or limiting migration.

Urban adjustment and control systems include laws and statutes in urban areas, employment agencies, ethnic and trade unions and various voluntary organisations such as the church. While rural structures determine who should migrate, when and how, the urban structures can dictate the extent to which a migrant is accepted and can thus survive in urban areas. Importantly, the whole system is affected by the environment, notably socio-economic, political, market, technological and institutional factors¹³. Through the communication and feedback mechanism, those migrants already settled in the urban areas will share relevant information with other potential migrants in the rural areas, thus likely triggering further migration to urban areas (Mabogunje 1970: 3).




Figure 5: Rural-urban migration systems theory diagram

Source: Mabugunje (1970: 3)

¹³ It is important to understand that the framework considers the illiterate and unsophisticated rural-urban migrants to be at the lowest level of the hierarchy in the urban areas (Mabogunje 1970).

Therefore, a number of aspects should be considered in exploring migration patterns and factors, including aspects raised in the neo-classical migration theories, such as pull-push factors (Lee 1969) and rationality elements (Todaro 1969), as well as those advanced by institutional and structural modes (Fussel and Massey 2004; Myrdal 1957), including the role of institutions and social networks. Specifically, factors related to migrants' consciousness and aspirations, skills, technology and social environment of migrants in both rural and urban areas should be emphasised, as advanced by (Mabogunje 1970: 3).

However, these migration theories are incapable of facilitating a better understanding of the rural-urban migration influences on the resilience of Maasai migrants and households. In particular, such theories have not mentioned how migrants and local households would cope with migration-related threats and how their resilience against such threats could be enhanced. The sustainable livelihood framework and the multi-layered social resilience frameworks are thus reviewed in the subsequent sections in order to tackle these deficiencies.

2.3 The sustainable livelihood framework

The sustainable livelihood framework offers an understanding of how individuals confronted by threats, risks or vulnerable situations can cope with or adjust to such threats or situations. In this context, the framework defines **vulnerability** as exposure to contingencies, stress and difficulty in coping with threats.

Accordingly, vulnerability comprises an external side of risks, shocks and stress to which an individual is subjected, as well as an internal side regarded as defencelessness, involving a lack of means or low ability to cope with stress and difficulties without damaging loss (Chambers and Conway 1992: 4).

According to the framework, **sustainable Livelihood** [resilience] refers to an individual or household's capacity to maintain its wellbeing [overcome the **vulnerability** context] without eroding the resources base. Such capacity is determined by the access to and ownership of **assets**, notably natural, physical, human, financial and social capitals. Human assets encompass skills, knowledge, ability to labour and good health, while physical assets include basic infrastructure (transport, shelter, water and energy) and communication facilities. Social assets entail social resources (networks, membership of formal and informal groups, relationships of trust, and access to wider institutions of society) that people draw upon in pursuit of livelihoods. Financial assets include cash money, savings, supplies of credit or regular remittances and pensions, while natural assets include aspects such as land, water, wildlife, biodiversity and other environmental resources (DfID 2000).

The transformation of capitals into livelihood or wellbeing is largely determined by **activities/strategies** through the mediation of **transforming structures** such as institutions, policies, laws, structures and cultures. These are determinants in owning and accessing assets, as well as transforming assets into livelihood strategies, activities or behaviours and further determining the livelihood outcomes (Ellis 2003; Scoones 1998). See the figure below.




Figure 6: The sustainable livelihoods framework diagram

Source DfID (2000 in Morris et al., 2007)

Therefore, according to the framework, vulnerability [threat] is closely linked to the access to and ownership of assets. The means of resistance to a threat or vulnerability context are the assets and entitlements that individuals, households or communities can mobilise and manage in the face of hardship [vulnerability or threat] (DfID 2000). In fact, the more assets that individuals or households have, the lesser vulnerable they are, while the greater the erosion of individuals and households' assets, the higher their insecurity (DfID 2000).

The sustainable livelihood framework could thus be seen as an approach for understanding the influence of migration on migrants' and sending households' resilience. In particular, it provides an understanding of how migrants and local households can cope with and adjust to migration-related threats and thus determine ways of enhancing their resilience against them. This is because the framework recognises assets and transforming structures, notably policies and processes as central to coping with and adjusting to threats (vulnerability). However, the livelihood framework has been criticised for being less analytical in understanding individuals' involved in threats (migration and local households) and providing ways of enhancing their resilience against the threat based on the following grounds.

Critique of the sustainable livelihood framework: The sustainable livelihood approach has generally been criticised for being extremely broad and general, given that it covers aspects ranging from micro to the macro levels. It can hardly systematically and analytically examine specific issues at the micro level (Otieno 2009). Moreover, the framework is also criticised for its lack of social theoretical contextualisation, according to which it does not permit power relations within the society and the impact of human mobility on social relations (Thieme 2008). This is because it presents the livelihood in a linear way with no feedback or other social relationships (Cahn 2002).

Indeed, this framework offers no explanation concerning the role of power relations and politics, even though they affect people's capacities in choosing and manipulating their livelihood assets (Smit 2012).

Moreover, the concept of resilience is implicit in the sustainable livelihood framework (Obrist et al. 2010). Much as the framework acknowledges the capitals and transforming structures as prerequisites for sustainable livelihoods, it does not clearly and analytically show how these resources interact to trigger sustainable livelihoods. Importantly, the framework places great emphasis on the resources that lead to sustainable livelihoods, such the assets and transforming structures, as well as neglecting the barriers [threats] to sustainable livelihoods (Obrist et al. 2010).

In other words, having access to and ownership of capitals does not necessarily guarantee having sustainable livelihood (overcoming barriers and threats). In this case, the framework lacks the interconnectedness, multidimensionality and indeed the analytical power in addressing the threat at hand and offering relevant mitigation strategies (Obrist et al. 2010).

The above-stated shortcomings of the sustainable livelihood framework seem to be fully addressed by the newly-developed Multi-layered Social Resilience Framework of (Obrist et al. 2010), which, as will be later explained, is a more inclusive and analytical framework for understanding the impact of migration on the resilience of both the migrants and their local households. It can be relied upon in exploring the migration-related threats experienced by the migrants and local households, examining strategies and capacities of coping with such threats and determining factors for enhancing their resilience against such threats.

2.4 The multi-layered social resilience framework

The multi-layered social resilience framework of (Obrist et al. 2010) borrows heavily from ecological (Carpenter et al. 2001; Folke et al. 2000; Holling 1973), psychological (Luthar 2003; Masten 2001) and socio-anthropological approaches (Bourdieu 1986, 1984), as well as the sustainable livelihoods framework of the UK Department for International Development (DfID 2000).

Within the context of this framework, resilience is defined as:

“the capacity of social actors to access capitals in order to not only cope with and adjust to adverse conditions or threat (reactive capacities), but search for and create options (proactive capacities) and thus develop increased competence (positive outcome [e.g. positive coping strategies] in dealing with threats.” (Obrist et al. 2010: 289).




Figure 7: The multi-layered social resilience framework

Source: Obrist et al. (2010)

According to this framework, resilience building must be examined with reference to a threat and the competencies that should be developed to deal with the particular threat. Depending on the threat under examination, different social fields emerge, each of which comprise a network of actors across various layers of society. These individual, social and societal actors can build resilience by strengthening reactive and proactive capacities to deal more competently with such threat. To strengthen their capacities, they can draw on and transform economic, social and cultural capitals and thus increase their symbolic capital. Moreover, the ability to mobilise capitals varies according to actors' position [power] within the social field (Obrist et al. 2010: 289).

It is important to more thoroughly understand the proactive and reactive capacities in this respect. On the one hand, “**reactive capacities**” reflect direct reactions towards a threat that is taking place or has just taken place. On the other hand, “**proactive capacities**” are hereby understood as abilities/initiatives such as anticipating threats, changing rules and regulations, creating new options, planning ahead and recognising danger. Accordingly, this means **creating options and responses** in order to reduce or prevent a threat that might occur again in the future (Giddens 1984; Obrist et al. 2010).

The capacities not only enable social actors to cope with and adjust to adverse conditions (**reactive**), but also to create options and responses (**proactive**) that increase competence and thus create pathways for mitigating or even overcoming adversity or threat(s). According to (Giddens 1984), the proactive capacity to reflect, discuss and learn from past experience represents an important dimension of human agency. In contexts of adversity, positive adjustment based on a learning process is an essential dimension of resilience, leading to increased competence in dealing with challenging livelihood conditions, notably migration-related threats in the context of this thesis.

Several aspects are of particularly great interest in this framework. Firstly, like the sustainable livelihood framework of the (DfID 2000), the multi-layered social resilience framework also recognises social, economic, cultural and symbolic capitals (Bourdieu 1986, 1984; DfID 2000) as prerequisites for resilience building processes.

In this context, economic capital entails command over economic resources, mainly cash and assets. Social capital encompasses various kinds of valued relations, whereas cultural capital includes knowledge, skills or education (Bourdieu 1984, 1986) in (Obrist et al. 2010: 290). Cultural capital is further sub-divided into three forms, notably embodied aspects such as personal dispositions, habits and objectified aspects such as knowledge and traditions stored in material forms, e.g. art, as well as institutionalised aspects such as educational qualifications (Bourdieu 1986, 1984).

Symbolic capital includes honour, recognition and prestige, showing how power-related resources can influence the ways in which actors (individuals, organisation or systems) can access capitals to overcome threats and thus build or enhance resilience (Bourdieu 1986, 1984).

Secondly, the framework recognises threats or barriers to resilience by drawing researchers’ attention to the following questions: what particular threat or risk is being examined? Researchers are thus urged to be explicit about whether they are studying resilience to a single or multiple hazards, to recurring, chronic or seasonal threats, etc. as well as whether the affected individuals, groups or organisations are aware of such threats. Indeed, if the actors are unaware of the threat to be tackled, the situation is considered as not only a danger but also a risk (Obrist et al. 2010: 280).

Thirdly, the framework views resilience building as a multi-layered process involving social networks including individual, household, community, meso, national and international levels. Accordingly, exchanges between the different layers can improve actors' capacity to cope with threat through accessing resources, learning from experience and developing constructive ways of dealing with day-to-day problems (Glavovic et al. 2003). For example, resources such as knowledge and information can be accessed from different layers through existing networks relevant to a specific threat, thus contributing to building 'layers of resilience' (Glavovic et al. 2003).

Fourthly, the multi-layered social resilience framework is a strength-based approach, redirecting attention to actors' personal strengths and support emanating from institutions surrounding them. Most works to have examined threats have been guided by a deficit approach that emphasizes risk and vulnerability, notably the vulnerability framework (Turner et al. 2003). The strength aspect of this framework is considered useful in the context of this thesis; given that it raises a positive perspective that draws attention to the ability of the Maasai nomadic migrants and their sending households to positively adjust to the aforementioned migration-related threats. In fact, these issues have been neglected in social development literature to date, as well as social science literature (Obrist et al. 2010; Dongus et al. 2010).

Finally, resilience thinking can provide policy-makers and researchers with a different, remarkably solution-oriented way of thinking about populations at risk, thus reflecting a more mitigation-oriented framework (Obrist et al. 2010; Dongus et al. 2010). This aspect is valuable for this thesis as it ultimately aims at suggesting policies suitable for enhancing the Maasai migrants' and their sending local households' resilience.

Drawing on the above theoretical discourse, it becomes apparent that, compared to the sustainable livelihood framework, the multi-layered social resilience framework is more holistic and analytical in examining the migration-related threats experienced by the Maasai migrant youth and local households and proposing ways of enhancing their resilience against such threats.

2.5 The analytical framework of this thesis

In order to effectively respond to the core research questions and achieve the intended broader research aim and objectives, the theories and frameworks reviewed above were adopted and variously relied upon in data collection, analysis and discussion of the findings in the context of this thesis.

The **first research objective** concerns understanding factors for and patterns of rural-urban migration of the Maasai pastoralist youth. Based on the above-reviewed migration models, we have noted that migration patterns and factors are complex and context-specific.

Therefore, the researcher was compelled to rely on a myriad of theories by not only considering tangible, rationality, physical, environmental and economic factors as suggested by the neo-classical economic models (Lewis 1954; Lee 1969; Todaro 1969), but also roles of institutions, social networks, etc. as recommended by the institutional and structural migration models (Myrdal 1957; Fussel and Massey 2004; Taylor 1999). In particular, migrants' consciousness and inspirations, technology and skills were critically considered, together with the rural and urban social environments under which rural-urban migration occurs, as recommended by the rural-urban migration systems theory (Mabogunje 1970: 3).

The multi-layered social resilience framework of (Obrist et al. 2010) was used to address objectives **two, three and four**, given that they generally seek to examine whether the Maasai migrant youth and households managed to draw on capitals from various social levels to increase "**reactive**" and "**proactive**" capacities in coping with migration-related threats, as well as determining factors for enhancing migrants' and households' capacities to cope with the migration-related threats, as further illustrated in the figure below.

The strengthening of the migrants' and households' capacities can certainly help them to access resources in terms of material support, knowledge and information in order to further increase their abilities in mitigating the migration-related threats.




Figure 8: The analytical framework of the thesis based on the multi-layered social resilience framework

Source: Obrist et al. (2010), modified by the author

The **second research objective** specifically relates to understanding the influences of the rural-urban migration of the Maasai nomadic youth on the resilience of migrants' local households. Firstly, building on the multi-layered social resilience framework of (Obrist et al. 2010), remittances from the migrants are examined to establish the extent to which they replenish households capitals; secondly, labour loss resulting from migration is examined to establish the extent to which it depletes households' capitals; and thirdly, households' strategies of coping with migration (labour loss) are examined to establish the extent to which they either enhance or deplete households' resilience (capitals).

In this case, the migration of households' members can be seen as both a threat and an opportunity to the households' resilience.

The **third research objective** concerns investigating the migration-related threats encountered by the Maasai migrant youth, their strategies of coping with such threats and indeed, whether they are capable of coping with them. In order to tackle the objective, firstly migrants coping strategies are holistically and systematically explored, including their relevant activities and behaviours. Secondly, the strategies are examined based on the multi-layered social resilience framework (Obrist et al. 2010) to establish the extent to which the migrants managed to solicit and utilise capitals from different social levels and develop **reactive** or **proactive capacities** of coping with the specific threats as further illustrated in the analytical framework below.

On the one hand, the successful mobilisation and utilisation of capitals to reactively and proactively cope with a specific migration-related threat is regarded as an element of being resilient to this specific migration threat. By contrast, being unable to solicit and utilise capitals to overcome threats such as use of negative strategies, coping inadequately or not being aware of the threat are considered as indicators of being less resilience to specific urban threat(s).

The **fourth research objective** intends to understand and propose factors for building the Maasai migrants' and local households' resilience against migration-related threats. In addressing this objective, the researcher examined and reflected on the extent to which the migrants and households were capable of coping and recovering from migration threats, as well as the reasons for their ability or inability to do so. In this case, both important resources and social layers that helped migrants to competently cope with such threats and the constraints that impeded them from soliciting and utilising capitals to reactively or proactively cope with the threats were carefully documented. Based on these reasons (resources and constraints), recommendations were made for re-building the resilience of both the Maasai migrants and their local household against specific migration-related threat(s).

2.6 Chapter summary

This chapter discussed the theoretical and conceptual framework for this thesis, reviewing a myriad of migration theories to gain a better understanding of rural-urban migration patterns and factors among the Maasai nomadic pastoralist youth. In order to achieve a better understanding of the impact of migration on migrants and sending households' resilience, the Sustainable Livelihood Framework (DfID 2000) and multi-layered social resilience framework (Obrist et al. 2010) were discussed.

Subsequently, an analytical framework was developed whereby a myriad of migration theories were deemed appropriated for exploring migration factors and patterns. Moreover, owing to its advantages over the sustainable livelihood framework, the multi-layered social resilience framework (Obrist et al. 2010) was considered more relevant for examining the influence of migration on migrants and households, notably in terms of its ability to provide a better understanding of how both migrants and households coped with the migration-related threats, their capacities of doing so and factors for enhancing their resilience against such threats. The following chapter discusses the research methods for this thesis, which are supportive to the above-presented theoretical and analytical frameworks.

3. Empirical literature on rural-urban migration in Africa in the context of this study

3.1 Introduction

This chapter undertakes a critical review of literature pertinent to this thesis. In chapter one, the following questions were asked: Why do the Maasai youth migrate to urban areas? What migration-related threats do the Maasai migrants and their local households encounter and how do they cope with such threats? What can be done to strengthen the resilience of the migrants and local households against such migration-related threats? This chapter focuses on answering these questions by drawing on existing migration literature in Africa, Tanzania and specifically among the Maasai nomadic pastoralists in Tanzania. The aim is to identify the research gap to be filled by this thesis, as well as broadening our scope in data collection, analysis and the discussion of the findings ultimately to be obtained from the field. The reviewed literature thus includes factors for and patterns of rural-urban migration, the influence of rural-urban migration on the resilience of migrants' sending households, various migration-related threats encountered by the rural-urban migrants in the urban areas and their strategies of coping with such threats. It is important to mention here that this review is based mainly on the African context, with significant attention paid to the nomadic pastoralist societies, given that this thesis is geared towards the Maasai nomadic pastoralists in Tanzania.

3.2 Rural-urban migration patterns and factors: evidence from Africa

Literature on rural-urban migration patterns and factors in Africa is overwhelming context-specific (Rwelamira and Kirsten 2003; Morrissey 2007). Rural-urban migration patterns in most parts of Africa are circular, namely seasonal or short-lived. During the colonial era, Africans migrated seasonally or for short periods, either to provide labour in the colonies or in search of wage labour to pay the taxes required by some colonial regimes, as evidenced in East Africa (DfID 2004) and documented in West Africa (Wosu and Kinikanwo 2010; Yaro 2008).

Circular rural-urban migration is also in practice in Tanzania, where mostly young people migrate seasonally to invest mainly in agriculture in their local households (Tacoli 2001, 2009; Dungumaro 2009). Moreover, such migration patterns are also evident among the Maasai nomadic migrants in Tanzania, who tend to work in cities for a short time before returning to their local household to invest in cattle (May 2003; Kweka 2011). However, research on the rural-urban migration of the Maasai does not include other Maasai migration patterns, notably other cities previously visited by Maasai migrants and why they tended to move to those cities.

Most of the literature highlights poverty¹⁴ and economic hardships as being key to rural-urban migration. Households' members thus migrate to urban areas to either alleviate or escape poverty at individual or household levels (United Nations 2007). This line of thinking has been empirically captured in SSA (Tacoli 2002), specifically in Ethiopia (Morrissey 2007) and Ghana (Akrofi 2006).

The aforementioned reason is also widely attributed to rural-urban migration in Tanzania (Karlsson 2008; Dungumaro 2009), and particularly among the Maasai nomadic pastoralists who migrate to urban areas due to poverty resulting from the decline of cattle economy, based upon climatic and political factors (Genda and Kirway 2009; Ole Kaunga 2007; Kweka 2011; May 2003, 2002). However, this research does not specifically concentrate on the Maasai pastoralist youth, but rather on the Maasai as a whole.

Another rural-urban migration factor in SSA that is closely related to rural poverty is the lack of social services in rural areas, suggesting that rural individuals are attracted by the presence of such services in urban areas. Accordingly, inadequate clean water supply, electricity, good transport, educational opportunities, medical services, cultural and entertainment activities and many other facilities coupled with by poor road infrastructure and the absence of effective business training and advisory services have reinforced rural-urban migration in Tanzania (Mbonile and Iliya 1996). Specifically, (Ole Kaunga 2007: 4) noted the Maasai nomadic pastoralists of Laikipia, Kenya, who migrated to urban areas to attain education services due to a lack of such services in their local areas. Even after schooling, the migrants remained in the urban areas in order to access communication services such as internet and newspapers, which were useful for better life opportunities (Ole Kaunga 2007). However, the author does not concentrate on the Maasai nomadic migrants of Tanzania and particularly among the youth.

Another cause for rural-urban migration is environmental-related factors and particularly climate change, as evidenced in the greater part of Africa (Tacoli 2008; Tacoli 2009) and particularly in Ethiopia (Morrissey 2007) and Zambia (Ito 2010), where individuals have migrated to urban areas due to climatic-related hazards such as droughts and floods. In particular, cycles of draughts in the Sahel region in the 1970s and 1980s forced nomadic pastoralists to migrate to coastal countries and cities of Benin, Togo, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire (Bonfoh et al. 2011).

In East and the Horn of Africa, floods and droughts led to the decline of livestock and agricultural economy, thus exasperating urban migration. Based on this reason, nomadic migrants such as the Karimajong in northern Uganda migrated to some Ugandan urban centres such as Kampala and Jinja cities, while the Maasai and Turkana of Kenya migrated to the cities of Nairobi, Mombasa and Malindi in Kenya (Kipuri and Korir 2006; Kipuri 2010).

¹⁴ Poverty is in this context considered as lack of or inability to access basic needs of life, notably food, health, shelter, education etc

The floods in in Mtwara and Lindi regions in southern Tanzania in 1992 and 1993 led to the decline of agriculture, pushing households' members to major cities such as Dar es Salaam (Mbonile and lihawa 1996).

Another strand of literature correlates rural-urban migration with some existing government structures and institutions in the respective countries. In Nigeria, rural-urban migration is perceived as a result of weak or lack of state migration regulatory mechanisms (Nwokocha 2008). Governments' failure to respond to natural and largely unfavourable climatic variations has also been noted as a principal factor forcing some nomadic pastoralist groups in Chad, Togo and Niger in West Africa to migrate to cities and hostile zones, where they are threatened by wildlife, endemic diseases and conflicts (Kerven et al. 2002).

The influence of government policies and institutions¹⁵ on rural-urban migration is also witnessed in Tanzania, where generally government development policies have tended to favour urban areas at the expense of rural ones (Tacoli and Mabala 2010b; REPOA 1998).

Moreover, privatisation policies in Tanzania have led to agriculture decline through the reduction of crop prices and abolition of agricultural subsidies, worsening households and rural poverty, which has consequently pushed people to rural areas (Sabot 1979; Mbonile and lihawa 1996).

This is specifically a reality among the Maasai pastoralists of Ngorongoro Arusha region (Goldman 2011) and Mkomazi in Kilimanjaro region (Mbonile 2005; Juma 1998) in northern Tanzania, who have been forced to migrate from their customary land owing to the government development and land tenure policies.

It has also been suggested that rural-urban migration is determined by households. In this case, members in particular households may individually or collectively fund initial migration movements and provide a kind of insurance against income shocks whilst the migrant settles in the urban area (Taylor 1999). In return, a migrant provides equivalent insurance against unforeseen income shocks at home once well established in the destination area (Waddington and Sabates-Wheeler 2004).

Closely related to the aforementioned factor is the realisation that rural-urban migration may also be triggered by households' inequalities. This aspect is captured among some young women migrants in Tanzania (Mbonile and lihawa 1996) and Nigeria, who migrated to urban areas due to power inequalities at the household level and subsequent unequal distribution of household resources and tasks (Tacoli and Mabala 2010b).

¹⁵ All over Africa, pastoralists are losing access to their traditional lands and finding their movements increasingly restricted. More of their fertile lands are being taken-up by government and private interests for non-pastoral and commercial uses (mining, ranching, wildlife conservation, military training grounds etc (...)). Consequently they are pushed to urban areas UN-HABITAT (2010: XIV).

Moreover, a significant proportion of literature highlights the role of social networks, notably support by friends and relatives, as an important factor in both triggering and catalysing rural-urban migration patterns (Salt 1997; Böcker 1994). The already-settled rural-urban migrants in some Botswana and South African cities function as “bridgeheads”, helping the newly arriving migrants to settle in cities by reducing their risks, as well as material and psychological costs (Krüger 1998, 1994).

Rural-urban migration has been argued to be culturally determined elsewhere in Africa. Some young people in Zimbabwe migrated to South African and Botswana cities as a sign of a “rite of passage”, signalling men’s maturity (Maphosa 2007: 9). This is because youth, and particularly young men, who have not been to South African cities, were often despised and perceived as *ibhare*, meaning the unsophisticated (Maphosa 2007: 9). Indeed, a similar situation was found among some young men in southeast Nigeria (Tacoli and Mabala 2010b).

A more sophisticated strand of literature relates the rural-urban migration phenomenon to levels of education and skills, expectations, aspirations and technological levels surrounding or held by migrants (Mabogunje 1970; Todaro and Smith 2006). This explains why some migrants may or may not migrate even when exposed to the economic, environmental, institutional and cultural factors as discussed above (Mabogunje 1970).

Firstly, the above school of thought maintains that, unlike their counterparts, the relatively educated and skilled individuals seem to be more enthusiastic, informed and swift to migrate to urban areas due to higher expectations and their relatively greater ability to manipulate urban environment and easily forge connections between urban and rural areas (Mabogunje 1970; Todaro 1969; IFPR 2005).

Secondly, individual migrants’ perception, motivation and inspiration are further determined through a cost and benefit analysis, whereby a migrant becomes motivated to migrate to a certain destination due to its anticipated benefits (Todaro 1969). This argument is also captured among the independent child migrants in Nigeria (Wosu and Kinikanwo 2010), and specifically those in Ghana who had migrated to cities of Accra, Kumasi and Takoradi, owing to the relatively good life they anticipated to experience in these cities (Kwankye et al. 2007).

Thirdly, technological advancement, notably concerning transportation and communication aspects, plays a significant role in determining rural-urban migration (Robert and Lucas 2007). While the presence of better roads and vehicles make it easy for migrants to move from rural to urban areas in Kenya (IFPR 2005), the rural-urban-migration of people from Mushayavanu village to Masvingo town in Zimbabwe was facilitated by the spread of mobile phone technology (ACF International 2012).

Therefore, factors for and patterns of rural-urban migration are multi-faceted, including poverty or economic hardships in rural areas, environmental and climatic-related reasons, as well as socially, institutionally and culturally determined factors.

At a more sophisticated level, education and skills status, perception, inspiration together with technological levels also play a significant role in migrants' decisions.

However, the above-reviewed literature on rural-urban migration factors and patterns does not adequately represent the Maasai nomadic pastoralist youth in Tanzania. Therefore, this literature enlightens the researcher towards exploring migration patterns and factors among the Maasai nomadic migrants in Tanzania.

3.3 Impact of rural-urban migration on the local households' resilience: focus on Africa

This sub-chapter presents literature concerning how rural-urban migration influences local households' resilience. It specifically investigates how remittances by migrants improve household capitals; moreover, it also explores how coping with migration by household members can either erode or enhance households' capitals, as well as its further implications on household's resilience.

To commence, migration can generally reduce households' vulnerability through asset accumulation, saving households from poverty (Robert and Lucas 2007; Ellis 2003). This notion has been empirically captured by (Adger and Locke 2002: 8) in most of sub-Saharan Africa, where remittances resulting from migration have enriched households stocks in terms of human, social, and physical capitals.

Impact on economic capital: Firstly, migration enhances households' economic capital through investment in agriculture through the purchasing of improved agricultural equipment, e.g. irrigation pumps, as observed in Ethiopia (Morrissey 2007) and improved seeds, as noted in Zimbabwe and Ghana (ACF International 2012; Mazzucato 2008; Ncube and Gómez 2011).

Moreover, the investment of remittances in agriculture and other rural productive sectors leads to higher employment rates in rural areas, as evidenced in Morocco (Heilmann 2006; Haas 2007).

In particular, some Kenyan nomadic rural-urban migrants contributed up to 50% of their household livelihoods through financial remittances, despite earning as little as 3,000 Kenya Shilling (44 US\$) per month (Ole Kaunga 2007: 7). This money was also used to purchase livestock that ended up becoming key assets for their household (Ole Kaunga 2007).

In Tanzania, the Maasai nomadic migrants also contributed to their local households' economy through investment in livestock, mainly for marriage purposes (May 2003; Kweka 2011). Maasai could hardly invest in agriculture due to their limited knowledge on farming, lack of reliable rainfall and irrigation services, as well as limits posed by rangelands (Kweka 2011; Homewood et al. 2009).

On the other hand labour shortage resulting from migration negatively impacts some aspects of economic capital such as livestock, land, and agriculture at household. In this case able bodied people migrate to urban areas leaving behind the sick, weak and young who can hardly engage in manipulating the aforementioned aspects of economic capital and the related subsequent financial benefits. This aspect has been captured more recently in Kenya (Wangui 2010) and in southern Tanzania (Dungumaro 2009)

However, the above-noted literature is unclear about how households' coping with migration either enhanced or depleted their economic capital.

Impact on cultural capital: Rural-urban migration also enhances households' cultural capital in various ways; for instance, indirectly through the improvement of households' physical equipment and human wellbeing, as evidenced by some female rural-urban migrants in Dar es Salaam, whose cash remittances supported households in terms of food and households equipment (Tacoli and Mabala 2010a; Dungumaro 2009).

Financial and non-financial remittances resulting from migration also improve some aspects of cultural capital, notably the knowledge and skills development of households members. This occurs through educational support and information sharing, as reported in northwest Africa (Scheffran et al. 2011) and widely evidenced in sub-Saharan Africa (Tacoli 2009; Tacoli and Mabala 2010b).

Specifically, (Ole Kaunga 2007: 3) notes that the Maasai and Turkana nomadic migrants in some Kenyan cities acted as a source of useful information for their local homes. Such knowledge informed the local households' members about commodity prices and employment opportunities in urban areas, which they would have otherwise been unable to access due to a lack of regular newspapers and electronic media (Ole Kaunga 2007). These kinds of support further enabled household members to attain employment and good commodity prices, among other things (Ole Kaunga 2007).

On the other hand, migration (loss of household member) can erode households' cultural capital aspects. The argument here is that migration deprives sending households' of human labour, notably able-bodied and well educated individuals, pushing households to less wealth production (Ellis 2003). This has been the case in some West African regions, where the loss of human power resulting from out-migration led to the collapse of the pastoral system (Goodall 2004), and particularly in Nigeria, where migrant-sending households [households] lost the manpower necessary for agricultural production (Nwokocha 2008).

More specifically, coping with migration by household members can also erode some aspects of cultural capital, notably the personal resilience of some household members. Despite remittances resulting from migration improving households' assets, it does not necessarily equally benefit other households' members such as women, children and the handicapped, as evidenced in Kenya (Wangui 2010).

This scenario has been well captured among the Maasai and Turkana nomadic migrant local households in Kenya, as well as the Maasai pastoralist migrants in Tanzania, where women took on a greater workload, with children lacking good parenting and education as a result of male out-migration (Ole Kaunga 2007; May 2003; Ole Kaunga 2002). However, these authors did not mention how the remaining Maasai pastoralists' household members managed to cope with this threat, nor did they explain whether coping with migration by household members also positively influenced their resilience.

Impact on social capital: Moreover, rural-urban migration in the majority of the African countries has also increased households' resilience through the strengthening of household social capital. This is evidenced by the rural-urban migrants in South Africa, who strengthened the households' social networks through connecting them with some financial institutions that assisted them with more economic power through access to credit (Robert and Lucas 2007; Tacoli 2009; Whande 2009).

Specifically, migration maintains positive networks between a migrant and local household through "multi-spatial households" in urban and rural areas that combine farm and non-farm activities (Tacoli 2009). In turn, this enables households to overcome financial, health and food constraints, among others, as evidenced in northwest Africa (Scheffran et al. 2011), as well as West and East Africa (Tacoli 2002; Whande 2009).

In Kenya, strong social capital that emerged from the Maasai and Turkana nomadic migrants in rural areas in the form of social movements, networks and associations helped to articulate social and economic issues such as the land rights of their respective rural areas (Ole Kaunga 2007). The support emanating from these associations further helped to improve social services, notably education, health and financial aspects, for local households (Ole Kaunga 2007).

However, migration can also negatively impact on migrants' households' social capital through the erosion of their vital social networks, as widely evidenced in sub-Saharan Africa (Bah et al. 2003; Tacoli 2002). Specifically, young and educated people in rural areas seem to have better networks necessary for households' wellbeing. Their departure to urban areas commonly leaves behind the less educated, the elderly and the poorest, who lack such important networks, thus weakening households' resilience (Bah et al. 2003; Tacoli 2002).

Some literature has briefly touched on migrants' households' strategies for coping with migration (loss of households' member), stipulating that the negative impact of rural out-migration is compensated for by the remittances sent by the migrants (IFAD 2008).

Specifically, some migrants' households, mainly those that are better-off and receive frequently high amounts of remittances in terms of money, food and other goods from migrants (household member), manage to cope relatively well with the (migration) loss of household members.

For instance, they experience improvements in food consumption, health, education and housing as a result of migration, as well as even using their increased income for improving farming, livestock, small trade and business in some instances (Smit 2012). Moreover, some agrarian societies in Rwanda (Smit 2012) and Morocco (Haas 2003) rely on hired labour often paid with the remittances received from the migrants in order to cope with the labour shortage resulting from their migration.

However, remittances from migrants sometimes appear insufficient to replace the departed labour force (IFAD 2008). Consequently, some households are incapable of entirely coping with migration (loss of households' member due to extreme poverty, receiving little, infrequent and at times no money from their poorly-educated and unsuccessful migrants (household members) in urban areas). The inability of these households to cope is compounded by their lack of financial and physical capital, income, land and livestock to absorb the loss of labour force (Smit 2012). Consequently, they experience an increased workload due to the insufficient replacement of the migrant(s) and are often forced to work for other, mostly better-off households (Smit 2012).

Therefore, this literature maintains that the extent in which migration has a negative or positive impact on sending areas is dependent on the duration of the migration, the local context and the amount of remittances (IFAD 2008). Indeed, the extent to which these remittances are sufficient to replace the labour shortage greatly depends on the amount of migrant remittances (Deshinkar and Grimm 2005).

However, the above literature seems to only dwell on how migrants and households cope with migration-related threats at the households' level, barely considering how these households are also capable of soliciting support from community, meso, national and international levels towards improving their resilience. The literature has not very explicitly stated how the coping with migration by the households would enhance or deplete the households' resilience.

In conclusion, migration positively impacts household resilience through remittances that are re-invested in economic capital, notably land and livestock, further improving aspects of cultural capital such as health, food and shelter. Social capital emanating from migration improves households' economic capital through cash transfers, which are further invested in economic and cultural capitals. Migration may also improve some aspects of households' cultural capital such as knowledge and skills through information sharing between migrants and households' members.

On the other hand, migration erodes households' resilience through the depletion of cultural capital, most notably the decline of human labour necessary for production, as well as the personal resilience of household members, typically in relation to women and children, who may not necessarily benefit from the migration. Furthermore, social capital, and particularly household networks, is also depleted as a result of the out-migration of the energetic and educated, who seem to have better and most useful networks for households' wellbeing.

However, this literature is silent about the influence of migration on symbolic capital; moreover, it fails to explain how coping with migration increases or depletes households' resilience. Above all, the rural-urban migration of Maasai nomadic pastoralists has been inadequately reflected upon within existing literature. Therefore, as much as this literature is useful for discussion of the findings for this particular thesis, it also poses the challenges of filling the knowledge gaps identified above.

3.4 Migration threats for and coping strategies of migrants: evidence from Africa

This sub-chapter offers a summarised discussion concerning the migration-related threats experienced by migrants in urban areas, as well as their strategies employed to cope with such threats. Moreover, this review also attempts to include examples from the African nomadic pastoralist groups. For the sake of simplification and clarity, threats are divided into four categories, namely: (1) financial constraints, unemployment and inadequate shelter; (2) exploitation and oppression related threats; (3) personal and property insecurity threats; and (4) health-related threats.

Financial constraints, unemployment and inadequate shelter threats: Financial constraints, unemployment and inadequate shelter are the most frequent migration-related threats encountered by the rural-urban migrants in urban areas in the context of SSA. Mainly owing to a lack of formal skills, education and proficiency in some dominant languages, migrants are incapable of raising sufficient income for their own survival in cities as well as supporting their local households, as observed among the rural-urban migrants in Botswana (Krüger 1998), South Africa (Min-Harris 2010) and East African cities (Kipuri 2010; Ole Kaunga 2007).

In Tanzania, financial constraints and unemployment threats are also a reality among rural-urban migrants (World Bank 2011), and particularly among the Maasai nomadic migrants, due to their lack of formal education, professional skills and proficiency in the Kiswahili language (Kweka 2011; May 2003; Homewood et al. 2006).

Consequently, around 28% of the Maasai nomadic migrants in Dar es Salaam and Arusha cities were found to be jobless, while those employed earned a monthly income of around Tsh 30,000 (15 Euro) (Kweka 2011: 3).

Another threat facing most rural-urban migrants in SSA is inadequate shelter, which mainly emanates from financial insufficiency among migrants, as observed among the migrants of Freetown, Sierra-Leone (Pratt 2010), Gaborone city in Botswana (Krüger 1998) and Cape Town city, South Africa (Deumert et al. 2005). Moreover, this has also been observed among nomadic migrants in some East African cities (Ole Kaunga 2007; Kipuri 2010; Parkipuny 1991).

In Tanzania, most research has also documented inadequate shelter as a serious threat among the rural-urban migrants in most cities, and particularly in Dar es Salaam city (Kombe 2005; World Bank 2011; Mbonile and Iliya 1996). More recently, this threat has also been noted among the Maasai nomadic migrants in Dar es Salaam and Arusha cities (Kweka 2011; Coast 2006; May 2003).

In order to cope with financial constraints, rural-urban migrants depend on some aspects of economic capital such as cattle and agricultural products in local households. These assets provide migrants with financial power in times of unemployment and rising commodity prices in urban areas. Such findings have been empirically noted among the rural-urban migrants in Gaborone city, Botswana (Krüger 1998; Whande 2009) and Cameroon (Tacoli and Mabala 2010a).

Migrants also make use of some cultural capital aspects to cope with financial constraints, unemployment and unreliable shelter threats, including engagement in informal sector activities, as evidenced by some unskilled rural-migrants in Cape Town city, South Africa (Deumert et al. 2005), Chad and Togo (Goodall 2004), who engaged in inferior and degrading activities that did not require higher levels of skills.

These same kinds of strategies have also been found among the nomadic migrants in East Africa, notably the Parakuyo, Turkana and Samburu in Kenya (Kipuri 2010; Ole Kaunga 2007) and the Maasai of Tanzania (Kweka 2011; Ole Kaunga 2002). These migrants engaged in selling art items, herbs and hair braiding for their survival in urban areas (Kipuri 2010).

Specifically, the Maasai in Tanzania engaged mainly in working as security guards, trading in livestock and human traditional medicine (Ole Kaunga 2007; Kipuri 2010). Moreover, some Maasai nomadic pastoralist women in Namanga town between the Kenyan and Tanzanian border engaged in prostitution as a strategy of remaining financially secure (Talle 1998).

Migrants also learn new formal and professional skills as a proactive strategy of coping with financial constraints and unemployment threats. Such skills learned by migrants include new useful languages, such as English and Afrikaans among migrants in Cape Town city, South Africa (Deumert et al. 2005). Similarly, the Turkana and Maasai migrants in Kenya learned Kiswahili language as a national and business language in Kenya in order to improve their chances of securing employment and overcoming financial insecurity. Furthermore, they also invested in formal and professional skills for themselves and their children as a future strategy of widening both of their employability prospects (Ole Kaunga 2007).

To cope with financial hardship, migrants generally opt for cheap items, visiting inexpensive and second-hand shopping centres and only spending on basic items such as food, as opposed to luxury items such as fashion (Hossain 2005). Such coping strategies have also been found among the rural-urban migrants in Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria (Bah et al. 2003), as well as the nomadic migrants in some East African cities, including the Maasai and Turkana in Kenya (Kipuri 2010; Ole Kaunga 2007).

Specifically, in order to cope with inadequate shelter, migrants opted for ghettos, slums and unfinished or dilapidated structures, as noted among the migrants in Sierra-Leone (Pratt 2010) and some cities of Cameroon, Mali, Nigeria and Kenya (UN-HABITAT 2011a), as shown in the table below.

Table 3: Where do the migrants live?

Country	Cameroon	Mali	Nigeria	Kenya
Non Slum Area	33.4%	1.2%	18.9%	37.2%
Slum Are	66.6%	85.8%	81.1%	62.8%

Source: UN-HABITAT (2011)

At the social capital level, migrants mainly depend on informal associations, friends and relatives or kinships to cope with the aforementioned threats. This reality has been observed among some rural-urban migrants in South African cities (Deumert et al. 2005) and East African cities (Ole Kaunga 2007; Kipuri 2010), relying on friends and relatives for job seeking and shelter support, particularly during their first days in urban areas.

In order to cope with inadequate housing conditions, those migrants who had successfully settled in some urban areas and attained jobs would provide shelter for newcomers who were still incapable of finding such services, as evidenced among the migrants in Dar es Salaam (Kombe 2005), specifically concerning the female urban migrants working as barmaids (Mbonile and lihawa 1996). This strategy has also been documented particularly among the Maasai nomadic migrants in Dar es Salaam and Arusha cities in Tanzania (Kweka 2011; Coast 2006).

Moreover, most of the migrants in SSA make use of rural-urban linkages as an aspect of social capital in order to cope with financial threats (Bah et al. 2003, 2003). In West Africa, migrants maintain ties with rural areas in such a manner that they can secure financial support and food items such as rice, wheat, vegetables and fruits to cope with hiking commodity prices in urban areas (Schrieder and Knerr 2002). Consequently, the amount of support remitted by some migrants to the sending households in Cameroon was partly dependent upon the size of the inheritance or support that the migrants expected from the local households (Schrieder and Knerr 2002).

In Kenya, the Maasai and Turkana nomadic rural-urban migrants organised themselves in some associations/groups, raising funds for members (migrants) in extreme financial need in urban areas (Ole Kaunga 2007). This was also noted among the Maasai migrants in Tanzania (Kweka 2011; May and Ole Ikayo 2007; May 2003, 2002).

Particularly, in order to maintain their employment in rural areas prior to leaving the city for a temporary period, the Maasai migrants offered a relative or age-mate the opportunity to take over the job, before subsequently exchanging places again when the latter returned to the city (May 2003; Kweka 2011)¹⁶.

Exploitation and oppression threat: Other migration-related threats experienced by the rural-urban migrants include different forms of exploitation and oppression, such as low wages, delayed salaries, overworking and segregation, as widely noted among most rural-urban migrants in SSA (van der Kruk 2009; Waddington 2003b). Specifically, low payment and the delay of salaries has been commonly found among some rural-urban migrants in West African cities (Rogaly and Coppard 2003) and specifically in Ghana (Kwankye et al. 2007).

In Tanzania, employers took advantage of illiteracy and poverty among female migrants working as barmaids to offer them employment under conditions that suited the employers and exploited the migrants (Lugalla 1990; Mbonile and lihawa 1996). Consequently, these migrants suffered low wages, overworking and the denial of shelter. Indeed, some migrants received meagre wages, while others received no wages at all (Mbonile and lihawa 1996: 1).

In order to cope with economic exploitation such as low payment by their employers, rural urban-migrants in Dar es Salaam were involved in supplementary activities such as shoe repair and maintenance services, urban farming, furniture making and operating small kiosks (Mbonile and lihawa 1996). Specifically, female rural-urban migrants working as bar-maids also engaged in food vending, local beer brewing and hair braiding (Mbonile and lihawa 1996).

Exploitation threat is also common among the Turkana and Maasai nomadic migrants in East African cities (Ole Kaunga 2007; Kipuri 2010), as well as the Maasai nomadic migrants in Tanzania, whose salaries were paid at their employers' convenience (Kweka 2011; Ole Kaunga 2002).

(Riley et al. 2012) noted that many Maasai migrant workers in urban areas had been falsely arrested on fraudulent charges, having to pay a significant amount of money either as bail, a fine or bribe to get out of custody. Moreover, migrants hardly asked for assistance when confronted with various forms of exploitation and oppression, instead simply quitting their jobs and seeking new ones (Riley et al. 2012).

¹⁶ Working as security guards by the Maasai migrants was appreciated by many city dwellers, including the Maasai themselves, as it is a reflection of the role of the traditional Maasai warrior: warlike and fierce (Ole Kaunga 2002).

Extremely few of them seek advice from informal structures such as from a village elder/traditional leader when they were paid late (Riley et al. 2012). However, the author failed to state why migrants did not turn to more formal structures such as NGOs (meso level), police and local governments (national level), respectively.

While (Ole Kaunga 2007: 4) and (Kipuri 2010: 8) did not explain how nomadic migrants in East African cities dealt with threats such as low payment, in West Africa it has been reported that migrants partly coped with this threat by insulting their employers and working slowly. Moreover, they also left work earlier than usual working hours, especially during peak hours, as well as engaging in informal strikes. Furthermore, migrants would spread false rumours about employers, with the intention of scaring their employers to pay salaries on time and fairly, as observed among some rural-urban migrants in Ghana (Kwankye et al. 2007).

Another form of exploitation and oppression experienced by migrants, and especially those from indigenous backgrounds, is segregation and discrimination, particularly regarding access to social services such as health care and education (UN-HABITAT 2010b). In order to cope with segregation and discrimination, most rural-urban migrants in developing countries often hide their identities and cut ties with their indigenous language and traditions as a safety measure (UN-HABITAT 2010b).

Segregation and stigma has also been observed among the Maasai rural-urban migrants in Tanzania. While rural-urban migrants in Tanzania are generally perceived as backward and naive by other urban dwellers, such an attitude is even more seriously directed towards the Maasai nomadic migrants (May 2003, 2002). Consequently, Maasai migrants are discriminated against by both the community and some formal urban governance systems (Ole Kaunga 2007; Kipuri 2010). Indeed, this segregation has denied the migrants access to financial, legal and health services (Kipuri 2010; Ole Kaunga 2007).

Specifically, the Maasai migrants in Namanga town between the Tanzanian and Kenyan border and those in Moshi town in Kilimanjaro region have been perceived as dirty, smelly, poor and ignorant by non-Maasai populations (Talle 1998). Consequently, residents in Moshi Town would refuse to enter into the same bus as the Maasai, due to the 'Maasai's bad smell'. However, this does not illustrate how the Maasai migrants coped with such a situation (Talle 1998).

One of the reasons for exploitation and oppression, including discrimination against the migrants, is their lack of proficiency in official and dominant languages. This has been empirically observed among some migrants in South African cities (Deumert et al. 2005) who experienced segregation due to their lack of proficiency in English and Afrikaans.

The nomadic migrants, particularly the Maasai in some Kenyan and Tanzanian cities, tended to be separated from the wider society due to their lack of Kiswahili language proficiency, which is the formal and official language in these countries (Ole Kaunga 2007, 2002).

In order to cope with the denial of formal governance systems, nomadic migrants in some East African cities channelled their concerns through informal systems, notably the informal social networks emanating from friends and relatives in urban areas (Kipuri 2010; Ole Kaunga 2002). Interestingly, in West Bengal, India, government institutions have supported rural-urban migrants by ensuring that they receive payment for their work, as well as interceding in favour of migrants. Moreover, these migrants also received support from the labour unions fighting for the fair wages of migrant workers (Rogaly and Rafique 2003).

More extreme forms of exploitation and oppression have been observed among some rural-urban migrants [mainly women] in South African cities (Min-Harris 2010), who were beaten, badly fed, poorly paid and became sex slaves to pay for their basic needs, due to being unaware of their rights. In Tanzania, young migrants involved in human trafficking were paid extremely low wages, denied food and the freedom of movement, among other things (ACP 2010). However, these authors have not demonstrated how these migrants coped with such threats, as well as whether they gained any relevant support from the existing public and private institutions.

Physical and property insecurity: Rural-urban migrants are likely to be confronted with personal and property insecurity in urban areas, as has been empirically captured among migrants in India (Rogaly and Rafique 2003), as well as the nomadic migrants working as security guards in some East African cities (Ole Kaunga 2007; Kipuri 2010). The personal security of these migrants was at stake mainly due to their lack of appropriated security skills and equipment.

While (Ole Kaunga 2002) and (Kipuri 2010) did not document how nomadic migrants in East African cities coped with the insecurity threat (attacks) resulting from gangs, (Rogaly and Rafique 2003: 5) noted that migrants in west Bengal city reduced their vulnerability to insecurity by working and travelling in groups, which strengthened their personal and property security while on the journey.

In Tanzania, physical insecurity has also been observed among the Maasai nomadic migrant women, who faced sexual abuse and confiscation of their property (May 2003; May and Ole Ikayo 2007). Women coped with this threat by staying and working in groups, particularly during evening hours. Alternatively, once having migrated to urban areas, they immediately look for other Maasai women with whom to share rooms for protection. Maasai women pastoralists in urban areas were also cautious of city men and often tried to interact with their fellow pastoralist women (May 2003).

However, this literature does not concentrate on the Maasai migrants' youth; moreover, it does not explain whether migrants are also capable of soliciting support from other social layers levels such as public and private institutions to cope with this threat.

Health threat: Like other urban dwellers, rural-urban migrants are generally also victims of urban health problems resulting from pollution, epidemics resulting from floods and huge populations coupled with relatively fewer and less well-equipped health services (World Bank 2011).

One of the health threats confronting migrants is the malaria pandemic, as evidenced among the nomadic migrant workers in Burkina Faso and along the Thai–Myanmar border (Brieger 2011). This threat is exasperated by the migrants' working environment and segregation by public health services (Brieger 2011: 1). However, this study did not show how the migrants coped with both the malaria pandemic and the subsequent denial of health services.

In Tanzania, the Maasai migrants are confronted with HIV/AIDS and possess little knowledge to cope with the pandemic (May and McCabe 2004; Lukumay 2008; May 2003; Coast 2006). However, this literature remains silent about other health-related problems among the Maasai migrants, such as malaria, despite the fact that these migrants work in a malaria-prone environment. Moreover, these authors have not specified how Maasai migrants are capable of soliciting support from other social levels, such as the NGOs and government institutions, in coping with the HIV/AIDS threat.

3.5 Chapter summary and research gap to be addressed in this thesis

This chapter has critically reviewed the literature pertinent to the context of this study in the light of the key research questions and theoretical frameworks guiding this thesis. Extensive literature on migration patterns and factors was highlighted, as well as that relating to the impact of migration on sending households. Moreover, migration-related threats encountered by the migrants and strategies of coping with them were reviewed.

However, it was noted that the reviewed literature generally talks very little about the rural-urban migration of the Maasai migrants in Tanzania. Specifically, the literature is almost silent concerning the impact of rural-urban migration on Maasai migrants, how local households cope with loss of migrants and whether coping with migration increases or depletes households' resilience.

The literature stipulates how migrants cope with threats mainly using cultural and social capital mostly at individual, households and community levels; however, it does not suggest whether and how migrants utilise support from other social layers, notably at the national and meso level, despite such institutions evidently being critical in helping migrants to cope with migration-related threats. Moreover, the literature is also silent about the role of symbolic capital in coping with migration threats.

Most importantly of all, existing literature has not highlighted factors for rebuilding or improving migrants' and their local households' resilience in coping with migration-related threats. Accordingly, this thesis seeks to more empirically address such knowledge gaps as identified above.

4. Research methods

4.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses methods for collecting and analysing data in this study. Accordingly, the chapter firstly presents the research design, concisely underscoring the meaning of qualitative research and its relevance in the context of this study. The study sites for this particular study are briefly described and the reasons for their choice are established. Subsequently, procedures for sampling the informants, techniques of data collection and analysis are elaborated. Moreover, research constraints are discussed in depth, mainly those inherent in the qualitative research approach and the role of the researcher in overcoming them. Furthermore, the reliability and validity of data and research ethics are presented, before concluding the chapter.

4.2 Research design and strategy: qualitative approach

This thesis employs a qualitative approach, yet also utilises both qualitative and quantitative data. According to (Strauss and Corbin 1990: 43), the qualitative approach seeks to understand a phenomenon in a specific context and real world setting in which the researcher does not attempt to manipulate the phenomenon of interest. Unlike quantitative research, qualitative research produces findings not necessarily arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other means of quantification, but rather based on multifaceted approaches. Therefore, it is capable of capturing people's life experiences, behaviour, emotions and feelings (Cresswell 2003; Maxwell 1996; Denzin and Lincoln 2003).

Qualitative research seeks to answer questions related to why people behave the way they do. How are opinions and attitudes formed? How are people affected by the events that go on around them? Moreover, how and why have cultures and practices developed in the way that they have? (Hancock et al. 2007: 7). It specifically focuses on the exploration or identification of concepts or views exploring the real-life context and sensitive topics, and thus requires flexibility in order to avoid causing distress (Hancock et al. 2007: 7).

(Maxwell 1996: 17) offers five important reasons for conducting a qualitative study, namely: (1) understanding the meaning; (2) understanding the particular context; (3) identifying unanticipated phenomena and influences; and (4), generating new theories; moreover, it also facilitates in (5) understanding the process by which events and actions take place, developing causal explanations.

As a powerful method for capturing experiences, meanings, opinions, motives, emotions, and social process (Maxwell 1996), qualitative research is necessarily characterised by flexibility, an interpretation that permit researchers some freedom to re-formulate questions or the topic depending on the trend of the subject being investigated (Cresswell 2003; Creswell 2007).

As a flexible and interpretative approach, qualitative research is also appropriate for studying complex and sensitive phenomena, given that it allows a researcher to prepare and reflect upon data prior to engaging in the next inquiry. For example, in qualitative research the question cannot ultimately be misunderstood because the researcher can either repeat the question or phrase it in a form that can better be understood by respondents (Cresswell 2003).

As a multiple inquiry approach, qualitative research heavily borrows from the social constructivist paradigm, a model of investigation whereby multiple processes and set of assumptions often combined with interpretation are used to study phenomena or groups of people (Cresswell 2003; Denzin and Lincoln 2003).

This paradigm supports a qualitative approach, given that it encourages the employment of multiple sources of data and enquiry techniques where broad questions are asked in order that the participants can construct the meaning of the situation as typically derived from the interaction or discussion with other persons (Cresswell 2003). A researcher focuses on the specific context in which people live and work in order to understand their historical and cultural settings (Cresswell 2003). Through such interaction, the researcher's intent is to make sense out of what the participants say and do, as well as the sorts of the meaning they have about the world around them (Cresswell 2003).

More specifically, this thesis employed an ethnographic inquiry strategy that falls under the qualitative approach and the constructivist paradigm model of investigation. This strategy is particularly useful in observing groups with common cultural features, helping a researcher to understand behaviour, language and the interaction of the members of the group under study (Leedy and Ormrod 2005; Cresswell 2003). The rationale of this strategy is to understand a certain phenomenon from the respondents' culture or perspective without attempting to manipulate their natural environment. This stands in contrast to imposing the researcher's own ideas and assumptions on the respondents.

However, under an ethnographic strategy, research data analysis and discussions are not only informed and guided by the researcher's insights and reflections, but also by the existing and available knowledge, frameworks or theories (Mitchelli 1993). In the context of this study, a myriad of rural-urban migration theories are employed as a lens to understand migration factors and patterns while the multi-layered social resilience framework of (Obrist et al. 2010) is relied upon to understand how migrants and households cope with, and the extent to which they are capable of coping with migration –related threats.

Under ethnography, a researcher attempts to interpret data from the participants' perspective, while acknowledging that it is difficult to know just how far it is possible to give a "true" account of a perspective other than one's own (Hancock et al. 2007: 6). Ethnography can include undertaking a "case study", namely a study of a single participant a small community or any other uniform group, in greater detail.

In this case, findings emanating from such an approach may not necessarily be generalised or work in another different environment (Hancock et al. 2007: 6). Such tasks cannot be achieved by other qualitative data analysis approaches such as ground theory content analysis, conversational analysis, narrative and descriptive analysis, given that they do not possess these particular strengths.

4.3 Relevance of the qualitative approach to this study

There are several reasons for employing the qualitative approach in this study. As previously explained this thesis explores the scenario of rural-urban migration of the Maasai nomadic pastoralist youth in order to specifically understand their migration reasons and patterns, in addition to the impact of migration on the Maasai nomadic migrant youth and sending households' resilience. Specifically, this thesis attempts to understand migration-related threats encountered by the migrants and households, their strategies of coping with such threats and whether they managed to cope.

All the above-stated issues require an understanding of the respondents' life experience and natural environment. As noted above, such a situation can be effectively tackled through a qualitative approach. More specifically, issues of mobility such as rural-urban migration and its related threats relate to migrants' expectations at destination areas, emotions or stresses resulting from migration threats and pressures involved in coping with them. Such experiences cannot be directly captured; rather, they need to be approached through an iterative process that involves reflection, interpretation, flexibility and particularly the use of multiple inquiry techniques including observation, as opposed to the quantification of such issues (Cresswell 2003; Maxwell 1996).

Specifically, as one of the most disadvantaged ethnic groups in Tanzania, Maasai pastoralists may be suspicious and sensitive when interacting with the researcher, thus damaging the quality of data. Such sensitivity may be overcome by different qualitative techniques such as triangulation, flexibility and long-term engagement in the field, as will be underscored in the research setbacks and researcher's role in overcoming them, detailed later in this thesis.

Moreover, a resilience building process, which reflects the main concern in this thesis, is something derived through inference and the interpretation of people's day-to-day experiences (lived experiences). Such experiences should be understood through an iterative process rather than traditional quantification approaches (Obrist et al. 2010). Such a process requires flexibility and corroboration, which hugely owe to the qualitative approach (Denzin and Lincoln 2003; Lincoln and Guba 1985).

Finally, the use of an ethnographic approach in this study helped the researcher to use multiple data sources, flexibility, reflection and understanding, as well as further reflecting on data (Creswell 2007). More particularly, it allowed for a combination of the researcher's reflection on both the field data and theories (existing knowledge) to gain a more meaningful and solid understanding of the phenomenon under study (Creswell 2007).

As a powerful inquiry strategy of understanding human behaviour and day-to-day ways of dealing with the surrounding circumstances (Leedy and Ormrod 2005), ethnography particularly facilitated a better understanding of different migration-related threats encountered by the Maasai migrants and their strategies of coping with such threats. Moreover, the revelation and elucidation resulting from the situation and practices of migrants and households further facilitated developing more culturally sensitive ways of building their capacities to more effectively cope with migration-related threats.

However, qualitative and ethnographic data in particular are questionable in terms of their reliability and validity. In order to offset such weaknesses, different issues of reliability and validity, as well as the role of researcher in ensuring these aspects, were considered during the data collection and analysis, as elaborated in the ***“role of the researcher”*** and ***“data reliability and validity sections”***.

The use of the qualitative approach in this study prompted the researcher to employ a combination of sampling procedures and data collection techniques as stipulated in the subsequent paragraphs.

4.4 Selection of the study sites

As highlighted earlier, this study was conducted in Ngorongoro district, Arusha region in northern Tanzania as the Maasai migrants' sending area, as well as Dar es Salaam city, a Tanzanian largest and rapidly urbanising city in the sub-Saharan Africa, as the migrants' destination area.

There were a number of reasons why these sites were selected for this particular study. Generally, Maasai nomadic pastoralists were selected owing to their unique lifestyle, which mainly stems from their exotic culture that distinguishes them from other communities in Tanzania. For example, unlike other communities in Tanzania, most of the Maasai nomadic pastoralists are not used to a monetary economy; rather, they are accustomed to a barter trade and sharing system used in their home region (Riley et al. 2012). Consequently, this suggests that Maasai migrants might also experience unique threats in the urban areas, subsequently employing unique strategies of coping with such threats, and hence the need to be researched separately in order to more effectively capture this uniqueness (Riley et al. 2012).

Specifically, Ngorongoro District was chosen as a Maasai pastoralist community that has been hard hit by continuous climatic shocks and development policies such as land reforms that hugely contradict the Maasai way of life and livelihoods (Olungurumwa 2009; May and McCabe 2004; McCabe 1997).

Therefore, it was interesting to ascertain how such changes have triggered rural-urban migration, as well as how migration resulting from this development has influenced the resilience of the migrants and their local households in these communities.

Specifically, the study concentrated in Ngorongoro and Loliondo Divisions, firstly because they are predominantly inhabited by the Maasai nomadic pastoralists, unlike the Sale Division, which is mainly populated by non-pastoralists, namely the Wasonjo/Watemi people.

However, the two divisions of Ngorongoro and Loliondo were also selected for comparison or rather control purposes. Firstly, as an area within which the Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA) is situated, Ngorongoro Division is more severely affected by development policies and particularly conservation programs that prohibit economic and domestic activities such as grazing, farming and the construction of permanent or modern shelter and roads. However, these same activities are allowed to a greater extent in Loliondo Division, which is predominantly a Game Controlled Area (GCA). Therefore, this selection was expected to guarantee more interesting findings regarding the motivations and rates of migration, as well as resilience implications such as the investments resulting from remittances in the two divisions.

On the other hand, Dar es Salaam city was selected as the migrants' receiving area owing to its current urbanisation levels, as well as being a city that has attracted migrants from all over Tanzania, including the Maasai nomadic migrants from different Maasai localities of Tanzania (Kweka 2011; May 2003). Specifically, the rapid urbanisation process in Dar es Salaam has mainly been associated with threats such as higher commodity prices, unemployment, inadequate shelter and increase in crime rates and homicides, which have been worsened by the limited capacities of the government and city authorities to respond to them (World Bank 2011; URT 2011a). Therefore, it was deemed interesting to explore what specific migration-related threats are encountered by the Maasai migrant youth, as well as their strategies of coping with such threats, the extent to which they are capable of coping and the implication on both migrants and their local households' resilience.

Initially, the researcher also aimed at including Arusha city as a second research study, given that it has also attracted a large number of the Maasai migrant youth (Coast 2006; Kweka 2011). However, this plan was unsuccessful due its apparent sensitivity. A couple of months prior to the field work, the former Arusha Regional Commissioner (RC), who is also a Maasai, publicly declared his dissatisfaction at the Maasai pastoralists in cities and ordered them to return to their local communities.

Therefore, any plan to approach the Maasai migrants for interviews in such an environment would be perceived by them as some sort of victimisation based on the RC's declaration.

Selection of wards and villages in Ngorongoro: Three of the seven wards in Ngorongoro Division, namely Olbalbal, Enduleni and Oloirobi wards, were purposively sampled given their history of sending migrants to urban areas (Coast 2006, 2002); moreover, this was also based on discussion with local government and NGOs officials in Ngorongoro.

Secondly, villages in these wards were randomly sampled, with Meshili Village in Olbalbal Ward, Enduleni Village in Enduleni ward and Misigiyo Village in Oloirobi Ward selected accordingly.

The same procedure was applied in Loliondo Division, whereby three out of seven wards namely Ongosoroki, Engusero-sambu and Oloipiri wards, were purposely selected based on their relatively large number of migrant households and history of sending migrants to urban areas mainly based on the identification exercise and discussion with some local government and NGOs officials in Loliondo Division.

Villages in these wards were randomly selected, prompting the focus on Sakala Village in Ongosoroki ward, Ngwarrwa Village in Enguserosambu Ward and Oloipiri Village in Oloipiri Ward¹⁷. The selection process is summarised in the table below.

Table 4: Surveyed divisions, wards, villages and households in Ngorongoro District

Divisions	Ngorongoro Division			Loliondo Division			2 Divisions
Wards	Olbalbal	Enduleni	Oloirobi	Ongosoroki	Engusero-sambu	Oloipiri	6 wards
Villages	Meshili	Enduleni	Misigiyo	Sakala	Ngwarrwa	Oloipiri	6 villages
No. of HHs	5	5	5	5	5	5	30 HHs

Source: Author, based on field data (2011)

4.5 Sampling of respondents

Sampling can be understood as a process of selecting a representative set of cases from a much larger set (Ragin 1994). In this thesis, it was necessary to sample three categories of informants, namely the household representatives, Maasai migrant youth and the informants both in Ngorongoro District and Dar es Salaam city.

¹⁷ By the time this field work took place in Loliondo Division (February-June 2011), there was no a very clear cut between wards and villages as the exercise of re-defining these administrative units was still under way. The names of the above mentioned villages and wards could be different after the completion of the exercise. Sampling of villages and wards exercise was largely directed by local government officials and researcher assistants who also happened to be among the local government officials.

Generally, both random and non-random sampling techniques were employed. A mixture of random and purposeful sampling was undertaken in selecting households in Ngorongoro districts, while a purposeful snowball sampling was applied in sampling the Maasai migrant youth in Dar es Salaam.

Following the use of the multi-layered social resilience framework (Obrist et al. 2010), this thesis also employed a multi-level sampling technique, which essentially refers to the selection of respondents from various social levels. A multi-level sampling technique is preferably used whenever the aim is to interview a sample drawn from a widely dispersed population such as a national population, a large region or city (Bryman 2004).

This kind of sampling was adopted based upon the aim to draw upon a sample of different people at different levels in both public and private sectors. Accordingly, a total of 110 respondents¹⁸ were sampled from various social levels, notably national, meso, community, households and individual levels, both in Ngorongoro District and Dar es Salaam city, as outlined in the table below.

Table 5: Multi-level sampling of Ngorongoro District and Dar es Salaam

Level of respondents	Ngorongoro	Dar es Salaam	Sub-Total
National level: Government officials	9+ (2FGDs) ¹⁹	7	16
Meso level: Financial /NGOs officials	4	3	7
Community level: Maasai elders/ migrants' employers	3	4	7
Household's level: Migrants' households	30		30
Individual level: Maasai migrants		50 + (3FGDs)	50
GRAND TOTAL			110

Source: Author, based on field data (2011)

4.5.1 Sampling respondents in Ngorongoro District

Sampling households: Firstly, migrants sending households were purposely identified from the randomly selected villages, with between 12 and 20 households identified in each village. This exercise was conducted by a researcher in very close collaboration with local government and NGO officials in both Ngorongoro and Loliondo Divisions.

¹⁸ Owing to the researcher's time and resources limitation it was thought necessary to have a small sample that would be interviewed in-depth rather than a large one that could not be handled profitably.

¹⁹ In Ngorongoro it was much easier to conduct FGDs with government and NGOs officials rather than the households' members as these officials were much easier to organise and also get the views of those officials who were not interviewed in-depth. Pastoralists were not easy to organise due to their mobile nature.

The criteria for identifying the households were as follows: firstly, a household should have sent one or more migrants to the urban area over the past 6 months; and secondly, a household should have been aware of the migrants' whereabouts and demonstrated undisputed willingness and availability to be interviewed.

Subsequently, the purposively identified migrants' households were subjected to a random sampling, in order that each of the 6 villages was equally represented by 5 households, leading to a total sample of 30 households²⁰. In order to reach this number, 30 special interview tickets were prepared, 5 for each of the 6 villages. A number of well-sealed envelopes equal to the number of the identified households in each village were prepared; however, only five out of those envelopes contained the special interview tickets. Those heads of households who selected one of those five envelopes containing interview tickets were automatically subjected to households interviews. However, the researcher was prepared to either repeat the sampling exercise or purposefully select another household in the case that one or more of the formerly sampled households' heads were not ready for interview for whatever reason, as will be further explained when outlining the research setbacks and role of the research during the course of this same chapter.

Table 6: The demographic data of the interviewed households' representatives

The demographic information of the interviewed households' representative is such that 10 respondents were under the age category of 20-40 years, 14 were under age category of 41-60 years and 6 belonged to the age category of 61 years old and above. Moreover, 11 of the respondents were female, whereas the remaining 19 were male. In terms of the respondents' education profile, it was noted the 12 had not been to school, 16 had been to primary school and 2 had acquired post primary education, where **n=30**. (Field data 2011)

Sampling of key informants in Ngorongoro: Key informants are people considered to have specific and relevant information or opinions about the topic under study (Mikkelsen 2005). They could be ordinary people and not necessarily specialists, those better educated, in power or officials (Mikkelsen 2005).

A total of 15 key informants were purposefully selected in Ngorongoro District, including the local government and NGOs officials together with some Maasai pastoralist elders. Most of the key respondents in Ngorongoro District were the people who I talked to during my previous visit and the subsequent field work in Ngorongoro. They included the NGOs and Government officials who also introduced me to some other key informants who held first-hand information concerning the core research questions.

²⁰ An average of 15 households was identified from each village out of which only 5 households were randomly selected

These respondents were also willing and motivated to discuss matters related to my research objectives. The sampling exercise and sample size of Ngorongoro District is summarised as in the table below.

Table 7: Respondents and levels of interviews and FGDs in Ngorongoro District

Levels of respondents in Ngorongoro	Loliondo Div	Ngorongoro Div	Sub-total
District level: District Councillor (DC)		1	1
Division level: Division Executive Officer (DEOs)	1	1	2
Ward level: Ward Executive Officer (WEOs)	1	1	2
Village level: Village Executive Officer (VEOs)	2	2	4
	1 FGD	1 FGD	2 FGDs
Meso level: NGOs/ CBOS/ FBOs officials	2	2	4
Community level: Maasai elders	1	1	2
Household level: Migrants HH representatives	15	15	30
GRAND TOTAL			45

Source: Author, based on field data (2011)

4.5.2 Sampling respondents in Dar es Salaam

Sampling of the Maasai migrant youth in Dar es Salaam: A total of 50 Maasai migrant youth in Dar es Salaam (20 in Kinondoni District, 15 in Ilala District and 15 in Temeke Districts²¹) were purposely selected for in-depth interviews. The criteria for selection were threefold: firstly, migrants should have belonged to the age group of between 15 and 35; secondly, they should have been in the city for at least 6 months; and thirdly, they should have been freely willing to be interviewed²². Migrants' length of stay in urban areas was critical, given that experience shows that after migrating to cities migrants first have to settle and find jobs or save before they can send any remittances to the rural households (Tacoli 2002; Smit 2012). More detailed demographic data of the interviewed migrants is detailed in the box below.

²¹ It must be acknowledged that, the number of the [Maasai] respondents from each district may not be accurate as the Maasai could very freely move from one district to another due to their mobile nature and as the three districts of Dar es Salaam notably Kinondoni, Ilala and Temeke are very closely located to each other.

²² All the interviewed migrants attested to have been in the city for at least a period of one year and above.

Table 8: The demographic data of the interviewed Maasai migrant youth in Dar es Salaam

Among the interviewed migrants, 22% belonged to the age category of 15-25, 52% to the age category of 26-29 and 26% to the age category of 30-35 years' old, where n=50. Moreover, 38% of the interviewed youth were married and 62% unmarried. 92% were males, whereas 8% were females who had essentially accompanied their husbands to urban areas (n=50). Moreover, 60% of the migrants were educated to primary school level, 34% did not have education at all and 6% had post primary education and professional skills, namely metal welding, carpentry and mechanics, although they did not practice these skills (n=50). However, it was observed that some of the Maasai youth who stated having undergone primary education did not know how to read and write. while a significant number were "school drop outs". (Field data 2011)

Essentially, a snowball technique accompanied with a high degree of rapport building was used to sample the Maasai migrants in Dar es Salaam. A snowball technique is a non-probability sampling technique used to identify potential research subjects where a research topic is sensitive and respondents are difficult to locate (Castillo 2009; Atkinson and Flint 2001). It also applies to a sample that is numerically small and mixed up with large numbers of other people (Hanneman and Mark 2005.).

A snowball sampling technique was found useful for sampling the Maasai migrant youth in Dar es Salaam due to their mobile nature, involvement in multiple economic activities and lack of permanent residential settlements in Dar es Salaam city, which consequently rendered them '*hard to find research subjects*' (Atkinson and Flint 2001). Moreover, owing to their indigenous nature, the Maasai are perceived as relatively backward and are thus relatively suspicious of other community members (May and Ole Ikayo 2007; Talle 1998).

Sampling was undertaken by the researcher in collaboration with his assistants and some local government officials. In order to conduct an effective sampling and to ensure productive discussion with the Maasai migrants, the researcher first approached the Maasai migrant youth working around his neighbourhood, as well as visiting the migrants in their gatherings places popularly known as (*oloipds*). Moreover, some people who were well known to the Maasai, such as the Maasai elders and migrants employers were contacted to assist with the identification exercise, given that they were relatively trusted and respected among the Maasai migrants²³.

Sampling key informants in Dar es Salaam: A total of 14 key informants in Dar es Salaam were selected and interviewed. As was the case with Ngorongoro, key informants in Dar es Salaam were also people who held first-hand information about the research topic, namely they were versed with the factors of rural-urban migration and impact of migration on the Maasai migrant local households, as well as the migration-related threats encountered by

²³ For more practical challenges in sampling and interviewing tasks as well as the researcher's role in overcoming them, please refer to the next section on the research setbacks and researcher's role.

the Maasai migrants and households and their strategies employed to cope with such threats. Moreover, they had to be willing to participate in discussion.

Such people who might have possessed in-depth information of this nature included the Maasai elders, migrants' employers, and government and NGOs officials in Dar es Salaam. Key informants were identified by the researcher in collaboration with his research assistants and familiarisation with different potential people as previously stated and will further be explained in the researcher's role section.

Table 9: Respondents and levels of interviews and FGDs in Dar es Salaam city

Levels of respondents in Dar es Salaam	Kinondoni	Ilala	Temeke	Sub-total
District level: District Councillor (DC)	1			1
Division level: Division Executive Officer (DEOs)	1			1
Ward level: Ward Executive Officer (WEOs)	1	1	1	3
Mtaa/Street level: Street Executive Officer (SEOs)	1	1		2
Meso Level : NGOs/ CBOS/ FBOs officials	1	1	1	3
Community level: Maasai elders / employers	2	1	1	4
Household level: Maasai migrants	20	15	15	50
	1 FGD	1 FGD	1 FGD	3 FGDs
GRAND TOTAL				64

Source: Author, based on field data (2011)

Reasons for less female representation in the sample: As can be noticed from the table above, female representation is significantly low, particularly among the Maasai migrant respondents in Dar es Salaam. The study initially aimed at including an equal sample of male and female migrants. However, during the data collection task became apparent that it was mainly the male youth who migrated to urban areas; indeed, only four female migrants could be traced. Women among the Maasai usually get married at a young age [between 15 and 18 years of age] and are traditionally responsible for raising children and carrying out other household chores such as cooking and taking care of the livestock (National Museum of Tanzania 2004).

4.6 Data collection techniques

Following the use of the qualitative approach in this study, a range of data collection techniques were employed. Such techniques involved the review and analysis of documents, key informant interviews, informal conversations and interviews, observation technique, in-depth and open-ended interviews mainly with the Maasai migrants and Maasai local households' members, together with Focus Group Discussions (FGD). These techniques are further elaborated below.

4.6.1 Document review and analysis

The first data sources were secondary ones, with over 150 different sources of published and unpublished research reports about the Maasai rural-urban migration reviewed. Moreover, further general documents on Maasai socio-economic, cultural, political and climatic issues, mainly in relation to the rural-urban migration of Maasai pastoralists, were also reviewed as background information.

The main sources for secondary data for this thesis were library and archival research from private and public institutions, most of which were research and academic based institutions. They contained resources centres and libraries where books, thesis, manuscripts, reports newsletters and policy briefs containing relevant literature on the Maasai pastoralists were available. Furthermore, some grey material such as local newspapers and magazines relevant to research topic and objectives were also obtained, while policies, plans and on-going projects among the Maasai communities relevant to my thesis topic were also available in some of these places.

Some of the academic and research institutions visited for the secondary data [desk research] included the University of Freiburg, University of Dar es Salaam, University of Mzumbe, Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA), and Social Economic and Research Foundation (ESRF). The second cluster involved local and international NGOs such as AMREF Tanzania, Irish Aid/ Embassy, Oxfam GB and Tanzania Gender Networking Program (TGNP).

The researcher also consulted some resource centres within government ministries and departments, such as the Ministry of Tourism and Natural Resources (MTNR). One general yet important source of secondary data was internet websites and links. Indeed, these sources were valuable in enabling the researcher to almost instantly download a number of relevant soft documents.

Through document review and analysis, I was able to identify key issues pertaining to my research topic that had been tackled by various previous researchers, thus also noting the existing knowledge gaps in respect of my research topic. In turn, this helped me to improve the structure of my study in the light of the knowledge gathered at this level.

However, documentary review could not provide detailed data concerning migration patterns and factors among the Maasai, given that most of the literature detailed the decline of cattle economy due to intensification of draught and subsequent poverty as factors for the rural-urban migration of Maasai pastoralists. Specifically, this literature could hardly account for the role of households, migrants' perceptions, social network and technology in fuelling their migration.

While this literature was almost silent concerning the impact of migration on the Maasai households, it was also significantly inadequate in terms of the migration threats encountered by the migrants, as well as their coping strategies.

4.6.2 Informal conversation and interviews

The limitations of secondary data in producing adequate and systematic data about the rural-urban migration of the Maasai pastoralist youth rendered it necessary for me to physically interact with both the Maasai migrant youth and their households. In this respect, I engaged in conversation and informal interviews, mainly with the Maasai nomadic pastoralists in Dar es Salaam and to a lesser extent with some households' representatives, when I later visited Ngorongoro District.

Informal conversations or interview techniques are in this regard a kind of interview that occurs spontaneously during the course of the fieldwork, in such a manner that a respondent may not know that an interview is taking place (Kitchin and Tate 2000). General discussion is initiated and the researcher injects some important issues about the research topic at hand during the course of discussion. This necessitated approaching the Maasai nomadic migrants in their working places, the gathering places traditionally known as the (*Oloipds*) and contacting different key people who would connect me to more Maasai migrants. Such people included Maasai elders and employers, as detailed in the subsequent paragraphs.

By physically interacting with the migrants, the researcher could generally observe and learn migrants' reasons for coming to the urban area, what threats they experienced and how they were coping with such threats. Informal interviews and discussion with the Maasai migrants also helped me to familiarise myself with the migrants, as well as internalising a number of insights that sharpened both my interview guide and skills in interacting with the migrants later on. Secondly, I noted that migrants were free and willing to discuss as long as I did not take note or use any recording devices. Such techniques were subsequently applied specifically in places where a researcher could not record or write down anything, given that tape recorders and note books would most likely limit the respondents' freedom of expression (Pope et al. 2000; Kitchin and Tate 2000).

Aside from these advantages, informal interviews were also liable to a number of limitations. Firstly, respondents were conveniently obtained and the information attained through this process was scanty. Secondly, the issues discussed were not systematically documented and controlled as they were mainly discussed spontaneously. Consequently, data was simply insufficient to address the research issues at hand. Thirdly, not all the questions were asked and also adequately responded to as the researcher did not have an interview guide with him. Moreover, he could not guarantee the availability of the migrants due to not having made a prior appointment.

4.6.3 Observation technique

The limitations of the secondary data review and analysis and informal interviews in producing sufficient data on the rural-urban migration of the Maasai pastoralist youth rendered it necessary for me to engage in the task of deep observation. This was mainly practiced among the Maasai migrants in Dar es Salaam and to a lesser degree in the sending households in Ngorongoro.

Participant observation means getting involved in people's daily activities while investigating certain issues of the topic of interest (Ragin 1994). On the other hand, non-participant observation involves learning about a group from a distance and not necessarily being part of it (Silverman 2001). Both types of observation techniques were useful in understanding migration-related threats and ways of coping with them. In this research, non-participant observation was mostly employed in collecting data.

In this case, the researcher visited some working, sleeping and eating places of the Maasai migrants in order to observe and document their experiences. Specifically, Maasai migrants working as security guards were visited to observe the kind of weapons they used and other means of coping with various aspects of insecurity. The researcher made several visits to some hair dressing saloons where some Maasai migrants were working to find out how much they earned, their capacity to negotiate payments with customers and employers and how they were generally treated by employers. In some cases, the researcher became a customer in some hair dressing saloons where the Maasai were offering services. Being part of the group, the researcher could observe how migrants were treated by their employers or customers, in addition to hearing the migrants' narratives about negative experiences surrounding different forms of oppression and exploitation, including how they coped with them.

Looking at where the Maasai migrant youth slept, what they ate and how they got it added further value to the verbal interviews conducted with various respondents. Through observation, it was possible to understand what migrants did to earn income, why they did it and what were the threats involved in different tasks, as well as how they overcame them.

This approach is sometimes criticised on the grounds that the group may behave differently when observed, thus invalidating the data obtained, as for example in the famous case of the 'Hawthorne effect'²⁴. To overcome this limitation, the researcher observed a number of similar situations over a period of time. Further ways of dealing with such shortcomings are detailed in the data reliability and researcher's role sections.

Overall, an observation technique made it possible to more practically understand the migration-related threats encountered by the Maasai migrants in Dar es Salaam, including how they coped with them. This knowledge further sharpened the questionnaire and later helped to confirm the data that had already been collected through other data collection techniques.

However, the limitation of the observation technique was that the information attained through this process was unreliable because issues discussed and noted were not systematically documented and controlled.

4.6.4 Semi-structured key informant interview

Based on the above-discussed shortcomings of the observation technique, a more systematic and appropriate data collection technique was employed, namely in-depth interviews with some key informants. As mentioned earlier, key informants are people who possess first-hand information about the topic under discussion. In the context of this study, such people included government and non-government officials, as well as some Maasai elders and migrants' employers.

This type of interview was conducted in such a manner that respondents not only provided information but were also allowed to correct some questions depending on their expertise and experience concerning the topic. Indeed, in semi-structured interviews, the informants are encouraged to criticise, correct or answer in any way they wish, based upon the premise that everything is negotiable (Mikkelsen 2005).

Much as the key informants provided a wider range of relevant information, different key informants were expected to offer different and specific information in their area of work. In this case, NGOs officials in Dar es Salaam were expected to provide information on the roles of NGOs in supporting the Maasai migrants to cope with migration-related threats, what they perceived as better ways of empowering the migrants in coping with the threats and their future strategies to achieve this.

²⁴ See also <http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O88-nonparticipantobservation.html/> , checked on 22/11

Government and NGO officials in Ngorongoro District were expected to produce data about the factors for the rural-urban migration of the Maasai youth, its impact on the households' resilience, households' strategies of coping with migration and whether they received support from other social levels in coping with migration threats. Moreover, given that some of the NGOs had been working at the grassroots level, they were also expected to recommend factors for enhancing the Maasai migrants' local households' resilience.

Key informant interviews generally helped to generate pertinent information about the main research questions, which significantly improved the interview guide with both the Maasai migrants in cities and local households' representatives in Ngorongoro. Above all, it sharpened my knowledge about the research topic and helped in improving the interview guides.

However, this information could not be trustworthily relied upon because the key informants had not practically been affected by the rural-urban migration of the Maasai youth. Consequently, it was imperative to more closely interact with the Maasai nomadic migrants in the urban area in Dar es Salaam and their local households in Ngorongoro District as individuals who were directly impacted by the rural-urban migration. This would guarantee the production of first-hand information, as well as more systematic and reliable data about the research questions.

4.6.5 In-depth interviews with the Maasai migrants and local households

In-depth and open-ended interviews were conducted with the Maasai nomadic migrant youth in Dar es Salaam and the Maasai migrants' sending households' representatives in Ngorongoro District. Unlike the closed-ended interviews, the in-depth open-ended interviews enable the researcher to broadly explore the topic through probing. These types of interviews allow for the modification of questions based on the interviewer's perception of what seems appropriate (Flick et al., eds. 2004; Mikkelsen 2005).

Interviews with the households in Ngorongoro: In carrying out in-depth interviews with the Maasai local household representatives in Ngorongoro, a household was considered as relatives who live under the same roof and regularly eat their main meals together (Eriksen 1996) in (Otieno 2009: 56). However, this definition was stretched among the Maasai to also include the extended family. This was relevant in the cases where some households' members did not live in the same households, yet their livelihoods were greatly influenced by the other households. This means that in cases where a husband was married to more than one wife, the wives and children were considered as one household as they shared much in common.

The organisation of interviews at the household level was a relatively long process. Firstly, appointments with the respective households were made at least one day prior to the interview being undertaken.

As stated earlier, the task of making appointments was conducted by the researcher, in close collaboration with his assistants, local government and NGOs officials. After arriving at the household, the researcher first cleared any doubts through a consent letter that introduced the researcher, the research topic and its importance. The letter emphasised the household members' freedoms to actively participate in the interviews and the fact that the information being solicited was solely intended for the research.

The consent of households' members was sought regarding the taking of notes, photos and recording their voices; indeed, in most cases they were willing to do so. In most cases, the introduction and the consent seeking duties were conducted by my assistant or the officials who had accompanied me, given that they were conversant with the Maasai culture including the language and seemed to be more accepted by the households. The sitting arrangement during interviews was kept informal, with the researcher sitting down together with the respondents. The discussion was also conducted informally while encouraging the participation of other household members as much as possible.

Allowing other households members to participate in the interviews would provide more reliable information about the extent to which the migration had influenced the household's resilience. For example, in a number of households children could help their parents or guardians to remember some of the non-financial remittances sent to the household by a migrant. Likewise, much as husbands or men mainly celebrated remittances sent to them by the migrants, wives/women reminded the researcher about the hard time experienced in coping with the loss of their households' members.

Even though other household members were allowed to contribute to the discussion, efforts were made to achieve a calm environment that ensured minimum distractions from outside households. After every interview session, respondents were usually asked whether they had any other questions or supplementary information. This provided them with an opportunity to air some of the issues that were not directly related to my research and helped the researcher to reflect and come up with meaningful interpretation in relation to the research topic and questions. In-depth interviews with households' members can be evidenced by the following photo.



Figure 9: Household's interview in progress in Ngorongoro District

Photo: L. Ngegea (2011)

Interviews with the Maasai migrants: The procedures for carrying out the interviews among the Maasai migrant youth in Dar es Salaam were almost the same as with the local households. Identification of migrants was conducted by the researcher and his assistants and appointments with the migrants were made in advance. Dar es Salaam is a very busy city and thus it was imperative to seek a calm place to conduct the interviews. In most cases, interviews were conducted at the migrants' working places or in open yet calm places such as playing fields, where we could hardly experience disturbance.

The permission to take notes, record voices and take photos of the respondents was transparently sought from both the Maasai migrant and households' representatives. However, unlike in the local households, the Maasai migrants in Dar es Salaam were very sensitive about such issues. Migrants commonly thought that photos would be sold or simply be misused. In such cases whenever a migrant was not in favour of any of the aforementioned data collection techniques, other alternative techniques such as observation and informal discussions were sought, while trying to include the pertinent questions as much as possible.

In such cases, the researcher transcribed the information as soon as the discussion was over in order not to forget the most important points. Furthermore, it was important that both my assistant and I produced a reported of what actually transpired in the discussion, which were subsequently compared. This proved to be an efficient way of maintaining data reliability.

The flexible nature of the in-depth and open-ended interviews generally enabled the researcher to add or omit some questions in order to gain the information needed. Moreover, it also enabled the researcher gain detailed information about a topic in a unique manner (Flick et al., eds. 2004). Owing to its flexibility, the in-depth-interview guide generally helped me to include relevant or omit irrelevant questions related to the factors for rural-urban migration and the impact of migration on the households' resilience, as well as the migration-related threats encountered by both the Maasai migrants and households, including their strategies of coping with such threats.

4.6.6 Focus Group Discussion (FGDs)

This is a type of group discussion involving around 6 to 12 persons guided by a facilitator, during which group members talk freely and spontaneously about a certain topic in question (Flick et al., eds. 2004). Specifically, FGD was used to gather information from among the nomadic youth and some key informants. FGDs improve data efficiency as it increases data range and amount from several different people at the same time (Bohnsack 2004). Secondly, FGD maintains flexibility in exploring a certain issue and facilitates natural quality control in data collection and analysis processes given that participants are capable of providing timely checks and balances on extreme views (Bohnsack 2004).

5 FGDs were conducted, 3 with the Maasai migrants in Dar es Salaam city and 2 with the local government and NGOs officials in Ngorongoro District. In Ngorongoro District, it was more convenient to hold FGDs with the local government and NGOs officials rather than the households, because it was much easier to bring together the officials given their flexible nature, whereas the households' members seemed to be relatively unorganised and mobile due to their nomadic lifestyles.

Moreover, the government and NGOs officials, including those whose villages and wards had not been selected for interviews, were considered to be more representative given their closeness with the households. Three Focused Group Discussions (FGDs) were carried out with the Maasai nomadic migrant youth in Dar es Salaam, one each in Kinondoni, Ilala and Temeke Districts.

4.7 Research drawbacks and challenges: role of the researcher

Most qualitative researchers are conscious of their impact²⁵ on data production and analysis tasks. There are two schools of thought about the impact of the researcher or the so-called observer's effect in qualitative research (McDonald 2005; Shipman 1997).

²⁵ Researcher's impact is also known as observer's effect or "reactivity" or the "Hawthorne effect" (McDonald 2005; Shipman 1997). It means how respondents may perceive the researcher and how the researcher introduces his/ her bias to the respondents and the impact that all this has on the quantity and quality of the data being produced (Burawoy 1991; Denzin 2003).

The first school of thought argues that a qualitative researcher may negatively affect the data being produced by altering its objectivity or contaminating the social environment under observation (Hunt 1985). Specifically, people (subjects) being studied may not behave in their usual manner whilst aware of being observed or interviewed (Monahan and Fisher 2010). On the other hand, a researcher may incorrectly introduce his/her biases to the group being studied, thus producing less objective data (Wilson 1977; Agar 1980).

The second school of thought acknowledges both positive and negative effects of an observer on the data being produced, adding that effort should be taken to minimise the effect, mainly through the researcher's appropriate skills and an objective set of methods (McDonald 2005; Shipman 1997; Rajedran 2001). In fact, the observer's effects are not in themselves liabilities to qualitative research, but also reflect a useful asset in facilitating the generation of important data and critical insights (Monahan and Fisher 2010: 358).

In order to minimise the observer's (negative) effect, qualitative researchers are reminded of important points during data collection, analysis and report writing to ensure the quality of data and findings. While rapport building may facilitate gaining access to the field sites and engaging in productive discussion with informants (Monahan and Fisher 2010), the interpretation of information helps in establishing why respondents behave or do not behave in a certain way (Fox 2004).

Specifically, researchers should be aware of their biases, documenting and incorporating them in their reports as limitations (Patton 2002). Moreover, drawing a variety of information from different sources [triangulation] for comparison purposes may disapprove some dubious data (LeCompte and Goetz 1982; Spano 2006). Furthermore, an informed consent of the participants may reduce any existing suspicion that impedes data outflow from the respondents (Monahan and Fisher 2010).

Research setbacks and challenges in the context of this study

Guided by the aforementioned general principles, the researcher executed the following roles during the data collection, analysis and report writing stages in the context of this study.

Recognition of respondents' culture and values: Firstly, before and during the fieldwork, the researcher was fully that the Maasai nomadic pastoralists in Tanzania are generally considered as backward. Indeed, Maasai are also aware of such stereotypes and thus most likely tend to reactive negatively against them. Bearing this in mind during his interactions with the Maasai migrants and households' representatives in Ngorongoro District, the researcher was careful not to say or do something in a way that would make the respondents suspect or feel disrespected.

The researcher regarded his informants as individual actors with different experiences, statuses, needs and motives. More specifically, the researcher was careful not to intentionally or otherwise mention any of the negative stereotypes or jokes widely held about the Maasai people, given that this could lead to a hostile relationship between the researcher and his respondents, thus spoiling the data quality.

Dealing with respondents' aggressiveness: During the sampling and data collection stages among the Maasai nomadic migrant youth in Dar es Salaam, the researcher increasingly learned that the migrant youth were uncomfortable discussing with non-Maasai people, mainly due to the apparent stigma waged against the Maasai pastoralists by the rest of the Tanzanian community. Based on this same fact, the migrants would at times decline to participate in the discussion due to the fear that researchers were journalists or government officials who were against their being in the city, as was repeatedly attested by some of the interviewed migrants.

In addressing the above-noted situation, both samplings as well as interviewing tasks were accompanied with a significant **rapport building** process in order to establish closeness with the respondents. Indeed, sufficient time with the respondents renders them more habituated to the presence of the researcher, and they are consequently more likely to behave normally (Geertz 1973; Stoddart 1986). Moreover, the closeness with respondents helps to cultivate close ties with them, dispelling the illusion that robust data is best achieved through distance (Monahan and Fisher 2010).

In this case, the researcher's entry point in sampling and interviewing the Maasai migrants was through approaching the Maasai migrant youth working around the neighbourhood. The researcher started interacting with the migrants more every day, especially during their free time, and as time passed migrants introduced the researcher to other Maasai migrants in different parts of Dar es Salaam city.

The researcher's favourite time, which seemed to also be suitable for the Maasai migrants, was during evening hours. The researcher would thus visit migrants' places of work and engaged in normal day-to-day general discussions with them.

The researcher would make several jokes such as talking about some positive Maasai cultural aspects and a small amount of the Maasai language, including common words and greetings preferred by the Maasai. Having studied, worked and lived in Dar es Salaam for around 15 years, it was much easier for the researcher to identify where the Maasai migrants worked and met for socialisation and recreational activities. During a one-week period, the researcher came to know around 15 Maasai migrant youth with whom he would deepen his discussions by redirecting it towards the core research questions.

When the migrants (respondents) were completely into the subject, the researcher made further appointments with them and asked if they were willing to introduce him to other Maasai migrant youth in various parts of Dar es Salaam. In most cases, the migrants were willing to do so, and on a few occasions they simply needed a small bus fare of approximately Tsh 1000/= (equivalent to 60 cent euro), which helped them to search for friends who were willing to engage in the discussion with the researcher.

The researcher's self-familiarisation with the migrants was extremely facilitated by his assistant, who was also a Maasai youth graduate student. Being a Maasai, the assistant researcher was easily accepted by his fellow Maasai migrant youth and thus easily capable of either conducting talks with them or introducing them to the researcher. The assistant always introduced the researcher to the respondents as his friend and a student who was writing his PhD research report for academic purposes and not otherwise, as stipulated in the research ethics section.

The researcher also worked with some Maasai elders and employers in Dar es Salaam who would easily connect him to more Maasai migrants. Maasai elders were considered an appropriate entry point because the Maasai believe in seniority; therefore, seniors (elders) would be appreciated and respected by the Maasai migrant youth who were junior to them. The researcher also learned that some Maasai migrants were on very good terms with their employers and other city dwellers that they trusted. Consequently, the researcher also went through some of these employers in order to secure an audience with the Maasai migrants.

Ultimately, establishing a friendliness atmosphere with the respondents kept the researcher in a harmonious relationship with the respondents, enabling both smooth sampling and interviewing tasks and the subsequent smooth extraction of information from the respondents, which finally contributed to the reliability of the data.

This approach corresponds with (Fox 2004: 9), namely that rapport building with informants facilitates engagement and collaboration with informants and smoothens the data extraction process.

Problems with recording: In some cases, the recoding of peoples voices was bitterly discontented by some respondents, most particularly among the Maasai migrants in Dar es Salaam. The respondents were simply suspicious about their voices being misused elsewhere. In order to overcome this hurdle, respondents were informed in advance about the use of audio recording and educated about the importance of using such devices.

Importantly, consent letter stipulating the rationale of the research and the respondents' freedom to participate or not was read to them. Both the researcher and his assistants consistently told the migrants that the information was desired for the researcher's PhD work, which was solely intended for academic purposes, and that part of the findings could be used to change some of the policies regarding the Maasai living conditions, both in rural and urban areas.

After openly telling the respondents about the ABCs of the research, most of them were willing to participate in interviews, include taking notes, photos and recording their voices. This follows (Monahan and Fisher 2010: 4), who suggests that an informed consent of the participants can reduce suspicions that impede data outflow from the respondents.

However, in some cases, some respondents would still not comply even after providing all of the above-stated explanations. Therefore, the researcher and his assistants avoided the use of the aforementioned techniques in collecting data to avoid suspicion by the respondents, which would also impede data quality. In this case, other data collection alternatives such as observation, informal interviews and conversation were also applied.

Dealing with exaggerated responses: As the research proceeded, the researcher realised that some respondents and particularly the Maasai migrants in Dar es Salaam would exaggerate responses to some of the questions for their own purposes. Essentially, the migrants tended to exaggerate responses regarding their income status, including the extent to which it was enough or not enough for them. These migrants deliberately gave out more negative responses to show that they did not have any support and that they needed immediate cash support from the researcher.

Based on the observations of both the researcher and his assistant, who was also a Maasai, it became evident that some respondents thought that the researcher had some direct connections with some funding organisations that could support them financially. Therefore, they intended to use this type of strategy to show how financially helpless they were in order to be assured of some financial support.

To offset this situation, both the researcher and his assistant continually explained to each of the respondents that the researcher was simply a student conducting academic research for his academic thesis, affirming that it had nothing to do with supporting them financially. However, it was made clear that part of the research findings would be used to advocate for the improvement of the Maasai working and living conditions in the urban areas, as well as livelihood rights in their local communities. Thus, providing the accurate and genuine information was the best thing required of them (respondents).

Dealing with false information: Closely related to the exaggeration of responses to some of the interview questions was the feeling experienced by both the researcher and his assistant that some respondents would provide “responses which they assumed the researcher expected or needed to hear and not based on their actual experiences”. For example, some of the Maasai migrants in Dar es Salaam falsely acknowledged having received support from the local government and NGOs simply to please the researcher. However, based on the subsequent fieldwork experience, evaluations and some follow-ups, both the researcher and his assistants recognised that some of the respondents who gave such responses thought that the researcher was possibly involved in a local government institution or NGO and would consequently victimise them if they gave out some negative responses.

In order to overcome such a situation, whenever researchers felt deceived they probed the respondents by asking more specific questions. Researchers' responses and emphasis on some points made the respondents realize that researchers were truly in search of genuine responses, hence validating the need for them to be truthful. Moreover, most of the doubted responses were crosschecked with other data sources and gathering techniques, notably observation, key informants' interviews and the review of secondary data. Former evidence also suggests that drawing a variety of information from different sources (triangulation) for comparison purposes can disapprove some dubious data (LeCompte and Goetz 1982; Spano 2006).

Dealing with indirect /less clear responses: During both data collection and analysis, the researcher increasingly noted that some responses provided by some respondents were not direct and thus could not be directly associated with the research questions. Therefore, a close reflection on and interpretation of data in relation to the research key questions was undertaken. This included seeking clarifications from both the respondents and research assistants. Immediately after the interview was completed, the researcher would also engage in informal conversations with respondents where he would more casually and subtly bring up some of the unclear issues. Moreover, the researcher used to have daily discussions with his assistants, during which they discussed some unclear responses and their relevance to the main research questions.

The researcher also keenly went through the data to establish the relevance of certain responses to the research questions. Moreover, during data analysis, the researcher communicated with either his assistants or particular respondents in the case of any information that seemed unclear. Such an initiative corresponds well with the contention that 'meaning is not out there to be found by the researcher'. It is rather continuously made and remade through social practice and the give-and-take of social interaction, including interaction between researcher and respondent (Emerson et al. 1995). Moreover, during data analysis, the researcher was conscious enough to take into account any distortions that had occurred during interviews, as well as the extent to which this could have affected the data quality, as suggested by wider qualitative research literature (Burawoy 1991; Denzin and Lincoln 2003).

Maintaining informants' motivation during discussion: At some point, the researcher also noted that respondents were uncomfortable with the interview sessions being too long. While some interviews would take more than one hour, most of the respondents were only capable of concentrating for between 15 to 45 minutes, after which they would hardly respond to further questions. Therefore, the researcher shortened the questionnaire and always started with general yet core and interesting questions before moving on to the less important ones. This enabled the interviewees to freely and fully respond to the questions within their preferred time framework, which facilitated fully exploring the topic under investigation, as suggested in previous former research (Salkind 2003).

For example, questions related with demographic information were cleverly asked during or at the end of the interviews.

Overcoming male perspective: During his fieldwork in Ngorongoro District, the researcher experienced a situation whereby some women households' representatives were unwilling to be interviewed in the absence of their husbands or at least a well-known male member. However, having read about the Maasai culture and partly lived with the Maasai, the researcher was fully aware that the Maasai society is highly male-dominated and thus women's decisions, including their participation in interviews, would be significantly influenced by males. According to the researcher's assistants and the officials who accompanied the researcher, women could nevertheless agree to have interviews in the absence of men. However, the researcher could not guarantee the quality of their information, as women were likely not to state the truth in the fear of their husbands.

To ensure the active participation of women in his discussions, the researcher and his assistants ensured that whenever a household was represented by a woman, they either had to be accompanied by a male neighbour or postponed the interview until the husband or an elder son was at home. In this case, the researcher would ensure the quality of data, as women felt more secure in interacting with a male visitor [interviewer] in the absence of a man, notably a husband or a Maasai man well known to them.

Dealing with lack of privacy: A lack of privacy in this research predominantly occurred in Dar es Salaam while interviewing the Maasai migrant youth. While interviewing a respondent, the researcher sometimes noticed that some other people, including other Maasai migrants who had already been interviewed, were moving around and tempted to join the discussion. Indeed, this somewhat destructed the discussion.

However, the researcher thought that ending the interview abruptly would send a signal of suspicion to the rest of the people, especially the Maasai migrants who were his potential respondents. These people would think that the researcher was perhaps trying to hide something, which would have consequently spoilt the researcher's rapport with the next respondents because such news would very quickly spread among the other Maasai migrants, given their unified nature. To avoid such suspicion, the researcher continued with the interviews and where possible asked some more general questions. The researcher could not completely stop the interview, given the nature of the respondents and the environment in which he had found himself.

To avoid other non-Maasai people destructing the discussion/interviews, the researcher made appointments with the respondents (Maasai migrants) on time and decided to meet in calm places that ensured silence and privacy. Moreover, whenever other non-Maasai people unexpectedly interrupted the discussion, the researcher was flexible enough to either change the topic or advised them to go away.

Demand for handouts in exchange for Data: Some respondents believed that the information provided was going to benefit the researcher financially and thus they requested incentives such as money in return. Indeed, following this they were unwilling to provide information, as evidenced by one of the respondents below:

“When you are looking for something [information], for free there are two things involved, either to get it or not to get it. So go back and tell your teacher [since I was a student] that you have not managed to find the information he [she] has sent you to look for. Nothing is given out for free these days”. (**Male Maasai migrant youth (27), Dar es Salaam**)

To overcome this, the respondents were made to understand that the information was purely for academic purposes and not otherwise. In this case, apart from a significant rapport building process, a research ethics letter that transparently stipulated the rationale of the research was also read to the respondents, as previously explained.

Coping with the language barrier: Although some Maasai pastoralists are familiar with Kiswahili, the national language in Tanzania, the greater majority of them are more comfortable with their mother tongue, the Kiamaasai or (*Maa*) language. This led to the communication problem between the researcher and the respondents, given that the researcher is not versed with the *Maa* language. To solve this problem, the researcher relied on his assistants for translation, given that they were Maasai. Accordingly, they helped with the data translations from the *Maa* language to Kiswahili or English, at almost all levels of the fieldwork. Indeed, such second-hand information could have also been considered as one of the weaknesses in terms of data reliability.

Dealing with respondents’ mobility and unavailability: In Dar es Salaam, the Maasai migrants were mobile and less traceable due to their lack of permanent settlements and engagement in multiple income activities in various parts of the city. Time management with the migrants proved difficult, even after making appointments with them.

In order to overcome this setback, the researcher was obliged to trace the migrants some few minutes before interviews, mainly through mobile phone. Moreover, the researcher had to be flexible enough to re-schedule his interview timetable depending on the migrants’ timetable and availability. This meant tracing the respondents in their working and sleeping places for interviews at their convenient time, including at night.

Almost the same situation as described above was evident among the Maasai local households’ representatives in Ngorongoro District. It was relatively difficult to meet and talk to some households’ members in Ngorongoro District owing to their nomadic nature, which rendered them extremely mobile. To solve this problem, the researcher used a motorcycle to search for the respondents in the most remote areas of Loliondo Division, where they engaged in various activities. At times, some respondents requested being transported back home where they could hold interviews in the presence of the rest of their family members.

This was a time-consuming yet positive element for the researcher, because the participation of other household members in the interviews strengthened data quality. Moreover, households' environment provided the researcher with an opportunity to carry out observations.



Figure 10: Planning where and how to find respondents in Ngorongoro District

Photo L. Ledio (2011)

4.8 Data coding and analysis

Owing to the research design employed in this study, the researcher used qualitative analytical techniques to organise, summarise, interpret and present research findings in relation to the study objectives and questions. Indeed, the analysis of qualitative research data begins in the field at the time of observation and/or interviewing, given that the researcher identifies problems and concepts that appear likely to help in understanding the situation (Maxwell 1996: 78–81).

In line with the above-stated wisdom, the first phase of data analysis task proceeded alongside the data collection, during which all of the necessary editing and organisation of data was undertaken to ensure its quality. Editing each interview soon after it was conducted provided the researcher with the opportunity to get back to respondents and collect some missing information. In this case, reading the notes or transcripts represented an important step in the analytic process of this particular thesis (Maxwell 1996).

Data was recorded in Kiswahili and (*Maasai language*) using the audiocassette, and subsequently transcribed and translated into English. The translated data scripts (hereafter referred to as documents) were entered into MAXQDA 10 [VERBI Software, Marburg, Germany] (2011). These documents were subsequently organised into four major categories, namely Maasai migrant youth, household representatives, key informants or experts and observation reports. Thereafter, the documents were thoroughly examined and edited to eliminate any possible errors. This was followed by a creation of codes, sub-codes and variables from the four data categories.

Thereafter, research objectives and questions further helped the researcher to determine codes and sub-codes to facilitate the emergence of patterns, themes or consistency in ideas. This was conducted based on an inductive approach, meaning that the patterns, themes, and categories of analysis emerged out of the data rather than being imposed on them prior to the data collection and analysis (Silverman 2001; Pope et al. 2000; Patton 2002). The information resulting from this process was further examined to consider the extent to which it answered the research questions or otherwise. The researcher subsequently commented on this information accordingly.

Demographic information such as age, sex, education and marital status were also scrutinised to quantify and present some of the repetitive patterns concerning the impact of migration on the resilience of the migrants and households.

In order to facilitate the aforementioned processes, two experienced qualitative assistant researchers were outsourced to work very closely with the researcher. Assistant researchers were versed with the Maasai culture and capable of speaking Maasai, Kiswahili and English. In collaboration with the researcher, the assistant researchers were responsible for interpreting responses provided by respondents who opted to express themselves in the Maasai language, carry out interviews, transcribing and translating the data from Maasai or Kiswahili to English.

4.9 Reliability and validity of data

In order to achieve the reliability and validity of qualitative data, qualitative research veterans encourage qualitative researchers to think in terms of trustworthiness (Denzin and Lincoln 1994; Lincoln and Guba 1985; Padgett 2004). This means that qualitative researchers need to contemplate beyond the conventional, positivistic criteria of internal and external validity and reliability (Denzin and Lincoln 2003, 1994; Padgett 1998) in (Bowen 2005: 115). In particular, credibility, transferability, dependability and conformability are proposed as vital criteria for trustworthiness, guaranteeing reliability and validity in the qualitative research (Denzin and Lincoln 2003).

Credibility refers to the confidence held about the truth of the research findings (Silverman 2001; Pope et al. 2000). Transferability means that other researchers can apply the findings of the study to their own research, while dependability refers to the stability of the findings over time. Finally, conformability refers to the internal coherence of the data in relation to the findings and interpretations and the recommendations made thereafter (Denzin and Lincoln 1994) in (Bowen 2005: 215–216).

In order to ensure these crucial aspects of “data reliability and validity” in the context of this thesis triangulation, prolonged engagement in data collection and analysis, member checking, peer review and debriefing, analysis of negative cases, daily evaluation of field work and reflection on the data were employed (Padgett 1998; Denzin and Lincoln 2003; Lincoln and Guba 1985). These criteria are detailed below as applied to the context of this thesis.

Triangulation: This involved consulting more than one source of information and using multiple techniques of data collection. In this case, a myriad of respondents, notably the Maasai migrant youth, Maasai local households’ members, government officials at different levels, NGO’s officials and the Maasai elders and migrants’ employers in both Dar es Salaam and Ngorongoro were interviewed. Moreover, as noted in the data collection section, numerous techniques of data collection were employed, including document review and analysis, informal conversation and interviews, observations, in-depth interviews as well as Focus Group Discussions (FGD) with the migrants, household representatives and key informants.

Furthermore, during the household interviews, other household members were also allowed to participate in the discussion to supplement the information. Eventually, this ensured the credibility and rigor of the data (Padgett 1998), reflecting the vital ingredients for the data reliability and validity.

Prolonged engagement in data collection and analysis: This essentially meant taking sufficient time to thoroughly accomplish the data collection and analysis tasks. This notably meant carrying out in-depth interviews and observations despite their irritability and time-consuming nature, rather than rushing them for the sake of finishing (Pope et al. 2000).

To ensure systematic data collection and analysis, the first phase of the field work lasted for seven months (January to July 2011), whereby observation, informal conversation, key informants interviews, in-depth interviews, focus groups discussions (FGD) and a series of observations were conducted both among the Maasai nomadic migrants in Dar es Salaam and the local households in Ngorongoro District.

Moreover, even after this first phase, additional data collection was conducted alongside data analysis tasks, from July 2011-October 2012. This was achieved through physically going back to the field or communicating with the research assistants.

Secondly, during this second phase of data collection, intensive communication with some of the respondents via e-mails and telephone calls were made as part of soliciting more data and confirming the existing data. In this case, iterative work of going back and forth was conducted in order to be certain about the data and findings (Padgett 2004, 1998).

Member checking and auditing: This essentially involves restating your data to your respondents and other important stakeholders to confirm the extent to which your findings are true and reflect your respondents' ideas (Carlson 2010). In order to achieve this important aspect of data reliability, the researcher shared the findings with the informants during the fieldwork, either immediately after the interviews or shortly afterwards. In most cases, the researcher summarised the interviews and restated the summary to the respondents to observe the extent to which the particular collected information reflected respondents' ideas.

Secondly, the researcher also shared part of his findings with some relevant stakeholders such as NGOs and local government officials, the Maasai elders and migrants' employers, either individually or in groups. These stakeholders provided constructive feedback, reflecting the extent to which the collected or analysed data/ information reflected respondents' ideas and particularly those of the Maasai nomadic migrant youth and their households.

Even after travelling to Germany, where most of the report writing task was accomplished, the member checking task continued through phone calls and e-mail communication with different respondents and non-respondents to check the accuracy of facts about the existing information while the data analysis and report writing tasks continued. Some respondents and important stakeholders were contacted to confirm and clarify certain information. Crosschecking data with respondents and particularly with research assistants helped the researcher to maintain reflexivity [that is referring back], patterning the data collection and analysis process. This encouraged self-awareness and self-correction (Padgett 2004).

Peer review and debriefing: Peer debriefing means having someone who is experienced about the topic going through the interview transcripts, emerging categories from those transcripts and the final report. The peer helps to detect whether or not a researcher has over-or under-emphasised certain points, which adds to the trustworthiness and credibility of the qualitative research data and subsequent findings (Lincoln and Guba 1985; Creswell 2003; Creswell 1998).

In order to accomplish this task, the researcher consulted at least four people throughout this work, including his two supervisors and one mentor with whom he would share the findings and progress on a weekly basis. Specifically, the mentor provided valuable help in demonstrating superior knowledge in qualitative research, rural-urban migration and resilience. She persistently asked extremely bitter and challenging questions, which kept the researcher more factual, analytical and focused on his work.

Moreover, the researcher contacted further individuals with advanced knowledge about his topic and the methodology he had decided to use. These people commented on the work accordingly and hence guaranteed the dependability of the findings (Padgett 1998). Furthermore, the researcher also had the opportunity to present his findings to two international conferences, where he also received relevant constrictive feedback.

Negative case analysis: Negative case analysis is a process of refining analysing negative or unexpected information until it can explain or account for the majority of cases (Creswell 2007). This involves searching for and discussing elements of the data that do not support or appear to contradict patterns or explanations that emerge from the data analysis. Negative cases were also apparent in the context of this thesis (Creswell 2007). This aspect was properly dealt with through the triangulation or consultation of other sources of information and data collection techniques.

For example, during interviews with the Maasai migrants, some of the migrants falsely acknowledged to have received support from local government and NGOs. This was somewhat strange to the researcher, because some previous data had increasingly maintained that the Maasai migrants could hardly receive support from public and private institutions in coping with various migrations' related threats. Later on, based on the fieldwork experience and some follow ups, the researcher recognised that respondents had provided such false responses intentionally due to the fear that the researcher was either a local government or NGO official who would victimise them for talking negatively about the role of public and private institutions in support of migrants. Therefore, they simply wanted to please me! As stated above, such suspicion was ironed out through taking it forward; employing other sources of information and inquiry techniques.

General reflection on the data and daily field work evaluation: During the fieldwork period, serious efforts were made to critically think and reflect on the gathered data on the daily basis. At the end of each day, interview scripts and field notes were reviewed to assess whether the task of the day met its objectives (Pope et al. 2000). The main focus was placed upon editing possible errors, missing or lacking information and identifying new issues and cases. In this case, it was imperative to meet with research assistants to compare notes and share what transpired throughout the whole day's fieldwork. Based on this evaluation, best practices were documented and helped to improve subsequent fieldwork tasks.

Note taking: Moreover, careful note-taking and recording exercises were undertaken, the former of which involved writing down important things that we observed before, during and after the interviews. Among other things, I was very conscious of noting down respondents' names, places, gender and age as interviews proceeded, in order not to forget them as well as shortening my interview time. Recording helped me to ensure the quality of data, particularly in places where I had limited time and could not write down everything.

4.10 Ethical considerations

This thesis ensured a number of ethical considerations to further counterbalance the previously discussed research challenges and to further promote data reliability and validity. Firstly, the researcher acquired the legal research permit No. **2011-291-NA-2011-149**, authorised by the Tanzanian Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH).

In addition, written research clearances were obtained from the Dar es Salaam and Arusha Regional Commissioners' (RC) offices and subsequently from the various local government offices in both Ngorongoro District and Dar es Salaam region, where the research took place.

Secondly, a carefully crafted consent letter was prepared and read to the participants prior to engaging in interviews with individual respondents. After reading the consent letter, respondents could willingly decide whether or not to participate in the interviews. Among other things, the consent letter assured the participants that the information being solicited was solely meant for research and not otherwise and that they were free to participate or not in the interview, as well as being free to withdraw from the interviews at any stage.

Moreover, the researcher worked with two experienced qualitative assistant researchers, both of whom were capable of speaking and understanding the Maasai/*Maa* language. Research Assistants had also received an intensive two-day coaching in qualitative research methods and ethics and were familiarised with both the research concept and tools.

4.11 Chapter summary

In summary, this chapter has discussed the research methods applied to this particular thesis. The chapter firstly presented the research design, whereby the meaning of the qualitative research and its relevance to this thesis were concisely underscored. The study sites for this particular study were briefly described and the reasons for their choice were established. Subsequently, procedures for sampling the informants, techniques of data collection and analysis were elaborated upon in-depth. Moreover, research constraints were intensely discussed, mainly those inherent in the qualitative research approach and the role of the researcher in overcoming them. Furthermore, the reliability and validity of the data was discussed and the research ethics were presented before concluding the chapter.

5. Factors for and patterns of rural-urban migration of the Maasai pastoralist youth

5.1 Introduction

This chapter explores and systematically documents reasons for and patterns of rural-urban migration of the Maasai nomadic migrant youth in Tanzania, taking Ngorongoro District, Arusha and Dar es Salaam City as cases in point. Specifically, the chapter attempts to answer the following questions: Why did the Maasai nomadic youth migrate to the present destination [Dar es Salaam], and what informed this decision? Based on the myriad of rural urban-migration theories and a qualitative approach, the findings contend that although rural-urban migration patterns among the Maasai youth were initially triggered by poverty-related factors, they were also fuelled by technological and social network-related factors. The chapter starts by presenting migration patterns and factors among the Maasai migrant youth, before proceeding with a discussion about these findings and some theoretical implications. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary.

5.1 Patterns and nature of the Maasai migrant youth migration

Migrants' occupations in rural areas prior to migration: Around 65% of the interviewed Maasai migrants were mainly engaged in pastoralist-related tasks, including grazing and taking cattle to auctions. They undertook such tasks on their own or for pay from others. Around 9% of migrants were mainly involved in agriculture, where they cultivated maize and to a lesser extent beans, cassava and varieties of cereals. 26% were mainly involved in different entrepreneurial activities such as bee keeping and honey selling, stone and sand quarrying²⁶, operating retail shops, selling livestock medication and offering security services in nearby places. These findings seem to correspond strongly with (Yanda and William 2010; Mung'ong'o 2010) , who also noted that the Maasai of Simanjiro and Longido districts in Arusha region engaged in entrepreneurship-related activities before migrating to urban areas. Such activities were keeping shops, livestock keeping, and agriculture and providing security services in the nearby areas as ways of coping with diminishing cattle economy resulting from drought²⁷.

²⁶ Sand and stone quarrying was one of the livelihood activity employed by some migrants before migration but also by their local households in Ngorongoro due to the decline of pastoralism. A lorry of sand / stones coasted between Tsh 15,000/= and 20,000/= [7-10 Euros].

²⁷ See also Mung'ong'o, G.C. (2010), *Climate Change and Changing Patterns of Pastoralism in arid and Semi-Arid Tanzania: Case of Pastoralist Maasai of Simanjiro District, Arusha*.

Migrants' consent to migrate: Essentially, around 62% of the interviewed migrants reported to have informed or discussed their decision to migrate to urban areas with their household members, namely wives, parents and guardians, and in many cases were allowed to migrate mainly due to household poverty²⁸. By contrast, around 38% of the interviewed migrants did not inform or discuss with their households or relatives concerning their decision to migrate.

There were particular reasons why some migrants did not discuss their decisions to migrate or were not allowed to do so by the household members. Firstly, Maasai youth declined to discuss their ideas to migrate with the rest of the household members due to the fear that they would not be allowed to migrate, given that they were still needed for some economic and cultural tasks such as initiation rites, grazing, agriculture and taking care of their siblings. Secondly, some youth did not inform about their intention to migrate due to misdeeds they had committed in the sending area prior to migrating to urban areas. It was learned that some youth had committed misdeeds such as stealing, selling their relatives' livestock, departing with other people's property such as mobile phones, watches and cash money without the owners' permission or simply dodging some household responsibilities²⁹.

On the other hand, some migrants' households did not allow their youth to migrate to urban areas because they perceived rural-urban migration as a negative practice that would expose the youth to threats such as HIV/AIDS. Moreover, it was believed that it would also lead to degradation of the Maasai culture and traditions through acquiring and practicing urban values.

Migrants' origins, destinations and cities visited before: In ascertaining the migrants' origins or last destinations visited prior to migrating to Dar es Salaam, it was revealed that around 60% of migrants had come from the **Arusha** region, namely the Monduli, Simanjiro, Longido, Arumeru, Manyara and Ngorongoro Districts. 15% had come from the **Kilimanjaro** region, notably from the Same, Mwanga and Hai Districts. 12% came from the **Tanga** Region, including the Muheza, Handeni and Kilindi Districts, while 4% came from **Morogoro**, mainly from the Kilosa and Ifakara districts. Moreover, 2% came from the **Mbeya** and **Iringa** Regions and 2 % came from **Dodoma**. Finally, around 3% came from the **Coastal region**, particularly from the Kibaha and Bagamoyo, Districts while 2% came from the **Lindi and Mtwara** Regions (n=50). Please see the figure below for further reference.

²⁸ Poverty in this context meant lack of or little access to basic needs [food, shelter, health support and education] of life by individuals or households due to mainly decline of pastoralism and agriculture.

²⁹ To discuss their desire to migrate with relatives and friends it would mean firstly resettling the aforementioned issues. However, in most cases they seemed not to be in the position to resolve these issues and thus migrated clandestinely.




Figure 11: Map of Tanzania: origin of / last place visited by the interviewed Maasai migrants in Dar es Salaam

Source: K. Lickert (2012)

However, it was also noted that a significant number of the Maasai migrant youth had been to more than one city before migrating to Dar es Salaam, including cities outside Tanzania. Specifically, 22% of the interviewed migrants were visiting an urban area [Dar es Salaam] for the first time, 32% were visiting an urban area [Dar es Salaam] for the second time or as a second city, while 46% were visiting Dar es Salaam as the third or more city (n=50). Besides, five of the interviewed migrants had previously migrated to neighbouring countries [although not necessarily to cities] such as Mozambique, Zambia, Somalia and Uganda prior to migrating to Dar es Salaam.

Specifically, the Tanzanian cities visited³⁰ by the interviewed Maasai migrants in Dar es Salaam were Moshi, Arusha, Bukoba Mwanza, Shinyanga, Morogoro, Tanga, Mbeya and Zanzibar. Central reasons for visiting these cities mainly related to their geographical proximity and social network (presence of relatives and friends). However, more uniquely, Maasai youth in the Ngorongoro District migrated to Arusha, Shinyanga, Mwanza, Moshi, Bukoba Boma and Kwasadala³¹ towns, as well as some Kenyan cities, namely Kisumu, Nairobi, Narok and Laitoktok, as shown in the figure below.




Figure 12: Map of Tanzania: Destinations of the Maasai migrant youth from Ngorongoro District

Source: K. Lickert (2012)

³⁰ Apparently, the Maasai did not only migrate to urban but also to rural areas. For example, the Maasai of Simanjiro District in Arusha Region migrated to the nearby rural areas where they engaged in agriculture and pastoralist activities. They intermarried with agriculturalists and later on adopted agriculture to cope with household poverty due to drought. (See also Mung'ung'o, G. (2010))

³¹ Boma and Kwasadala are [trading centres] small towns between Arusha and Moshi Cities

Again, migrants preferred these cities due to their geographical proximity, social network, support and more particularly to experience the same cultural aspects such as language and economic activities, i.e. pastoralism, conducted by Maasai from both Kenya and Tanzania in these cities. The role of social networks in fuelling the rural-urban migration among the Maasai nomadic pastoralists will be further explained in one of the subsequent sections.

Some secondary data also supports the aforementioned findings, noting that Maasai pastoralists in Simanjiro District in Arusha Region have been moving their animals south to the Kilindi District, Tanga region, Kiteto, Arusha, Kilosa, Morogoro and Dodoma region as a response to climate variability, given that pasture conditions are much better in such locations (Mung'ong'o 2010).

Duration of stay in urban areas and ties with local households: The rural-urban migration of the Maasai youth was essentially circular [seasonal or short-lived] in nature. Maasai intended to work in urban areas for a short period of time and return home to invest mainly in cattle. Around 80% (n=50) of the interviewed Maasai migrants demonstrated their heartfelt desire to return home after each specific period of time [e.g. 6 months or one year] or to work shortly with the purpose of saving and investing in their local communities as opposed to living in cities permanently. 20% were either undecided or tended to remain in urban areas indefinitely. One of the migrants attests that the city is simply a place of making money rather than living forever:

My intention of coming here was obviously not to live here forever. Who told you we [Maasai] were born to dwell in cities? I simply need to [work] raise money and buy cattle (...) this is just a place for raising money and buy [invest it in] cows. (...) I need cattle for bride price and for my future life [other needs like food, shelter and education for children]. **(Male Maasai migrant youth (30), Dar es Salaam)**

Some secondary data also stipulates the common form of migration among the Maasai migrants as being seasonal or temporary, with the intention to return to their areas of origin (May 2003; Kweka 2011). Specifically, Maasai opted for this with the primary aim of rebuilding their diminished livestock herds and returning to Maasai-land as pastoralists (Kweka 2011).

In terms of the frequency and means of communication between migrants and their local households, it was noted that around 60% communicated with households at least once in a week, 35% communicated with their local households yet were not certain about the frequency. Finally, around 5% never communicated at all, communicated inconsistently or could not remember when they last communicated with their households (n=80).

The above-noted revelation shows that most of the Maasai migrants maintained close ties with their local households even after migrating to urban areas. These findings are in line with (Mbonile 2006) in (Yanda and William 2010: 2), who noted that some Maasai youngsters who had migrated to urban areas such as Arusha and Dodoma Regions in search of wage employment maintained close ties with their homes.

There were several reasons why some Maasai migrants were more active than others in communicating with their local households. Migrants mainly communicated with their households due to the accessibility and availability of mobile phone service, as well as based on their need and ability to send remittances back home. By contrast, those who did not have access to mobile phones nor the need and ability to send remittances were significantly reluctant in communicating with their local households.

Migrants' inability to send remittances back home subjected them to social stigma, because whenever they communicated with their relatives in the local households they were asked to send some remittances; however, these migrants were either unprepared or not in the position to do so. One respondent stipulates it as follows:

(...) you know these youth are afraid of calling back home because of the shame. Some of them don't have jobs or good reasons to stay in the city. They are afraid of being asked and answering questions like where they leave and what they are doing in the city. Or they fear to be asked for support [economic support] by their household's members. The majority of them consider such questions as embarrassing because they have neither good jobs nor good places to stay or to be proud of. **(Male key informant (42) Loliondo Division, Ngorongoro)**

Besides, migrants were ashamed of looking back to their local communities, partly because they had been involved in socially undesirable behaviour before leaving their households and villages.

5.2 Factors for rural-urban migration of the Maasai youth

5.2.1 Households' poverty, decline of pastoralism and agriculture: climatic factors

Households' poverty: The findings noted that the rural-urban migration of the Maasai youth was fundamentally due to households' poverty, as evidenced by around 92% (n=80). Poverty in the context of respondents meant a lack of or inability by households' members to access basic needs, namely food, clothing, shelter, health and education. Consequently, Maasai youth had to migrate to urban areas³² in search of wage labour to mitigate household poverty in a bid to ensure the aforementioned needs, or simply to escape the poverty situation of their households. Around 8% (n=80) of respondents mentioned family problems such as marital inconveniences and misunderstandings among family members as a factor for migration.

It was further noted that households' poverty as a main migration driver was also caused by the decline of pastoralism and to a lesser extent agriculture, which had been the main livelihood activities in the Maasai land. The decline of such activities and subsequent unemployment and poverty situations thus pushed the Maasai youth towards urban areas to either escape or search for wage labour in order to alleviate household poverty.

³² **"Irrelevance of purpose of existence"** was variously mentioned as one of the major factors for rural-urban migration of the Maasai youth. Traditionally, Maasai youth practiced transhumance that means migrating with cattle, or going to steal cows, but now they could not do it due to the decline of livestock due to climate change, conservation and investments.

Therefore, it was important to further inquire factors leading to the decline of both pastoralism and agricultural, unearthing the following.

Decline of pastoralism and agriculture: Exploring the reasons for the decline of pastoralism as a critical reason for rural-urban migration, migrants and sending households maintained that pastoralism was undermined by unexpected climate variability (62%), lack of land [due to conservation and investments] (2%) and livestock diseases, mainly due to a lack of extension services (16%) (n=80).

Major reasons for the decline of agriculture were also mainly associated with extreme or unexpected climate variability (66%), a lack of land [due to conservation and investments] (22%) and agricultural skills and support (subsidies) (12%) (n=80). In such cases, extreme climate variability included drought [shortage of rain] and floods [too much rain] that devastated crops, pastures and impeded water availability. This limited pastoralism given that it caused livestock death and intentional reduction of stock by the Maasai in order to enable them to cope with the shortage of pastures. The devastation of crop worsened hunger and hiked food prices, leading to migration, as stated by one of the many Maasai migrants in Dar es Salaam:

All that I am saying is that, at the moment, we simply don't have rain there [in his local village]. As a result, pastures and water are affected [negatively]. So cows are diminishing simply because of that. This is a big problem because we depend on livestock for whole our lives [hundred percent]. Because of that we don't have food and means of getting married [paying bride prices]. And this is one of the problems that have made us [Maasai] think of coming to the city. **(Male Maasai youth migrant (30), Dar es Salaam)**

A key informant in Ngorongoro [Ioliondo] also correlates the harsh climate and the rural-urban migration of the Maasai youth below:

.... I still recall the 2009 drought; it devastated not only livestock but also crops. In fact, we did not harvest anything!! [Our] youth became practically jobless as they could engage neither in livestock husbandry nor in agriculture. But this is not enough, in the past [1997-98] we have experienced *Elnino* [heavy rains and floods] which caused deaths of so many cattle here. It was terrible, I don't want to remember about it anymore (...). **(Male, local government official and former NGO official, Loliondo division, Ngorongoro)**

Secondary data³³ also supports climate variability³⁴ as source of frequent droughts and floods that increased poverty and livestock diseases and hence leading to among other things rural-urban migration of the Maasai as a livelihood strategy (ODI 2009; May and McCabe 2004; UNEP 2009).

³³ In his recent study, (Mung'ong'o 2010) informs that many of the Maasai in Simanjiro District, Arusha attested the 1997, 2005 and 2008 as the hottest years emphasising that the 2009 drought has been the worst in 40 years. The 2005-2006 droughts were nicknamed *Olodondolit* (red marrow) because when the cattle died, their marrow turned red. This led to less milk and less food production on farms. The animals did not fetch the same price as before since they are thin and sick. The price of a bull had declined from between Tsh. 80,000 and 100,000 to the current Tsh. 50,000.

³⁴ It has been suggested that East African rainfall is bimodal, yet characterised by uncertainty both spatially and temporally, see, for example Galvin, Thornto, Boone & Sunderland (2004).

Particularly, in 1998 El Niño produced an estimated five-fold increase in rainfall whereas 1997 and 1999 were drought years (WFP 2003). Besides, failures in agricultural production in the Maasai land has been worsened by droughts, floods and poor soils (Mung'ong'o 2010) . The figure below further illustrates this fact.



Figure 13: The 2009 drought in East Africa: a major factor for the Maasai urban migration

Photo: E. Munishi (2011)

Land loss to investments: It was also noted that the lack of land for pastoralism and agriculture resulting from conservation and investments in Maasai land reflected a major reason for poverty and subsequent rural-urban migration among the Maasai youth. The loss of land among the Maasai of Ngorongoro District is essentially due to the fact that 51% of land is under Conservation Area and 49%, mostly found in the Loliondo, Division is under Game Controlled Area, hence denying the people full control of their land (Odhiambo 2008; Olengurumwa 2009).

Besides, the Maasai who formerly occupied the area around the Ihefu valley in Mbeya region, southern Tanzania, were evicted in order to give way to conservation, thus worsening their wellbeing. Moreover, Maasai who formerly inhabited in the present Mkomazi National Game Reserve in the Same District in the Kiimanajro region were also evicted during the 1980s and 1990s to give way to conservation [game reserve] (Kaare 1996; Juma 1998).

Maasai in the Kilosa District, Morogoro region, have lost large tracks of grazing land to famers and other groups due to government land policies that are less considerate of vulnerable groups such as the Maasai (Odhiambo 2008; Mbonile 2005), as further evidenced by one of the respondents below:

“Also these days we are not allowed to graze in some parts of Loliondo, one of the places we used to take our cows to for water and good pastures especially during dry seasons have been given to an investor who does not allow us anymore to graze there”. **(Female, Household representative (34) Loliondo Division, Ngorongoro)**

The following figure shows some protected areas in Tanzania, depicting that Maasai land is more affected by such development.




Figure 14: Map of Tanzania: protected areas

Source: Ole Ndaskoy (2006), modified by K. Lickert (2012)

Economic investments in Ngorongoro prohibited pastoralism and agriculture. Moreover, a loss of grazing and agriculture land has also occurred among the Maasai of the Monduli and Manyara Districts. A household representative in the Ngorongoro District attests to the loss of land through conservation initiatives as follows:

In the past we used to have a reserve land for grazing. When draught prevailed in the southern part we would move towards the north around Serengeti area where we would secure nice pastures including abundant water for our livestock. However, the government has been progressively more encroaching on these areas [our land], by allowing the investors to use the land and openly prohibiting us from practicing pastoralism there. Investors are inflowing here day after day and if we talk against the investments in our land the government silences us by force. So if this is the situation why shouldn't our young people migrate [to urban areas]. **(Male household representative (60), Loliondo)**

Some secondary data also offers insights into Maasai land loss to investments. In 2009, the inhabitants of the Loliondo Division in the Ngorongoro District were evicted from their ancestry land in order to give way for investors. Thousands of hectares of the Maasai land [8 villages] were taken by the OBC investment, with 200 households and food stores entirely burnt, around 3,000 people made homeless, several maize farms set ablaze, more than 50,000 cattle pushed into inadequate and drought pasture, leading to deaths, among other things (Olengurumwa 2009).

5.2.2 State and land tenure policies

Secondary data suggests that a lack of land among the Maasai, which hugely determined the current rural-urban migration patterns of the Maasai youth, is mainly a product of Tanzania's inconsistent land tenure policies from colonial times to the present.

During colonial times (1880s-1990s), colonial Land Tenure³⁵ policies falsely legalised the use of Maasai land for settlement construction, ranches and national parks and game reserves as evidenced by the present Serengeti, Manyara, Ngorongoro, Tarangire national parks in Tanzania and the Maasai Mara National park in Kenya (Kweka 2011; Goldman 2011).

Following independence in (1960s and 1970s), state land policies in Tanzanian [and Kenya] have continued to discriminate against the Maasai pastoralists in terms of their land. While Tanzania land laws consider land as a state-owned resource, the government has failed to ensure the equal and equitable distribution of land, including who and how to invest on land. Consequently, the Maasai land has been taken under national interests in order to support farmers and national investments (Shivji 1991).

For example, due to their pathetic nature, state land tenure laws have increasingly allowed the encroachment on to the Maasai land of Maasai land by agro-pastoralist societies such as the wa-Meru and wa-Arusha people (Goldman 2009; Doenges and Newman 1989).

³⁵ According to (Ole Ndaskoi 2006; Dapash 2001; Parkipuny 1991), the 1904 and 1911 false land treaties between the Maasai and the British colonial government and later on the re-drawing of artificial territorial boundaries [creation of modern states of Tanzania and Kenya] resulted in the permanent loss of the Maasai [land] sovereignty and systems of governance

Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and market economy policies adopted by the Tanzanian government from the 1980s onwards encouraged more conservation and investments in Maasai land, giving less recognition to communal grazing land by the Maasai pastoralists (Goldman 2007, 2009). Such development included the Ngorongoro Conservation Area, Mkomazi National Game Reserves and Investments such as game hunting by OBC in Loliondo and commercial farming in Monduli and Manyara (Goldman 2007, 2011; Kweka 2011).

It has also been argued that the loss of cattle due to diseases and lack of pasture among the Maasai pastoralist has been determined by the adoption of economic liberalisation policies in 1980s, leading to cuts in government subsidies in terms of dips and veterinary services on Maasai land. Consequently, this has prompted an increase in cattle diseases and deaths (Kweka 1999, 2011; May and Ole Ikayo 2007).

Eventually, the decline of pastoralism due to [scarce land and harsh climate]³⁶ further fuelled the rural-urban migration of the Maasai youth through ***“the irrelevance of purpose of existence of the Maasai youth”***. In the past, the existence of Maasai youth in their land increasingly depended on cattle-related activities. Maasai youth (*Morans*) engaged in cattle grazing, cattle rustling from other communities and taking cattle to auctions [market places], but also depended on cattle as part of the bride price and inheritance. The decline of pastoralism rendered the presence of the Maasai youth irrelevant in their own land, and thus they opted for rural-urban migration mainly for wage labour as a livelihood coping strategy. A Maasai elder summarises this as follows:

(...) these young people [Maasai youth] are running to cities simply because of what I would term it as the ***“Irrelevance of purpose of existence”***. (...) If your purpose of existence becomes irrelevant you must definitely change your ways of life and do things in a different way; and this is exactly what is happening with our MORANS [Maasai youth], the exact group of Maasai community that has been migrating to urban areas. But, previously a Moran had his purpose of existence (...) as a male youth in a Maasai community. The MORANS [young Maasai] were warriors and their work was to fight, firstly to keep or defend what they had in their community [particularly cattle] and raid from neighbouring communities and societies. But modernisation and depletion of cows have taken out these roles out of the Maasai youth and that is why they migrate to urban areas (**Male key informant (65), Dar es Salaam**)

³⁶ Livestock deaths due to diseases had also led to decline of cattle economy infuriating poverty and subsequently leading to rural-urban migration of some Maasai youth in Ngorongoro.

5.2.3 Conflicts and insecurity condition

Following the aforementioned development, Maasai communities have been confronted with a range of conflicts and insecurity situations, mainly based on land resources³⁷. Indeed, this has further contributed to the rural-urban migration of the Maasai youth. It has been noted that most of the Maasai communities in Tanzania, notably in Ngorongoro, Kilindi Tanga, Mkomazi National Game Reserve (MNGR), Kilosa District in Morogoro and the Ihefu valley in Iringa Region in the southern Tanzania, have been involved in one or more land-related conflicts,³⁸ prompting them to opt for rural-urban migration as a livelihood coping strategy.³⁹

In Ngorongoro District, it was noted that conflicts⁴⁰ between Maasai and investors⁴¹ had fuelled the rural-urban migration among the Maasai youth, as one of the key informants puts it:

We have [got] the OBC investor who is always accusing and threatening the Maasai of interfering with his land. He claims that he has legally acquired this land for the purpose of game hunting. (...) so whenever he sees the Maasai around this area he gets irritated and starts chasing them away. (...) at times, the government even sends security people to support the Investor to shoot the Maasai. **(Male Key informant (45), Loliondo Division, Ngorongoro)**

A young Maasai from around the Mkomazi National Game Reserve in the Same District, Kilimanjaro Region, states how land conflicts between the Maasai and other communities, mainly farmers, prompted him to migrate to Dar es Salaam city:

Do you know where the Mkomazi game reserve is? That is where my family is. We have had continuous land conflicts with other tribes over land. The government evicted us from there in the past [1980's and early 1990's] and showed us another land. But the Waswahili [non-Maasai/ agriculturalists] have kept on interfering with our grazing land for agriculture and other purposes. This is why some of us have migrated to urban areas rather than fight with the Waswahili always. **(Male Maasai migrant youth (29), Dar es Salaam)**

³⁷ Scarcity of land for agriculture and more importantly for pastoralism has made Maasai pastoralists enter into serious conflicts either among themselves, with other non-Maasai neighbouring tribes' communities' e.g. farmers and investors (Olengurumwa 2009; Ole Ndaskoi 2006).

³⁸ It is important to understand that most of the conflicts among the Maasai are structurally determined. State policies have legalised the eviction and resettlement of Maasai in the name of conservation, tourism or development investments. This has always pushed Maasai to a series of conflicts.

³⁹ Interviews, FGDs, review of literature, radio and televisions news

⁴⁰ Existing and the perceived emergence of conflicts and insecurity situation was also an important factor contributing to migration. Apparently, all the Maasai communities in Tanzania namely Ngorongoro, Kilindi Tanga, Mkomazi National Game reserve, and Kilosa Morogoro and Ihefu valley in Iringa are involved in land-related conflicts.

⁴¹ Between 2009 and 2010, Maasai of Ngorongoro were demonstrating against the OBC investment in Ngorongoro for reasons that the investor jeopardized both their grazing land and the environment [wildlife]. This resulted to fierce conflicts between the Maasai and the OBC and government intervention that was always in favour of the OBC.

Another migrant in Kilindi, Tanga, North-eastern Tanzania, a region with a large Maasai community, emphasises that conflicts between the Maasai pastoralists, farmers and other non-pastoral groups over land also fuelled his decision to migrate to Dar es Salaam city:

There have been continuous land conflicts between the Maasai and other tribes. Because the grazing land for the Maasai is at the moment being invaded and confiscated by the Waswahili (non-Maasai people) for agriculture and other purposes. This has led to considerable and serious land conflicts between the Maasai pastoralist and the farmers. So I thought it wise to come to Dar es Salaam and try my fortune in another way (...) at times we pastoralists enter into serious conflicts with our brothers, [the farmers]. This happens when our herds happen to accidentally feed on their crop gardens either simply due to the shortage of enough land for grazing". **(Male Maasai migrant youth (31) Dar es Salaam)**

Commenting on the extent to which conflicts between the Maasai and investors have led to the rural-urban migration of the Maasai youth, one key informant states:

(...) rural-urban migration of our youth has got a lot to do with the insecurity in the Maasai land. Many people are running away from Loliondo because of the threats from the government, investors and indeed the conflict itself. We have the OBC investor who is always accusing and threatening the Maasai of interfering with his land for grazing. He says that this area has been given to him by law of the government of Tanzania. This area has been given to him with the purpose of game hunting and so whenever he sees the Maasai there he gets irritated and starts chasing them away. Maasai fail to tolerate this situation as this amounts to encroaching on their good pastureland. Much worse, at times even the security people sent by the government of Tanzania end up supporting the Investors and shoot the Maasai. **(Male NGO official (50), Loliondo Division, Ngorongoro)**

Some secondary data supports the contention that land-related conflicts among and between the Maasai and other groups had significantly fuelled the rural-urban migration of the Maasai youth. The Maasai have been involved in three types of conflicts: firstly, between different Maasai sections, albeit to a lesser degree. Secondly, are conflicts between Maasai and neighbouring tribes of Loita and Purko in Soit Sambu over water and land; and thirdly, land conflicts between the Maasai and investing international and national companies such as Cattle Products Ltd from Kenya, Tanzania Breweries Company Limited and Thomson's Safaris (Odhiambo 2008; Olengurumwa 2009).

Specifically, resource- [land and water]-related conflicts among the Maasai have been induced by the ineffective government land tenure policies in some places such as Morogoro and Mkomazi regions, where some Maasai had migrated to. This is because, according to Tanzania land policy, land is a state resource, although the state has not been sufficiently clear in managing it, partly by incorrectly allowing investors, farmers and other groups to use Maasai land (Mbonile 2006).

5.2.4 Migrants' expectations at destination areas

Interaction with the migrants proved that prior to migration, the majority of the migrants [92% (n=50)] had positive expectations concerning their areas of destination, and notably Dar es Salaam.

Migrants hoped to succeed in various ways, which reflected one of their motivations to migrate. They specifically hoped to secure better jobs and to be supported by their friends and relatives in settling in cities, and particularly in securing jobs,⁴² with the ultimate aim of improving the livelihoods situation in their local households.

For my case when I left home [first migrated to urban area] I expected my life would change rapidly [rapid success], and my future too. My aim was to get good job [with good income] and later on return home [local household] and invest it in [buying] cattle. But, as we talk now my aim has not yet been realized, (...) but I still hope to succeed. **(Male Maasai migrant youth (31), Dar es Salaam)**

Some households' members also allowed their young people migrate to urban areas with the expectation that they would make good income and support their local households:

Our intention for letting him go [migrate to urban area] was good. (...) we hoped that he would get the *kibarua* [job] and be able to support us. (...) By the time he left [2008], we did not have anything at home [in terms of cattle]. We had simply lost all the cattle due to drought and we had practically nothing to sell to earn some money. So whether he succeeds or not, our intention was good! The fact that he did not get very good paying job is something else. **(Male household representative (51), Ngorongoro division, Ngorongoro)**

5.2.5 Role of social networks

Around (95% (n=50)) of the interviewed migrants had connections with or were inspired⁴³ to migrate by relatives, friends or employers prior to migrating to the particular urban destinations. By contrast, around (5% (n=50)) did not have a direct or indirect connection with any specific person in the urban areas before migrating to Dar es Salaam. However, upon their arrival in the city they were well received and accommodated by their Maasai counterparts who had already settled in the city. The newly arriving migrants received support related to aspects including food, accommodation and job searching, which helped them to successfully settle down.

The influence of some returning migrants on the potential migrants in rural areas was also marked as an aspect of social network that fuelled the rural-urban migration among the Maasai youth. In particular, a significant proportion of migrants became inspired to migrate through the sweet tales about urban areas presented to them by friends and relatives who had been to cities before. A Maasai elder explains that when the migrants returned to or visited their local households, they inspired their peers to also migrate:

When they [migrants] talk to their relatives and friends in the rural areas about city life they make it so attractive and most of them [prospective migrants] become influenced to migrate to cities , because they talk about the wonders of cities [making cities] look like the most ideal places to live in. Oh, there are cinemas and we see them every day (...) and so forth. Now these other guys [in the rural areas] have never heard of or seen cinemas and so they become encouraged to migrate. **(Maasai elder/ household representative (64), Dar es Salaam)**

⁴² Maasai migrant youth engaged mainly in working as security guards, hair dressing, local herbs selling, and a few of them in selling labour in construction and entrepreneurship work such as keeping shops.

⁴³ Some inspiration or influence by friends and relatives about the possibility of realising better life in cities than in villages such as finding employment, earning and saving more, see and learn some new city insights.

Another aspect of social network contributing to the rural-urban migration of the Maasai youth was the interaction/connections between Maasai youth and the *wazungu*, [white people], as evidenced by around 12% of migrants and a number of key interviewees. It was noted that Maasai youth and *Wazungu* were increasingly interested and connected to each other. On the one hand, the *Wazungu* were interested in Maasai due to the “Maasai’s exotic nature”⁴⁴. In this case, they associated themselves with the Maasai by having photos with them, etc. On the other hand, Maasai were interested in the *Wazungu* due to the perceived socio-economic benefits.

Around 14% of the Maasai, most of whom were working as security guards in the tourism sector [in hotels and beaches], attested that they had photos with or danced for the *wazungu* for pay. This added to their reasons for remaining in urban areas, as well as encouraging others to migrate. Inquiry proved that some Maasai migrant youth in the cities of Zanzibar, Dar es Salaam, Arusha and Tanga were in close contact or affairs with the *Wazungu*, which provided Maasai with a reason to migrate to and remain in urban areas.

One informant explains how the *Wazungus’* [whites] interest in Maasai promoted the Maasai rural-urban migration of the Maasai youth:

Now days, a certain behaviour has emerged, whereby the *wazungu* [white people] need them [the Maasai] for having photos, (...) mainly for prestigious purposes, just to show off that they are close to some African indigenous people. If you go to any of the Tanzanians hotels, you will find a Maasai keeping a gate as a symbol of African culture because they are always in the Maasai dress code. So, they are being used just because of their exotic (unusual) culture. Because a Maasai still looks different and [more] traditional, (...) now they [*wazungu*] will say I have been to Tanzania and somewhere in the Bush and to show you the evidence here is a photo of a Maasai and you find that the guy is just here in town.
(Male educated Maasai (65), Dar es Salaam)

Another respondent illustrates how Maasai pastoralists migrated to rural areas due to the expected or realised benefits from (*wazungu*) foreigners:

Maasai youth have benefited a lot from associating themselves with the *Wazungu* [whites]. In collaboration with some Germans, for example they have opened a camel centre project. It operates as a **Zoo**, which has become a big tourist attraction and employed a number of local young people in the area. Some [migrants] have also used most of the money got from foreigners [who are interested in them] for buying livestock such as cows. Other youth are attracted to cities because of such development. (Male key informant (35), Dar es Salaam)

⁴⁴ Increasingly respondents in Dar es Salaam contended that the *wazungu* preferred associating themselves with the Maasai because of the *Maasai’ exotic nature*; meaning that despite the rapid global change Maasai ways of life are still unique/ indigenous and perhaps less developed compared to other communities

5.2.6 Technological influence: role of transportation and communication network

All of the interviewed migrants [100%] had travelled to Dar es Salaam city by road⁴⁵ [bus]. This owes to the well-established road networks and transportation system between Arusha, Kilimanjaro, Tanga and Morogoro regions where most of the migrants migrated from and Dar es Salaam city where these migrants migrated.

Moreover, the decisions of Maasai youth to migrate were mainly informed by the use of mobile phone technology, an increasing ability to speak Kiswahili language [communication ability] and frequent interaction with different people in auctions and market places, as evidenced by around 70% (n=50). An investigation showed that a significant number of both migrants and their local households owned mobile phones, while those who did not have could easily access the service from friends, relatives, neighbours or calling centres.

Specifically, 30% of the interviewed migrants communicated with families through frequent visits, as well as via friends, relatives and village-mates. On the other hand, migrant youth in cities would always identify their friends and relatives travelling back to rural areas, sending them to their local households. One respondent puts this in perspective:

With the introduction of mobile phones the world is becoming smaller and smaller. Youth communicate and interact with quite a number of strangers. When they [Maasai youth] go to livestock auctions [market places], they meet and exchange contacts with their fellow youth who have been in the urban areas before. They keep on sharing a lot including the possibility to migrate. (...) you will only see them [Maasai youth] talking on phones and after few days you don't see them around, you only hear they have left for such and such a city. **(Male household representative/ elder and former NGO official, Loliondo)**

5.3 Discussion and some theoretical implications

In this section, the aforementioned findings are discussed in the light of the existing migration literature and theories. Based on this discussion, comments are made accordingly.

It was revealed that migrants from Ngorongoro migrated towards the relatively nearest urban centres such as Arusha, Moshi and some Kenyan cities, mainly due to geographical proximity and social network factors. However, some migrants in Dar es Salaam had been to more than one city, including outside Tanzania.

On the one hand, the above findings correspond strongly with the concept of chain migration (Ravenstein 1889), which states that migrants start to migrate to nearby cities and subsequently to those further away. On the other hand, it also disagrees with the theory on the basis that a significant number of migrants in Dar es Salaam city had either directly or indirectly migrated to Dar es Salaam, which is far away from the Maasai land. Indeed, some migrants had been to other cities further than Dar es Salaam and notably outside Tanzania prior to migrating to Dar es Salaam.

⁴⁵ FGD's and interviews with some key informants increasingly revealed that at the moment road networks in Tanzania are far better than they were two decades ago

It was also noted that Maasai migrants' duration of stay in cities were on average short [6 months to one year], and the majority of migrants did not intend to stay in cities permanently. These findings correspond strongly with the concept of circular migration, which is essentially seasonal or short-lived in nature (Vertovec 2007). However, it is also contrary to the findings of (Ole Kaunga 2007) among some Kenyan nomadic migrants who preferred to stay in urban areas permanently.

Migration decisions were also partly determined by households, as evidenced by a significant number of migrants who first sought migration consent from their households prior to migration. Such findings correspond strongly with the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) school of thought (Taylor 1999; Waddington 2003a), which considers migration as being determined by the household. However, it also disagrees with the school, as evidenced by a significant number of the migrants who did not receive their households' consent to migrate to urban areas.

Exploring the factors for migration, it was noted that poverty, economic hardships and the lack of access to basic needs were key to Maasai rural-urban migration. Moreover, similar migration reasons have been found among migrants in Ethiopia (Morrissey 2007), the nomadic pastoralist migrants in Kenya (Kipuri 2010; Ole Kaunga 2007) and in West Africa (Kwankye et al. 2007; Tacoli and Mabala 2010a).

Closely related to poverty were environmental and climatic aspects such as drought and floods. These factors have also been empirically captured among the nomadic migrants in some Kenyan cities (Ole Kaunga 2007) in Benin, Togo, Ghana and Ivory Coast (Bonfoh et al. 2011) and Northern Ethiopia (Morrissey 2007).

Migration was also caused by the insecurity situation resulting from resource conflicts. Similar findings have been reported among the nomadic pastoralist migrants in the Horn and East Africa (Kipuri and Korir 2006) in (Kipuri 2010). Moreover, the same situation has also been noted among the Karimajong nomadic migrants migrating from northern rural Uganda to Kampala and Jinja cities (Kipuri 2010), as well as the nomadic migrants in Nairobi, Mombasa and Malindi cities in Kenya (Ole Kaunga 2007).

Governmental institutions were found to have systematically created precarious a livelihood situation among the Maasai pastoralists, leading to poverty and subsequent rural-urban migration. Such reasons for migration have previously been found among the urban migrants in Nigerian cities (Nwokocha 2008; Wosu and Kinikanwo 2010). They have also been empirically captured among some nomadic pastoralist groups in Chad, Togo and Niger in West African cities, whose urban-migration was a result of governments' failure to control environmental problems among the migrants' local areas (Kerven et al. 2002).

Maasai youth urban-migration was also significantly mediated by social networks, resulting from migrants' friends, relatives and potential employers mainly in urban areas. This revelation agrees with (Salt 1997; Dungumaro 2009) and specifically with (Krüger 1998) among the rural-urban migrants in some Botswana and South Africa cities whose friends and relatives had already settled in the urban areas, functioning as "bridgeheads" for the newly arriving migrants.

Knowledge and skills, including Kiswahili language proficiency, facilitated or informed the Maasai migrants' decisions to migrate by enabling them to forge networks and negotiation with urban dwellers, and notably non-Maasai and employers. The role of education and skills in fuelling migration has also been observed among some urban migrants in Kenyan cities (IFPR 2005) and indeed the majority of migrants in African cities (Byerlee 1974).

Besides, most of the migrants were motivated to migrate due to their preconceived positive expectations concerning urban areas [getting good employment and positively transforming their lives]. This same reason for migration has previously been captured by (Mabogunje 1970; Todaro 1969) and recently among migrants in Ghana (Kwankye et al. 2007).

Technological aspects such as improved road transport and communication technology through mobile phones further fuelled the migration of the Maasai youth,⁴⁶ as evidenced by around 70% of respondents. Indeed, these same reasons have significantly facilitated rural-urban migration in Kenya (IFPR 2005) and Zimbabwe (ACF International 2012).

However, this work was unable to establish whether the urban migration of the Maasai youth was culturally determined e.g. as a rite of passage process, as earlier stipulated among migrants in Zimbabwean, South African and Botswana cities (Maphosa 2005).

5.4 Chapter summary

This chapter explored and systematically documented rural-urban migration patterns and factors among the Maasai nomadic pastoralist youth in Tanzania, taking the Ngorongoro District and Dar es Salaam city as case studies. It specifically answered the questions of why Maasai youth migrated to Dar es Salaam, as well as what informed this decision.

Based on the myriad of migration theories, the study revealed that Maasai migrant youth have predominantly migrated to Dar es Salaam city due to households' poverty, emanating from a decline of pastoralism and agriculture caused by climate change, insufficient access to land, livestock diseases, resources conflicts and unemployment. Specifically, persistent droughts and floods have led to the decline of livestock and agriculture, which are the main livelihood activities among the Maasai, which have thus worsened household poverty.

⁴⁶ FGD's and interviews with some key informants increasingly revealed that at the moment road networks in Tanzania are far better than they were two decades ago

Moreover, the rural-urban migration of Maasai youth was catalysed by some inconsistent land and development policies that legalised large-scale investments in the Maasai-land at the expense of the Maasai's livelihoods. Specifically, their decision to migrate was mainly informed by social networks, migrants and households' aspirations and technology, including improved communication and transportation such as mobile phones and road networks.

Policy and theoretical implications emanating from these findings are elaborately and critically discussed towards the end of this thesis, in chapter ten.

6. Impact of migration on the Maasai migrants' local households' resilience

6.1 Introduction

This chapter investigates the influence of the rural-urban migration of the Maasai nomadic migrant youth on the resilience of migrants' local households in the Ngorongoro District in Tanzania. Based on the multi-layered social resilience framework of (Obrist et al. 2010), the aim is to firstly understand how remittances by the migrants replenished households' capitals, secondly, to ascertain how labour loss resulting from migration could have depleted households' capitals, and thirdly, to explore how households' strategies of coping with migration (labour loss) either enhanced or depleted their resilience (capitals). In this case, the chapter discusses the impact of remittances on the households, before presenting the negative impact of migration on the household, including how its members cope with to determine how their coping strategies either enhance or harm their resilience. Thirdly, a discussion of the findings based on the multi-layered social resilience framework (Obrist et al. 2010) and other existing empirical migration literature is undertaken, before the chapter summary is finally presented.

6.1 Migration impact on economic capital

Impact on household financial status: It was noted that the Maasai migrants had remitted a number of benefits to their households, albeit not so consistently, as attested by one of the most experienced Maasai migrants, below:

(...), it is true that we [Maasai] do send money [remittances] back home. But, we do so for some special reasons. (...) we send money for buying [more] cattle, for buying food and if there is [supporting] someone who is critically ill [health support]. It is hard to estimate the amount of money we send [back home] per month as some of us may not be able to send on the monthly or even in two-month basis. But, I would say that in average many of us send money at least once in three months. Moreover, the majority of us still prefer to take with us whatever we have [money] at the end of the year when we visit our households. **(Maasai migrant youth (30), Dar es Salaam)**

Based on the revelation above, household representatives were facilitated to reflect and remember the amount of financial and non-financial assistance that they had received from migrants over the past three months, whereas the migrants in the urban area were similarly asked to estimate the amount of financial and non-financial assistance they had sent back home over the same period.

The computation of this information revealed that 9 migrants had not sent any financial support, 17 migrants had sent Tsh. 10,000 [5Euro] or less, 26 had sent between Tsh 10,000 and 25,000 [5-12 Euro], while 28 migrants had sent Tsh 25,000 [12 Euro] and above over the past three months (n=80).

Looking into the frequency of sending remittances by migrants it was revealed that 13 migrants sent remittances to households every month, 20 sent once in every three months, and around 25 once in every five to twelve months. A further 22 migrants either could not remember the last time they did so, or did not send any remittances (n=80).

Responses by both migrants and household representatives generally hinted that financial assistance [remittances] by migrants was generally re-directed towards maintaining cattle and agriculture, as well as procuring food, health and education services. To a lesser extent, they were also invested in shelter, household equipment such as mobile phones, radios, maize milling machines, TV sets and furniture, as will be discussed in detail in the subsequent paragraphs.

Impact on livestock: One specific aspect of economic capita significantly impacted by migration was that of **livestock**. On the one hand, migrants directly improved households' livestock production and ownership, as attested by 38 (n=50) migrants in Dar es Salaam and 20 (n=30) local households' representatives in Ngorongoro. Migrants improved households' livestock ownership through buying more cattle and paying for veterinary services⁴⁷. As increasingly testified by some respondents, this kind of investment further ensured households' food and health needs, together with paying for migrants and other households' members bride prices.

(....) after the drought [in 2005], we practically remained with one or two goats, so how could we live [survive]? But ever since he got a job as security guard [in a tourist company] in Arusha city, he has managed to buy about four cows. The other one [one of the cows] was pregnant and it produced only four months after he had bought it. Now we can talk of having some tea in a different taste [milk in teat]. Now we can move forward confidently and count ourselves as any other household with cattle. We hope the rest [of cows] will also do well soon. (**Female Household representative (44), Ngorongoro division, Ngorongoro**)

The above data means that livestock obtained as a result of migration partly led to households' food security through milk production [**economic/cultural capital**], as well as promoting a sense of respect and power for some households [**symbolic capita**]. This is because the Maasai consider having cattle as not only economically profitable but also prestigious⁴⁸.

⁴⁷ Despite a number of hurdles associated with livestock production in the Maasai land, pastoralism still seems to be a major economic mainstay among the Maasai. Consequently, migrants think that investing on it, would lead to the ripple livelihood increment in the Maasai land.

⁴⁸ Cattle ownership is regarded as a sign of prestige and respect among the Maasai. The more cattle one has the more respect s/he earns [symbolic capital].

On the other hand, migration depleted livestock [production], as was attested by 10 (n=30) household representatives. Households' members felt that the departure of youth led to the decline of livestock, given that they were heavily depended upon for performing most grazing-related activities such as moving with cattle in search of pastures, and especially during drought.

Consequently, households' financial and nutritional benefits resulting from cattle were increasingly fading away, as stated by some respondents below:

..., when he was still away so many cows and [livestock] died as they did not have someone to attend to them. (...) Normally, when there is drought the MORAN [youth] are responsible for moving with cattle to look for pastures [and water]. So our cattle died partly due to lack of pasture [water] and this is because he [migrant] was not here to move with the cattle [in search of pasture and water]. That's why we have fewer cows [cut down number of cattle]. Now we are simply experiencing poverty [fewer cattle benefits such as milk]. **(Household Representative Loliondo Division, Ngorongoro)**

Another household representative talks about the negative impact of migration on livestock:

..... If he were here, he could take part in some other various [income generating] activities and he could more effectively handle these cattle as well as looking after the family. How can I take them for pastures [and water] or give them medicine once they fall sick. I mean he [my husband] could do it much better than me. Now, at times cows may either die or remain in bad health. **(Female household representative (27), Ngorongoro Division, Ngorongoro)**

Maasai youth migration⁴⁹ left households "hanging economically", as maintained below:

".. so I would say [that] some households have been left "hanging economically" or they are simply facing hunger due to loss of human labour [resulting from migration]. Just imagine, youth who were expected to replenish livestock or engage in agriculture and save households from hunger have instead disappeared to cities. Consequently, families have either failed or too slowly recovered from shocks resulting from both drought and livestock deaths. **(Male key informant, (54) Loliondo Division-Ngorongoro)**

Another way in which migration depleted livestock was based upon the Maasai youth often leaving for urban areas so abruptly and clandestinely⁵⁰ that livestock were left unattended. Consequently, livestock became lost, stolen or attacked by some wild animals, as confirmed by this respondent:

The departure of Kennedy [to Kisumu city in Kenya] led to a huge cattle loss; as he left so abruptly leaving the livestock unguided. (...) and so some of them [livestock] were attacked and eaten up by wild animals and some of them got lost. [Secondly] he [migrant] sold around 13 goats to finance his travel to Kisumu city. (...) his absence has made us hire another person to take care of livestock for pay, [he's paid Tsh. 1000 daily = 50ct. Euro] which is quite economically demanding. **(Male Household representative (54) Ngorongoro Division, Ngorongoro)**

⁴⁹ It was repeatedly stated that, even though livestock had been diminished by drought and lack of pasture, still youth should have remained behind to re-stock up their households with more cattle rather than migrating to urban areas.

⁵⁰ Some Maasai youth left their household abruptly and clandestinely mainly because of the fear of not being allowed to migrate. Some of them had committed some crimes, or were ill advised by their peers to migrate. Under such circumstances, they could not openly migrate as their households members [wives, parents or relatives] could not allow them to do so.

Impact on agriculture: Agriculture was another aspect of economic capital to be affected by migration, most particularly in Loliondo Division, where this kind of economic activity is widely practiced. This was evidenced by 11 (n=30) Maasai migrants' local households who stated having received such kind of assistance, while 22 (n=50) Maasai migrants in Dar es Salaam city confirmed having supported their local households towards this same purpose.

Migrants supported agriculture through buying more farmland, financing land clearance and cultivation, as well as also weeding, buying improved seeds, insecticide, fertilizers and manure. Agricultural products improved household food security and financial well-being **[economic capital]**, which was also used for financing health and education **[cultural capital]**.

One local government official commented on the extent to which Maasai migrant youth had improved agriculture in Loliondo Division, leading to other households' benefits:

"(...) their sons [migrants'] have variously boosted agriculture and this cannot be underestimated. This agriculture is evidently becoming our second livelihood option as pastoralism is declining. In this way, we have food supplement and leave cows to prosper [livestock] more. Otherwise, we were supposed to sell out cows to address other households needs [e.g. purchase food and health services], [Cows], which are not there of course. **(Male key informant (45) Loliondo Division, Ngorongoro)**

Another informant emphasised that migrants invested in agricultural production:

We have seen some young men [and women!] here from cities, who have bought (...), land for their parents, hired tractors to cultivate farms (...) engage in modern agriculture through use of modern [farm implements] seeds, fertilizers and planting. This does really contribute to food security because agriculture is [slowly] is becoming an important economic activity as cattle vanish due to drought [lack of pastureland]. **(Male key informant (60), Loliondo Division, Ngorongoro)**

Furthermore, a household representative in Loliondo puts it this way:

During the last season [agriculture season], he [migrant] sent us some money for weeding and buying fertilizer. The other year he did not have enough money so he only paid for the tractor to cultivate our two acres of land. This was such a big support to us, because we could not do it on our own. (...) Now we can harvest more and in most cases, we sell them as we don't use the whole of it for consumption. **(Male Household Representative (51) Loliondo Division, Ngorongoro)**

Some of the interviewed migrants also affirmed to have already invested or been in the process of investing in agriculture in their local households, as one of them puts it:

(.....) I have been saving and now I have bought a piece of land (1½ acres) in our place [in Arumeru Arusha]. God willing I intend to cultivate there vegetables mainly tomatoes and onions for sale [at village]. Now I only need to work a little bit much harder and earn more money [enough] to buy a water pump for facilitating irrigation **(Male Maasai migrant youth (30) Dar es Salaam)**

Another migrant states how he has invested in agriculture at his local household:

I have managed to buy three acres of land and at the moment, I grow maize and beans and at times vegetables for both food and commercial use [purposes]. I have also bought about four cows and a few goats. My intention is to sell these agricultural products and invest the money in education for my children and open a better business in the future **(Male migrant youth (28) Dar es Salaam)**

The above quotes emphasise that remittances directed towards agriculture increased local households' financial resilience through the improvement of agriculture **[economic capital]**, which was subsequently re-invested in food, health and education **[cultural capital]**.

On the other hand, migration led to the depletion of agricultural production in the migrants' sending households in various ways, as attested by 19 (n=30) migrants' local households in the Ngorongoro District, mostly in Loliondo Division⁵¹. This mainly occurred through the shortage of agricultural labour resulting from urban migration, which subsequently subjected households to extreme poverty, as put below:

(...) yes, obviously agriculture should be our next [livelihood] option [as a result of declining cattle economy]. But, engaging in agriculture requires a lot of energy. Unfortunately, this energy is no longer there as many of them [youth] are running towards urban centres to try their fortune. So, old as we are, we cannot engage in agriculture anymore. **(A household representative (50) Loliondo Division, Ngorongoro)**

An NGO official emphasises how labour loss resulting from migration jeopardised agriculture:

Agriculture has been especially [negatively] affected here due to loss of labour [As a result of youth migration]. It's basically the elders and children who have been left behind and they can simply not engage in agriculture. Just see around, some households have been forced to stop agriculture or reduce number of herds due to the loss of labour resulting from the migration of youth. This has added on our levels of poverty here [lack of basic needs] at both the household and village level. (Female key informant (54) Loliondo Division, Ngorongoro)

Another way in which migration depleted households' economic capital, and notably agriculture, land and livestock productions, was through compensating for damages caused by the migrants both in rural and urban areas, as attested by 11 (n=30) households' representatives. Firstly, some households spent considerable financial resources paying for debts left behind by the migrants, some of whom owed other people valuables such as mobile phones or watches before leaving for urban areas. Secondly, households compensated for losses caused by the migrants in urban areas⁵². Such compensation had to be made by the households' members, either financially or in kind, and notably selling resources such as cattle and land, thus further encroaching on the households' economic and cultural capital.

⁵¹ A more significant impact of migration on agriculture was noticed in Loliondo Division [Ngorongoro], probably because there are fewer conservation measures compared to Ngorongoro Division where the bigger part of the land is occupied by the Ngorongoro National Conservation Authority (NNCA). Individual land ownership and agricultural production are virtually prohibited in Ngorongoro Division, as the whole division falls under the Conservation Area [NNCA].

⁵² Migrants were at times held responsible for some lost property at work places. They were required to pay for this property even when they were not truly responsible for such losses. See the next chapter on exploitation and oppression threat.

The above-given information is supplemented by one of the respondents as stated here:

He left a lot of debts behind [financial debts]. It seems he owed some money to some people (...) consequently, up to now we have paid around three goats [Tsh 90,000/= [45 euro]⁵³ and still some other people are coming to demand for more [financial compensation]. This means a big loss to us as we have to sacrifice other household needs [food, health, shelter, resulting from financial loss]. **(Male household representative (37) Loliondo Division, Ngorongoro)**

An NGO official elaborates upon how selling some households' economic resources to compensate for migrants' financial losses in urban areas encroached on some other households' resources, consequently leading to more household poverty [lack of basic needs]⁵⁴.

This is obvious [compensating for damages made by migrants]. At times, these young people are implicated with serious [financial] frauds at work places, which they themselves cannot pay. So parents [local households] are forced to finance such losses even by selling plots of land, more especially now that our livestock have been struck by drought and diseases, households have to real constrain themselves financially or sell of piece of land to **(Male key informant (61), Loliondo Division, Ngorongoro)**

One household representative exclaims:

They [employers] informed me that he [the migrant] was being held by the police and they would not release him until we paid the compensation [Tsh 500,000 [200 Euro]. We didn't know whether he had truly been involved in this scandal [colliding with thieves to steal from the employer]. All that we did was to run up and down look for money [borrowing from friends and relatives] and rescue our son [migrant]. **(Male household representative (65) Loliondo Division, Ngorongoro)**

The above data simply mean that coping with migration by households members led to the depletion of some aspects of economic capital such as livestock and land to pay for losses resulting from migration. Moreover, encroachment on economic capital further led to the depletion of some aspects of cultural capital, including the health, food and education of household members. Therefore, coping with the migration of households' members could be said to have depleted rather than enhanced migrants' local households' resilience.

6.2 Migration Impact on cultural capital

The rural-urban migration of Maasai youth both positively and negatively impacted households' cultural capital aspects, albeit in different ways. Specifically, some cultural capital aspects impacted upon by migration included education, knowledge and skills, human labour, as well as physical aspects such as mobile phones, modern shelter, radios and television sets, motorcycles and maize-milling machines.

Education Knowledge and skills: Maasai migrant youth variously supported education in their local households, as evidenced by 14 (n=30) household representatives and 23 (n=50) Maasai migrants in Dar es Salaam.

⁵³ Cash money was in some cases presented in form of livestock [mostly goats]. In the above quote one goat was equivalent to around Tsh. 30,000 [15 Euro]

⁵⁴ Compensation of migrant's fraud by their sending households was widely reported by informants in both rural and urban areas.

Specifically, migrants mainly supported the education of household members [siblings] through paying school fees, buying school uniforms, books and stationary, providing pocket money and paying for other educational-related contributions, as attested by one of the respondents below:

Ever since he went there [migrated to urban area], he has sent [us] some money for buying exercise books and other school contributions for his siblings. Initially, we didn't have anything [financial capacity] and so we would always think of selling off cows. But then where are those cows, it is thanks that him [migrant] went to the city [Arusha] and secured a job [as security guard]. So at least now we can buy children's [school] uniforms. **(Female household representative (54), Ngorongoro Division, Ngorongoro)**

A migrant in Dar es Salaam city also expressed how his current job in the urban area had enabled him to support his siblings' education in the local household:

When I first decided to come to Dar es Salaam more than 5 years ago, I was always thinking about how to raise enough money to educate my children in the village [in the future]. I didn't want to touch on cattle as they had been seriously reduced by drought and diseases. But, after acquiring this job [security guards] I can now talk of being able to educate my children [buy uniforms and books] through the income I earn here, [without necessarily depending on cattle]. **(Male migrant youth (32) Dar es Salaam)**

A Maasai migrant youth insists on how his being in urban areas had given him both the exposure and economic power to support his siblings' education:

(...) I support my father to pay for my young brother and sisters' education too. When I have nothing [money] completely I even give them some pocket money. (...) off course she is my sister and she is doing something good. So whenever she's having a problem [financial problem] and I am capable of supporting her I will do so. I know [some of] my colleagues may be against it [supporting female education] but for me I don't see anything wrong doing it. **(Male Maasai migrant youth (30), Dar es Salaam)**

Specifically, it emerged that migrants transmitted new positive knowledge and ideas into their local households and communities based on the exposure and experience gained from urban areas, as attested by 11 (n=30) local households' representatives and 18 (n=50) Maasai migrants in Dar es Salaam. This knowledge gained and shared included advising households to diversify economic activities such as agriculture and entrepreneurship rather than only relying on the declining cattle economy **[economic capital]**. Moreover, migrants also advised households to sell off livestock when prices are still high to avoid losses that could stem from drought and diseases. This would enable them to invest in health and education, particularly in girl's education, as evidenced above **[cultural capital]**, as well as engaging in agriculture and growing more marketable crops such as soya beans, which were likely to fetch much higher prices in the market **[economic capital]**.

When he came from Nairobi, he encouraged us to cultivate soya beans. He insisted that it matures [relatively] faster and it has good prices in cities like Arusha, Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. Our problem was money but he bought us the seeds and showed us how to plant them in a modern way [in rows and good space, fertilizers etc.]. **(Female household representative (48) Loliondo Division, Ngorongoro)**

The preceding information and subsequent quote highlight that migrants used knowledge obtained from urban areas to improve agriculture, leading to financial wellbeing **[economic capital]** that was invested in improving education and food **[cultural capital]**.

However, 17 (n=30)⁵⁵ household representatives in Ngorongoro, most of whom included women and the elderly, felt that the departure of the household member had negatively affected the academic progress of their children. They believed that the education-related assistance did not arrive on time and was inadequate when it was eventually forthcoming⁵⁶.

Moreover, whereas old people were too weak to finance and follow up on their grandchildren's academic progress, women specifically argued that children were more likely to be disciplined and successful in academics when guided by two parents and most particularly by the male parent,⁵⁷ as stated by a wife to a migrant, below:

No! Leave apart this other support [buying school uniforms and paying school fees]; a man will always be listened to by a child. If I tell him/ [her] [a child] about being more responsible at school s/he will [most likely] not listen to me in the same way [S/he] would listen to his/her father, because a man is a man [means that a father gives more effective orders]. For me I [also] need to deal with the young ones and so where do I find time? [No time to follow up on her boy's education progress] **(Female Household Representative [wife to a migrant] (29) Loliondo Division, Ngorongoro)**

Health support by migrants: More specifically, It was noted that migrants directed remittances towards supporting household health-related matters, as evidenced by 22 (n=50) Maasai migrants and 12 (n=30) household representatives in Ngorongoro. Migrants directly bought medicine, settled hospital bills as well as buying food⁵⁸. In Dar es Salaam city, it was also observed that 3 migrants had managed to bring their relatives to the city for health services.

On the other hand, 18 (n=30) households members, the majority of whom were women, felt that households' health needs were negatively affected or inadequately met by the migrants. This is because male household members were always regarded as physically and economically powerful in facilitating household health-related services. For example, owing to lack of transport service, men were responsible for carrying patients to hospitals that were located relatively far away from their households.

⁵⁵ The unwillingness by a big number of migrants to support education in their local households may be associated with the Maasai general low sensitization on the importance of formal education.

⁵⁶ Although Tanzania declared universal primary education (UPE) since late 1990's, this concept is still not yet implemented. A good number of schools are not yet well equipped with teaching and learning resources. Importantly, parents are incapable of covering the basic education needs of their children such as purchasing exercise books, uniforms and food. For more detailed information on Education among the Maasai community in Tanzania, see Bishop (2007) and Drinkwater (2010).

⁵⁷ Some households' members maintained that, it would have been much better for households' their young people not to migrate and instead remain at home and to engage in agriculture or pastoralism. This would more reliably guarantee the households' wellbeing including being able to cover health and education expenses for households members.

⁵⁸ One possible explanation for inadequate health support by the migrants to households could be due to the Maasai heavy reliance on traditional medicine.

A key informant further supplements the aforestated reality below:

Here household members either never receive or do receive too little health support from migrants. Women especially prefer their husbands to be at home when it comes to their own illness or for one of the households' members. This is because compared to women men especially the husbands are thought to have more economic power and physical strength necessary to access health services for their households' members. Men can for example assist in carrying a patient to health facilities as these facilities were located relatively far away from home. **(Male NGO official (45), Loliondo Division, Ngorongoro)**

Investment in physical items: It was established that migrants had variously Invested in some physical aspects of cultural capital, as evidenced by 9 (n=30) household representatives in Ngorongoro and 18 (n=50) Maasai migrants in Dar es Salaam city. Such items were typically houses, radios, mobile phones, bicycles, motorbikes, mobile phones, radios, TV sets, beds, mattresses and maize milling machines.

Some of these items such as motorcycles for hire and maize milling machines significantly uplifted the resilience of household, mainly in terms of finance, food security, health and general wellbeing. Moreover, 13 (n=30) households, the majority of them from Loliondo Division,⁵⁹ had benefited from modern shelter. In this case, migrants had either constructed new houses or improved the existing ones, as evidenced in the figure below.



Photo: L. Ledio (2011)



Photo: E. Munishi (2011)

Figure 15: Old versus modern house in Ngorongoro District

For example, the research observed around 4 new houses that had been recently built by some rural-urban migrants in Loliondo Division. They were basically constructed from wood and soil, yet grounded with a cement floor and roofed with new iron-sheets. These houses were considered as modern in the Maasai-land⁶⁰.

⁵⁹ Due to conservation reasons, Maasai within the NCA were not allowed to invest in durable houses. This could be one of the reasons why the migrants did not popularly invest in modern houses.

⁶⁰ Cement floor and iron-sheet roofed houses were considered as modern houses among the Maasai communities because traditionally Maasai house have been constructed of grass and soil.

However, it was also observed that the departure of migrants from households had negatively affected the housing condition in their particular households, as in the case of the dilapidated house pictured above.⁶¹ 4 out of 30 surveyed households [2 in Ngorongoro and 2 in *Loliondo*] did not have reliable shelter,⁶² mainly as a result of the rural-urban migration of more productive household members⁶³. This is attested by a household member as below:

(...) If he were here, he could have supported us to build a [much] better house, because as you can see this one [*see photo above on the left*] is basically not in good order. The one [house] you see here was built by him some years ago. But now it is [already] dilapidated and too small to accommodate all of us. (...) As you can see it is already having too many holes on it, and it's leaking, and so it could collapse at any time **(Female household representative (66) Loliondo Division, Ngorongoro)**

It was also noted that migrants were increasingly buying **motorcycles for hire**, popularly known as Bodaboda or Bajaji,⁶⁴ as household investments. This added to the household's source of income and thus enabled access to other household basic needs such as food, health and education. A household representative confirms this reality and how it had improved the household's resilience:

At times it [motorcycle] brings problems it may need to be repaired and the driver may not be faithful [submitting all the money]. But after maintaining the machine [servicing the motorbike] they can still get some sugar or *ugali* [food] (...). In the last season [agriculture season] we used some of it [part of the money generated from the motorbike business] to buy some maize seeds and fertilizer. **(Male Local household representative (54), Loliondo, Ngorongoro)**

One male migrant had purchased a maize-milling machine, with his wife witnessing how it had improved the household's resilience.

"(...) he [her husband] migrated after drought had killed all the cows. Fortunately, things have worked well for him [got work as security guard] and now he's installed a maize milling machine. Now we're assured of eating, what else could I wish him? Let him continue working there (...) it is a good thing for him to continue with the same work in Arusha. **(Female household representative (25), Loliondo division, Ngorongoro)**

Concluding from the above data, it can be said that physical items such as motorcycles and maize-milling machine [**cultural capital**] brought by migrants improved households' financial base [**economic capital**], which was subsequently invested towards meeting their health, food and educational needs [**cultural capital**].

⁶¹ Less reliable shelter in this context means kind of houses that could not protect the household members from natural / physical dangers such as rain, cold and dangerous animals, strong wind etc as they were too dilapidated. An old lady [Seina Kerea] was living in an extremely dilapidated house simply because she was too old to build a better one, emphasising that this could have been done by two of her sons and four grandsons who had migrated to cities as she puts it "if they were here they could help me build the house "she lamented.

⁶² These houses were badly dilapidated kind of houses, which could not any way be used by a human being.

⁶³ It should however be noted that some households more especially in Ngorongoro did not have enough modern houses partly because they were not allowed to construct durable houses due to conservation reasons.

⁶⁴ Motorcycles for hire commonly known as Bodaboda or *Bajaji* are increasingly becoming popular in many of the Tanzanian urban areas, and as vital source of youth employment. The researcher also hired a Bodaboda for his transport during his fieldwork in Loliondo Division, Ngorongoro.

Another respondent adds that migrants bought **mattresses** to sleep on, thus facilitating the sleeping environment for rest of the household members.

Some parents didn't know anything about mattresses, but now they can lie on beds with mattresses only because their children who have been to cities have bought them. Some of them have bought motorcycles as sources of income. They call them; they use them as taxis for transporting passengers from Waso⁶⁵ to Loliondo town. **(NGO's Official Representative Loliondo Division, Ngorongoro)**

Furthermore, investment in households' mobile phones by the migrants had significantly facilitated transfers and the delivery of remittances mainly sent by migrants. Moreover, it also improved the communication process between household members and outsiders concerning pertinent household issues. Indeed, around 26 (n=50) migrants and 12 (n=30) household representatives confirmed having utilised mobile phones for sending and receiving remittances, respectively. This was possible due to the fact that around 27 (n=50) migrants in cities and 11 (n=30) migrants' local households managed to access mobile phone services either as personal property or through sharing with friends and relatives.

It was however noted that, labour shortage resulting from migration negatively impacted some aspects of households' cultural capital, notably human power. Among other things, this led to an extra workload among some households' members, the majority of whom are women, the elderly and children. For example, women engaged in male-related tasks, such as grazing, attending meetings and providing labour for public work. One of the women whose husband had migrated to the urban area accounts for this situation below:

As you can see for yourself he [husband] left me alone. At the moment I have no one to help me with households' responsibilities. In the morning I have to work up early enough to prepare something to eat [breakfast and lunch] for both myself and the two kids. Then I have to rush either for *kibaru* (manual labour) before taking cattle to pastures. On some days I am really occupied here. These are days when I am supposed to attend some public meetings. If you don't attend some of these gatherings they fine you. If my husband were here, he could at least assist with grazing and attending meetings so that I would only concentrate in some households' chores such as cooking and taking care of kids. **(Female households' representative, Ngorongoro Division)**

Overworking of households' members and more especially women due to male out-migration can further be depicted in the following photo. In this case, a woman in Ngorongoro District was observed engaging in cattle grazing task, a predominantly male-related task while at the same time carrying a child on her back.

⁶⁵ Waso a small trading centre located about 5 kilometres from Loliondo District headquarters.



Figure 16: Overworking of women as coping with men out-migration

Photo: E. Munishi (2011)

On the other hand, it was observed that in coping with labour-shortage created by migration and its related threats such as financial constraints, some households' members, mostly women, engaged in entrepreneurship activities such as local brew making and selling, honey production, sand/gravel quarrying, selling labour in agriculture and livestock keeping⁶⁶. The economic ability resulting from such activities further helped households to secure basic needs such as food and health services⁶⁷. Moreover, women whose husbands had migrated to urban areas commonly belonged to self-help groups where they could gain assistance with some household chores, such as cooking and feeding the children in cases where they went grazing, as well as receiving support with livestock grazing while at home for some other tasks.

The above-stated data means that the engagement in multiple economic and entrepreneurship activities by some households' members as a strategy of coping with negative migration impact ended up bolstering the household economic/financial capacity **(economic capital)**. This further suggests that coping with labour shortage resulting from migration did not essentially erode the household' resilience but also enhanced it in a way.

⁶⁶ Series of observation, interviews with households' representatives together with the public and private institutional officials.

⁶⁷ Apparently, various livelihoods strategies employed by some households had been undertaken not only because of migration by one of the households' members but also because of the current looming poverty situation in and among the Maasai communities and the migrants' households in particular.

Secondly, through the formation and working in groups (**social capital**), households' members developed reactive capacities to cope with labour constraints resulting from migration. Therefore, like the above case, coping with migration by households' members may be perceived as not only eroding household resilience but also enhancing it.

Moreover, as a way of coping with labour shortage resulting from households' members out-migration, some households' members engaged their children in productive work. Observation showed that children of a school-going age (7-14 years old) were involved in livestock grazing-related tasks,⁶⁸ even during school days and hours. This naturally denied their right to education, which could have most likely jeopardized their future life. The following figure speaks for itself.



Figure 17: Coping with extra work burden through child labour

Photo: E. Munishi (2011)

Drawing on the above data, it can be said that migration eroded households' resilience through the engagement of children in productive work (child labour), as this further denied the children right to education, among other rights. This therefore means that coping with migration by the household members' eroded an important aspect of household cultural capital notably the personal resilience of the children who were overworked and denied schooling.

⁶⁸ In some instances children were also involved in looking for food

6.2.1 III - health resulting from urban threats and insecurity

It was also noted that migration-related risks encountered by the migrants, such as HIV/AIDS and physical insecurity⁶⁹ or falling victim to crimes while working as security guards, further contributed to the depletion of human labour resulting from the ill-health and deaths of migrants. According to the respondents, such depletion of human labour generally led to the further reduction of households' resilience in terms of finance, food, health and shelter, given that it diminished livestock and agriculture, which were among their main livelihood determinants in the migrants' sending areas.

Around 45 (n=50) respondents [30 household+20 key informants] regarded HIV/AIDS as a deadly migration-related threat in the Maasai land and more specifically in the Ngorongoro District. They argued that migrants contracted this disease in urban areas before subsequently transmitted it to the sending households/communities.⁷⁰ Respondents added that the disease had depleted households' financial and non-financial resources that were invested in taking care of the already-infected individuals, including the financing of burial services, as attested below:

AIDS more especially among the youth is a reality here. Studies have been carried out here and proved existence of this disease more especially at Enduleni and Kakeshi [wards in Ngorongoro] where migration to urban areas is rampant. Our main concern is that the majority of the infected youth are the migrants who keep on bringing AIDS back home. **(Male, Key informants (35) Ngorongoro Division)**

Respondents expressed how HIV/AIDS had claimed lives and how this would further infuriate households' livelihoods in the future:

I tell you this disease [HIV/AIDS] will finish up all of our youth here. Everybody in Ngorongoro is concerned about our diminishing young blood [death of youth Maasai due to HIV]. A big number of youth around the neighbourhood is simply infected [by HIV]. You can just count them one by one, because [the signs of] this disease cannot be hidden. This is dangerous because it will simply diminish both our culture and economy. To whom shall we turn to once we are old and our youth are all gone? **(Male household representative (54) Ngorongoro Division-Ngorongoro)**

Moreover, (Coast 2002: 8) also correlated HIV/AIDS prevalence in the Ngorongoro District with the rural-urban migration of some Maasai youth, noting that Enduleni and Kakeshi Wards in were particularly vulnerable to the pandemic as they relied on urban-migration as an important livelihood strategy⁷¹.

⁶⁹ Although household members could not specifically relate HIV/AIDS and physical insecurity to depletion of household resilience, their serious concerns about it and the evidence from literature points to critical impact of these hazards to individual households resilience depletion, now and in the future.

⁷⁰ For more detailed works on HIV/AIDS and Maasai migration in Tanzania sees, (Lukumay, 2008; May 2003; AMREF, 2010; Oxfam GB Tanzania reports; Coast, 2002 and Coast, 2006). The present work examines the general impact of rural-urban migration on the resilience of Maasai migrants sending households and community. HIV/AIDS pandemic has therefore not been specifically dealt with.

⁷¹ To my knowledge, no recent HIV/AIDS [prevalence] data available specifically for the Maasai youth and Ngorongoro district in particular. However, Coast (2002:8), noted that HIV/AIDS prevalence rate among the general population of Ngorongoro was 6% and it would continue to rise for several years.

Essentially, Maasai migrants were vulnerable to HIV/AIDS due to the lack of HIV protective skills ((May 2003; Coast 2002, 2006; Ole Kaunga 2002; May and Ole Ikayo 2007), as well as a lack of self-control due to alcohol overconsumption (Lukumay 2008; Kweka 2011). Moreover, Maasai and more specifically Maasai women considered the use of condom as shameful and promiscuous,⁷² whereas men considered it a waste of semen (Coast 2006; Homewood et al. 2006).

In terms of physical insecurity, 13 (n=30) respondents in the sending area were concerned about migrants' deaths resulting from physical insecurity among Maasai youth mainly working as security guards in urban areas. They stipulated that these youth either lost lives or suffered permanent disabilities resulting from attacks⁷³ by robbers⁷⁴, as one of the migrants' wives puts it below:

(....) but my only worry about his [her husband] departure to the city is being attacked by gangs. So many of them have been killed and injured while working as [night] watchmen in cities. Otherwise, I don't have problem with his departure to the city, because as a man he has gone there to look for a living for us who have remained behind. Certainly, if he remained here there was nothing he could do to feed the [his] family **(Female Household representative (29), Ngorongoro Division, Ngorongoro)**

Moreover, during his field work in Ngorongoro (May–July 2011), the researcher witnessed the arrival of two dead bodies of Maasai youth who had been attacked and killed by gangs while working as security guards in Mwanza city in Tanzania and Kisumu city in Kenya.⁷⁵ In his inquiry, the researcher noted:

Deaths resulting from urban [physical] insecurity [dangers and risks mainly attacks by thieves] are becoming almost common now. On the auctions [market] days you will always hear death announcements or see a dead body of a young Maasai who has been killed in the city mainly when they are working as night-watchmen. Due to low economic support they transport these dead bodies on the livestock auction [market] days so that they can either pay cheaply or not at all pay as these Lorries will be heading to same direction. **(Female Key informant (45), Ngorongoro division, Ngorongoro)**

It was noted that the shortage of labour resulting from migration did not only create a labour gap at the household level, but also at the community level. This was due to the fact that, unlike in the past, youth are presently largely absent in some public functions, specifically due to the ongoing rural-urban migration of the Maasai youth, as attested by the majority of the local government and NGO's officials in Ngorongoro.⁷⁶

⁷² AMREF has been implementing the Nomadic youth sexual reproductive health project among the Maasai in Kilindi Tanga region Tanzania for around 5 years. OXFAM works to boost livelihoods of pastoralists and Maasai of Ngorongoro in particular.

⁷³ Local households representatives/ and migrants sending are in [Ngorongoro] were concerned about the migrant's physical insecurity condition in facing Maasai migrants working as security guards in Tanzanian cities

⁷⁴ FGD with household representatives /elders, supplemented with in-depth interviews with the Local government and NGO's officials.

⁷⁵ It was established that deaths resulting from physical insecurity and HIV/AIDS costed the households dearly in terms of finance and time when preparing burial services.

⁷⁶ Series of discussion with Local Government Officials and the NGO's representatives in Ngorongoro from 15 May to 25 June 2011.

The above-presented information is further sampled by a testimony as below.

Normally we depend on youth to maintain some public cattle structures [public water and medication structures]. But at the moment we need to run up and down looking for these youth as they cannot easily be found. Again during festivities youth labour is required for preparation. But one can hardly find them [partly] because they have migrated to urban areas.⁷⁷ **(Male key informant (50), Ngorongoro Division, Ngorongoro)**

6.3 Migration impact on households' social capital

Migration of the Maasai youth to urban areas also significantly impacted households' social capital. On the one hand, it improved households' social network, thus helping households to ameliorate their access and ownership of other capitals, as evidenced by 8 local households' representatives and 22 Maasai migrants in Dar es Salaam city.

Firstly, through social connections, migrants in cities helped those newly arriving to settle down by offering them accommodation, food and assistance in their search for jobs. This ultimately helped migrants to boost their households' resilience in the sending households.

Ever since he went to Arusha [city] he has called [invited] about three of them [relatives and friends] and I guess they are also working either in the shop or as watchmen in Arusha like himself. (...) One time he came for a holiday and took one of our neighbours and after sometime I heard he called [invited] two more from among his friends **(Female Household representative, [wife to migrant] (27) Loliondo Division- Ngorongoro)**

A young Maasai migrant in Dar es Salaam explains how social-network resulting from migration helped his young brother to secure a job in the city, which helped him to earn money to buy cattle at the household.

I am the eldest brother [at home] (...) so I first migrated to the city and left the young ones at home (...) after noticing that it pays [this job] I called [invited] my brother. (...) Now he has earned more money (...) he's buying cows and ploughing the shamba [farm] at home. He can now support the family because he has the work. So it was good that I called him. **(A Maasai pastoralist youth (30) Dar es Salaam)**

The positive impact of social network was also noted in Kilindi⁷⁸ District, Tanga Region, one of the large Maasai communities, where Maasai migrant youth in urban areas forged networks that helped them to solicit support from different people in order to ameliorate their households and communities' resilience.

For example, it was noted that, in collaboration with some visitors from Germany,⁷⁹ Maasai migrant youth from the Kilindi District in Tanga Region opened up a camel garden project⁸⁰ that offered employment and improved people's livelihoods in different ways.

⁷⁷ Ibid

⁷⁸ Kilindi District is found in Tanga – in the northern Tanzania, and it hosts a huge Maasai community. Maasai settled there in 1980's and they have been attracting more of their relatives in the continued basis mainly due to land pressure and drought in Maasai land/ Arusha.

⁷⁹ Influence of foreigners has been one of the secondary factors for the rural-urban migration of the Maasai youth. Visitors and more especially the white people tend to be interested in Maasai youth in different ways and Maasai youth on the other hand, take economic advantages of these visitors in various ways.

The aforesaid information is further elaborated here under.

Of course, opening the camel's garden is only one thing (...) Maasai youth [Migrants] have also negotiated with some people and organisations to invest in different social projects, one of them being a Tsh 46 million agriculture project, where a "foreign seeds development organisation" had contributed 26 million, and towards improving agriculture and general livelihood in Kilindi. **(Male key informant (45) Dar es Salaam)**

On the other hand, the departure of household members had somewhat destroyed or weakened the household's networks, hence weakening agriculture as one of the most important household livelihood activities, as attested by 7 (n=30) household representatives in Ngorongoro and further confirmed by one respondent below:

In the past [before migration] we could cultivate much bigger piece of land because he was here and his friends could support us. He belonged to the group of his colleagues who would work for each other in turns. This really simplified [accomplishment of] agriculture tasks. He worked for them today and they would work for him the following day. But, ever since he left his friends can no longer come here and help us, (...) it is pity that we have got no more energy to cultivate⁸¹ **(Female Household Representative (60), Loliondo)**

6.4 Migration impact on households' symbolic capital

Migration mainly influenced households' [sending community] symbolic capital through the depletion of Maasai culture and traditions. Firstly, it emerged that Maasai youth were an important social group for sustaining Maasai culture, as expressed below:

The transition from one rite of passage to the other becomes a suitable occasion for the transfer of the acquired knowledge and experience. The important aspects during the transmission of knowledge process involves not only discipline, close knowledge of various plants and herbs but also how and when this knowledge is to be applied at the required moment (National Museum of Tanzania 2004: 72)

Moreover:

The physical peak of Maasai manhood is at the Moran stage (youth 15-35) and it is imperative that these groups are at their fingertips the knowledge of various trees, herbs and plants and their medicinal properties both curative and preventive (National Museum of Tanzania 2004: 71).

Consequently, youth urban migration led to delays or inconsistencies in some cultural events [rituals], as Maasai society is based on age set groups, which facilitates the existence and transmission of the Maasai culture from one generation to the other. Therefore, the migration of Maasai youth meant delays in cultural events, mainly initiation such as circumcision and transition from youth hood to adulthood, including subsequent marriages.

⁸⁰ Telephone interview with Mr. George Saitteu, Maasai Nomadic Youth Sexual Reproductive Health Project Officer, at AMREF, Kilindi Tanga, Tanzania.

⁸¹ Working for one another in turns more especially in agricultural-related tasks was common mainly among the Maasai of Loliondo Division.

Specifically, it emerged that celebrations aiming to initiate youth [14-30 yrs old] into junior elders [30-40s yrs old] were held after every specified period of time [in a specified season], which presupposed the youth being present. However, youth or *Morans* [14-25] who were supposed to be initiated into junior adulthood⁸² [25-30] and positions were largely missing due to rural-urban migration. This consequently negatively affected such initiation processes and their sustainability,⁸³ as further stated below:

Maasai youth from the age of 25 *Morans* onwards become junior elders or the *Olmorio*. (...) among the elders there are different sub age groups the most senior being the oldest. Those people who were born and circumscribed one time are supposed to compose and sing songs of their warrior stage, what they achieved and their other experiences. But, increasingly, this is becoming almost impossible because a big number of these people [15-35 years] are in cities. **(Male Key informant (65) Dar es Salaam)**

As a result, migration jeopardised traditional Maasai practices among youth:

(...) I recently attended one of our important traditional ceremonies; and as a Maasai I took my camera with me expecting to capture a number of typical Maasai traditional displays by the *Morans* [youth]. But, to my surprise I did not see any of them. The elders were bitterly complaining, as the boys were singing about the wonders of the cities. Oh!! Discos and many others, typically modern Kiswahili music! I wondered whether these were also part of Maasai traditions **(Male key informant (65) Dar es Salaam)**

Still on the decline of Maasai culture and traditions, a Maasai elder contends:

During various traditional ceremonies junior elders (25-35) are supposed to sing some victory songs, typically of what they did when they were still *Morans* (youth). But when it comes your time for being a junior elder and you cannot sing songs of your warrior stage, and you don't real have or know anything that you did it becomes a big problem and that is exactly where the Maasai are moving to!! You don't know who brave man is or who is a coward. So this loses the meaning. **(Male key informant (60), Ngorongoro Division, Ngorongoro)**

Maasai youth acquired some socially undesirable behaviour that was against Maasai culture while in urban areas, such as eating pork and fish, the over-consumption of alcohol, smoking, along with illegally engaging in sexual affairs or intermarrying with non-Maasai women.

⁸² *Enuoto* is one of the important rituals at this stage, where senior Maasai warriors are permitted to marry and prepared to become good future fathers. Junior elders are among other things shaved their hair and ordered to drop their spears [weapons] as sign of doing away with use of energy and force and start using their wisdom to lead families.

⁸³ At the time of field work [May 2011] researcher attended *Emanyata* ceremony [a ritual performed after circumcision to accord youth a status of warrior-hood] at Loliondo Division, and learned that a significant number of youth formerly circumcised and expected to attend this ceremony were missing because of rural-urban migration.

Migrants were also responsible for transmitting these habits to their peers in the rural areas. One respondent talks about the growing habit of Maasai getting married to the *Waswahili* [non-Maasai] as something that is detrimental to Maasai culture:⁸⁴

Young people among the Maasai are not allowed to drink alcohol. But once they go to cities develop habits of drinking and they even at times drink with the elder's once they come back here. To be precise, morals have totally declined here to the extent that at times you're incapable of distinguishing between an elder and a youth. So, giving orders according to our culture becomes extremely difficult here. **(Male key informant, (60) Ngorongoro Division, Ngorongoro)**

Consequently, morals and future parental responsibilities among youth were at stake:

Looking at the Maasai youth migrants in terms of future parent stock; firstly they can no longer make good fathers as they don't really take part in the traditional practices. What kind of teachings will they give to their children? Are they going to teach them about discos and many others, city life? **(Male key informant (56), Loliondo Division, Ngorongoro)**

The above findings essentially portray a negative impact of migration on the Maasai households and community's resilience. Delays and inconstancies concerning rites of passage as well as the disowning of cultural and traditional practices by the Maasai migrants threatened the continuation of these cultural aspects.

This depleted some elements of **symbolic capital** among the Maasai because some cultural events such as initiations [circumcision, transition from youth-hood to adulthood] symbolically differentiated Maasai from other tribes, which is what Maasai were respected for. For example, Maasai have been employed as security guards in cities, partly due to their fighting skills acquired during their initiation at the warrior stage.

Moreover, cultural demise jeopardised Maasai **cultural capital**, as these cultural events or initiations were accompanied with special teachings and responsibilities such as marriage and effective parenting, which would again significantly determine Maasai **(symbolic capital)** in terms of honour and reputation, e.g. good warriors/security guards.

The decline of symbolic capital among the Maasai could be detrimental to the Maasai households and communities' in the long run, given that most of the Maasai social and economic aspects such as pastoralism are deeply imbedded in Maasai culture and traditions. Therefore, any negative impact on Maasai culture has a fundamental impact on the Maasai livelihoods and resilience in particular (National Museum of Tanzania 2004).

⁸⁴ FGDs and In-depth interviews with mostly key informants

6.5 Discussion and some theoretical implications

This discussion highlights the relevance and discrepancies that the aforementioned findings can have on existing empirical literature relating to the impact of rural-urban migration on local households' resilience.

At the economic capital level, migrants' financial and non-financial remittances were re-invested in livestock and agriculture, further improving other households' livelihood aspects such as food security, health and education [**cultural capital**]. Such findings have previously been observed among some sending households in Ethiopia (Morrissey 2007) Zimbabwe (ACF International 2012; Ncube and Gómez 2011), Ghana and Uganda (Mazzucato 2008) as well as Kenya (Ole Kaunga 2007).

On the other hand, migration depleted households' economic capital through a shortage of labour, leading to a decline of cattle and agriculture. Households conceded economic resources such as cash money, cattle and land [**economic capital**] in order to compensate migration losses, thus negatively affecting household access to health, education and food [**cultural capital**].

Some existing studies have also reported how a labour gap resulting from migration may reduce households' economic capital (Nwokocha 2008; Tacoli 2002). However, none of these studies have explicitly stated the depletion of households' economic capital as resulting from their compensation for losses caused by migrants, as noted by this work among Maasai migrant-sending households. This work's ability to unearth this crucial aspect could have been due to the use of the multi-layered social resilience framework (Obrist et al. 2010) that inclined the research to also investigate how coping with migration by households' members could have either enhanced or depleted household's resilience.

At the cultural capital plane, it was found that migrants invested in education, health, housing and equipment such as radio, TV sets and motorcycles, which improved other household capitals, leading to more strengthened household resilience. Similar findings have been established among migrant-sending households in Tanzania (Dungumaro 2009), Kenya (Ole Kaunga 2007), Cameroon and Nigeria (Tacoli and Mabala 2010b).

However, coping with migration eroded some household members' social resilience, namely through the overworking of women and a lack of good parental care and education for children. Indeed, similar findings have been established among Maasai migrant-sending households in Kenya (Ole Kaunga 2007) as well as in Pakistan (Siegmann 2010).

Interestingly, it was also noted that in some cases coping with migration not only harmed but also enhanced households' resilience. This was the case where some households' members managed to offset financial and manpower constraints resulting from migration by working in groups (social capital) and engaging in entrepreneurship activities (cultural capital). This is a new insight in this work and across migration literature as a whole, given that such a perspective has rarely been found in other migration research.

This work's ability to capture this important aspect might have been facilitated by the employment of the multi-layered social resilience framework that reflects a more strength-based framework (Obrist et al. 2010).

Findings further showed that ill-health and deaths resulting from AIDS and physical insecurity in urban areas led to labour loss. Moreover, ill-health resulting from migration has also been widely documented. Such authors maintain that migration heightens communicable diseases such as HIV, given that migrants have a greater possibility of interacting with multiple sexual partners in rural areas due to their exposure and economic power (Gugler 1970; Hansen 1990; Little 1974; Mayer and Iona 1974; Schapera 1947; Stichter 1985) in (May 2003: 12).

However, none of these previous studies have specifically highlighted migrants' deaths resulting from physical insecurity such as gangs-attacks in the urban areas, including its resilience implications on the sending areas, as shown in this work.

In terms of social capital, migration increased household social capital, thus enabling migrants to secure accommodation and job connections in urban areas, as previously found by (Adger 2004; Tacoli 2002). On the other hand, it was noted that the migration of youth terminated some households' social-networks and led to a shortage of labour, further eroding agriculture and pastoralism [**economic capital**], as well as less access to food and housing at the household level [**cultural capital**]. These findings are consistent with (Tacoli 2002), who contended that migration may ultimately break social networks and the protection formerly offered by migrants.

With respect to the impact of migration on **symbolic capital**, the findings noted that Maasai migration jeopardised the reputation and honour of Maasai-sending households as a result of decline in some Maasai cultural practices such as rituals and initiation process among other things. Indeed, some existing works have illustrated delays of some cultural rites such as initiation processes among the Maasai, due to rural-urban migration of Maasai [male] youth [15-35 yrs] (Ole Kaunga 2007; May 2003; Kweka 2011; May and Ole Ikayo 2007; Kweka 2011).

6.6 Chapter summary

In conclusion, this chapter investigated the influence of the rural-urban migration of the Maasai nomadic youth on the migrants' local households' resilience in Ngorongoro District. Based on the multi-layered social resilience framework of (Obrist et al. 2010), the aim was to firstly understand how remittances by the migrants replenished households' capitals; secondly, how labour loss resulting from migration could have depleted households' capitals; and thirdly, how households' strategies of coping with migration (labour loss) either enhanced or depleted their resilience (capitals).

Findings revealed that, at the economic capital level, migrants' financial and non-financial remittances were re-invested in livestock and agriculture, further improving other households' livelihood aspects such as food security, health and education **[cultural capital]**. On the other hand, migration depleted households' economic capital through a shortage of labour, leading to a decline of cattle and agriculture. Households conceded economic resources such as cash money, cattle and land **[economic capital]** in order to compensate migration losses, thus negatively affecting household access to health, education and food **[cultural capital]**. This suggests that coping with migration (loss of a household member) by households depleted the households' economic capital rather than replenishing it.

At the cultural capital plane, it was found that migrants invested in education, health, housing and equipment such as radio, TV sets and motorcycles, which improved other household capitals, leading to more strengthened household resilience. However, coping with migration eroded some household members' social resilience, namely through the overworking of women and a lack of good parental care and education for children. This thus means that labour shortage resulting from migration depleted household cultural capital (labour) rather than enhancing it.

Interestingly, it was also noted that in some cases coping with migration not only harmed but also enhanced households' resilience. This was the case where some households' members managed to offset financial and manpower constraints resulting from migration by working in groups (social capital) and engaging in entrepreneurship activities (cultural capital). This is a new insight as well as unique contribution to this work and in the migration literature as it's rarely found in other migration research. Findings further showed that ill-health and deaths resulting from AIDS and physical insecurity in urban areas led to labour loss in sending households.

In terms of social capital, migration increased household social capital, thus enabling migrants to secure accommodation and job connections in urban areas. On the other hand, it was noted that the migration of youth terminated some households' social-networks and led to a shortage of labour, further eroding agriculture and pastoralism **[economic capital]**, as well as less access to food and housing at the household level **[cultural capital]**.

With respect to the impact of migration on **symbolic capital**, the findings noted that Maasai migration jeopardised the reputation and honour of Maasai-sending households as a result of decline in some Maasai cultural practices such as rituals and initiation process among other things.

Therefore, based on the multi-layered social resilience framework (Obrist et al. 2010), we can conclude that, on the one hand, the rural-urban migration of the Maasai youth strengthened households' resilience through remittances that were invested in livestock, agriculture, shelter, food and health services.

However, on the other hand, migration depleted households' resilience through a shortage of labour and its subsequent threats such as overworking of the remaining households' members, financial constraints, and shelter and food inadequacy. Accordingly, more practical and elaborate factors towards strengthening households' resilience are detailed in the final chapter of this thesis.

7. Financial, employment and shelter constraints among the Maasai migrant youth

7.1 Introduction

This chapter ascertains and examines financial constraints, unemployment and inadequate shelter threats faced by the Maasai nomadic migrant youth in Dar es Salaam city. Based on the multi-layered social resilience framework (Obrist et al. 2010), the aim is to understand whether the migrants managed to solicit and utilise capitals from different social levels to develop both reactive and proactive capacities for coping with the aforementioned threats. Furthermore, this chapter also strives to recommend factors for enhancing the migrants' capacities to more competently cope with such threats.

As applied to this chapter, migrants' capabilities to solicit and utilise capitals from different social layers to reactively and proactively cope with the aforementioned threats is perceived as migrants being resilient to the threats, whereas the opposite case is seen as either being less or not at all resilient to the threats. Based on the reasons for being able or unable to fully respond, suggestions for improving migrants' resilience against these particular threats are offered.

Firstly, the chapter presents the magnitude of these threats, before discussing different strategies that migrants employ to cope with them. Subsequently, the findings are discussed and a chapter summary is presented.

7.1 Financial and employment situation of the Maasai migrants

Migrants' financial situation: In order to gain an idea of the migrants' financial status, both the financial and non-financial earnings of the Maasai migrant youth in Dar es Salaam city were systematically documented and examined, and noted in the table below⁸⁵.

Table 10: Maasai migrants' monthly financial earnings

Earnings' categories	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
15-25 (€)	12	24.0	24.0
26-50 (€)	14	28.0	52.0
51-74 (€)	16	32.0	84.0
75-Above (€)	8	16.6	100.0
Total	50	100.0	100.0

Source: Author, based on the field data (2011)

⁸⁵ This computation has included both financial and non-financial earnings. However Most of the migrants ended up taking home between 5-50 Euros due to arbitrary deductions and delays of their monthly salaries. See the following chapter on exploitation and oppression threats.

As can be observed in the above table, the majority of the migrants earned between Tsh 30,000 and 150,000/= (equivalent to **Euro 15-75**) per month. However, none of the migrants earned less than 15 Euros, while around 16% received over 75 Euros. This information slightly corroborates with other existing studies. For instance, (Coast 2006: 3) rated Maasai migrants' monthly earnings as ranging from 14 to 71 USD (**Euro 7-50**), while (Ole Kaunga 2002: 4) observed a monthly income of between Tsh 30,000/= and 70,000/= (equivalent to **Euro 15-35**). However, (Kweka 2011: 3) recently reported an average monthly income of only Tsh 30,000/= (**Euro 15**) among the Maasai migrants.

These current findings show that no migrants received an income of less than 15 Euros per month, whereas some migrants received more than 75 Euros per month. This variation could have been due to the changing socio-economic situation in Tanzania, and thus the current study has considered both the financial and non-financial earnings of the migrants.

It was important to establish the extent to which migrants felt satisfied with their financial income. Generally, the majority of the migrants felt dissatisfied with their earnings, noting that they were simply inadequate to finance essentials such as food, shelter, local transport and supporting their local households in the rural areas.

Migrants also noted the rising standards of living, notably the hike in commodity prices, as worsening their financial inability in urban areas. They complained that food items such as meat, milk and grain, notably maize, were becoming increasingly expensive due to climate change [lack of rains], a lack of electricity supply, as well as higher fuel prices leading to inflation⁸⁶ in Tanzania, as one of the migrants stipulates below:

How can the salary be enough to cater for all my needs! Food prices are especially high in the city. (...) A Kilo of meat costs around Tsh 5000 [2 Euro] and a cup of milk costs not less than Tsh 500/=. [50 cents Euro]. This is really expensive for me; taking into account the amount of salary I receive (...). I mean it is too little to support myself and the family [local household in the sending area]! (**Male Maasai migrant youth (27), Dar es Salaam**)

Most of the migrants associated their financial predicament with unstable employment, including low payment and delayed salaries, unjustifiable salary deductions and job termination by the employers.

⁸⁶ When this research took place (March-October 2011), there was famine in some rural areas in Tanzania resulting from bad weather. Lack of electricity in the whole of Tanzania was alarming. This had led to higher prices of commodities such as fuel and food-related products that were highly in demand. Some people whose livelihoods entirely depended on electricity failed to engage in production or did so at a relatively much higher costs. For example food sellers had to pay extra charges for preserving perishables such as fresh meat, fish, fruits and milk. This consequently made them raise food prices. Consequently, it had affected people at ground such as the Maasai migrants as it led to higher prices for food and other domestic goods due to higher costs of production.

This particularly occurred among the Maasai migrants employed as the *[walinzi]* or security guards, hairdressers and houseboys [girls!]. Consequently, this limited migrants from effectively solving their financial-related problems, as attested below:

At the moment I really don't have something to do (...) One time I was employed as a watchman in a rich man's family, but, we could not understand each other because one day he found me dozing while at work, and decided to kick me out of work because of only one day's mistake (...). Now the situation is worse as it is not so easy to find jobs here. At the moment it's even impossible to find something to eat.

(Male Maasai Migrant youth (31) Dar es Salaam)

7.2 Coping with inadequate income, employment and shelter by migrants

This section discusses how migrants coped with the aforementioned threats, as well as the extent to which they managed to do so. These threats have been grouped together due to their interrelated nature and because migrants seemed to have employed almost the same kind of strategies in coping with them.

7.3 Economic capital against inadequate income, employment and shelter

Depending on local households assets: Around 35% (n=50) of the interviewed Maasai migrant youth depended on some forms of economic capital, notably livestock, land and agricultural products, mainly from their local households, in order to cope with financial constraints and unemployment in the urban areas. Firstly, the financial capacity that emanated from the selling of these resources enabled them to travel to urban areas and sustain themselves during the first days.

(...) Off course, how could I have come to the city without something in the pocket? I sold two of my bulls and used the money for both travelling [bus fare] to Dar es Salaam and survived [buy food] on the first days. **(Male Maasai migrant youth (30) Dar es Salaam)**

Secondly, Maasai migrant youth used this same financial capacity to invest in various entrepreneurship activities such as engagement in hair dressing activities and trading in local human medicine and crafts. Other activities included the opening of retail business, e.g. mobile phone accessories and buying motorcycles, popularly known as *bodaboda*,⁸⁷ for carrying passengers, as further evidenced below:

I wanted to become more economically independent so I want to invest the money in my own hair dressing saloon. I need to have my own customers, because at the moment I have to get the customers through my boss [employer] at the Y2K saloon and she has to deduct some percent from my money, let's say per every customer ..., which is somehow exploitative for me. **(Male Maasai migrant youth (27) Dar es Salaam)**

⁸⁷ Boda-boda means slang for motorcycle for transporting people within the city: This kind of transport is becoming popular in many cities in Tanzania. It is relatively quick and affordable but also dangerous as most of the drivers are not experienced enough.

In connection with the foregoing topic, another migrant explains:

I don't have to depend on the salary all the year around. After all, the salary is too small to sustain me here in the city. So from time to time I return to my home village where I can either seek more money [engagement in pastoralism and agriculture] to improve my income and survive in the city. **(Male Maasai migrant youth (31), Dar es Salaam)**

Having learned through the harsh financial and employment situation in the urban areas, around 75% (n=50) of the interviewed migrants intended to invest in livestock and agricultural production in their local households as a future means of becoming more financially stable. They wanted to do this through buying more livestock or sending financial assistance to replenish existing livestock. According to them, this would liberate them economically in different ways. For example, they would sell cows to support future health, education and food needs⁸⁸. Migrants invested in livestock in different ways, buying cows directly or sending money and livestock medication to maintain livestock in their households, as this migrant puts it:

From now on I have decided to buy more goats and cows at home so that I can sell them once I have [financial] problems. So, buying cows and goats it is even more worth than keeping money in the bank. This is because I can bargain the price or sell them [livestock] at the time when the prices are higher (at the pick). **(Male Maasai migrant youth (27), Dar es Salaam)**

Another migrant confirms the above stated view below:

....my plans are to buy more cows, keep them in the village so that when they grow very fat, I can sell them at [relatively] much higher price and get some money, to invest in my children's education. Then, I will do away with this business [working as security guard a kind of job that is less paying]. As you know cows [cattle] is everything among us [we the Maasai]. **(Male Maasai migrant youth, Dar es Salaam)**

Migrants were willing and planning to invest in agriculture, mainly in their local households, as a proactive way of both overcoming unemployment and becoming more financially stable. Those migrants who wanted to invest in agriculture had either purchased or intended to purchase irrigation water pumps, plots of land and saved money for different farming activities in the village.

The majority of them aimed to farm onions, maize and beans, as crops that would grow well in most of the Maasai land.

At the moment, I am struggling to save some money and invest it in the vegetable production. I think farming onions in my village may pay quite well. And this I think should be a good strategy towards saying bye-bye to poverty [financial and unemployment threats]. Here we work from morning to evening [as security guards] but we don't see any progress [good income] **(Male Maasai migrant youth, (29), Dar es Salaam)**

The above results show that through some elements of economic capital, notably livestock, land and agricultural products mainly at the local household level, migrants managed to develop reactive capacities to cope with financial constraints and unemployment in the urban areas. Indeed, it is through such resources that they gained the financial power to sustain their lives in the urban areas and invest in various income-generating activities.

⁸⁸ FGDs /interviews with Maasai migrants and key informants in Dar es Salaam

Moreover, reflection and learning processes emanating from these threats (experience) enabled the migrants to develop proactive capacities, typically involving much better future ways of coping with financial constraints and unemployment threats, including investment in livestock and agricultural production.

7.3.1 Financial support from meso level organisations

Non-government organisations NGOs: Firstly, it was noted that Maasai migrants did not have the knowledge of the relevant NGOs. Secondly, the existing NGOs in Dar es Salaam, such as AMREF, CARE, and OXFAM, concentrated on the Maasai pastoralists in the rural areas as opposed to migrants in the urban areas. However, it was noted that one local NGO known as LIVES, based in Sinza-Dar es Salaam, worked with a focus on Maasai livelihoods.

However, this NGO only intervened in issues of HIV/AIDS and the labour rights of Maasai migrants in Dar es Salaam and did not exclusively involve itself with the financial problems of the Maasai migrants. Moreover, as will be noted in the following chapter on 'exploitation and oppression', this organisation was relatively ill-equipped in terms of both technical and financial resources. This could have been the reason why it failed to support the Maasai migrants economically.

Profit meso level financial organisations: Migrants were practically incapable of accessing support from financial organisations such as local banks and SACCOS for a number of reasons.

Lack of knowledge about organisations: Owing to their poor knowledge about these organisations, the majority of the Maasai innocently stated that they feared accessing financial support [loans] from such institutions because they would fail to repay the money and thus being imprisoned or have their property confiscated. Moreover, some other Maasai youth were afraid of accessing financial support from some existing financial organisations due to bureaucratic and corrupt processes that might have been involved, as evidenced by around 32% (n=50).

We are afraid of going to borrow from Banks or SACCOS to get loans because they require a lot of explanations such as the ID cards, the aims for acquiring loans. So what are all these explanations for? I can simply approach my relative or friend [a Maasai] who can in turn support me without all these complications. **(Male Maasai migrant youth (30), Dar es Salaam)**

Another migrant youth was afraid of obtaining a bank loan due to the bureaucracy involved:

There are [practically] no [financial] institutions that we can turn to for financial support. We are afraid of going to Banks [SACCOS] to get loans because they require a lot of explanations such as the ID cards, the aims for acquiring loans. So what are all these explanations for? If I turn to my fellow Maasai or a friend there will be no need for all this kind of chain of explanations. **(Male Maasai migrant youth (26), Dar es Salaam)**

Lack of collateral and financial ability: Maasai migrants also failed to solicit financial support from financial institutions due to a lack of collateral, as justified by more than 80% (n=50) of Maasai youth migrants.

I can't bother myself seeking for financial assistance from banks or SACCOS simply because I don't have anything to give them as a security against the loan. Also, I don't have time to go through all the bureaucratic procedures. What I normally do is to save a bit of what I earn [for my future] and also consult my friends and relatives whenever I have a financial problem (**Male Maasai migrant youth (28), Dar es Salaam**)

However, the researcher's consultation with some local financial organisations and experts noted that there were also some group loans purposely for poor people working in groups [without collaterals] that could also be enjoyed by the Maasai migrants trading in different local goods. However, Maasai migrants were unaware of such support and could hardly organise themselves to access it.

Lack of permanent address in urban areas: Another factor that impeded the Maasai from obtaining financial support from financial organisations was a lack of permanent physical address. This can further be justified by the fact that more than 70% (n=50) of Maasai migrants in Dar es Salaam did not have permanent settlements (accommodation) and a physical address in the city. This same sentiment was also shared by some key informants:

"....., may be they can go to banks for loans, but most of them will not qualify [for loans] because of their lack of adequate income and Permanent settlement [physical address], bankers cannot give money to people without permanent settlement... it is like throwing away money" (**Male Key informant (37), Dar es Salaam**)

A local bank officer also emphasises that permanent physical address is a prerequisite for acquiring financial support from financial institutions.

You can't lend money to someone who doesn't have a physical address (...). It is dangerous as it amounts to throwing money away (...). You can hardly deal with someone who doesn't have a specific physical address as tracing the loan becomes extremely cumbersome. Most of these people [the Maasai migrants] don't have well established settlements here in the city. How do you expect them to benefit from us? (**Male key informant (37) Dar es Salaam**)

Some secondary data also stipulates that Maasai migrants could not succeed in obtaining financial support from the existing financial institutions due to their lack of permanent settlements in urban areas. For instance, financing institutions found it hard to trace them once they had left urban areas, e.g. Dar es Salaam city (Ole Kaunga 2007).

At the national level, it was noted that migrants could also not access any financial related support at this level because the government of Tanzania did not have relevant programs/initiatives such as credit schemes for poor migrant like the Maasai migrant youth.

7.4 Cultural capital against inadequate income, employment and shelter

Most of the Maasai migrant youth engaged in informal sector activities as a way of coping with unemployment and financial constraints. Such activities included working as security guards, hair braiding, selling labour for domestic and non-domestic activities and trading on local traditional commodities such as herbs and ornaments, as discussed below

Working as security guards: Around 75% (n=50) of Maasai the migrant youth in Dar es Salaam city confirmed having worked as security guards to generate income. They undertook this work during the day or night time, on either a part-time or a full-time basis. They provided this service in private places such as families, as well as public places such as construction sites, car parks, motorcar garages or yards, churches, schools, health facilities, bars and hotels. In 2006, (Coast 2006: 2) noted that around 90% of the Maasai pastoralists in Arusha city also worked as guards (*askaris*), as demonstrated in the photo below.



Figure 18: Offering of security services to maintain financial and employment status

Photo: K. Lickert (2010)

Maasai migrant youth engaged in work as security guards primarily because most of them belonged to the age group between 15-35 years, known as the *Il-moran*, a group considered by both the Maasai and non-Maasai people as fierce warriors, and thus effective in working as security guards. Moreover, compared to other tribes and ethnic groups, Maasai migrants were considered more faithful and relatively affordable in providing security services.

Importantly, working as security guards emerged as the closest job option for the Maasai migrants due to their lack of formal and professional skills that would avail them to more formal and higher paying jobs, as attested below:

We would like to have [much better] paying jobs. (...) but as you know, we don't have education. Who may be willing to give you [as uneducated Maasai] a paying job if you don't have education [skills]. Leave alone being able to use modern weapons, being able to read and write is an important ingredient for securing employment [good job] here in the city **(Male Maasai migrant youth (30), Dar es Salaam)**

The above data highlights that the Maasai aggressiveness, diligence and faithfulness, most of which emanated from their local culture **(cultural capital)**, strengthened the Maasai migrants' **reactive capacity to** cope with unemployment and financial constraint threats through working as security guards.

Engagement in Maasai traditional hair braiding: Moreover, around 43% (n=50) of the interviewed migrants engaged in Maasai traditional hair dressing activity, either on a full- or part time basis as a way of earning income. Firstly, migrants carried out this activity in partnership with the *Waswahili* (non-Maasai), the majority of whom were the hair dressing saloon owners. In this case, a *Mswahili* owning a hair dressing saloon hires a Maasai who can work for him or her on permanent or part-time basis. Secondly, Maasai migrants carried out the hair dressing activity independently by negotiating with customers in terms of the price and a convenient place where the activity could be carried out⁸⁹. In such a case, either a Maasai migrant moved to the customer's place or a customer moved to a Maasai place of choice. Thirdly, some migrants opened a hair dressing salon either as individuals or a group. It was noted that around 4 Maasai migrant youth had been operating hair dressing saloons individually or in groups with other Maasai youth.

One of the key informants summarises the organisation of hair dressing activity by the Maasai as follows:

Some of them [Maasai youth], [extremely few of them] hire a business house where they conduct this business [hair braiding]. So they organise it purely by themselves. They pay the house rent and some of the workers in their working station. But the majority of them are employed by none Maasai people (...) and divide the income accordingly. **(Female key informant (27), Dar es Salaam)**

⁸⁹ In some cases some Maasai migrants performed the hair dressing job at the same time as they were engaged in other activities such as working as security guard or selling traditional items such as herbs.



Figure 19: Engagement in Maasai traditional hair dressing as coping with financial and unemployment threats

Photo: L. Munishi (2010)

The above-stated data emphasises that hair dressing skills emanating from the Maasai local culture (**cultural capital**) increased the Maasai migrants' reactive capacities to cope with unemployment and financial constraints threats through either self-employment or being employed by the **Waswahili** to carry out hair dressing activities.

Trading on Maasai traditional articles: Furthermore, around 24% (n=50) of the interviewed Maasai migrant youth traded on Maasai traditional articles, including traditional human and livestock medicine, Maasai traditional clothing, beads, shoes, handbags and belts,⁹⁰ as stated by one of the migrants below:

I am selling these ornaments and some decorated clothes and that's how I earn a living. I sell them mainly to the Maasai people but also other city residents who are interested [in them]. [Apparently], it is [mainly] the non-Maasai people who seem to be more interested in buying them in large quantities more than the Maasai themselves". (**Female Maasai migrant youth (29) Dar es Salaam**)

Maasai migrants selling these items walked around the city as hawkers, stationing themselves in some strategic places such as bus stands and road reserves, as well as public places such as bars and hotels, as partly evidenced in the photo below.

⁹⁰Maasai local herbs are highly preferred by the Maasai living in the city but also the other city residents as they are said to directly and indirectly cure a number of ailments, which include stomachache, fever, and human fertility-related problems.



Figure 20: Trading on traditional items as coping with financial and unemployment threat

Photo: A. Mwanga (2011)

Maasai migrant youth secured traditional items such as herbs from their local areas by physically travelling to these villages, sending their friends who were travelling back home, as well as making arrangements with relatives and friends who sent herbs through bus transport and received money through a mobile phone service known as M-PESA money transfer service.

The above data means that migrants remarkably managed to develop reactive capacities to cope with financial constraints and the threat of unemployment based on their local knowledge and skills of making and selling local items (**cultural capital**). Moreover, mobile phone services (**cultural capital**) further facilitated the ordering of these items from the rural areas.

It is important to also understand that migrants encountered further minor threats while trading local goods such as herbs and ornaments. One such challenge was constantly being evacuated from business places, as well as the confiscation of their property by the city guards. This was because migrants mainly carried out these activities [crafts selling] in unauthorised places such as bus stands and road reserves. Some secondary data also maintains that Maasai migrants involved in petty business were increasingly arrested for violating municipal by-laws, while others were accused of violence or vandalism (Riley et al. 2012).

In order to cope with this condition, some migrants either kept on walking around the city as hawkers or engaged in bribery with the city guards to allow them to continue with their income-earning activities.

Indeed, during the fieldwork, the researcher observed that some Maasai who were engaged in selling traditional medicine, tobacco, and ornaments in illegal places at the Mwenge bus stand bribed the city guards to allow them continue with their business.

Selling labour in domestic and construction work: Around 8% (n=50) of the Maasai migrant youth worked as houseboys and [girls], as well as supplying labour in places where roads and house construction were taking place. Domestic activities performed by the migrants mainly involved cleaning, grazing and milking cows, as observed in the outskirts of Dar es Salaam city, notably in Kimara, Mbezi, Kibaha, Pugu, Tegeta and Bunju. Interviews with some household representatives in Ngorongoro District also revealed that 6 migrants engaged in grazing and milking livestock for pay in Arusha, Dar es Salaam and Mwanza cities, in Tanzania and Kisumu city in Kenya, while 2 migrants sold labour in construction work, notably assisting in building roads and houses, in Moshi and Dar es Salaam cities, respectively.

Engagement in multiple income earning activities: It was also noted that around 75% (n=50) of the migrants engaged in more than one of the aforementioned livelihood activities. In such cases, some Maasai migrants simultaneously engaged in working as security guards and selling herbs or hairdressing. One common way of engaging in multiple income earning activities was through carrying out security work at night and selling herbs during the day, as attested below:

I work as a watchman, but during my free time in the afternoon I engage myself in hair dressing business. I also sell some Maasai traditional herbs and tobacco. At times I can get a tender of supplying Maasai traditional sandals and I do it immediately. I have to do all these in order to survive in the city [boast financial capacity]. Otherwise I may end up begging here. **(Male Maasai migrant youth (29) Dar es Salaam)**

Another migrant stated:

..... In this way we end up fetching water, carrying sand, cements and bricks in contractions sites [reactive way of looking for alternative income]. This helps us earn more and also offset the misconception that the Maasai are incapable of engaging in other activities other than working as watchmen. **(Male Maasai migrant youth (23), Dar es Salaam)**

A key informant details the Maasai's involvement in multiple economic tasks:

...He works [a migrant] day and night without a break in between. He works as night security guard in one of the local schools here. (...) But in the morning he is responsible for washing pupil's dishes. (...) In the afternoon he works as a gate keeper and a messenger whereas, in the evening he is responsible for cleaning the classrooms after the students have left the school. (...) He [migrant] spends a night with his family [wife and child] at work place when working as a night security guard. **(Male key informant (36), Dar es Salaam)**

On the other hand, there were several problems associated with migrants engaging in multiple economic activities. Around 54% (n=50) of the interviewed migrants complained that engagement in more than one income activity frequently made them too tired and ineffective to more actively participate in other tasks; for example, they would fall asleep while engaged in security work at night. Moreover, migrants associated health problems

such as chest pain with overworking [engagement in more than one job], as one migrant explains:

Some people do some extra jobs that (...) working day and night to get more money. But for me I can't do that as it is so tiresome. One time I used to work as a night watchman and engaged in the hair dressing during the day. As a result, I experienced severe chest pain. I stopped it and now I am only working as security guard during the day and my health seems to be okay. Why should I make myself suffer for money! **(Male Maasai migrant youth (28), Dar es Salaam)**

Spending less on basic needs/ opting for cheap goods and services: Around 46% (n=50) of the interviewed migrants spent relatively less on different needs as a strategy of remaining financially secure. Firstly, migrants opted for less expensive food such as *ugali* [maize flower and vegetable source dish] and ate relatively little meat and milk, despite these being the Maasai's traditional foods. Moreover, Maasai traditionally do not eat fish, pork or chicken. Although a handful of Maasai youth have recently started eating these kinds of foods, the majority are still opposed to eating them. In some ways, this enabled the Maasai migrants to reduce their costs of living **(FGDs and in-depth interviews in Dar es Salaam and Ngorongoro).**

Secondly, some Maasai migrants spent less on clothing. Indeed, rather than buying expensive clothes, they relied on their traditional clothing, namely *rubbega* and *traditional sandals* made out of old car tyres, as stated by one of the migrants:

Look here! We [Maasai] wear simple shoes [as you can see] made out of car tyres. We wear it every day. And unlike the *Waswahili* [non Maasai] we can wear them all year long. We wear our simple *rubbega* [Maasai traditional garment also known as *Shukas*]. We need only two or three pairs [of them] are enough for us. Unlike the *Waswahili* we can hardly visit or spend money on fashion shops and so on. **(Male Maasai migrant youth (30), Dar es Salaam)**

In terms of coping with inadequate shelter, 40% of migrants slept at their work place, 24% slept at open places such as under trees, while a further 24% of the migrants slept in abandoned and dilapidated buildings. Only 12% of migrants acknowledged having hired rooms, even though such rooms were in extremely bad conditions. Furthermore, observation and FGDs further showed that most of the migrants shared accommodation, notably sleeping in groups, as discussed under the social capital section **(FGDs and in-depth interviews in Dar es Salaam, 22/05/2011).**

Secondary data also maintains that due to low and intermittent income, the Maasai migrants in urban areas are forced to live in slums where social amenities do not exist; moreover, they normally do not have a formal leadership to demand such services from the authorities (Ole Kaunga 2002, 2007). This coping strategy is further elaborated in the figure that follows.



Figure 21: Sleeping outside and in dilapidated structures as coping with inadequate shelter

Photo: E. Munishi (2011)

The above-presented data shows that, on the one hand, migrants managed to develop reactive capacities of coping with financial threat through local knowledge and physical strength, notably by engaging in multiple activities and spending less on some items, including the use of cheap shelter. On the other hand, this presents a health risk among the migrants as it eroded their health (**cultural capital**) through eating inadequate and less nutritious food, as well as sleeping in unhygienic shelter, which could expose them to some health problems such as malaria, resulting from mosquito bites.

Use of formal skills and education: Unfortunately, migrants widely lacked formal skills and education, including the inability to read, write and complete simple arithmetic. In addition, they also lacked Kiswahili language proficiency as a dominant and national language in Tanzania. Such important aspects of cultural capital lowered the Maasai migrants' competence against financial constraints and unemployment threats.

The migrants themselves believed that these skills would reward them with better employment opportunities, consequently increasing their bargaining power when it came to seeking employment and negotiating salaries. This was further attested by 56% (n=50) of the Maasai migrants mentioning bargaining power as an important capacity for acquiring a good job and subsequent good salary.

Unfortunately, however, migrants lacked these aspects, as attested below:

At times you feel that your employer is exploiting you by offering too little salary but, you keep on arguing [bargaining] with him [her] to give you more salary. Otherwise, if you keep silent and agree with everything that s/he telling you, you might end up working for him [or her] for free. But as you can see so many of us can't argue [bargain] with employers because of our low levels [lack] of education (**Male Maasai migrant 30, Dar es Salaam**)

Formal education and skills among the interviewed Maasai migrants was such that only 60% of them had attained primary education, 34% did not have education at all and 6% had post-primary education and professional skills, namely metal welding, carpentry and mechanics, although they were not working in their respective professions. Moreover, in 2003, around 77% of the Maasai migrants (specifically in Dar es Salaam) did not have formal education, which they associated with their poverty given that it limited them from accessing paying job opportunities (May 2003: 8; Drinkwater 2010)⁹¹.

Kiswahili language proficiency: Maasai migrants explained that their lack of proficiency in this language hindered their different entrepreneurship activities due to the inability to effectively communicate with customers. One of the key informants acknowledged that job negotiation, which is greatly determined by Kiswahili language proficiency among the migrants, is the main determinant of good employment and a subsequent good income:

(...) Some Maasai [migrants] in Dar es Salaam are good at bargaining and this enables them work in more than one shops or companies that are especially close to each other. So depending on their bargaining power it is possible that some Maasai [migrants] can earn up to Tsh 500,000/= (Euro 250) monthly; when they put together the whole amount. An important missing aspect is lack of education among the as so many of them don't know how to read and write leave alone possessing professional skills! This remarkably reduces their job and salary bargaining powers. (**Male key informant, 36, Dar es Salaam**)

Indeed, it was consistently observed that some relatively financially successful Maasai had a good command of the Kiswahili language,⁹² thus enabling them to communicate in business as well as soliciting more social networks from other people apart from their Maasai counterparts. Poor Kiswahili proficiency among the Maasai migrants was mainly due to the lack of formal education held by the majority of the Maasai. In the Maasai-sending households, it was noted that Kiswahili language proficiency had not only enabled the migrants to migrate to urban areas but was also an important factor for their success whilst in urban areas.

Interestingly, around 60% (n=50) of the interviewed Maasai migrants intended to proactively invest in their own and their children's education as a long term strategy of coping with threats of both unemployment and financial constraints.

⁹¹ For more detailed works on education among the Maasai see Drinkwater. A. M (2010): Critical democratic pedagogy through the arts in indigenous/Maasai rural schools in Kenya and (Bishop, E. (2006): policy and practice of Educations service provision for Pastoralists in Kenya and Tanzania.

⁹² Kiswahili is a national and official language in Tanzania and also an important business language. Most of the retail businesses like the ones mostly conducted by the Maasai migrants in urban areas require a lot of bargaining, which stresses the importance of Kiswahili language.

Some Maasai migrant youth who suggested investing in their children's education argued that their lack of education had considerably rendered them financially dependent, and thus they were unwilling to see their children fall into a similar predicament in the future.

... I would be happy If I could get some kind of business education [skills] that would help me more especially when I want to open my business, (...) because as I told you I am soon going to open my hair dressing, saloon so I think business education will really help me to effectively [plan] run my business.
(Male Maasai migrant youth, (25), Dar es Salaam)

Another migrant insisted on investing in his children's education:

You know, we are suffering [don't have good income] because we simply lack education, we cannot read even a newspaper to find a jobs inside there. Employers would be happy to see that [employ people who can read and write] (...) so I am not read to see my child falling a victim of this same situation [not having education]. It is important to give education to my child. (...) so I am working hard to save enough [money] for taking my child to school. **(Male Maasai Migrant youth (31) Dar es Salaam)**

The Maasai initiative to invest in their own and children's education as a long-term strategy shows their proactive way of coping with a financial threat in the future.

Use of mobile phones: One important and cross-cutting cultural capital aspect in coping with financial constraints and employment threats was through the use of mobile phones, which helped migrants to communicate with customers, seek employment and order traditional goods, e.g. crafts and traditional medicines (herbs) from rural areas.

Drawing from the above data, it can be concluded that the use of cultural capital-related aspects (physical strength and local skills) mainly at the individual level, such as engagement in informal sector activities, multiple-tasks and behaviours such as opting for cheap items, helped the migrants to develop reactive capacities of overcoming inadequate income, shelter and employment threats. Moreover, reflection and lessons resulting from these threats further enabled the Maasai migrants to develop proactive capacities, and notably future ways of coping with the aforementioned threats. Such strategies included investment in education, skills and Kiswahili language. On the other hand, Maasai lacked aspects of cultural capital such as formal education skills and Kiswahili language proficiency to more competently cope with such threats.

A negative resilience implication of the above results is the fact that in some cases some migrants coped with threats by eroding their own resilience. Firstly, migrants opted for cheap and low quality goods and services some of which could have put their health at danger. Secondly, migrants coped with inadequate shelter by sleeping in the open places and dilapidated shelter a situation that could further expose them to health problems such as malaria, stomach-ache and also insecurity situation as sleeping in open places in Dar es Salaam would be unsafe. Indeed according to (Obrist et al. 2010: 290) this further shows that migrants' resilience was to some extent at stake because "resilience is more than coping in the sense of minimising the consequences of an adversity and managing vulnerability to ensure short-term survival".

In this case coping with a threat by eroding own's resilience notably consuming less food or spending less on education may not be considered as proper in the realm of resilience building process.

7.5 Social capital against inadequate income employment and shelter

Maasai migrants depended on social capital in various ways in order to cope with inadequate income, employment and shelter-related threats, as discussed below.

Depending on friends and relatives: Firstly, around 23% (n=50) of the migrants depended on their relatives [i.e. uncles, brothers and sisters] in cases where they needed financial support. This was relevant when migrants needed to buy some food, a bus fair to return to their local households or when they were required to pay for some missing items at their work place yet lacked money.

One migrant explains:

.... When I find that it is not enough I go to see my relatives or friends (Maasai). If it is not too much they can contribute and give it to me for free. But, when it is too much they give it to me in form of a loan and then I pay them slowly. **(Male Maasai migrant youth (27), Dar es Salaam)**

Specifically, in order to retain employment, before leaving the city for a short period a Maasai migrant would offer his job position to a relative or a friend, e.g. to work as a security guard (*Mlinzi*), and this migrant would resume the job again when he returned to the city. This same kind of strategy had previously been observed among the Maasai migrants in Dar es Salaam city (May 2003; Kweka 2011).

Consequently, this means that social networks resulting from friends and relatives (social capital) increased migrants' reactive capacity to cope with financial constraints, as well as coping with unemployment threat through changing job position or retaining jobs.

Sharing of resources: Around 42% (n=50) of the interviewed migrants spoke of sharing various resources as one of their strategies of coping with financial constraints, unemployment and unreliable shelter threats. Owing to the strong social networks among them, Maasai migrants cooked and ate together in order to reduce costs, also partly to help those who could not afford to buy food. Moreover, migrants also shared accommodation due to their financial inability to rent houses.

It was also noted that Maasai people and especially those in the same age group had a social and moral responsibility to help each other, marking the reason why they were more comfortable in soliciting financial support from among themselves than the rest of the community. For instance, Maasai culture does not allow a Maasai warrior or Moran (Maasai youth) to eat or drink milk on his own! Culturally, all the food [food and meat] to be consumed by the *Moran* (youth) should be pooled in one location for all the *Morans* to have an equal share (National Museum of Tanzania 2004: 22).

This means that the sharing spirit inherent in the Maasai culture (cultural capital) increased their reactive capacities to cope with financial constraints, unemployment and unreliable shelter.

However, on the other hand, over 80% (n=50) of the Maasai migrant youth seemed to have received little or no financial assistance from the rest of the community aside from their fellow Maasai, as indicated by this young man:

It is not easy to find someone else [other than your fellow] to talk to about your financial problem. These days the world has changed! (...) unlike in the past now you cannot approach someone for a financial support! So when the situation is very tense, I always approach my relatives who can support me [other Maasai]. **(Male Maasai migrant youth (26), Dar es Salaam)**

Secondly, some Maasai were ashamed of soliciting financial support from other non-Maasai people due to social-cultural-related reasons. For instance, the Maasai regard non-Maasai people as the *Waswahili*, literally foreigners, but more specifically meaning that the *Waswahili* are unreliable and con people who would listen to the Maasai problems yet not pay any attention to them, instead taking advantage of their problems and their state of being the Maasai.

Specifically, the Maasai felt segregated or despised by the non-Maasai people (*Waswahili*), and thus it was almost impossible to receive any kind of support, including financial assistance, from the people who despised them. Some historical data maintains that Maasai have been considered backward, conservative and segregated by other tribes in East Africa. Maasai migrants are regarded as conservative minorities who refuse to become modern, and have been typified as strangers in cities (May 2003: 8). The lack of Maasai social capital from the rest of the community level is further summarised below:

The Maasai social cohesion led to ethno-centrism whereby other groups are viewed as outsiders and therefore potential enemies who must be contained at all times. It was perfectly legitimate [by the Maasai] to plunder the wealth, women and children of those conceived as enemies and use their wealth, women and children to strengthen your group [Maasai' group] (National Museum of Tanzania 2004: 45).

The above data implies that a lack of good image and acceptability by society (social capital) reduced migrants' **capacities** of coping with financial constraints and unemployment threats.

Turning to employers for financial support: 34% (n=50) of the migrants secured financial support mainly in the form of loans and advance salaries from their employers once confronted with abrupt and pressing financial problems such as a family member falling sick, paying fees for children and other emergencies. The borrowed money would subsequently be deducted from the migrants' salary in the following months. This helped them to solve their financial problems on time, as stated below.

When I need more money I can simply talk to my employer and he can give me my salary in advance. But when the problem is too urgent and pressing and my salary is not enough, I would talk to my boss to lend me some amount of money and then I can pay him slowly. I have been doing this whenever I need to pay big amount of money such as paying my children's school fee **(Male Maasai Youth migrant (32), Dar es Salaam)**

It was observed that Maasai migrants received some loans from their employers, ranging from Tsh 10,000/= to 150,000/= (around 5 Euro to 75 Euro), which would be deducted from their subsequent monthly salaries.

However, financial support from employers was accompanied with a number of problems. In the first instance, some migrants complained that their bosses could deduct the whole loan from their following month's salary, which worsened their financial predicament for the entire month. Secondly, it was not easy to trace (find) the employer at the time of financial problems. Some migrants reported having only seen their employers two days to one week after the problem occurred. According to the migrants, this was less helpful because problems such as health, food or the death of relatives require urgent financial support.

The failure of Maasai youth to easily communicate with their employers was exasperated by the fact that the interaction or relationship between Maasai workers and employers was generally less friendly and respectful. Migrants complained that employers communicated with them through their house girls and boys, prompting them to feel less respected and subsequently fail to express their financial problems directly to their bosses on time.

Maasai solidarity organisations: Around 28% (n=50) of Maasai the migrants attested to having turned to their existing formal or informal solidarity groups for financial, employment or shelter support⁹³ in the city. Financially speaking, these organisations supported their members through transport services on occasions such as death and illness, as well as start-up capital for members who sought to start a business. In the case of supporting a business, the financial support was given out either for free or as a loan, depending on the status of the person requesting support and the amount involved.

We insist that Maasai living in the city must unite and support each other. We meet to discuss problems [including financial ones] that are facing us and how to overcome them here in the city. In case someone finds life unbearable we can assist him; for example we must contribute some money and support one of us who happens to fall sick or has lost a relative. **(Male Maasai migrant youth (31), Dar es Salaam)**

Another migrant attests:

Our unions are helpful in many ways. When one of us has entered into a problem let's say into serious confrontation with the employer [boss]. For example, it could be that the boss has accused him of stealing or damage at work, we quickly contribute some money and transport him to the village and he should stay there until the storm is over, or his boss completely forgets about it. **(Male Maasai youth migrant (25), Dar es Salaam)**

Maasai solidarity groups were observed in different parts of Dar es Salaam, including in Kinondoni areas, Kimara Baruti, Mbezi Mwisho (commuter bus stand) Mwenge bus stand, Ilala Boma, Tabata Kona, Kigamboni, as well as some peripherals of Dar es Salaam such as Pugu, Kibaha and Tegeta.

⁹³ The researcher observed some Maasai groups (associations) in Kigamboni, Kimara, Tabata, Ubungo, Sinza and Tegeta. According to one of the Maasai migrants in Kigamboni Dar es Salaam, their association was formally and legally registered as Tungi Maasai Association (TMA), and that they had a Bank account for their association.

Maasai youth were grouped according to their areas of origin and at times based on their friendship and residential areas in Dar es Salaam. It was further observed that once they meet in their groups, Maasai perform different cultural and traditional dances for both entertainment and fundraising. In most cases, people interested in these dances donated some money to the particular Maasai group, thus supplementing their financial security.

Some secondary data also acknowledges the presence of the Maasai solidarity groups popularly known as *Oloips*, whereby some Maasai nomadic migrants met to socialise with their age mates, exchange news, discuss problems and play games, as well as supporting each other financially (May 2003).

7.6 Symbolic capital against inadequate income, employment and shelter

Firstly, Maasai migrant youth in Dar es Salaam city demonstrated cultural identity as a strategy towards both maintaining employment and remaining financially secure. Maasai cultural practices in the city entailed wearing Maasai traditional attire, carrying some traditional weapons such as swords and arrows, keeping their hair traditional, etc. to distinguish themselves from the rest of the city dwellers. According to the migrants, these practices added to their degree of faithfulness and professionalism (**symbolic capital**), which would subsequently impress most employers to employ them mainly as security guards and within the tourism sector.

This was further supported by some secondary data that maintained that the Maasai's employers were impressed with the Maasai migrants' cultural uniqueness or identity, portraying their faithfulness and attraction in offering services in tourism sector, although this also entailed an aggressive trait of working as security guards (Kweka 2011; Mung'ong'o 2010; May and Ole Ikayo 2007).

Secondly, Maasai migrant youth also strived to gain some elements of symbolic capital such as honour, prestige and respect through working hard and investing in education for themselves and their children. They thought that this would eventually earn them positive economic status, as evidenced below:

Well, certainly we are not respected because of our lack of education and good financial background. So the most important thing is for us to work hard and earn as much money as enough and also invest in our children's education so that in the future they will not end up working as security guards and so be despised like ourselves (**Male Maasai migrant youth (31) Dar es Salaam**)

A key informant states how some aspects of symbolic capital such as respect helped the Maasai to alleviate unemployment and financial constraints:

Maasai simply respect themselves. Moreover, they are so faithful in carrying out their jobs. Maasai don't sleep at night and they will not steal or spoil anything at work place. So that is why most of the people go for them. On the other hand when you employ other people they might be expensive to maintain and they may end up not being careful at work as they may steal or sleep and let the thieves in. (**Male migrant's employer (45) Dar es Salaam**)

The above data emphasises that Maasai's social reputation resulting from their traditions such as wearing their customary clothing (**symbolic capital**) improved their reactive capacities in coping with financial constraints and unemployment threats, given that it bolstered their chances of being employed mainly as efficient security guards and service providers within the tourism sector.

7.7 Discussion and some theoretical implications

As noted from the above findings, inadequate income, employment and shelter threats were apparent among the Maasai nomadic migrants in Dar es Salaam city. Moreover, similar threats had been noted among the rural-urban migrants in Gaborone city, Botswana (Krüger 1998), Freetown city, Sierra Leone (Pratt 2010), Cape Town city, South Africa (Deumert et al. 2005) and among some nomadic migrants in East African cities (Ole Kaunga 2007; Kipuri 2010).

An interesting part of this discussion relates to how the migrants solicited and utilised capitals from different social layers, thus developing 'reactive' and 'proactive' capacities to cope with these threats.

At the economic capital level, migrants sold off cattle and agricultural products mainly at the local household level in order to finance their trips to urban areas, thus increasing their reactive capacities to cope with the aforementioned threats. Consequently, these enabled migrants sustain themselves in the city during the first days, as well as investing in entrepreneurship. Through these threats, migrants learned to proactively invest in livestock and agriculture for their future financial and employment security.

The use of households' economic assets to cope with the aforementioned threats in urban areas has also been noted among the migrants of Gaborone city, Botswana (Krüger 1998) in Cameroon (Schrieder and Knerr 2002) and some nomadic migrants in Malaysia (Goodall 2004). However, these authors have not considered certain proactive coping aspects, such as how learning from migration-related threats triggered investment in economic assets as a future means of coping with the financial constraints, unemployment and unreliable shelter, as noted among the Maasai migrants in this thesis.

In terms of cultural capital, migrants engaged in informal-sector activities, notably working as security guards, selling labour for domestic and construction work and trading in traditional goods. Such findings correspond well with former findings among rural-urban migrants in South African cities (Deumert et al. 2005), in Freetown city, West Africa (Pratt 2010) and in East African cities (Ole Kaunga 2007; Kipuri 2010). Specifically, migrants opted for cheap commodities and services, mainly from some cheap/second-hand places. Such behaviours have also been observed among migrants in Bangladesh (Hossain 2005) and nomadic pastoralists in some East African countries (Ole Kaunga 2007; Kipuri 2010).

In order to cope with the inadequate shelter, Maasai migrants sleep in slums, ghettos and dilapidated buildings, or even outside. With the exception of sleeping outside, these other strategies were also apparent among the migrants of Freetown, Sierra-Leone (Pratt 2010), in South African cities (Deumert et al. 2005), as well as Cameroon, Nigeria and Kenya (UN-HABITAT 2011a). Specifically, they were also practiced by migrants in Dar es Salaam city, Tanzania (Kombe 2005; Mbonile and Iihawa 1996) and especially among the Maasai nomadic migrants (Kweka 2011).

However, it was noted that Maasai migrants' ability to cope with financial inadequate income, employment and shelter was also impeded by their lack of formal education and skills, as well as a lack of proficiency in some formal or dominant languages. Such factors for inadequate income and employment have also been observed among the nomadic migrants in some East African cities (Ole Kaunga 2007; Kipuri 2010; Parkipuny 1991) and the migrants of Cape Town city, South Africa (Deumert et al. 2005).

Consequently, based on their experience of coping with the aforementioned threats, migrants learned to proactively invest in learning new skills and taking their children to school as future ways of coping with such threats. Moreover, these findings were also apparent among Turkana and Maasai nomadic migrants in some Kenyan cities (Ole Kaunga 2007) and migrants in South Africa (Deumert et al. 2005).

Maasai migrants increasingly utilised social capital aspects such as networks of friends and relatives, kinships, together with their formal and informal associations in order to cope with financial constraints, unemployment and unreliable shelter. These associations contributed money or searched for employment on behalf of the in-need Maasai migrants. Similar strategies have been found among the nomadic migrants in some Kenyan cities (Ole Kaunga 2007), South African cities (Deumert et al. 2005), among the nomadic migrants in East and Central African cities (Kipuri 2010), as well as Cameroon (Schrieder and Knerr 2002).

Particularly in order to cope with the inadequate shelter, Maasai migrants also stayed with friends and relatives who had already successfully settled in the urban areas. Indeed, such findings have been common among other rural-urban migrants in Tanzanian cities (Mbonile and Iihawa 1996; Kombe 2005), Botswana (Krüger 1998) and Zimbabwe (Maphosa 2007).

However, the Maasai migrants could not solicit relevant support from meso and national levels towards coping with inadequate income, employment and shelter. This was because they lacked a physical address and assets to enable them to borrow money from institutions; moreover, a housing policy for the urban poor hardly existed. Furthermore, migrants were unaware of such institutions, which also segregated against the migrants. The same reasons have previously been documented among Maasai migrants in Tanzania (Ole Kaunga 2002) and Kenya (Ole Kaunga 2007).

At the symbolic capital level, Maasai migrants engaged in cultural practices that distinguished them from the non-Maasai people (*Waswahili*); for instance, they dressed in traditional (clothing) *illkarash*, and demonstrated their aggressiveness as worries (*Il-Moaran*). This earned them respect and trust (power and prestige), which further added to their chances of being employed and thus becoming more financially secure.

However, these strategies among the Maasai migrants contradict those of other migrants in South Africa (Deumert et al. 2005) and Zimbabwe (Maphosa 2007), who would drop their cultural practices and identify themselves with the urban culture in order to gain access to urban social services, employment, financial and shelter support.

7.8 Chapter summary

To conclude, this chapter ascertained and examined the inadequate income, employment and shelter threats facing the Maasai nomadic migrants in Dar es Salaam city. Based on the multi-layered social resilience framework (Obrist et al. 2010), the aim was to understand whether migrants managed to solicit and utilise capitals from different social levels to develop both reactive and proactive capacities for coping with the aforementioned threats, as well as recommending factors for enhancing their capacities to more competently cope with such threats.

The findings showed that the Maasai migrants employed a number of strategies to cope with the threats. At the economic capital level, migrants reactively utilised household resources such as cattle and agricultural products to cater for some basic needs in the urban areas and invest in various entrepreneurship activities. Moreover, they also proactively invested in these resources for future financial security. However, Maasai migrants hardly managed to solicit financial support from the existing meso level organisations. Firstly, NGOs did not essentially deal with giving out financial support. Secondly, migrants could not secure financial support from the meso level financial organisations such as local banks and SACCOS due to lack of knowledge about them, lack of collateral and financial ability and Lack of permanent address in urban areas.

At the cultural capital level, migrants mainly engage in informal activities such as working as security guards, selling labour in domestic and construction work, hair braiding and vending traditional goods. Furthermore, migrants engage in multiple income activities, sleeping outside, in dilapidated structures or at their work places, whilst also engaging in bargaining and negotiation for better payments. Moreover, migrants used mobile phone technology to search jobs and facilitate entrepreneurship activities such as ordering traditional commodities and sending remittances back home. Migrants proactively invested in formal skills for themselves and their children as future ways of creating employment and financial security.

However, migrants lacked crucial aspects of cultural capital notably formal education and skills including Kiswahili language proficiency towards coping with the above-named threats. Furthermore, they received little or no support in terms of information, training and relevant skills from meso, national and international levels due to being unaware of such institutions, in combination with these institutions limited capacity to deliver, as well as their general segregation against the Maasai.

At the social capital level, migrants received employment, financial and shelter support through strong social networks and associations among the Maasai. Based upon rural-urban linkages, migrants managed to receive some financial support from local households. At the symbolic capital level, migrants utilised the Maasai social reputation as faithful people and fierce warriors capable of working as security guards in order to cope with unemployment and subsequent financial constraints.

Therefore, based on the multi-layered social resilience framework (Obrist et al. 2010), it can be concluded that migrants managed to solicit and utilise capitals primarily from individual, household and community levels to develop mainly reactive, and to a lesser extent proactive, capacities to competently cope with the threats of financial constraints, unemployment and inadequate shelter. However, migrants' competencies against these threats could be further strengthened through the amelioration of migrants' formal skills and education, as well as making the existing meso, national and international institutions more responsive towards the aforementioned threats.

More practical and elaborate factors for enhancing the Maasai migrants' resilience against the financial, employment and shelter constraints are detailed in the final chapter of this thesis.

8. Exploitation and oppression threat for the Maasai migrant youth

8.1 Introduction

This chapter explores and examines different forms of exploitation and oppression threats encountered by the Maasai nomadic migrant youth in Dar es Salaam city. Based on the multi-layered social resilience framework (Obrist et al. 2010), the aim is to understand whether migrants are capable of soliciting and utilising capitals from different social levels to develop reactive and proactive capacities for coping with the threats encountered in the urban areas. Consequently, this chapter strives to recommend factors for enhancing their capacities to more competently cope with such threats.

Based on the aforementioned framework, migrants' ability to solicit and utilise capitals from various social layers to reactively and proactively cope with these threats is regarded as being resilient to threats, while the opposite is considered either less resilient or even non-resilient to such threats. Based on the factors for being able or unable to cope with the threat, factors for building migrants' resilience against exploitation and oppression threats are offered. Firstly, the terms of exploitation and oppression are defined as applied to this chapter. Subsequently, forms of exploitation and oppression encountered by the migrants are explained and the migrants' various ways of coping with the threat are presented. Later, a discussion is undertaken and a chapter summary presented.

8.2 Exploitation and oppression defined

The following quote by one of the interviewed migrants, which seemed to have been echoed by other migrants, may summarise the meaning of exploitation and oppression in the context of the Maasai nomadic migrants:

(...) this is total exploitation, we work from morning to evening and realise very little in terms of income. These people [employers] don't care about what we eat or where we sleep (...) they only look at us in terms of machines, people who work endlessly, without or with little payment. (...) maybe it's because we don't seem to be aware of our rights. They [employers] are oppressing us because we are in need [need of money] and so we must work for them. **(Male Maasai migrant youth (30), Dar es Salaam)**

The meaning of exploitation and oppression provided by migrants seems to be in line with those obtained from a written source. One source defines exploitation as the utilisation of another person or group [of people] for selfish purposes. It is an act of treating someone unfairly by using his/her work or ideas whilst giving them little in return. It reflects an unfair treatment of someone or the use of a situation in a way that is wrong, in order to gain some benefit for yourself⁹⁴.

⁹⁴ <http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/exploitation> (23/12/2011)

On the other hand, oppression may be defined as unfair and cruel treatment by a powerful person or government, or the state of being kept down by unjust use of force or authority. It is [therefore] the feeling of being very worried or unhappy⁹⁵.

The meaning of the terms oppression and exploitation from migrants themselves and the above-stated definitions highlighted that the two terms are interrelated in containing an element of power. This means that more powerful [actor] people take advantage of the less powerful [the acted upon] in aggrandising themselves mainly by ruining the other [use of situation wrongly]⁹⁶. In fact, migrants could not separate meaning of the two terms in most cases. It is essentially a form of injustice upon to the weaker individual directly or indirectly by the stronger one. This mainly happens by taking advantage of the weaker person or group's situation, causing them unhappiness and worry.

When the terms of exploitation and oppression are applied in the context of the Maasai migrant workers in Dar es Salaam city, it would mean that economically and socially powerful actors in the city such as Maasai employers use their influence and take advantage of the Maasai situation of being weak in terms of less education, less exposure to urban environment and being severely stricken by poverty to underpay them for their labour and service, to arbitrarily deduct and delay their payments, as well as randomly terminating them from jobs or segregating against them. This consequently subjects the Maasai migrants to unhappy and worrying situations as one common manifestation of exploitation and oppression.

8.3 Forms of exploitation and oppression encountered by migrants

Overworking and unequal labour returns: Around 85% (n=50) of the interviewed Maasai migrant youth in Dar es Salaam felt that they were either overworked or that the wages received did not reflect the amount of labour they offered and life in the city in general. Firstly, it was observed that the majority of the Maasai migrant youth received a monthly pay of between Tsh 30,000/= and 150,000/= (i.e. 15-70 Euro) per month, which according to them was extremely inadequate and inconsistent with their workload.

⁹⁵ <http://onelookonline.com/What-is-oppression?> (22/01/2012)

⁹⁶ In this context, an individual may be termed as weak or inferior based on his or her ethnic background, race and colour but also based on one's low education status, less exposure etc as applied to Maasai migrants.

The aforestated information is more passionately presented by, one of the respondents⁹⁷ as here under:

For me I think that we take care of very valuable property that worth millions and millions of shillings [money] but we receive very little money in return. You can see for yourself, all these wealth [vehicles and buildings]. It obviously worth a lot of money! Yet, at times thieves may also come to steal from us and so we have to fight with them to protect it, (...) but we still receive peanut [too little money]. And so I am not at all satisfied. **(Male Maasai migrant youth (23), Dar es Salaam)**

Further complaints concerning low salaries were also raised by most of the Maasai youth in Focus group discussions (FGDs) in different parts of the city. Most of them essentially maintained that their monthly [daily/weekly] wages were not proportional to their daily tasks at the work place. According to the migrants, low payment for their labour and services had severely incapacitated them from attending to their daily needs, bearing in mind that most of the migrants worked to sustain their own lives in the city and their local households in the sending area. **(Male Maasai migrant youth FGD, Ilala District, Dar es Salaam)**

Some secondary data also demonstrates that Maasai migrants working as security guards in Dar es Salaam city, earned an average of (US\$ 40) [35 Euro] per month (Ole Kaunga 2007), while Maasai migrant workers in Arusha city in the northern Tanzania earned around US\$ 14 to US\$ 71 (10- 50 Euro) (Coast 2006). A relatively recent study notes that Maasai migrant workers in some urban centres earn an average income of Tsh 30,000 (equivalent to 15 Euro) (Kweka 2011).

Putting the above data into perspective, it can be said that the majority of the migrants seemed to have been earning monthly payments below the current minimum wage in Tanzania, which stands between Tsh 65,000 to 300,000/= ⁹⁸ (75 to 150 Euro) depending on the employment sector (URT 2011a) ⁹⁹. Moreover, most of the workers seemed to have been living on less than 2 US\$ per day, which is the minimal daily income recommended by the United Nations (UNDP 2009).

⁹⁷ See previous chapter on “financial threats”. Ideally, after computing both monetary and non-monetary earnings of the migrants, together with engagement in multiple income activities, some Maasai migrants would earn a monthly income of up to Tsh 350,000/=.

However, most of the migrants earned an average monthly income of Tsh between 30,000 and 150,000/= per month due to different forms of exploitation and oppression notably, unjustifiable delays and deductions of payments, and arbitrary job terminations.

⁹⁸ Minimum wages in Tanzania are set by categories covering eight employment sectors; ranges from 65,000 Tanzanian shillings per month for hotel workers to 350,000 shillings per month for the mineral sectors. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_minimum_wages_by_country/ 13/07/2012.

⁹⁹ See also <http://www.tanzania.go.tz/human.html>

Empty promises by employers': Migrants' low payment was further aggravated by the empty promises made by the migrants' employers. For example, some Maasai migrant youth agreed with their employers to be only paid part of their monthly salary [e.g. half salary] while their bosses kept the rest [half salary], towards the purpose of receiving a more substantial lump sum, payment after a certain period of service [could be after months or years¹⁰⁰].

However, employers could not implement the agreement, as noted below:

Normally, they [Maasai] say if you are paying me Tsh 100,000/=, just give me some of it, [let's say Tsh 30,000] and then keep the rest [let's say 70,000] for me so that when I decide to go back home you will give it to me in lump sum, so as I can have enough amount to travel with and support my family. But then an employer plays a trick here, by reporting them to police as thieves. So the Maasai runs away without this money rather than face a police officer or prison. **(Male Maasai elder (63), Dar es Salaam)**

Maasai migrant youth working as hairdressers were also underpaid due to their little knowledge of the market situation in the urban areas, low bargaining power and skills, together with the situation of poverty they found themselves in, as witnessed by one of them:

I do almost the whole work at the hairdressing saloon but my boss [employer] pays me too little. But, I think the reasons for the low payments is due to the truth that I don't have my own hair dressing saloon where I can independently do this work and determine prices by myself. At the moment, she [employer] pays me Tsh 5000-10,000 per head depending on the hair dressing style. Yet, the work may take me more than one day, and to my knowledge, she receives up to Tsh 50,000 and even more per one head. If I had my own saloon, I would be earning all this money for myself. **(Male Maasai migrant youth (27), Dar es Salaam)**

Secondary data also stipulates that Maasai [youth] also popularly known as the *Morans* engaged in hair dressing business were exploited, as they were doing it in an ad hoc way and did not have a regular place where they could easily be accessed by customers. As such, they were at the mercy of the hair salon owners, who took most of what the customers paid (Ole Kaunga 2002).

Involvement in multiple tasks for same pay: Another form of underpayment among the Maasai migrant youth occurred by the way of innocently or forcefully engaging in more than one tasks at work place yet only getting paid for one job. For example, Maasai migrants who were employed as security guards did this job both day and night for the same pay [salary equivalent for either only night or day]. Yet, while at work they were also responsible for working as messengers and gate keepers, cleaning the environment, washing their employers' vehicles, loading and unloading luggage from vehicles, fetching water and

¹⁰⁰ Observations proved that increasingly Maasai migrants in Dar es Salaam preferred accumulating salaries with their employers with the aim of receiving lump sum amount at the end of a specified time. Such relatively big amount of money would help them get capital to be invested in cattle, agriculture, building houses, or entrepreneurship activities. Maasai therefore should be sensitised to receive their complete salaries and consider depositing it with banks or SACCOS rather than keeping it with employers.

assisting with some other household duties such being sent for shopping, as one of the migrant states:

My day is quite busy here, you must be aware of the fact that, at night I work as a security guard and in the afternoon as a gatekeeper [messenger or a gatekeeper]. However, in most cases I also help them [employers] with some other duties [domestic activities] such as fetching water, washing vehicle and also being sent for anything in the shop. **(Male Maasai migrant youth (31), Dar es Salaam)**

In some shopping and business centres like in Kariakoo, Dar es Salaam, it was observed that one Maasai migrant youth would work as a night watchman for more than six shops yet received a salary equivalent to working for only one shop, as it was put by this key informant:

This young man here for example, is really experiencing a lot of problems. You know we have employed him as a group of eight business people (....) and each one of us pays him Tsh ten thousand per month [equivalent to ten euro] [and at the end of the month receives about **(80,000/= 40 Euro)** from four people]. It is too little compared to his business [responsibilities] of watching 8 shops at night. There is a very great possibility that at times he does not receive his salary on time due to fewer chances of meeting physically with the employers. **(Male businessperson and Maasai youth employer (43), Dar es Salaam)**

Another key informant explains how the Maasai youth were exploited through overworking:

Most of the Maasai [youth] employed as security guards are required by their bosses [employers] to also do some other works. When a Maasai is serving as a security guard at big shops, groceries or in bars he may without extra pay be responsible for loading and unloading sacks of rice, crates of beer and sodas and even performing cleanness without their conceit. That is undeniable fact! **(Female businessperson and Maasai employer (42), Mwenge-Dar es Salaam)**

Forcible display of traditional values and photo taking with visitors: Maasai working mainly in the tourism sector (e.g. beaches) in Dar es Salaam city complained that they were forced to take photos with the purpose of promoting employers' business, yet they did so without receiving payment, as explained by one of them below.

These visitors [mainly whites] come to us and request us to have photos with them and sing and dance our traditional dances for them. Visitors come to us as if it is their own move, but we have discovered that it is the boss [our employer] who directs them to us. In fact we have also found out that dancing and singing our traditional dances for the visitors is officially stipulated as one of the beach's offers and advertised by the beach management as one of the services that visitors should expect [entitled] to get once they are here. But this has not been explicitly communicated to us. We should have been informed about it! **(Male Maasai migrant youth (32), Dar es Salaam)**

Some secondary data also justifies this situation among the Maasai migrants in cities. This literature notes that that Maasai migrants working as security guards and night security guards in Dar es Salaam also worked as models to attract tourists or promote business, including taking photos in styles demanded by the tourists (Ole Kaunga 2007, 2002). However, these Maasai were only paid as security guards, and not for these other activities despite the fact that employers benefited hugely from them. Besides, some organisations, most notably mobile phone companies, in Tanzania have used Maasai culture to add flavour to their marketing strategies and wedding activities, although the Maasai never benefit from it (Ole Kaunga 2007).

At the international level, Maasai culture is produced and consumed by the global tourism in terms of arts, dances and clothes. Maasai identity has been used in the media for advertising hotels, wildlife economy and expensive gift selling shops. Specifically, Maasai attires and hair styles are used to represent African culture in general and Tanzania specifically, as it has been widely used in National Geographic magazines and commercial advertisements (May and Ole Ikayo 2007; Kweka 2011).

Apparently, labour exploitation in Tanzania is not only limited among the Maasai migrant workers. (LHRC 2011) notes the problem of underpayment to the majority of the Tanzanian employees, both in the public and private sectors. Specifically, Health care workers, bank employees, journalists and hotel attendants were among the underpaid groups, who not only worked under harsh conditions but also were forced to work prolonged hours (LHRC 2011). Likewise, (ICFTU 2006) country labour law survey noted that forced or compulsory labour was common among workers, who were forced to work extra hours under the threat of being fired.

Arbitrary salary deductions: On the other hand, employers deducted Maasai salaries for different unlawful and unjustifiable reasons. Firstly, Maasai migrants salaries' were unfairly deducted to pay for some items that went missing at work places for the simple argument that Maasai were allegedly directly or indirectly responsible for their disappearance. Employers specifically maintained that Maasai either directly stole the items or colluded with thieves [outsiders] to do so.

They also associated the loss of such property with the Maasai lack of keenness while at work. The researcher found out that in many cases Maasai migrants were innocent of such situations, although employers did not properly and objectively analyse the situations under which the property disappeared prior to deducting the salaries of migrants. Consequently, this simply amounted to oppressing and exploiting the Maasai migrants, as stated by the testimonies below.

Another problem is the fact that, at times things may be stolen at work place and my boss wants me to pay them, (...) he simply deducts it from my salary and this retards my development plans as my targets may not be reached [because of deductions]. **(Male Maasai youth migrant (26), Dar es Salaam)**

Another Maasai migrant youth stated that:

(At times things get lost or stolen at work place and I have to pay them. You see, the fact is that even if I resist paying them, my boss will deduct it from my salary anyway. (...) And in most cases he will obviously do so against my will though" **(Male Maasai youth migrant (32), Dar es Salaam)**

Unlawful and unjustifiable salary deductions of the Maasai migrant youth were also repeatedly mentioned in the migrant-sending areas. This aspect was underscored by some households' representatives when explaining why some migrants had not supported their respective local households financially, as well as the extent to which this had jeopardised their household livelihoods:

.... He also told us that he could not send us anything [financial support] because some property got lost at the shop where he was formerly working as a security guard and his boss falsely held him responsible for it, (...) and so he was imprisoned. But, later on, the actual victims were found out and he was released from the prison. He was not compensated anything by the boss [employer] **(Male household representative (43) Ngorongoro Arusha)**

Delays of payments: Another form of exploitation and oppression experienced by the migrants was related to the arbitrary delay of their salaries and other payments. More than 50% of respondents, including key informants, attested that Maasai youth migrant workers received their salaries later than usual due to less than convincing reasons. Payment delays among the Maasai migrants were also reported by key informants as noted below:

(...) they don't really pay them on time [the Maasai]. However, they tell them that oh! We are very sorry about it and may be next time I will consider paying the full amount. So economically, they do not really benefit a lot from working as security guards. They only get what the Swahili people call "*kifutia machozi*" [it means very little payment compared to the amount of service they offer"]. **(Male Maasai elder (52), Dar es Salaam)**

Another informant talks about the reality of salary delays among the Maasai migrants.

There is no way he can get his monthly pay on time! The arrangement here is such that he works for more than five employers [shops] and he has to negotiate and trace them individually at the end of the month. Now, the problem is that at the end of the month he can approach more than five shop owners without any success. If he approaches the first one he tells him first go to the other one, if he goes to the second one he's told to go to the third one etc. **(Male businessperson and a Maasai migrant employer (36), Dar es Salaam)**

Moreover, some household representatives from the migrant-sending areas repeatedly mentioned salary delays among the Maasai migrant youth. They made this point when they were explaining why some migrants had not financially supported their respective households. A household representative described the situation as below:

He told us that the company pays him around 170,000/- per month, but then, he was complaining that at times it takes too long for him to receive his salary (...). Last time he called us and said that they had not paid him for almost two months and he was depending on his friends for a living **(Female household representative (51), Loliondo Division - Ngorongoro)**

Secondary data also confirms that Maasai migrants' payments were extremely over-delayed by their employers without genuine justifications, partly due to having entered mutual agreements with their bosses, which were in most cases to the advantage of their employers. Consequently, Maasai were more often than not at the mercy of their employers, who would subsequently pay salaries at their convenience (Ole Kaunga 2002).

False accusation and victimisation of the migrants: It was repeatedly noted that Maasai youth migrants were mainly confronted with false accusations by their employers and other city dwellers. Around 46% (n=50) of the respondents asserted having either directly or indirectly experienced or witnessed false accusations among the Maasai youth migrants. These accusations were mainly related to lost property or stealing from work¹⁰¹. The accusations costed the Maasai migrants dearly both in terms of financial and time resources, as stated by this male migrant:

I think exploitation will never go away from us. For example, when my boss noticed that I had bought the motorcycle he simply concluded that I had stolen from him and so he reduced my salary from Tsh 120, 000 to Tsh 90,000". This has been a big blow to me as it sounds like working for the benefit of other people and not realizing my own dreams. **(Male Maasai youth migrant (31), Dar es Salaam)**

Moreover, false accusations among the Maasai migrants were also reported by the migrants sending households, as one household representative puts it below:

.... He also told us that he could not send us anything because some property got lost at the shop where he was formerly working as a security guard and his boss falsely held him responsible for it, and so he was imprisoned. Nevertheless, later on, the actual victims were found out and he was released from the prison. He was not compensated anything by his boss [employer]. He then decided to look for another work. **(Household Representative, Male (43) Ngorongoro Arusha).**

Secondary data sources also inform that Maasai migrant workers would also be implicated with frauds that even took place at the work place on the days when they were not on duty, mainly because their employer did not want to pay their salary or that something was stolen while they were working (Riley et al. 2012). In such cases, migrants would subsequently be harassed and humiliated by police and their job contracts terminated without being given an opportunity to defend themselves (Ole Kaunga 2007; Rosen 2009).

Random job termination: Maasai youth also experienced random job termination mainly for some unjustifiable reasons. Maasai migrants' employees were kicked out of jobs as it pleased their employers, possibly due to the disappearance of some items, or not showing up at work place due to genuine reasons such as being sick, etc. This even occurred in instances where the Maasai migrants were not at all responsible for such faults. This consequently forced migrants to survive under extremely challenging economic situations, as attested by one of them:

What I am experiencing is simply mistreatment because, as I have told you, the *mzungu* [a white employer] chased me away simply because of one day mistake which I even committed it for the first time, (...). I also used to receive my salary very late which was at the same time very little. Tsh 50,000 [the monthly salary he receives] is not enough to keep someone here in the city, because life is very hard. **(Male Maasai youth migrant (27), Dar es Salaam)**

¹⁰¹ Generally, Maasai are believed to be faithful and diligent in discharging their responsibilities, more especially working as security guards; and this is certainly one of the reasons why they are increasingly recruited and employed for the same. Dealing with the issue of the Maasai being considered unfaithful [steal at work place] this as a negative case the researcher mainly found out that most of the Maasai were innocent of this situation, and they were therefore fixed in such traps by their non-Maasai co-workers or their employers who were not willing to pay them.

Social stigma, stereotypes and segregation: Inquiry further noted that a considerable social stigma in the form of segregation and stereotyping was waged against the Maasai migrants, simply for their virtue of being Maasai. This amounts to exploitation and oppression, given that such situation or treatment robbed Maasai migrants of their respect by the rest of community, as well as the symbolic capital that was important for maintaining their livelihoods.

Stigma in addressing and identifying the Maasai: Specifically, social stigma against the Maasai youth migrants was manifested in the way in which Maasai youth **were identified and addressed** by the rest of the community in cities and Dar es Salaam. Young people in Tanzania generally identify and address each other as *mshikaji* [generally a partner, friend or relative] or *kaka* [a brother] and *dada* [a sister], generally showing respect to one another. However, Maasai are simply addressed as *Maasai*¹⁰² rather than *Washikaji* (friends, brothers or sisters), as commonly used among other young people. Secondary data sources also note that Maasai are considered social “misfits” by the urban dwellers. They are always identified as “Wamaasai” while everyone in Dar es Salaam and Tanzania in general is identified by the tag “ndugu” or Brother/sister (Ole Kaunga 2002: 4).

Stigma at public places: Social stigma against the Maasai youth also occurred in public places whereby some Maasai were also treated as the second-class citizens at bus stops or on public transport. On some occasions, Maasai were expected to wait for other non-Maasai people to first enter into the public transport and take their seats. In some instances, some people would hardly share a seat with the Maasai, or even when they did, they were uncomfortable in doing so, as this respondent puts it:

There are many forms of marginalisation of the Maasai here. You can just take an example at bus stops. When a Maasai happens to enter into a *Daladala* [commuter bus], before other non-Maasai [passengers] do so, you will always hear, *wewe* [you] Maasai, where are you going, first wait! **(Male Maasai elder (65) - Dar es Salaam)**

Based on our definitions of exploitation and oppression, social stigma, stereotypes and segregation amount to exploitation and oppression because all this happened to the Maasai migrants simply by their virtue of being regarded as inferior, owing to their socio-economic background. They were simply looked upon as inferior based on their social, economic and political status. Such mistreatment could have robbed Maasai migrants of their social reputation, which was important for their resilience against various threats in urban areas.

8.4 Migrants’ strategies of coping with exploitation and oppression threat

This section presents the findings on how Maasai migrant youth were capable of soliciting and utilising capitals from different social levels to reactively and proactively cope with the different forms of exploitation and oppression as discussed above.

¹⁰² There are many jokes in Tanzania meant to illustrate that the Maasai pastoralists are backward, and at times someone may be called a Maasai to mean less civilized etc.

8.5 Cultural capital against exploitation and oppression

Individual level: Constantly reminding and searching employers: Migrants constantly looked for employers, insisting that they pay their salaries on time and not deduct their salaries. They would call employers on the phone or physically trace them in different parts of the city, as stated by one of the migrants below:

A Mswahili [non-Maasai employer] will not pay your money on time [salary], unless you persistently look for him/her all over the city. Yes, simply they can hardly think of paying your salary on time. In many cases they will expect you to look for them because they know that you are the one with a problem [financial need]. So since we are in-need we have to look for them [employers].

Another migrant insists on looking for employers:

“Yes after terminating my job he gave me my salary. But this happened after making several follow ups. It was not easy. I became so bitter to him to the extent that he had to give up himself [paid the salary]”.
(Male Migrant youth (28), Dar es Salaam)

Quitting jobs/switching from one job to another: In addition to reactively searching for employers, around 44% (n=50) of Maasai, migrants cited quitting jobs and finding new ones as a strategy against exploitation and oppression by their employers. One migrant puts it this way:

My first job here was working as a security guard, but I quitted it because my boss was not fair to me (...) [why?] Because my boss could say that I was a thief, stealing from him something that I had not done. Then I decided to leave the job so that I could avoid unnecessary quarrels with him [the employer]. **(Maasai youth migrant (28), Dar es Salaam)**

Another Maasai migrant youth phrases it as follows:

(...) I have nothing to do rather than leave the job. My employer should only pay me for the days that I have been working for him, (...) nothing else other than looking for a new job. “If it is my fault I will always apologize to him [or her], but if he recognizes that it is his fault and apologizes matters get over. However, if it is his fault and he does not apologize, and maybe he wants to take things to court I will simply leave the work. (...) Even if I am the one who did wrong and he wants to take me to court, I will still say goodbye to him. I always apologise once I am wrong, but if I am not wrong I simply tell him to give me my rights [remaining salary] and I quit the job. I better look for another job elsewhere rather than enter into conflicts. **(Male Migrant youth (29), Dar es Salaam)**

Specifically in order to cope with social segregation and stigma, around 23% (n=50) of the interviewed Maasai migrants emphasised interacting with other non-Maasai people and engaging in some non-Maasai activities predominantly to be recognised and not despised by the rest of community.

I engage in almost all kinds of jobs that can earn me income. All that I need is to be respected. You see at times the Waswahili [non Maasai people] think that we [the Maasai] are naive, less skilled and exposed so much so that we cannot engage in the same kind of activities they do. That is not true. I prepare and sell chips like any other Mswahili [non-Maasai] **(Male Maasai migrant youth (30), Dar es Salaam)**

Deducing from the above data, we can subsequently say that based mainly on their local knowledge and physical strength (cultural capital), Maasai migrants managed to develop reactive capacities of coping with the exploitation and oppression threat. Such strategies included constantly searching for employers and emphasising the need to pay them on time, leaving jobs and switching to other jobs. Particularly in order to cope with social stigma or segregation, Maasai migrants engaged in other non-Maasai activities to emphasise that they were not different from other non-Maasai urban dwellers. This further meant that they deserved the same respect and attention as other urban dwellers.

Depending on God: In some cases, migrants were powerless in coping with some forms of exploitation and oppression such as low pay, delay and the deduction of salaries, together with arbitrary job termination. In such cases, migrants either remained docile or depended on God. Observation proved that appealing to God was repeatedly undertaken by the migrants at the end of their statements when they were explaining how they coped with various forms of exploitation and oppression. As one migrant puts it, *“we do all these but at the end of the day we leave it to God as we can hardly compete with them [employers]”*.

(Ole Kaunga 2007: 4) also noted that “once confronted with injustices Maasai migrants would leave everything to God and fate as they were not protected against unscrupulous employers and found thus finding it difficult to engage the law” (Ole Kaunga 2007).

Much as appealing to God is a positive thing in terms of one’s faith, it also shows that the Maasai were helpless and hopeless in overcoming various forms of exploitation and oppression among themselves.

Lack of awareness and knowledge of labour rights: It was noted that the majority of the Maasai migrants fell victim to various forms of exploitation and oppression, such as poor pay, deductions and delays of salaries, as well as arbitrary job termination due to a lack of job contracts that could hold employers legally responsible. Only around 14% (n=50) of migrants possessed contracts, the majority of which were oral as opposed to written contracts, while 86% (n=50) did not have any contracts. Several reasons were provided as to why an alarming number of migrants did not have contracts.

Firstly, migrants were ignorant of their right to job contracts:

The problem with my relatives [fellow Maasai] cannot speak the language [Swahili]. So how do you go about arguing [bargaining for better pay or requesting for job contract] with a Mswahili [non Maasai and employers] when you don’t know how to speak the language? This is especially a big problem with my relatives [other Maasai] because they are used to only speaking the (Ki) Maasai. **(Male Migrant youth (29) Dar es Salaam)**

For instance, most of the migrants did not understand that a lack of job contracts would among other things jeopardise their employment rights, as portrayed by one of the migrants below:

I understand that having a contract will help me acquire my final employment benefits such as my pension. But the pension is nothing, I can deposit it [money] in a bank by myself and get it when I need it, (...) what is a pension after all? Benefits or pension are both money and I can have that money from friends or relatives once I need it and deposit it in a bank by myself, in case I need to do so. **(Male Maasai Migrant youth (27), Dar es Salaam)**

Secondly, employers claimed that Maasai were working as casual and extremely mobile labours [*vibarua*] who did not truly deserve contracts:

“The boss [employer] does not want to give us the job contract because he knows that we can leave at any time and so if he gives us the contract it is going to be a kind of disturbance. If you remind him about it he becomes very bitter with you” **(Male Maasai migrant youth (24), Dar es Salaam)**

Thirdly, employers preferred not to enter formal contracts with the Maasai workers in order to avoid paying them other job-related benefits on top of their salaries, as required by the labour laws in Tanzania.¹⁰³ A migrant summarises this below:

You ask me why I do not have a [job] contract. Employers want to use us as much as they wish, without even caring about our rights. I have consistently asked for this thing [formal contract], but I have not really managed to receive it from him [employer]. May be they despise us because we have not been to school” **(Male Maasai migrant youth (28), Dar es Salaam)**

Fourthly, migrants’ employers took advantage of the Maasai’ illiteracy, particularly their lack of labour law knowledge and bargaining skills due to lack of Kiswahili language proficiency.

“...most of the employers may not be willing to provide job contracts as they want to take advantage of the Maasai not having contracts to exploit them. Now the second thing is that if you demand for it he will simply threaten to take you to court or call in a police officer”. **(Male educated Maasai elder (65), Dar es Salaam)**

Secondary data also confirms that Maasai migrant workers in urban centres did not have legitimate contracts as required by the Tanzanian labour law, mainly due to a lack of knowledge about it. Consequently, employers took liberties and played tricks by taking advantage of the cultural shock that severely hits the Maasai upon their initial arrival in the new city (Ole Kaunga 2002; LHRC 2011).

The above-presented data shows that, at the individual level, Maasai migrants managed to utilise aspects of cultural capital, notably using their local knowledge and physical strength to develop mainly reactive capacities of coping with forms of exploitation particularly, low salary, delay and deductions of payments and arbitrary job terminations, together with social stigma.

¹⁰³ Discussion based on observations but also personal telephone and e-mail communication with key informants, labour law experts

Such reactive capacities were reflected through strategies such as searching and reminding employers, leaving jobs and looking for better ones, as well as depending on God. Importantly, migrants engaged in interaction with the rest of the community and engaged in various activities to cope with stigma and segregation.

However, Maasai migrants' capacities for coping with such threats at the individual level were limited by their lack of sensitisation and knowledge in terms of bargaining skills, as well as a lack of job contract and labour laws knowledge. This was further reinforced by illiteracy¹⁰⁴ and particularly not knowing how to write and read but also a lack of Kiswahili language skills.

Specifically, reflecting further on the above-presented data, we note that lack of job contracts among the migrants was such an important factor subjecting them to various forms of exploitation and oppression threat. Yet, some of the interviewed migrants appeared not to be unaware of this fact, as they did not really understand the importance of job contracts in their daily jobs. This shows that the migrants were not only facing the threat but also experiencing a risk situation. This is because according to (Beck 1992 [originally publ. 1986].) in (Obrist et al. 2010: 290), If individuals or organisations being affected by a threat are unaware that the threat does exist and that it can be tackled, such situation presents not just a danger but also a risk.

Based on the results in foregoing sections and its subsequent resilience implications, it was thus logical to inquire whether the Maasai migrants managed soliciting cultural-capital related aspects such as information, labour laws and rights, legal support and Kiswahili language skills from meso and National level structures in a bid to overcome various forms of exploitation and oppression.

Meso level structures: At this level, only one NGO was identified as working directly for the Maasai migrants in Dar es Salaam city, known as the Livelihood Initiatives (LIVES). It is dedicated to supporting Maasai livelihoods in terms of entrepreneurship, human rights and HIV/AIDS training, including employment and labour rights information. However, It was noted that only around 6% (n=50) of the migrants managed to solicit some relevant support related to exploitation and oppression from NGOs.

Reasons for this inability included that some existing NGOs (such as Livelihood Initiatives (LIVES)) were extremely ill-equipped in terms of both financial and human resources, while other NGOs such as Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) were not dealing directly and specifically with the Maasai migrants' exploitation and oppression issues such as labour rights. One of the NGO officials states:

¹⁰⁴ Only 60% of the interviewed migrants had primary education, 34% did not have education at all and 6% had post primary education and professional skills. Significant number of them is school dropouts who can hardly read and write.

“There are no such organisations as designed to support the Maasai, we have never even seen one, not even the government has done that, instead they are chasing us away, whenever they find us carrying out our petty business” **(Male Maasai migrant youth (27), Dar es Salaam)**

It was further noted that most of the NGOs in Dar es Salaam worked with the Maasai in rural rather than urban areas, as attested by one of the NGOs officials:

Our project deals with the Nomadic youth in Kilindi rural area and not here in Dar es Salaam. And so I cannot claim to be knowing anything about the problems of the Maasai migrants youth living in Dar es Salaam city. I cannot even think about it because it is something that is not in my area of work. I also doubt if there is any our staff who can avail you to such information. **(Female Key informant (32), Dar es Salaam)**

Moreover, in Tanzania, there exists a number of labour unions whose responsibility is to fight labour-related exploitation and oppression threats among workers. The existence of these unions would provide an opportunity for the Maasai migrants to air their different employment related forms of oppression and exploitation, given that trade unions are concerned with securing financial and non-financial rights or benefits for their members through collective bargaining (Khan 2010). However, the majority of the Maasai migrants could not access such support from these organisations as they were either unaware of them or did not know how they operated.

National level structures: Essentially only a handful (around 6%) of the Maasai migrants managed to solicit the elements of cultural capital such as legal support etc from government institutions once faced with exploitation and oppression-related threats, while 84% (n=50) were unable to. There were several reasons why the majority of the migrants were either reluctant to or incapable of soliciting support against exploitation and oppression from relevant government institutions, as detailed below:

Corruption: Firstly, around 65% (n=50) of the interviewed migrants stated to have declined soliciting support from the police or local government authorities because they considered these institutions as corrupt. They stated that the police were simply interested in their money rather than listening to their problems, as attested by one migrant who was included in a *bodaboda* (motorcycle) riding business:

Ehee!! These traffic police are very chaotic to us. They always ask for bribe from us as if they don't obtain salary from the government. They keep on asking for bribery from us even when we have not done anything wrong. How do you expect me to report my problems to someone who asks for bribe from me even when I am not guilty? **(Male Maasai migrant youth, (30) Dar es Salaam)**

Another migrant emphasises a similar perspective:

... Personally, if I happen to enter into conflict with a person, I normally apologise and make sure that matters end on the spot and in peace. Normally I don't want to take matters very far like going to police, because I have learned that there is a lot of corruption going on there [among the police officers]. (...) they tend to prolong matters in order to get money from us unnecessarily. Therefore, I would not take issues to police as it amounts to wasting my money and time. **(Male Maasai migrant youth, (32) Dar es Salaam)**

Another respondent concedes corruption to the police in order to get his business done:

At times I can go to police and report it to them. But as you may know, at times you may report your case to police and not receive good cooperation. In this case I can also give some money [bribe to police] so that justice can be done. This people have to be given something whenever you want them to work out your issues properly. **(Male Maasai migrant youth (32), Dar es Salaam)**

Fear of and little knowledge about government structures: Secondly, the majority of the Maasai migrants did not make use of the existing government structures such as the police due to a general fear and lack of knowledge about how they operated. Consequently, due to this they also feared them. Moreover, Maasai felt that they were not listened to whenever turned to such institutions for support.

Secondary data also stipulates that Maasai found administrative structures complex and inaccessible or essentially designed to cater for the “*Ilushumba*” (singular- *Olashumbai*) that is the [rich and educated], who are the direct beneficiaries of modern development and government resources (Ole Kaunga 2002). Moreover, whenever Maasai entered into legal problems and reported them to responsible public institutions, they were always ignored rather than receiving support (Ole Kaunga 2007; Rosen 2009).

It was also noted that in Tanzania there exists Labour laws and policies that are summarised in the the Tanzanian employment and labour relations Act of 2004¹⁰⁵. The Act clearly prohibits different forms of exploitation and oppression of workers. They also offer the steps that an employee can take in case of the violation of labour rights such as the denial of job contracts, underpayment, arbitrary salary delays and deductions, job termination and segregation at work (URT 2004). However, like with many Tanzanian workers, Maasai migrant workers were unaware of such National Labour laws; let alone being in the position to use them. Consequently, they could not make use of them in order to overcome different forms of exploitation and oppression at work.

International level institutions: At the international level, Tanzania has ratified all eight of the ILO labour conventions, on the freedom of association, the right to organise and collective bargaining, the elimination of discrimination and respect of employment and occupation and unequal remuneration, the elimination of forced or compulsory labour and the abolition of child and forced labour (ICFTU 2006).

Furthermore, Tanzania has also ratified the **ILO Convention No. 111**, which tackles employment and the occupation of protected, groups, including indigenous and tribal peoples such as the Maasai nomadic pastoralists (ICFTU 2006). Moreover, Tanzania ratified both the ILO Convention 29 (Forced Labour Convention 1930) and Convention 105 (Abolition

¹⁰⁵ For more detailed information about Tanzania’s labour laws in relation to unequal payment, deduction and delays of salary and job termination see the United Republic of Tanzania, [URT] (2004), Employment and Labour Relations Act No 6 of 2004, Sub - Part E - Unfair Termination of Employment, section (37) unfair termination, See also sections 38, 39 and 40. See also, Sub-Part F- about other Incidents of Termination 41, 42 and 44.

of Forced Labour Convention, 1957) both of which address the unfair job termination, unlawful salary delay and deductions (ICFTU 2006).

However, the Maasai migrant youth and workers were not aware of such International labour laws and thus could not take advantage of them in ransoming themselves from labour exploitation and oppression.

8.6 Social capital against exploitation and oppression threat

Turning to relatives and friends for advice: Around 85% (n=50) of migrants turned to their friends for various kinds of support against different forms of exploitation and oppression. Support from relatives and friends revolved around tracing and facing the employer, advising a migrant on how to face the employer, borrowing money to pay the employer, as well as counselling (consolation).

When I have problems at work with my boss, lets' say something has been stolen, I first consult my friend and try to contribute money so that we can pay the boss. Then we shall discuss if we shall apologise so that he can return the money. But I am very much annoyed by the fact that my boss behaves to me in such a rude manner that may simply make me go back home and come when the situation is calm and then look for another job. **(Male Maasai migrant youth (29), Dar es Salaam)**

Embarking on collective violent acts against employers: Based on their strong social networks, in some cases migrants organised themselves in groups and engaged in some violent acts against their employers who were less responsive to their demands. Use of violence by the Maasai migrants against forms of exploitation and oppression such as low payments, delay and deduction of payments was testified by at least 13% (n=50) of migrants and 16% (n=30) of the key informants. Specifically, around 32% (n=50) of the Maasai migrants explained that they were planning to strike or demonstrate [stop working for days or hours] in demand of their employment rights.

Some key informants also acknowledged that some Maasai migrants resorted to violence once they were denied certain rights by employers. A female Maasai employer states:

They always cooperate among themselves whenever they have problems. If you want to know how cooperative and united they are [the Maasai] try to just temper with the salary of one of them. They will always unite and look for you. And once they find you (...) it is only beating you up and later on take you to police. Even if they don't get you on the same day they will still continue hunting for you until they find and arrest you. **(Female key informant (35) Dar es Salaam)**

Another Maasai migrant employer states:

The other day there was one person who failed to give money to a certain Maasai they caught him and presented him to the police and at the end of the day this particular Maasai got his money. **(Male Maasai key informant (42) Dar es Salaam)**

Turning to Maasai associations: It emerged that some formal and informal Maasai associations¹⁰⁶ exist in different parts of Dar es Salaam. Maasai turned to such associations for social, legal and psychological support once they had experienced exploitation and oppression related threats such as payment delays and deductions, false victimisation and job termination.

The associations helped migrants to trace their employers, hold discussions with them pertaining to the fair and timely payments of migrants, as well as pleading with employers to retain migrants' jobs and benefits in cases when a migrant had been terminated from work. Furthermore, they also consoled migrants concerning the injustices such as discrimination against them.

Maasai solidarity groups were observed in different parts of Dar es Salaam, mainly in Kimara Baruti, Mbezi Mwisho (commuter bus stand), Mwenge bust stand, Ilala Boma, Tabata Kona, Kigamboni, and in some peripherals parts of Dar es Salaam such as Pugu, Kibaha and Tegeta. Maasai youth were grouped according to their areas of origin or based on their friendship and residential areas in Dar es Salaam. Such groups had also been observed in the past, where Maasai migrants in Dar es Salaam would meet in Oloips (groups of 20 to 40) in a place traditionally known as enkang or Boma in Kiswahili to socialise with their peer groups, exchanging news, discussing problems and playing games (May 2003).

However, these organisations could not adequately solve the migrants' threats related to exploitation and oppression, given that they were ill-equipped in terms of both human [skills and knowledge] and financial resources, as one of the key informants puts it:

So when they meet now and start talking about all these things among themselves, they are basically consoling each other. They start remembering that, so and so lost his five goats or ten cows etc, because they always evaluate money in terms of cows and goats. For example, the seventy thousand not paid by an employer would have bought three goats etc. I say this is just some kind of consolation because tomorrow or the day after they will go back again and do the same jobs again. **(Male key informant (65), Dar es Salaam)**

Drawing on the above-presented data, it sounds clear that on the one hand Maasai migrants managed to solicit social capital notably strong social networks from their friends and relatives (associations) to develop reactive as well as proactive capacities to cope with various forms of oppressions and exploitation.

Examples of reactive capacities included the ability to collectively search employers, perform violence against employers, negotiated jobs and payments once these aspects were unjustly denied to them. Proactive capacities included migrants' strong desire and the need to start organisations for advocating for their labour rights and good working conditions having learned about the relevance of such organisations as far as coping with the particular forms

¹⁰⁶ The researcher observed some Maasai organisations/associations in Kigamboni, Kimara, Tabata, Ubungo and Sinza and Tegeta. According to one of the Maasai in Kigamboni, their association was formally and legally registered as Tungi Maasai Association (TMA), and that they had a Bank account. Unfortunately, majority of the Maasai were unaware of such organisations and so could hardly solicit support from them.

of exploitation and oppression is concerned; but also investing on less exploitative and oppressive jobs in the future.

However, as we have noted in the foregoing sections, these networks were incapable of adequately solving the migrants' threats of exploitation and oppression due to their apparent financial and technical malfunction.

8.7 Discussion and some theoretical implications

Based on the aforementioned findings, it is apparent that the Maasai migrant youth in Dar es Salaam experienced various forms of exploitation and oppression threats, notably low payment, the forcible display of traditional values free, arbitrary job termination, delay and deductions of payments. These forms of exploitation and oppression were also found among the nomadic migrants in Kenya (Kipuri 2010; Ole Kaunga 2007) and among some young migrants in Tanzania. However, the forcible display of migrants' traditional values for free seems to be more common among the Maasai migrants in Tanzania and to a lesser extent in Kenya as they seem not to be explicit in the wider reviewed migration literature.

Maasai migrants also became victims of social stigma and segregation as well as false accusation/victimisation, mainly due to a lack of knowledge and skills and support by relevant institutions. Social stigma, segregation and victimisation have also been found among the nomadic rural-urban migrants in Kenya (Ole Kaunga 2007; Kipuri 2010), as well as the Maasai nomadic migrants in Tanzania (Talle 1998; May 2003; May and Ole Ikayo 2007). However, false accusation or victimisation of the migrants seems to be unique among the Maasai rural-urban migrants in Tanzania as it was hardly reflected in the reviewed literature.

Generally the forms of exploitation and oppression among the Maasai migrants are less extreme compared to the rural-urban migrants in south African cities [mainly women] who were beaten, badly fed, poorly paid and became sex slaves to pay for their basic needs (Min-Harris 2010). Specifically, none of the interviewed Maasai migrant reported to have been involved in sexual exploitation, denied food and the freedom of movement as earlier on found among some young migrants in Tanzania (ACP 2010).

It was interesting to note that Maasai migrant youth managed to differently solicit and utilise cultural and social capital aspects at the individual and community level in order to reactively and proactively cope with the above-presented forms of exploitation and oppression as discussed below.

Using some aspects of cultural capital at the individual level, migrants frequently pleaded with employers to pay them on time and fairly, they quit jobs and searching for alternative ones. Some migrants freely interacted with other community members and engaged in various activities to cope with segregation and stigma. However, Maasai migrants did not shy away from or hide their cultural and traditional identities as a way of coping with stigma and segregation in the urban areas. This kind of strategy by the Maasai migrants seems to be

contrary to that of other migrants in South African cities who would hide their traditional rural identities and instead identify themselves with urban culture as one of the ways of coping with stigma and segregation threat. In this case such a strategy gave them access to urban social services such as health and legal support from various authorities (Pratt 2010; Min-Harris 2010).

Specifically using aspects of cultural capital at individual level, migrants coped with segregation and stigma through emphasising on their identity as the Maasai and opted for informal governance structures such as turning to some friends and other people who they trusted. This is contrary to most of the indigenous rural-urban migrants in sub-Saharan Africa who often cope with segregation and discrimination by hiding their identities and cutting ties with their indigenous language and traditions as a safety measure in urban areas (UN-HABITAT 2010b).

Unfortunately, migrants could not solicit aspects of cultural capital such as education, legal support and labour rights knowledge at the meso level structures due to either lack of or existence of extremely few of them. These organisations were further ill equipped in terms of human, financial and technical resources. They also hardly managed to solicit cultural capital aspects at National level structures such as government departments, police and local government authorities due to the national-wide segregation waged against them and the unfriendly nature of the institutions. Moreover, Maasai also feared these institutions and believed that they existed for the wealthier and educated people. This is contrary to the migrants in West Bengal India who gain support from labour unions that fought for the fair wages of migrant workers (Rogaly and Rafique 2003).

At social capital level, based on their strong social networks, Maasai migrant youth engaged in violent behaviour or group demonstrations against their employers in demand of their rights to fair remuneration and timely payment. Such similar resistances/strategies have formerly been employed by groups of migrant workers in some Ghanaian cities (Kwankye et al. 2007), as well as among the young rural-urban migrants in South Africa (Min-Harris 2010) and Nigeria (Wosu and Kinikanwo 2010). However, the spread of false rumours about employers and the spoiling of working equipment as a strategy of coping with exploitation and oppression was not explicitly found among the Maasai migrants, as previously observed among some rural-urban migrants in Ghana (Kwankye et al. 2007).

Moreover, migrants turned to friends, relatives and Maasai associations for consolation and advice on coping with various forms of exploitation and oppression.

8.8 Chapter summary

In a nutshell, this chapter has ascertained and examined various forms of the exploitation and oppression threats among the Maasai nomadic migrant youth in Dar es Salaam city. Based on the multi-layered social resilience framework (Obrist et al. 2010), the aim was to understand whether migrants managed to solicit and utilise capitals from different social levels to develop reactive and proactive capacities for coping with the different forms of exploitation and oppressions encountered in the urban areas. Subsequently, the chapter recommended factors for enhancing migrants' capacities to more competently cope with such threats.

It was found that migrants encountered various forms of exploitation and oppression threats, such as unequal returns to labour and services, overworking, the involvement in multiple tasks for the same pay and forcible display of migrants' traditional values for free. Migrants also encountered a delay in payments and arbitrary deduction of salaries, false accusations and victimisation, together with random job termination.

Migrants employed a variety of strategies mainly based on the cultural and social capitals to cope with various forms of the threat. Using the cultural capital at individual level, such as local knowledge and physical strength, migrants quit jobs and looked for alternative ones. They frequently convened talks with their employers and insisted upon being remunerated timely and fairly. Some migrants employed violence such as insulting employers, demonstrating against some forms of exploitation and oppression and not showing up for work. However, migrants were unaware of job contracts and illiterate of existing institutions such as labour laws that could help them to address various issues of exploitation and oppression.

Even so, migrants could not solicit cultural capital-related support from the meso, national and international social levels. Meso level organisations were fewer, financially and technically ill-equipped. Moreover, migrants seemed unaware of the existing meso level organisations and the ways in which they operated. On the other hand, National level organisations notably government institutions, the police and local government authorities, were less friendly and responsive to migrants in terms of providing the migrants with education, skills, labour rights and legal support to cope with various forms of exploitation and exploitation.

At the social capital level, migrants used strong social networks and associations emanating from friends and relatives for advice and assistance in tracing employers to convince them to remunerate them in a timely and fair manner. They also engaged in group demonstrations against their employers in demand of the same rights.

Therefore, based on the multi-layered social resilience framework (Obrist et al. 2010), we conclude that migrants managed to solicit and utilise capitals primarily from individual and community levels to develop mainly reactive and to a lesser extent proactive capacities to competently cope with the threat. On the other hand, migrants' capacities to cope with the threat could be further improved through the amelioration of migrants, formal skills and making them aware of relevant institutions, as well as the sensitisation of existing meso, national, and international institutions to be more responsive towards this threat. More practical and elaborate factors for enhancing the Maasai migrants' resilience against different forms of exploitation and oppression are detailed in the last chapter of this thesis.

9. Physical insecurity and the Maasai nomadic migrant youth

9.1 Introduction

This chapter ascertains and examines the physical insecurity threat among the Maasai nomadic migrant youth in Dar es Salaam city, which mainly entails falling victim to crime by the migrants while working as security guards. Based on the multi-layered social resilience framework (Obrist et al. 2010), the aim is to understand whether migrants manage to solicit and utilise capitals from different social levels in order to develop reactive and proactive capacities for coping with the insecurity threat. Moreover, this chapter aims to recommend factors for enhancing their capacities to more competently cope with the threat. Based on this framework, migrants' ability to solicit and utilise capitals from different social layers towards reactively and proactively coping with the threat is regarded as being resilient to the threat, while the opposite is regarded as either being less or non-resilient to the threat. Based on the relevant factors for being able or unable to cope with the threat, factors for building migrants' resilience against physical insecurity threats are offered. However, first, the term insecurity is clearly defined as used in this chapter; secondly, the magnitude of the insecurity threat¹⁰⁷ among the Maasai migrants is discussed. Later on, the chapter presents different strategies employed by the migrants in coping with the threat. Subsequently, a short discussion about the findings is undertaken, culminating with the chapter's conclusion.

9.2 Physical insecurity defined

According to the online Macmillan English Dictionary, the word insecurity is derived from the word insecure, meaning capable of [easily] being lost or taken from you at any time, able to be entered by force, or not well protected or (...), lacking self-confidence, assurance or safety. It also means not [being] safe from attack(s).¹⁰⁸

According to the online Collins English Dictionary, insecurity, from the word insecure, may be understood as the anxiety one experiences when s/he feels vulnerable and insecure. It is also the state of being subject to danger or injury¹⁰⁹. A Maasai migrant youth working as a night security guard in Dar es Salaam city summarises what he considers as physical insecurity for himself and other migrants when working as night security guards:

We are not safe here; we are just working under God's protection. This is becoming normal now. At times, you hear that so and so [fellow Maasai security guard] has been attacked, and you just have to wait to see when your turn will come [to be attacked by the gangs]. However, we have to work like this [under this challenging situation] what else can we do! So I would say that "*usalama wetu*" [our security] situation is at stake. **(Male Maasai migrant youth (30), Dar es Salaam)**

¹⁰⁷ The current state of insecurity among the Maasai migrant youth is explained here to enable a reader to understand the context under which the threat occurs and enable a reader to clearly follow the subsequent arguments.

¹⁰⁸ Online Macmillan English Dictionary, <http://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/american/insecure>

¹⁰⁹ The Online Collins English Dictionary, <http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/insecure>

Following the above-presented definitions of the word insecurity and more specifically that derived from the migrants, this chapter recognises an insecurity situation as mainly the act of the Maasai migrant youth falling victim to crime when working as security guards. As we shall later learn, migrants fall victim to such situations due to their low self-protection ability resulting from a lack of proper security equipment, training and support from relevant social structures.

9.3 Magnitude of insecurity threat among the Maasai migrant youth

The findings generally revealed that falling victim to crime by the Maasai security guards in Dar es Salaam city was apparent, as attested by around 55% (n=50) of the Maasai migrants in urban areas, 50% (n=30) of households' representatives in Ngorongoro and 60% (n=30) of key informants from both Ngorongoro and Dar es Salaam.

The Maasai migrant youth working as security guards and night watchmen in Dar es Salaam were more often than not attacked, mistreated, injured or even killed by thieves who were interested in the valuables that they were taking care of¹¹⁰. These findings are strongly supported by secondary data, which describes the Maasai security guards as operating under constant attacks, mainly from gangs who intend to steal from their working sites (Ole Kaunga 2002; Kweka 2011).

Specifically, 55% (n=50) of the interviewed Maasai migrant youth attested to have either witnessed or been directly involved in some sort of insecurity related events. In this case, gangs/thieves had attacked migrants while on duty as night watchmen or security guards.

It was further noted that those Maasai migrant youth who worked as security guards mainly experienced two major types of insecurity situations [attacks] at their places of work. One was large-scale attacks that involved professional and heavily armed gangs, who tended to steal larger and more valuable items such as vehicles, machines and equipment worth huge sums of money. This situation would also cause serious injuries, disabilities and deaths to the migrants, as evidenced below.

They had particularly come to steal from BRAC¹¹¹ [a local microfinance organisation at Kimara Baruti-Dar es Salaam] over there. They shot on the air two times. Our friends [other Maasai] who were keeping guard here disappeared, off-course! They [thieves] managed to break in and collected for themselves many valuables including cash money. Even the Maasai keeping guard around the neighbourhoods also took off. **(Male Maasai migrant youth (26), Dar es Salaam)**

¹¹⁰ Maasai underwent a number of mistreatment from the gangs before the gangs would steal from them. Such mistreatments included being beaten and tied up with ropes, being locked inside a room to give way for the gangs.

¹¹¹ BRAC means Building Resources Across Communities. It's one of the local microfinance organisations in Tanzania

Another Maasai migrant also insists that the “large scale thieves” attack using strong weapons:

(...) they [thieves] came and started shooting several bullets on the air but still we declined to open the gate. They then shot at the small hole through which we were watching them. (...) I guess they were interested in stealing the company’s vehicles. Then we thought it was dangerous! We ran towards the back of the yard where we took hid under containers and started calling our employers and the police in our mobile phones (...) **(Male Maasai migrant youth, (31), Dar es Salaam)**

The second form of insecurity situation [attacks] among the Maasai migrant youth involves small-scale attacks by some petty thieves, popularly known as *Vibaka*¹¹² in Kiswahili. The *vibaka* do not steal large and highly valuable items such as the whole vehicle; rather, they steal some small items such as car spare parts, including car side mirrors, batteries, car seats, lights, wires, etc. which they can quickly and cheaply sell in order to earn their living.

Nonetheless, this still became a form of security threat to the Maasai migrants working as security guards because many of the *vibaka* were always under the influence of drugs and used simple yet dangerous weapons, notably knives, razors, stones, etc. to threaten the migrant security guards whenever they contained them. This would consequently cause the migrant security guards some physical harm, as one of them explains below:

There are many *vibaka* [petty thieves] around here who are always intending to steal from my place of work [as a watchman], (...) so I have to be extra careful as I chase them away because they can simply turn against me. (...) they tend to be targeting at me as they know that once they overpower me they can easily steal some car items like side mirrors etc. ... and this is exactly where I enter into problems with my bosses[employers] **(Male Maasai youth migrant (30) Dar es Salaam)**

Another Maasai migrant youth explains how dangerous the *vibaka* [petty thieves] can be to the Maasai working as security guards:

At times, the *vibaka* may be so powerful, they come in groups of more than two and then they play some tricks with you. Some of them keep you busy asking questions or making stories while others are stealing something [from our place of work]. If you happen to realize their trick and start dealing with them [stop them] they all turn against you, and if you are alone you will have to be silent otherwise, they will injure you. **(Male Maasai migrant youth (27) Dar es Salaam)**

Consequently, some Maasai migrant youth seemed to be working in fear or a state of anxiety due to the serious insecurity situations encountered. The migrants explained that their fear was further infuriated by the fact that they were taking care of valuables that attracted many thieves who would attack them using sophisticated weapons, while the Maasai migrants did not have such advanced weapons to defend themselves against attacks.

¹¹² *Vibaka* is a Kiswahili word for petty thieves who unlike the professional gangs steal small items such as car spare parts and use small and simple weapons such as knives, razors etc to defend themselves in case they are caught while stealing.

One Maasai migrant youth who was working as a night security guard in a motorcar repair garage states:

You can see all this property here [vehicles] (...) how much do you think they worth? Obviously a lot of money, isn't it? So [Valuable as they are] everyone would wish to have them, and having them means first injuring us. But we are remunerated very low and given very inferior weapons to guard them [valuable property]. We must be fearful because this is dangerous to our life [insecurity]. **(Male Maasai migrant youth (30), Dar es Salaam)**

Some respondents in the Maasai local areas notably, in Ngorongoro District also reported the insecurity situation among the Maasai migrant youth mostly working as security guards in cities. They acknowledged that their sons [Maasai migrant youth] who were working mainly as security guards in urban areas had been attacked by gangs on several occasions, resulting in deaths and permanent disabilities.

Moreover, during his field work in the Ngorongoro District (May–July 2011), the researcher witnessed the arrival of two dead bodies of the Maasai pastoralist youth who had been killed whilst working as night security guards in Mwanza city in Tanzania and Kisumu city in Kenya.

9.4 Migrants' strategies of coping with the insecurity threat

This sub-chapter discusses various strategies employed by the Maasai migrant youth working as security guards in coping with the aforementioned insecurity situation. Specifically, it explains how the migrants managed to solicit and utilise capitals from different social levels to develop reactive and proactive capacities in coping with the insecurity threat.

9.5 Cultural capital against insecurity threat

Individual level: At the individual level, Maasai migrant youth opted to run away from work places, as well as hiding whenever they were attacked or anticipated attacks from the gangs. This strategy was evidenced by 28% (n=50) of migrants and over 80% (n=30) of the key informants. Essentially, Maasai migrant youth opted for this strategy due to their lack of superior weapons to counteract their enemies, as further attested below.

There is nothing else we can do other than running away (...) the truth of the matter is that we have to run away as we cannot [afford] fight [ing] the gangs using such weapons [swords and sticks]. As you can see we are using only our sticks and *Sime* [sword]¹¹³ to defend ourselves. How then do you expect us to be able to compete with guns [gangs with guns]? **(Male Maasai youth migrant (28), Dar es Salaam)**

Moreover, in order to cope with gang-attacks, Maasai migrants changed their traditional attire and wore other kinds of clothing before hiding or running away from the gangs. The main reason for this was to specifically camouflage themselves from the criminals.

¹¹³ *Sime* is a Kiswahili word for a sword; a Maasai traditional weapon mostly used by the Maasai youth.

Consequently, this strategy prevented the migrants from being easily identified and criminalised by criminals [beating or killing them]¹¹⁴.

Changing of traditional attire and hiding were evidently also opted by the Maasai migrants working as security guards around the places that had been invaded by gangs, even though they were not those directly attacked by the gangs. One key respondent explains:

In most cases when thieves break into a place that is being watched [guided] by the Maasai, the Maasai security guards obviously become a target of aggression [victim] as he has to be disabled in a way [beaten, injured or killed] before he can allow the gangs to depart with some valuables. So, one of the ways in which the Maasai [including those working in the nearby sites] use to avoid this situation is changing their traditional clothes before escaping. **(Female key informant (29) Dar es Salaam)**

Another respondent also comments the Maasai running away as a strategy of avoiding gangs' aggression:

"One day Maasai working as night watchman in that SACCOSS over there were attacked by gangs. And we witnessed them changing their clothes [traditional ones] and running away to escape punishments by the gangs". **(Male key informant (24), Dar es Salaam)**

It is important to note that Maasai migrants (respondents) could not explicitly acknowledge running away, hiding or changing their attire as strategies of coping with the insecurity threat in some cases. This is because such a testimony would have contradicted with the Maasai's own culture and community perception, considering the Maasai as aggressive worriers who are capable of working as effective security guards.

However, although some migrants managed to cope with the insecurity threat based on the aforementioned strategies, most of the migrants 80% (n=50) expressed their inability to cope with the insecurity threat due to their lack of effective security equipment, especially a lack of modern weapons. Migrants' security guards mainly relied on sticks, swords, arrows and spears in providing security services, even though the migrants were providing security services to very sensitive places such as financial institutions, shops, bars and restaurants, car yards, garages and workshops.

These places were vulnerable to invasion by some well-armed gangs, as this respondent puts it:

".....Maasai migrants working as *Walinsi* [security guards] are attacked by the gangs who posses' better weapons compared to them. (...) I mean this is very serious because, how can a Maasai use a stick to fight against gangs who come in with a sub-machine gun or other much heavier weapons." **(Male Maasai migrant youth (27), Dar es Salaam)**

The following photo depicts how Maasai migrants working as security guards used less effective security equipment, notably machetes and sticks, to cope with the insecurity (crime) threat.

¹¹⁴ The majority of the respondents maintained that whenever gangs attacked a place that was being watched over by the Maasai security guards, it was the Maasai who were always the target of aggression.



Figure 22: Maasai migrant security guards using poor traditional weapons to discharge security services

Photo: K. Lickert (2010)

The migrants' lack of formal security training further rendered them incapable of competently dealing with the insecurity threat. Maasai migrant security guards are not trained in formal and professional security skills. Consequently, they lacked the formal and modern skills to effectively protect themselves once confronted by the gang-attacks, as stated below:

The problem with the Maasai youth working as the *walinzi* [security guards or night watch men] is that they are not professionally trained to do this work and not essentially because of poor weapons!. A few days ago our neighbour was attacked by the gangs; the Maasai providing security services there were seriously injured not because they were shot by the gangs but because they were escaping so unprofessionally and thus ended up falling down, crushing into some walls, trees etc. You see, they were simply physically unfit! **(Female Key informant (38), Dar es Salaam)**

Another key informant insists that the Maasai migrants' lack of formal security skills an impediment to coping with the insecurity:

No, they do not really have skills for dealing with gang attacks [insecurity problems]. What they do more especially when the attacks are serious is to run away and they disappear or go back to their local homes. This happens more especially when they are required to appear before court or interrogated by the police. In this case their employers think that the Maasai have collaborated with the thieves in stealing from them. **(Male, Key informant (45) Dar es Salaam)**

Another key informant maintains:

In order for an individual to be employed as a security guard, one should demonstrate significant capability to prevent and [or] deal with crimes. (...), an individual should possess qualifications and skills such as sound general body health, skills such as being able to use weapons [modern], and security communication devices such as radio calls etc. However, I do not think whether the Maasai do possess all these skills! **(Male key informant (43), Dar es Salaam)**

It was specifically noted that migrants could not secure modern security devices and training from their employers due to the migrants' lack of knowledge concerning how to use the devices. The situation was further contributed by Maasai employers' low economic power to supply such devices and the belief held by both the migrants and employers that the Maasai were effective security guards simply by virtue of being the Maasai warriors and through their strategy of working in groups¹¹⁵. However, some employers denied the Maasai migrants these services based on exploitative reasons, as attested below.

(...) they [employers] take them as cheap labour; as they don't give them food, shelter or weapons [modern security facilities]. They know that they can terminate their work [contract] any time they enter into disagreements with them. Very few employers can value them [Maasai] (...) they [Maasai] get little salary that is not enough even for their daily needs (...) if they don't have weapons [modern ones] how do we guarantee their security once they are attacked [by gangs]. **(Male, key informant (44) Dar es Salaam)**

Considering the above data from the perspective of the multi-layered social resilience framework means that the utilisation of local knowledge and physical strength such as running away, hiding and changing of the attire by the Maasai migrants **(cultural capital at individual level)** enabled the migrants to develop mainly reactive capacities to cope with the insecurity threat. However, the migrants lacked security training and skills as well as equipment that would enhance their capacities to more effectively cope with the insecurity threat.

Another important strategy of coping with the insecurity threat at work places employed by the Maasai migrant youth was the use of **mobile phones**, as evidenced by 52% (n=50) of migrants and 54% (n=30) of the key informants.

¹¹⁵ Series of informal interviews with different key informants and FGD's with Maasai respondents

In particular, Maasai migrant youth used mobile phones to call employers, friends or police to come to their rescue once attacked by thieves, as stipulated in the case study below:

One night thieves came in a car and knocked on our gate. Having looked at them through a small security hole at the gate we noticed that both the car and the people in it were unfamiliar to us because none of them resembled a worker in this company [where Maasai were working as security guards]. They shot several bullets on the air but still we declined to open the gate. They then shot at the small gap through which we were watching them. Then we thought it was dangerous for us! We ran towards the back of the yard [garage], took a hid under containers, and started calling our employers and the police. The police told us that there were some police officers patrolling nearby our place and they would immediately come to our rescue. It seems the thieves sensed our communication with the police and employers. Consequently, they started insulting us. They told us that we were lack for not opening the gate; otherwise, that night was going to be our worse moment. Then, they disappeared. Police however came in after 40 minutes while our employers had already arrived in 30 minutes. We were not happy about the delay of the police because the police post is just a few kilometres [2-3 Km's] away from us, yet they took 40 minutes to come to our rescue. The thieves could have finished us! **(Male Maasai migrant youth, Dar es Salaam)**

However, some migrants could not effectively use mobile phones to protect themselves against crime due to their lack of knowledge and skills in operating mobile phones. They were also unaware of important telephone numbers, such as those of the police and their employers. Some migrants did not have phones, while in other cases their phones were either too dilapidated or did not have sufficient airtime, as one of the migrants further explains:

At times you might be attacked by thieves, but fail even to request for support from your boss [employer] or friends simply because you don't have some airtime in your phone or your phone is not functioning properly. Yet, this is important [having airtime in your phone] because as you know, nobody knows the day and time of attacks by gangs. Thieves may come in at any time, whether you are prepared or unprepared; (...) and in most cases, they come when you are unprepared. **(Male Maasai migrant youth (28) Dar es Salaam)**

Again, the above-presented data shows that migrants managed to utilise an element of cultural capital at the individual level, notably through the use of mobile phones to develop the "reactive capacity" of coping with the insecurity threat. However, quite a number of them could not use this strategy, mainly due to technological and economic reasons as detailed above.

Apart from the use of mobile phone, Maasai migrants opted for various economic activities other than working as security guards to cope with the insecurity threat. Specifically, engaging in non-security activities helped them to abandon the security guard job and its associated insecurity threats. Such activities included selling Maasai traditional herbs, hair pleating [dressing] and other modern businesses such as selling mobile phone accessories and airtime, etc.

Working as a *mlinzi* [watchmen] was not at all promising for me as it exposed us to a number of problems. Whenever something could get lost at work your boss would turn to you. Yet the same boss did not provide us with any support [weapons or skills] of fighting with the *vibaka* [petty thieves] (...) For the period of two years I did not see this as a good job because of these complications [being invaded by petty thieves] I decided to engage in selling as herbs. **(Male Maasai youth migrant (27), Dar es Salaam)**

Whereas some Maasai migrants had already quit working as security guards and opted for some of the aforementioned activities, others still engaged in these economic activities on a part-time basis alongside working as security guards. According to the interviewed Maasai migrants, this was a strategy of saving and investing in some other more viable economic activities to equip themselves economically before they would completely stop working as security guards.

Off course, working as security guards is such a tough task, bearing in mind a number of complications [including insecurity] we have to encounter and deal with (...) but the other truth is that you cannot leave a job before securing another job. We need to service our daily life [here in the city] and save for the future. Where do you get all this money if you stop working now [abruptly]? **(Male Maasai youth migrant (31), Dar es Salaam)**

Explicitly, around 34% (n=50) of migrants considered engaging in agriculture and animal husbandry in their local households **[economic capital]** as future plans in dealing with the insecurity situation in which they found themselves. According to them, investment in pastoralism and agriculture was a more long-term strategy of overcoming insecurity, given that it would help them to abandon working as security guards and the associated risk.

In terms of future ways of coping with the insecurity threat, Maasai migrants aimed at adopting much safer jobs such as entrepreneurship activities, e.g. hairdressing, engagement in domestic and construction work. Moreover, they also talked of investing in the education of their children, as well as developing their knowledge and skills to be more competent in providing security services. Some of the skills mentioned by the migrants included undergoing security training such as learning, business skills, Kiswahili language, etc., and how to use modern weapons.

The interpretation of the above data is that the utilisation of local knowledge and physical strength, notably engagement in informal sector economic activities different from working as security guards (cultural capital at the individual level), enabled the migrants develop “reactive capacities” in avoiding the insecurity threat. However, it is important that lessons drawn from the threat enabled the migrants to reflect and developed “proactive capacities”, notably more effective future strategies of coping with the insecurity threat. For example, migrants invested in relevant skills together with opting for other much safer future economic/livelihood activities.

Finally, it was interesting to note that around 18% (n=50) of the Maasai migrant youth demonstrated their strong dependency on God’s grace [support] in enabling them to overcome some insecurity conditions such as attacks by thieves.

The reasons for their dependency on God mainly rotated around the fact that they lacked efficient skills and sufficient weapons to counteract the thieves who would attack them, as explained by one of the migrants:

Yes, in most cases we enter into confrontations with thieves more especially at night. But, I don't think we have enough power to fight against them [thieves]! Some of the thieves are far better armed than ourselves. (...) they have guns, and we only use sticks, machetes and spears. They can easily overpower us! So I would say that it's only God who helps [protect us from gangs] us here. **(Male Maasai migrant youth (31), in Dar es Salaam)**

Dependency on God's assistance in dealing with the insecurity situation was also implicitly mentioned by the majority of the respondents even, after having mentioned other ways of dealing with this threat. They affirmed that dependency on God was above all a reliable protection from gangs, as stated by one of the migrants below:

(...) In order to contain them [thieves] from overpowering us we constantly try to work as a team (...) and when things turn worse we need to run away also. (...) but at times we also need to entrust all these in God's hands as we cannot guarantee security based on our own efforts [against the gangs] by hundred percent. **(Male Maasai migrant youth (31), Dar es Salaam)**

Therefore, as a summary of his section, it could be said that migrants were capable of utilising cultural capital mainly at the individual level to cope with the insecurity threat. Such elements of cultural capital utilised by the migrants included running away, hiding and changing attire and the use of mobile phones to communicate with the security organs and employers in the case of gang-attacks. Moreover, they also engaged in various informal sector economic activities other than working as security guards, and to a lesser extent depended on God. However, migrants lacked some elements of cultural capital such as security skills and equipment, as well as support from other social levels that would enable them to more effectively cope with the insecurity threat. Consequently, these aspects of cultural capital should be given due attention in order to bolster the resilience of the migrants against the insecurity threat in urban areas.

Based on the above summary, it was important to find out whether the migrants managed to solicit some forms of cultural capital such as security skills and equipment, legal support and language skills at meso and national levels to enable them to more competently cope with the insecurity threat.

Meso level support: It was noted that Maasai could hardly solicit security related support such as security skills, information and equipment from the meso level organisations in Dar es Salaam. Indeed, there was only one NGO, known as LIVES, which directly worked for the Maasai livelihoods in Dar es Salaam. However, this organisation was technically and financially incapacitated in supporting the Maasai in terms of security skills, language skills and legal support in a bid to more competently cope with the insecurity threat. Moreover, Maasai migrants were also unaware of the organisation.

National level support: At National level, it was found that the Dar es Salaam city safety and security Institutional Arrangement were well-established at regional, municipal or city council, district, division, ward and street or hamlets levels (URT 2002; Robertshaw et al. 2001). However, only a handful of migrants managed to solicit security-related support notably legal support from these government institutions. Around 86% (n=50) of the migrants both directly and indirectly demonstrated their failure to successfully solicit support related to security skills, language skills and legal support from the government institutions such as the police and local government institutions/ offices to enable them cope with insecurity threat.

Several reasons were responsible for the migrants' failure to solicit cultural capital related aspects from these organisations for coping with the insecurity threat. One of the reasons was the fact that such security related support such as legal education and security skills for unprofessional security guards like the Maasai migrants were not institutionalised and thus not provided by these structures.

The second major reason for failing to solicit and utilise security support from such government structures was related to the Maasai's lack of confidence in government institutions such as the police, as well as [local] government structures and courts, mainly due to corruption. Indeed, one of the migrants' states:

"... then who can waste his [her] time to go to the police or the *mtendaji* [local government officials]. They will only look at you and they will not seem to help you. The problem with these people [is that] they will expect something from you before they can listen to your problem [corruption]" **(Male Maasai youth migrant (30) Dar es Salaam).**

Another migrant insists that corruption by government officials impeded him from reporting insecurity issues:

For us if we happen to capture the *kibaka* [petty thief] we only punish him severely and later on hand him over to the boss [employer]. The boss knows what to do with the victim. I think they [police/local government officials] will not listen to us; we just waste our time going there. May be they will only end up asking for corruption from us. **(Male Maasai youth migrant (27) Dar es Salaam)**

Thirdly, Maasai migrants' failure to access security related support from the government institutions was due to their general fear and ignorance concerning the ways in which these institutions operate. Specifically, it was noted that the Maasai declined to give witness in courts, local government offices or at the police due to an irrational fear and lack of awareness about these institutions.

In such cases, Maasai migrants ran away thinking that they would be victimised rather than supported by these institutions:

They [Maasai migrants] disappear and at times go back home [their local homes], more especially when the problem [insecurity threat] inclines them to appear before court or be interrogated by police. In this case, their employers think that Maasai may have collaborated with the thieves and that is why they run away or unwilling to cooperate with the police and the court. **(Male Maasai employer/businessman (44), Dar es Salaam)**

Indeed secondary data also stipulates that the Maasai migrants perceive the exiting existing government administrative structures as complex and inaccessible. They perceive them as essentially being designed to cater for the “*Ilashumba*” or “*Olashumbai*”, meaning the modernised and the direct beneficiaries of modern development and government existence in Tanzania (Ole Kaunga 2002).

Fourthly, the government institutions were generally slow and reluctant in responding to the Maasai insecurity issues, either due to a lack of facilities or for bureaucratic reasons, as one respondent reports:

(...) We ran towards the back of the yard, took a hid under containers, and started calling our employers and the police. The police told us that there were some police officers patrolling nearby our place and they would immediately come to our rescue. (...) the Police however came in after 40 minutes while our employers had already arrived in 30 minutes. We were not happy about the delay of the police because the police post is just a few kilometres [2-3 Km's] away from us, yet they took 40 minutes to come to our rescue. The thieves could have finished us!

On the fifth note, some public officials ignored the Maasai's insecurity issues either because they sounded inferior to them or simply because the Maasai reported them¹¹⁶. This discouraged the migrants from forwarding their insecurity related issues through public institutions:

For us if we catch a victim [thieve] we simply punish him [her] severely. We do not have time to take him [victim] to the Police or to Mtendaji [local government official]. I think what they [police] will do is mainly to look at you and say a few *porojo* [less convincing and helpful words]. May be our [boss] employer can take matters forward but not me. (**Male Maasai migrant youth (31) Dar es Salaam**)

Proactively speaking, the Maasai migrants planned to establish a Maasai advocacy organisation that would among other things empower them on security skills but also advocate for the Maasai good working environment, including dealing with insecurity related issues. Maasai migrants thought that the formation of such an organisation could help them to coordinate and facilitate advocacy against Maasai harsh working conditions, as well as reminding some government institutions such as the police to resolve their various livelihood threats including insecurity in a timely and just manner.

One of the Maasai migrants attested the above explanations as here below:

Definitely, there are no any decent [formal] nongovernmental organisations that tend to speak for us [empower us on security skills] and more especially when it comes to the matter of our working conditions [insecurity]. As you have seen, we are working in difficult conditions as we don't have education (...) neither are we provided with working facilities [weapons]. I think it is high time we came up with our own organisation that will delve in improving our working environment [including insecurity] (**Male Maasai migrant youth (31), Dar es Salaam**)

¹¹⁶ See also the chapter 8 of this thesis, the Maasai migrants failed to adequately solicit support from government structures in dealing with different forms of exploitation and oppression due to their general fear and lack of awareness about these institutions and importantly due to the corruption involved in obtaining such assistance.

Drawing on the aforementioned data, it can be stated that the Maasai migrants could not solicit any forms of cultural capital from the meso and national level to develop capacities of coping with the insecurity threat. This was because some aspects of cultural capital such as security skills and legal education for the non-professional security guards like the Maasai migrants were not institutionalised or provided by these structures. Moreover, migrants were less proficient in Kiswahili language, they were unaware of these institutions or the institutions were non-responsive to the migrants' threat due to some social, technical and financial reasons.

9.6 Social capital against insecurity threat

At the social capital level, the Maasai security guards worked in groups of at least two people in one work place as a strategy of coping with the insecurity threat. This was mainly facilitated by the strong social networks that existed among the Maasai migrants. Those Maasai migrants who were employed as day-security guards supported those working as night in order to strengthen their efforts against gang-attacks¹¹⁷. Moreover, the Maasai also constantly persuaded their employers to employ more than one Maasai at work in order that they could work in a team of at least two.

According to the migrants, this strategy was particularly practical, firstly because gangs would fear attacking the Maasai working in groups, and secondly as group migrants could more effectively react to attacks. Thirdly, working groups kept the Maasai awake and thus more vigilant against attacks, as they conversed throughout the night. A migrant puts it as below:

Concerning the problem of many thieves around [at work place], we try to work hand in hand with some other Maasai engaged in the same kind of work [security guards] in the nearby places. In this way, we can easily contain the thieves. But if you are alone it is really a problem as they can easily overpower you and steal [from you] whatever they can. **(Male Maasai migrant youth (28), Dar es Salaam)**

Another migrant insists on working in teams as a strategy of coping with the insecurity threat:

Concerning the thieves who come to our place of work from time to time we try to work together with some other watchmen in the neighbourhoods [Maasai] to chase them away and I think this helps to some greater extent [collaboration with other Maasai]. We keep on supporting each other like brothers and that is what our culture teaches us (...) as MORANS [youth] we should love and support each other as brothers [and sisters]. **(Male Maasai migrant youth (31), Dar es Salaam)**

¹¹⁷ It was also observed that some Maasai migrants supported their friends in working as security guard as a strategy of securing a place for spending a night. This is because a significant number of the Maasai migrants did not have reliable and adequate shelters.

Some key respondents also testified how the Maasai security guards worked in teams to cope with insecurity threat, as below:

In most cases, Maasai will provide security services in the places where they can work together with some other Maasai. (...) When they work many of them in the same place, it becomes very hard for them to be attacked [by gangs], and even other non-Maasai security guards are [increasingly] using this same kind of tactic [working more than one]. **(Male, key informant (29), Dar es Salaam)**

Another key informant supplements the above statement:

These days they are very clever [the Maasai]! At times they work in groups of up to ten (...) just working in the same place. In this case a thief can hardly penetrate there. But you should also keep in mind that some Maasai don't have a place to sleep on. And so all they have to do is they join their friends at night to both support them and secure a place for passing a night" **(Female key informant (36), Dar es Salaam).**

Working in groups, and particularly more especially at night, as a strategy of the Maasai coping with crime can further be evidenced in the following figure.



Figure 23: Working in groups more especially at night to cope with the insecurity threat

Photo: K. Lickert (2010)

It was noted that the tendency to support each other or share resources among the Maasai migrant youth was deeply imbedded in the Maasai culture. Culturally, Maasai warriors//*Moran* or youth are obliged to share many things.

For example, Maasai youth or *Il-Moran* are not allowed to eat or drink milk alone! The accepted norm among them is for all the [food] milk for consumption by Moran to be pooled in one location, enabling all *Morans* to receive an equal share in order to enforce social unity among them (National Museum of Tanzania 2004: 22).

However, the Maasai migrants did not prefer working with the group of non-Maasai people. This is because Maasai migrants believed that the non-Maasai people would turn out to be potential enemies/thieves or would easily conspire with thieves and invade the Maasai.

On the other hand, a handful of the Maasai migrants (around 23% (n=50)) solicited support against the insecurity threat at the community level, specifically from the non-Maasai people. In such cases, the non-Maasai urban residents would provide the Maasai with some insecurity related tips such as perceived organised crimes or attacks against the Maasai, as well as coming to their rescue once they were attacked by thieves or gangs.

They also worked hand-in-hand with the Maasai security guards to ensure the security situation in their residential areas one way or another, as attested by one of the Maasai migrants below¹¹⁸:

At times, it is also good to build relationship with the *waswahili* [Non Maasai] so that once they can inform you in case they foresee any possible future invasions [insecurity threats]. Last time our friend at Mbagala ward was saved by a *Mswahili* [non Maasai] who over-heard some people planning to steal from him [at his place of work]. He reported to his boss and that night his boss hired many of us to support each other [more Maasai], although we did not manage to arrest them [thieves], we chased them away and in this way they [thieves] realized that we were vigilant at work. **(Male Maasai migrant youth (27), Dar es Salaam)**

On the other hand, it was learned that most of the Maasai migrants (77% (n=50)) received either too little or no security support from the non-Maasai urban residents, mainly because the Maasai were not strongly connected to the rest of the non-Maasai urban community. One respondent confirms:

(...) likewise those ones who can better interact with other community members [non Maasai city residents] are supported by their neighbours [in case of insecurity threat] as people in these particular places are already aware of them and so support them once they are in problems [e.g. insecurity threat]. In the contrary those Maasai who don't have good interaction with community have got less support from community as well [they are not given support due to poor relationship with the people living in the nearby places] **(Female key informant (45), Dar es Salaam)**

Another reason why the Maasai migrants solicited less support from the urban community level is that Maasai are national-wide and particularly by the urban community less accepted. Moreover, they also generally feel segregated or despised by the non-Maasai people. Cultural-wise, the Maasai regard themselves as more special, considering other people as (*Laioni/rumeo*), literally meaning the uncircumcised or impure.

¹¹⁸ Some Maasai working as security guards provided some free security service to some nearby residents expecting to secure shelter and receive some security related information such as organised crimes, etc. and also to be supported directly in case they were attacked by gangs.

Therefore, Maasai are essentially shameful to solicit support from such people, as evidenced by this educated Maasai elder.

(...) Indeed, there is a considerable social gap between the Maasai [working in Dar es Salaam city] and the rest of the urban community. The problem with us the Maasai is that we don't have trust in other non Maasai people and because of that we don't associate with them. So it becomes a problem on our side when we need some assistance from other people and more especially when we [Maasai] land on some social [security] problems **(Male key informant (65), Dar es Salaam)**

Besides, it was noted that Maasai migrants were reluctant to solicit support from non-Maasai people because they regarded them as the *Waswahili*, unreliable and corn people who would listen to the Maasai problems yet hardly help them¹¹⁹.

A lack of Kiswahili language proficiency also impeded the Maasai migrants from mobilising some security-related support from the rest of the urban community, as evidenced by over 45% (n=50) of respondents. Maasai were more comfortable with their traditional language (the *Maa*) rather than Kiswahili language, which is both the official and business language in Tanzania, and is widely used in Dar es Salaam.

The above-stated data suggests that, on the one hand, the Maasai migrant youth managed to solicit some elements of social capital mainly from the community level, and particularly strong Maasai networks and to a lesser degree support from city residents, in order to develop mainly reactive capacities to competently cope with the insecurity threat. On the other hand, the Maasai could hardly solicit support from the community, meso and national levels to cope with the threat. This is because the Maasai were less connected to the rest of urban community notably to other non-Maasai people and they were also less proficient in Kiswahili language that is an important and widely language in Dar es Salaam .

9.7 Symbolic capital against insecurity threat

Finally, the work explored the extent to which Maasai migrants were capable of soliciting and utilising symbolic capital, which entailed resources available to an individual on the basis of honour, prestige or recognition, as well as the authority to cope with the insecurity threat (Craig 2002).¹²⁰

Firstly, based on the Maasai culture, there was a common perception by the community that the Maasai were brave and very cruel in dealing with crime or gangs who would invade them at work places.

¹¹⁹ As earlier noted, Maasai migrants discharging security services did not prefer working together with the *Waswahili* [non Maasai] in the same place as they believed that the Non-Maasai people would collude with the thieves and to turn against them.

¹²⁰ For more detailed work on the symbolic capital, see Craig Calhoun, ed. (2002). "Symbolic Capital", *Dictionary of the Social Sciences*, Oxford University Press.

Maasai braveness¹²¹ is associated with their culture, perceiving the Maasai youth or MORANS as fierce warriors. This prompted people to fear and respect the Maasai in discharging security-related services. Based on this belief, thieves would shy away from attacking the Maasai security guards, even though they were working without formal security skills and devices such as modern weapons and communication devices¹²². One Maasai migrant states:

(...) we're respected here (...) because most of the people see us [the Maasai] as brave worriers who can do their work [working as watchmen] very well. They take us as people who are faithful but also, furious and so they cannot fight with us. Do you get me? We normally carry sticks with us, *sime* [a sword] ready to destroy anyone who doesn't wish us good. (...) and when they see us carrying these [traditional] weapons they think that we are bad people or we can use them to attack people [just anyhow]. **(Male Maasai youth migrant (29), Dar es Salaam)**

A key informant ascertains that Maasai are feared due to their fearless character:

Now everybody is running after the Maasai [employ them as security guards] because they are fierce! (...) if someone sees a Maasai over that gate there for example, nobody will even move near to it. They [Maasai] do their work very well, at night they do not sleep because of their keenness in discharging their services, and this is exactly the reason why they will still be needed. **(Male Maasai elder [educated] Maasai (65), in Dar es Salaam)**

Another key informant supplements the above information:

"Well! It is true that Maasai are being attacked by gangs. Nevertheless, most of the city dwellers still employ them as security guards not initially as cheap labour but because of their culture of aggressiveness and braveness (...) and for their cheap labour off course" **(Male key informant [NGO representative] (29) Dar es Salaam)**

Furthermore, another key informant suggests:

Morans [Maasai youth] are well known by other tribes too as fierce and aggressive worriers who could not entertain any kind of insecurity. Such community perception helped the Maasai excel well in their work as security guards and indirectly fairly deal with the insecurity threat as it discouraged their enemies. **(Male Key informant (44), Dar es Salaam)**

Reasoning from the aforementioned insights, it can be concluded that some aspects of symbolic capital such as Maasai braveness implicitly helped some Maasai migrants working as security guards to develop reactive capacities in overcoming the insecurity threat. Both the Maasai and other communities [employers] regarded the Maasai as fierce and aggressive worriers who could not easily be defeated, thus minimising the number of attacks by thieves. Specifically, most of the Maasai security guards belonged to the age group of 20s-30s, which is popularly considered as the warrior age group or the Morans¹²³.

¹²¹ In the past and even at the present some people maintain that Maasai youth [MORANS] are very fierce warriors and in the past they had to kill a lion as an important activity during the worrier-hood stage.

¹²² Series of discussion with some Maasai security guards, and key informants some of who were both central and local government officials, NGO's officials and lawyers and more importantly some security officers and police in particular.

¹²³ Traditionally, as warriors the Morans or [Maasai youth] are responsible for protecting the existing community wealth [cattle] and increase this wealth through fighting and stealing [more cattle].

Migrants could hardly make use of economic capital to develop reactive as well as reactive capacities and thus cope with the insecurity-related threats due to the lack of some aspects of economic assets in the urban areas; for example, they commonly lacked cattle, land and houses in the urban areas.

9.8 Discussion and some theoretical implications

Learning from the above-presented findings, physical insecurity and notably Maasai migrants falling victim to crime while working as security guards in Dar es Salaam, was apparent. Almost similar threats were evident among some rural-urban migrants in South African cities (Min-Harris 2010) as well as migrants of west Bengal city (Hossain 2003).

However, none of the Maasai migrants in Dar es Salaam reported to have encountered any kind of physical and property insecurity when travelling either from urban to rural areas or the vice versa, by contrast to such instances being reported among some rural-urban migrants in Bengal (Hossain 2003; Rogaly and Rafique 2003) and Ghana (Kwankye et al. 2007). The fact that the Tanzanian Maasai migrants did not encounter this threat could have been due to the relatively peaceful situation prevailing in Tanzania.

The work noted that migrants solicited and utilised mainly cultural and social capitals from mostly individual and community social layers to competently cope with the insecurity threat.

Using the cultural capital at individual level, Maasai migrants utilised knowledge and skills such as running away, hiding, changing attire and relying on God's protection (faith). Importantly, they used mobile phones to seek support after having been attacked. The migrants also used mobile phones to communicate among themselves and with their employers in case of any insecurity threat, mainly at their work place. Proactively, Maasai migrants opted for economic activities other than working as security guards, particularly investing in livestock and agriculture, mainly in the local households. Indeed, such strategies do not seem to have been documented by other sources.

Moreover, Maasai migrants proactively intended to deal with the insecurity threat through investment in activities such as dressing, the education of themselves and their children, developing their various knowledge and skills to be more competent in providing security services. Once again, these findings seem to be lacking within wider migration literature.

On the other hand, Maasai migrants failed to successfully cope with the insecurity threat, mainly due to lack of some aspects of cultural capital such as necessary security equipment and training.

Even so migrants hardly managed to solicit some forms of cultural capital such as security training, equipment, information etc at meso and national levels in order to cope with the insecurity threat.

Specifically, migrants were incapable of accessing support from the meso level due to small number of relevant institutions, who moreover have limited capacities in delivering relevant support. Meso level organisations did not specifically deal with the Maasai, focusing more on the insecurity threat.

Furthermore, Maasai were significantly unaware of the right ways of soliciting support from such organisations. Likewise, migrants hardly solicited relevant support against the insecurity threat at the national level due to segregation practiced by these institutions against the Maasai, combined by migrants' lack of little awareness of government institutions. They also failed to solicit support due to the corrupt and bureaucratic nature involved in accessing relevant support from these institutions. These findings are also partly supported by existing literature (Ole Kaunga 2002; May 2003).

In terms of social capital, migrants worked in groups to cope with gang attacks, based upon strong social networks that existed among migrants. However, they avoided working with the non-Maasai people in the same group. Migrants received relevant security-related information from community members, who also came to the rescue once attacked by gangs. Nonetheless, the majority of the migrants could not access support from the community level.

With respect to symbolic capital, the migrants managed to overcome the insecurity threat through potentials such as aggressiveness, braveness as well as values of trustworthiness and respect that are deeply imbedded in the Maasai culture and traditions; alternatively, this was also achieved simply by their virtue of being the Maasai.

Although some authors (Ole Kaunga 2007; Kipuri 2010) have also noted more-or-less the same values among the Maasai and other nomadic migrants in some East African cities, such authors have hardly showed how the values helped the migrants cope with the insecurity threat in urban areas.

9.9 Chapter summary

This chapter explored and examined the physical insecurity threat among the Maasai nomadic migrant youth in Dar es Salaam city, which mainly entailed falling victim to crime while working as security guards. Based on the multi-layered social resilience framework (Obrist et al. 2010), the aim was to understand whether migrants managed to solicit and utilise capitals from different social levels, thus developing reactive and proactive capacities for coping with the insecurity threat. Moreover, this chapter also sought to recommend factors for enhancing migrants' capacities to more competently cope with such threats.

The findings showed that migrants utilised aspects of cultural capital such as local knowledge as well as physical strength such as running away and hiding in coping with the threat.

Furthermore, they also made use of mobile phone technology to communicate with friends, employers and the police in cases of attacks by enemies. They also refrained from working in the same place with non-Maasai people as they could represent potential enemies or sources of insecurity.

However, migrants lacked some important aspects of cultural capital notably formal security skills and equipment in coping with the insecurity threat. Even so, migrants could not solicit such aspects of cultural capital support from other intermediate social layers such as meso, regional, national and international levels for various reasons. Migrants were either unaware of such institutions, or the institutions were less responsive to the Maasai due to financial, socio-political and technical factors as discussed above.

Moreover, they utilised social capital, mainly strong social networks among themselves, which helped them to become organised and work in groups. Friendships emanating from the non-Maasai city dwellers slightly helped the migrants' access to some insecurity threat-related information, while they also practically came to the migrants' rescue once involved in insecurity situations. At the symbolic capital level, migrants demonstrated their social and cultural identity as 'fierce worriers', thus preventing gangs/enemies from attacking them.

Therefore, based on the multi-layered social resilience framework (Obrist et al. 2010), it could be concluded that migrants managed to solicit and utilise capitals primarily from the individual and community level to develop mainly reactive and to a lesser degree proactive capacities to competently cope with the insecurity threat. However, migrants' competence against the threat could be more improved through the amelioration of their security equipment, formal skills and rendering the existing meso, national, and international institutions more responsive towards this threat.

More practical and elaborate factors for enhancing the Maasai migrants' resilience against the physical insecurity threat are detailed in the last chapter of this thesis.

10. Summary and conclusions of the thesis

10.1 Summary of findings

Conclusively, this thesis explored influences that the rural-urban migration of the Maasai nomadic pastoralist youth inflicts on the resilience of both the migrants in Dar es Salaam and local households in Ngorongoro District, Tanzania. Accordingly, it answered the following questions: (1) Why do the Maasai pastoralist youth migrate to urban areas (Dar es Salaam)? (2) What impact does the rural-urban migration of the Maasai youth have on the households' resilience? Specifically, how do the remittances resulting from migration improve households' resilience (capitals), and how could the labour deficiency emanating from migration have eroded households' resilience? Importantly, how does coping with migration by households (loss of labour) either enhance or further deplete households' resilience? (3) Thirdly, what migration-related threats do the Maasai nomadic migrant youth encounter in urban areas? How do they cope with such threats, and to what extent are they capable of coping with the threats? (4) Fourthly, what factors can contribute to re-building the resilience of the Maasai migrants and local households against migration-related threats?

In answering the first research question, the study revealed that the Maasai migrant youth have been migrating to Dar es Salaam city due to household poverty, mainly lacking and inadequate access to basic needs of life, emanating from the decline of pastoralism and agricultural production. This situation was further caused by climate change, insufficient access to land, livestock diseases, and unemployment and resource conflicts. Rural-urban migration was catalysed by inconsistent land and development policies that denied Maasai access to land, social networks, migrants and households' aspirations together with technological advancements, notably improved communication and transportation networks, including mobile phones and road networks.

Findings regarding the second research question and its sub-questions showed that migration both positively and negatively influenced the households' resilience. Remittances sent by the migrants to households enhanced their economic capital through cash money, investments in livestock, land and agriculture. In turn, this improved some aspects of households' cultural capital such as food, health support, formal education and skills, together with household equipment and structures such as motorcycles and shelter. To a lesser degree, migration also improved the households' social capital through rural-urban linkages that facilitated household members' secure opportunities such as jobs and other opportunities in urban areas.

On the other hand, migration eroded resilience (capitals) in some households. Labour loss resulting from migration (loss of household members) and the hiring of labour to fill in this gap led to the depletion of households' economic capital, mainly the loss of cattle and decline of agriculture.

Moreover, it further depleted some aspects of cultural capital such as shelter, and caused ill health and deaths resulting from migration and a lack of proper child upbringing. This situation echoed more threats rather than opportunities for households.

Some households' members managed to competently cope with the aforementioned threats, based mainly on their local knowledge and physical strength (cultural capital), through engagement in entrepreneurship activities such as local brew making, sand and stone quarrying, honey production and eating wild foods (cultural capital). They also depended on informal affiliations such as self-help groups (social capital), mainly at the individual, household and to a lesser extent, community level, thus increasing households' resilience against financial constraints, inadequate health, and food and education services.

However, coping with migration (loss of labour) also led to the depletion of households' economic capital through paying for hired labour and the compensation for various damage and losses made by the migrants in urban areas. Moreover, it also led to the depletion of cultural capital through overworking some household members such as children and women. This was due to households' poverty and lack of support from meso, national and international levels, mainly because these organisations and structures were unaware of the migration-related threats encountered by these households.

Moving towards the third research question, the findings contended that the Maasai migrant youth in Dar es Salaam experienced threats such as inadequate income, unreliable shelter and unemployment. Moreover, others threats were related to oppression and exploitation, notably low and delayed labour returns and arbitrary job terminations, stigma and segregation. Migrants also encountered physical insecurity threat, notably falling victim to crime when working as security guards, predominantly due to a lack of proper equipment and security training.

On the one hand, migrants managed to solicit and utilise capitals from different social layers, thus developing 'reactive' and to a lesser extent 'proactive' capacities to competently cope with the aforementioned migration threats. On the other hand, migrants could not competently cope with threats due to some factors discussed below.

At the **economic capital** level, migrants coped with unemployment, financial constraints and inadequate shelter by depending on the households' economic resources such as cattle and agricultural products, which helped migrants to cater for some basic needs in the urban areas and invest in various entrepreneurship activities to create employment, thus overcoming financial and shelter hardships. They also proactively invested in these resources for future employment and financial security. Moreover, Migrants implicitly depended on these same resources to partly cope with exploitation and oppression threats, and particularly on the occasions where migrants' salaries were delayed, deducted or not even paid to them for various reasons.

At the **cultural capital** level, migrants coped with unemployment, financial constraints and inadequate shelter mainly by utilising their physical strength and local knowledge (individual level). This included engagement in informal activities (sector), notably working as security guards, selling labour in domestic and construction work, hair braiding and vending traditional goods. Moreover, migrants engaged in multiple income activities, sleeping outside, in dilapidated structures or at work places, and also instigated bargaining and negotiation for better payments. Furthermore, migrants used mobile phone technology to search for jobs and facilitate some entrepreneurship activities such as ordering traditional commodities and sending remittances. Migrants proactively invested in formal skills for themselves and their children as future ways of creating employment and financial security.

However, migrants lacked important aspects of cultural capital such as formal education and skills, including Kiswahili language proficiency, which could help them to more competently cope with the aforementioned threats.

In order to cope with exploitation and oppression, migrants utilised some aspects of cultural capital at the individual level, including local knowledge such as quitting jobs and looking for alternative ones. They frequently convened talks with their employers and insisted being remunerated in a timely and fair manner. Some migrants employed violence such as insulting employers, demonstrating against some forms of exploitation and oppression, as well as not showing up for work.

To cope with the insecurity threat (falling victim to crime), migrants utilised aspects of cultural capital at the individual level based on their local knowledge and physical strength, including running away and hiding. Moreover, they also made use of mobile phone technology to communicate with friends, employers and the police in cases of attacks by enemies. More uniquely, migrants refrained from working in the same places as non-Maasai people, given that they could represent potential enemies or sources of enemies who would jeopardise the security situation among the Maasai migrants working as security guards.

Turning to **social capital** plane, Maasai migrants coped with unemployment, financial constraints and inadequate shelter threats primarily through seeking employment, financial and shelter support through strong social networks and associations among the Maasai. Importantly, migrants managed to receive some financial support from local households through rural-urban linkages.

In terms of coping with exploitation and oppression at the social capital level, migrants used strong social networks and associations (community and meso levels) emanating from friends and relatives for advice and assistance in tracing employers, as well as convincing them remunerate them in a timely and fair manner. They also engaged in group demonstrations against their employers in demand of the same rights. However, migrants were not only unaware of job contracts but also illiterate of existing institutions such as labour laws that could help them address various issues of exploitation and oppression.

In order to cope with the insecurity threat, Maasai migrants also utilised social capital, typically centred on strong social networks among themselves, which helped them to become organised and work in groups. At the community level, friendships emanating from the non-Maasai city dwellers slightly helped the migrants' access to some insecurity threat-related information, as well as reactively and practically coming to the migrants' rescue once they became involved in insecurity situations.

At the **symbolic capital** level, Maasai migrants utilised the Maasai social reputation mainly as faithful people and fierce warriors capable of working as security guards to cope with unemployment and subsequently financial constraints, with employers sufficiently appealed by these values to be employ Maasai mainly as security guards. Moreover, migrants also utilised aspects of symbolic capital, mainly at community level, such as demonstrations of their social and cultural identity as 'fierce worriers', thus preventing gangs/enemies from attacking them.

Concluding from the above summary, it clearly appears that the Maasai migrants managed to cope with the migration-related threats using mainly cultural and social capital predominantly from the individual and community levels; moreover, to a lesser extent they also utilised economic and symbolic capital, mainly from the household and community level.

However, migrants could not solicit support from meso, national and international institutions due to their lack of awareness and general fear surrounding them, combined with the misconception that these institutions existed to serve the non-Maasai people, specifically the rich and educated. Moreover, the extremely few existing meso level organisations were financially and technically ill-equipped to deal with the various migration-related threats encountered. Migrants could not solicit support from government institutions, notably the police and local government authorities, due to the discriminative and unfriendliness of such institutions. Based on this summary of findings, more practical and elaborate policy implications, most notably including factors for enhancing the Maasai migrants and local households' resilience against migration-related threats, will be addressed immediately after the following section on the theoretical implications.

10.2 Theoretical implications

Generally speaking, the theoretical frameworks and models used in this thesis proved useful in generating the aforementioned findings. As mentioned earlier in the theoretical framework chapter of this thesis, multiple migration models were employed as a lens for exploring migration factors and patterns, while the multi-layered social resilience framework (Obrist et al. 2010) was used to explore migration-related threats experienced by migrants and households, as well as their ability to cope, along with factors for building their resilience against such migration-related threats.

Use of multiple migration models

The application of a myriad of rural-urban migration models generally provided a robust and analytical exploration of migration factors and patterns among the Maasai nomadic migrants. The neo-classical economic migration models, notably those of (Lewis 1954; Lee 1969) and (Todaro 1969), facilitated the exploration of physical, economic and rationality-related migration factors and patterns. Moreover, the structural and institutional migration models (Taylor 1999; Mabogunje 1970; Fussell 2004) helped to investigate non-physical, economic and rationality aspects of rural-urban migration.

The above-stated theoretical orientation further led to the production of relatively richer and unique data such as how migrants' aspirations, culture, technology and skills, as well as the role of local institutions, e.g. households, significantly determined the rural-urban migration among the Maasai nomadic youth. Such aspects are rarely acknowledged by migration research and especially among the Maasai migrants, as elaborated earlier in the discussion section of chapter five in this thesis.

In particular, the employment of multiple migration theories helped to unearth some unique explanations relating to migration factors and patterns, including how some of these factors were interrelated in determining the migration process. For example, it was noted that while the use of mobile phones played a significant role in determining migration, effective social networks among the Maasai allowed for mobile phone sharing among both the Maasai migrants and household members. Indeed, it was noted that the access to mobile phone services among the migrants and household members largely took place through sharing rather than individual ownership.

The multi-layered social resilience framework

Generally speaking, the application of the multi-layered social resilience framework was useful in understanding the resilience building process against different migration-related threats experienced by the Maasai migrant youth and sending households. Firstly, it helped in structuring and organising data collection, analysis, interpretation and indeed the report writing tasks based on the capitals. Moreover, structuring the findings according to the capitals further helped to identify which specific capital was more critical in fostering resilience building process against certain kinds of threat. Likewise, it was interesting to note that capitals influenced each other in the resilience building process (coping), suggesting that it involves closer interplay between and among capitals.

Arranging the findings according to capitals also provided a logical check and balance in ensuring that all capitals were fully exhausted in relation to the threat(s) under examination.

Secondly, as already noted in the theoretical framework chapter of this thesis, the multi-layered social resilience framework insists on the examination of resilience in relation to the threat.

Narrowly defining the threat (migration threats) in the context of this thesis sharpened the analysis scope, thus enabling the researcher to determine migrants and households' specific threats and coping capacities. In this thesis, the researcher managed to clearly define, identify and examine financial constraints, inadequate shelter, unemployment, exploitation and oppression together with insecurity threats among the Maasai nomadic migrants in Dar es Salaam. Such clear definition and examination of threats placed the researcher in a better position to clearly determine specific factor(s) for re-building the migrants' resilience against these specific threat(s).

Moreover, the multi-layered social resilience framework considers the resilience building process as being determined by the individual, household, community, meso, national and international levels. Such a multi-level orientation of the framework facilitated a better understanding of how migrants and the sending households' members (actors) managed to horizontally solicit support from within one individual social layer, as well as vertically from intermediate social layers. Such multidimensionality and interconnectedness orientation of the framework further sharpened the examination of the threat(s) and determined the role of specific layer(s) in building resilience against specific threat(s). Understanding which social layer(s) contributed to resilience building more than the others further facilitated recommending specific factors for re-building resilience against the specific threat(s) among the migrants.

For example, it was noted that the Maasai migrant youth were more capable of soliciting support against various threats mainly at the individual and community level, and specifically among their fellow Maasai relatives and friends. However, the migrants hardly managed to solicit support from meso and national levels in mitigating the same kinds of threats.

Although migrants and households could not solicit support from certain social levels to cope with various migration-related threats, these findings still reflect the unique role of the multi-layered social resilience in exploring the role of these social levels, notably community, meso, national and international levels, in relation to migration-related threats encountered by the migrants. Therefore, these results move beyond other migration literature that has always narrowly examined migrants' capacities to cope with migration-related threats by predominantly focusing only on the migrants' individual and household levels.

Furthermore, the strength-based nature of the framework facilitated recognition of the migrants' resourcefulness, thus proving the contention that migrants and sending households are never only passively taken up by the migration-related threats; instead, they have their own ways of actively reacting to these threats based on their local knowledge, social networks, etc.

The strength-based approach of the multi-layered social resilience framework specifically helped to understand that Maasai culture and reputation are not only liabilities in themselves, as widely asserted by communities in Tanzania, but that they also represent an asset for Maasai migrants in coping with financial, employment and insecurity threats.

This is because even though the Maasai are widely socially considered as backward, their social reputation as fierce warriors helped them to secure employment and alleviate their financial constraints, as well as being feared by the gangs who would attack them at their places of work. Such an understanding could not be facilitated by the vulnerability framework (Turner et al. 2003) or risk research approach (Blaikie et al. 1994), which only consider threat and actors' defencelessness to cope without recognising their (migrants) capacities to cope. Therefore, such frameworks reflect more problem-oriented ways of examining resilience.

Moreover, the strength orientation of the multi-layered social resilience framework enabled the researcher learn that the household members learning to coping with migration not only harmed but also enhanced households' resilience. This was the case with those households whose members managed to offset financial and labour-shortage constraints resulting from migration by working in groups (social capital) and engaging in entrepreneurship activities (cultural capita). This is a new insight in this work and across migration literature as a whole; given that existing migration literature has either ignored this aspect or perceived households' members as incapable of coping with migration related threats such as labour shortage and financial constraints.

Moreover, employing symbolic capital as defined by (Bourdieu 1986, 1984) in the context of this study brought to light issues of power relations regarding the resilience building process or determining coping capacities with threats. For example, it was possible to capture how the Maasai migrants' "social power" or "social reputation" resulting from Maasai culture helped them to cope with unemployment and financial constraint threats. Moreover, it also helped the researcher to discover how the Maasai migrants' powerlessness resulting from their negative social image further subjected them to various forms of exploitation and oppression such as low wages, being denied public services and respect simply by their virtue of being the Maasai, who are otherwise considered backwards people.

Such abstract elements, notably power-related aspects in the resilience building process, could have not been captured by the sustainable livelihood framework, given that it ignores power relationships and considers livelihoods building as a liner process, as noted elsewhere (Otieno 2009). Moreover, "Power-related resources [symbolic capital] play a particularly important role because they influence not only the capacity to act but also the ways in which actors can access the other three types of capitals" (Obrist et al. 2010: 288).

The employment of the concept of "reactive" and "proactive" capacities was exceptionally useful in broadening the researcher's capacity to determine migrants' abilities of coping with migration-related threats. The definition and employment of "proactive capacity" enabled the researcher to specifically capture and understand the extent to which migrants had learned and reflected on the specific threats, thus organising themselves much better in coping with such threats in the future.

The “learning and self-organisation” aspects mainly reflected in the proactive capacities of individuals involved in threats has rarely been acknowledged or considered by existing migration studies.

Therefore, this further places the multi-layered social resilience framework as well as the findings of this study ahead of other former migration frameworks and literature.

However, as much as the framework managed to facilitate answer the question concerning resilience to threat, it hardly facilitated answering the question about resilience according to who? This was the case when examining the impact of migration on the migrants’ local households’ resilience. It was noted that much as remittances by migrants improved some household capitals and thus offset threats such as financial constraints, it also eroded some household members’ personal resilience. For example, children lacked good parenting and education mentorship through engagement in child labour, women were overworked and the elderly missed food and shelter. Rectifying the framework in such a way that can help to answer the question of resilience according to who would sharpen the framework’s analytical strength.

Moreover, capitals in the multi-layered social resilience framework of (Obrist et al. 2010) tended to be too broad compared to the assets in the sustainable livelihood framework of the UK Department for International Development (DfID 2000). Consequently, it proved relatively laborious to clearly define and identify what were exactly aspects of cultural capital and how they contributed to the resilience building process. Breaking the capitals, down would further add to the analytical effectiveness of the framework.

To conclude, it can be said that these findings have improved our theoretical understanding concerning the Maasai migrants and households’ capacities to cope with migration-related threats. This is because the findings show that, like other human beings and migrants mainly in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, Maasai migrants also possess a range of coping strategies that they employ in times of hardships, such as in the context of the aforementioned migration-related threats.

In other words, migrants and households do not passively react to migration related threats (vulnerability); instead, they actively manipulate their own resourcefulness and the surrounding social environment to cope with migration related threats. Thus, the findings of this study further help to enrich the migration literature and more specifically patterning how migrants and those from a disadvantaged background such as the Maasai nomadic pastoralists may socially respond to migration-related threats.

Specifically, these findings are critically useful both in terms of theory and policy, most notably among the Maasai migrants and households.

Indeed, until now, there had not been any detailed data concerning how the Maasai nomadic migrants and their sending households cope with migration-related threats, as well as their capacity to do so, based on their own resourcefulness and other social actors at different social levels, notably household, community, meso, national, and international levels.

These findings further inform that migration itself does not lead to threats (migration related threats); rather, other prevailing socio-economic environment such as urbanisation, policies and other institutions play a crucial role. Consequently, those migrants and households that managed to mobilise resources from different social levels suffered less than those who could not. Based on the major findings and theoretical implications outlined above, more practical policy recommendations are detailed in the subsequent section.

10.3 Policy implications and recommendations

A number of policy implications could be derived from the major findings of this thesis in order to help to improve both the Maasai migrants and local households' capacities for coping with migration-related threats. These implications were initially suggested by the respondents themselves and subsequently critically reflected upon by the researcher.

Enhancing the Maasai migrants and local households' resilience

Building on households and migrants strengths: We have noted that both the migrants and households competently coped with migration-related threats based on a range of strategies. For example, households engaged in honey production, local brew production, engagement in agriculture, as well as selling labour in pastoralism and agricultural. Moreover, they also depended on local solidarity and affiliations deeply rooted in the Maasai culture.

Likewise, the Maasai migrants in the urban areas predominantly used their personal local skills/knowledge and physical strength to engage mainly in private sector (entrepreneurship) activities, including utilising the strong social networks that existed among themselves. Such strategies should be recognised, systematically documented and supported by responsible and relevant private and public institutions.

Empowerment on formal and professional skills: Migrants employed mainly local knowledge and skills to cope with the migration-related threats, which should be recognised and enhanced accordingly. However, they lacked formal education and practical skills that could further improve their capacities to cope with the same threats. The deficiency of such key skills included the migrants' inability to read, write and practice basic arithmetic of entrepreneurship skills. Therefore, the provision of such skills should be simultaneously conducted among the Maasai children and youth/Morans, both in urban and rural areas.

In particular, Maasai nomadic migrants should be equipped with the aforementioned skills, not targeted towards the purpose of passing exams but rather unearthing and fostering basic skills that take into account the cultural environment (pastoralism) of the Maasai. Consequently, the literacy capacity emanating from the provision of such skills would help Maasai migrant youth to negotiate good salaries and demand formal job contracts.

Practical and professional skills such as entrepreneurship skills would help the Maasai to more profitably manage their entrepreneurship activities, including acquiring financial assistance from financial institutions.

In the long run, the young Maasai generation should be empowered with more comprehensive formal education and skills to help them to compete with other non-Maasai Tanzanians in the job market. Consequently, this would guarantee them more reliable future livelihood activities, thus minimising their chances of falling victim to inadequate income, unemployment, exploitation and oppression, as well as physical insecurity.

Sensitisation and awareness of the Maasai migrants: Maasai youth should be made aware of the existing public and private institutions in order that they can effectively make use of them in coping with the aforementioned threats. Firstly, they should be particularly made aware of local financial institutions such as banks and SACCOS, including the ways in which these organisations operate. This would help migrants to take advantage of such organisations in coping with financial threats.

Secondly, Maasai should also be familiarised with the existing relevant public and private human rights institutions and their modes of operation. Being aware of such institutions and how they operate would help migrants to report various issues of exploitation and oppression such as discrimination, arbitrary job termination, wage deductions and delays. Specifically, the Maasai migrants should be prompted to understand that the existing government structures and institutions, notably the police, local government and courts, are meant for all Tanzanians including the Maasai migrants themselves, and thus they should not shy away from soliciting their support.

In particular, the Maasai should be sensitised on the importance of job contracts, labour laws and more specifically in relation to job termination, overworking [extra work for no pay], salary delay and deductions. Moreover, Maasai employers should be held responsible for ensuring Maasai labour rights, including the provision of job contracts to migrant workers. Furthermore, employers should be held responsible once found guilty of subjecting migrants to various forms of exploitation and oppression.

In addition to taking a lead to learn various security skills, Maasai migrant youth working as security guards should be sensitised about their right to proper security equipment and training in order that they should not unnecessarily fall victim to crime when working as security guards.

However, at the same time, Maasai employers should be held responsible for such misconduct, notably not equipping their employees with adequate skills and equipment.

Active role of public and private sectors/institutions: This thesis has specifically noted that both public and private institutions were either not at all or extremely unresponsive to the migration-related threats encountered by both Maasai migrants and households, mainly because the institutions had not realised such threats, neglected them due to the marginalised nature of the Maasai, or lacked the financial and technical capacity to do so.

Therefore, private sector, notably Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and Faith Based Organisations (FBOs), as well as public sector ministries and departments, the police force and local governments should be more responsive to the migrants' threats. Accordingly, they should mainstream, institutionalise and prioritise the Maasai migrants and local households' issues (migration threats) within their agendas.

Amendment of the existing land tenure and development policies: Firstly, we have also noted that lack of or inadequate access to land among the Maasai pastoralists, predominantly due to poor land policies, has forcibly pushed them into urban areas where they are subjected to various threats, notably financial constraints, unemployment, unreliable shelter, exploitation and oppression, together with falling victim to crimes whilst working as security guards.

Secondly, as noted earlier, Maasai migrant youth significantly depended on land for coping with migration-related threats. Maasai households needed land for agriculture and grazing while the migrants in urban areas reactively depended on these resources to survive in cities, while also proactively invested in them for future livelihood security. Unfortunately, the Maasai pastoralists and more specially those located in the Ngorongoro District do not have full control over land, given that most of it falls under either conservation or private investments, mainly due to lopsided development and land policies.

Thus, the review of these policies in such a manner that gives the Maasai full control of land is necessary.

Promote alternative livelihood activities among the Maasai nomadic pastoralists: It was also noted that the Maasai still regard pastoralism as an important livelihood activity, despite this activity being under serious threat. Therefore, pastoralism could be improved through the construction of dams, the provision of veterinary services and improvement of livestock quality/breed. On the other hand, agriculture appears to be the second most important and the fastest emerging livelihood activity among the Maasai, and this activity may be further strengthened through provision of relevant skills, capital or subsidies and market base.

Improve general social services and infrastructure: Lastly, social services including health facilities, schools, market places, [e.g. more improved cattle auctions] and road infrastructures among the Maasai and in Ngorongoro District and Loliondo Divisions in particular should be improved.

Specifically, we have noted that both the Maasai migrant youth and household representatives employed physical strength in coping with migration-related threats. Therefore, in the short run, health related services such as medical and nutritional services need to be ensured among the Maasai communities in order to enhance their physical strength, which seems to have played a critical role in coping with various migration-related threats. These services have been found to be largely missing among the Maasai local communities mainly in Ngorongoro District.

Investing in the Maasai rural youth in terms of education, jobs and health care is necessary towards reducing poverty and diminishing urban drift, given that it helps youth to improve their rural livelihoods through self-sustaining employment. This will reflect a long-term and lasting solution to migration-related threats currently encountered by the Maasai migrants in urban areas. These policy implications may further be implemented hand in hand with the following research priorities among the Maasai nomadic migrants and households.

10.4 Further research on the rural-urban migration of the Maasai pastoralists and resilience

This thesis has not entirely exhausted all relevant aspects of rural-urban migration and the resilience of the Maasai nomadic pastoralist youth and local households. Accordingly, further research is needed to tackle the following aspects:

In most cases, Maasai migrants and households depended on the land for both pastoralism and agriculture in coping with various migration-related threats. Unfortunately, land is extremely scarce among the Maasai, mainly due to tourism and large scale agricultural investments that seem to be carried out at the expense of the Maasai pastoralists' livelihoods and resilience.

Therefore, more research should be directed towards understanding and enhancing the harmonious co-existence of the Maasai nomadic pastoralists' with nature and particularly with the wildlife, as well as considering the mode of investments in the Maasai land¹²⁴.

Moreover, further research among Maasai migrants is particularly required in the area of health. Such issues to be addressed by research could include but are not limited to HIV/AIDS and malaria, owing to the nature of the Maasai working environment that inevitably renders them victims of such threats (Ole Kaunga 2002; Kweka 2011).

¹²⁴ Under good ecological and political conditions, pastoralists can help to maintain diversity on the land through their mobility (Bonfoh 2011).

At present, there is scarce research concerning migration and Malaria threats among the Maasai migrants. Moreover, the existing research on HIV/AIDS among Maasai migrants (May 2003; Coast 2006; Lukumay 2008) has only concentrated on the Maasai capacity to cope with this threat at the individual level, notably by focusing on the migrants' knowledge and skills to protect themselves against the pandemic. This research has thus generally neglected the role of other social players such as public and private sectors.

Research that aims at identifying and analysing the Maasai migrants' skills and employment needs should be conducted, in order to facilitate a better skills provision and livelihood empowerment among the Maasai migrants.

Finally, this thesis is a qualitative study based only on the small case study of around 110 respondents, including only 30 household representatives. Therefore, it was naturally incapable of offering a robust picture of rural-urban migration and resilience among the Maasai migrant youth and households as a whole. Therefore, a much larger scale study, including various Maasai districts and utilising both the quantitative and qualitative approaches should be carried out, particularly in the context of the impact of migration on the Maasai-sending local households' resilience. Consequently, this would help to provide a more holistic picture concerning this subject matter.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Interview guide with the Maasai migrant youth in Dar es Salaam

I: Demographic Information. Respondent's code/ No:

Migrant	Gender	Age	Maritals	Education	Occupation	Origin	Arrival date

II Factors for and patterns of rural-urban migration

1. Why did you come in the city? Please probe the following:
 - Poverty, environmental factors, notably droughts/floods.
 - Lack of social services, education, health unemployment, etc.
 - Role of local household in organising and facilitating migration!
 - Role of relatives or friends already living in Dar es Salaam? How did they help you to settle in the city?
 - Role of technology, roads network, mobile phone, transport, etc.
 - Motivation and expectations in the urban areas, bright lights of the city!!
 - Influence of friends relatives or role models
2. Did you discuss your decision to migrate with your family members (yes or no) and why? With which family members did you discuss this, what was their response and why?
3. Before migrating to Dar es Salaam, did you move to another city? If so, what did you do there? Probe places previously visited within and outside Tanzania and the specific reasons for visiting specific areas. What was the last city you visited before coming to Dar es Salaam?
 - Before migrating to Dar es Salaam, what were you doing in your home town/village?
 - Probe, pastoralism, agriculture, entrepreneurship, etc.
 - How might have your departure from the household have affected these activities?
 - Are there any family rules at household, village, or ward levels that control migration? How might they have influenced migrants' decision to migrate? If they have had a negative impact, how are the households coping with it?

II Migration threats, coping strategies and reasons for opting for those strategies!

- Now that you are here in the city, what kind of activities are you involved in?
- How much do you earn in cash or kind? Include all non-financial earnings (monthly, weekly, daily, etc), then compute them systematically!
- Is this adequate for you? If not, what are your plans to improve it? (Probe: individual, family and social organisations in improving income).
- Generally, what livelihood challenges and problems (threats) do you encounter here in the city? How do you deal with and overcome them
 - Please probe as many specific threats as possible, notably financial constraints, unemployment, different forms of exploitation and oppression, including segregations and stigma, unreliable shelter, physical insecurity, health related threats, e.g. HIV/AIDS and malaria.
- For each of the above-mentioned threats, please probe how migrants are capable of soliciting and utilising capitals from different social levels to overcome them.
- i. **At individual level:** Can you use your own education (knowledge and skills) to overcome threats in the city? If yes, how? If no, what other skills and education do you need to maintain your livelihood?
- ii. Please probe the migrants' personal behaviours and activities to overcome specific threats.
- iii. **At community level:** Do you receive any support from friends and relatives regarding this threat? If yes, what kind of support, if no, why and what kind of support would be needed to solicit this support? Please probe for quality of relationships!
- iv. **At household level:** Do you turn to your household for support in the case of any particular threat? If yes, what kind of support? And if no, why and what support would you need to receive from households?
- v. **At Meso level:** Do you solicit any support from meso level organisations, notably NGOs, FBOs and CBOs, including financial organisations such as banks and SACCOS, in relation to a particular kind of threat? If yes, what kind of support? If no, why and what kind of support would you need to solicit more support from NGOs?
- vi. **At National level:** Do you solicit any kind of support in relation to specific support at the government level? If yes, what kind of support? If no why and what kind of support would you need to effectively solicit this kind of support from the government level?
- vii. **At international level:** Do you solicit any kind of support from any international organisations in relation to a specific threat? If yes, how and what kind of support? If no, why and what kind of support would you need to more effectively solicit support from these organisations?

Thank you: We have now come to the end of this discussions, I would like to thank you so much for your active participation. Do you have any other questions or additional inputs? Please feel free to add then!

Appendix 2: Maasai migrants' household representatives interview guide

I: Demographic information

Respondent's code/ No.

HH Rep	Gender	Age	Maritals	Education	Occupation
Migrant	Gender	Age	Maritals	Education	Occupation

II: Impact of migration on the sending local households' resilience

- Why did the household member (**name**) migrate to urban area? (Probe: pull and push factors) poverty, environment factors, notably droughts and floods, lack of social services, unemployment, inequalities within households, role of households, technology, i.e. transport and communication, motivations and expectations, influence of peers, social networks, migrations rules at household and community levels.
- How often do you communicate with or visit each other? How do you communicate?
- How many people in your household have migrated?
- Did the migrant discuss their decision to migrate with you? Why? What was your/households members' reaction/response to their decision to migrate?
- What impact does the household member's migration have on the households' assets? Probe positive and negative impact on economic, cultural, social and symbolic capitals
- Specifically, what were the migrant's roles before migration? How have these roles been affected by the household member's departure (migration)?
- Generally, is it more of a benefit or loss of the household member migrating to the city?
- What channels do the migrants use to support their local households?
- How do you cope with the loss or negative impact emanating from the migration of the household member? Please probe and observe how dealing with the loss of the household members enhances or erodes the household's capitals, thus increasing or reducing their resilience.
- What is the migrant doing in the city? How much do they earn? What kind of migration-related problems have they shared with you? How do they cope with them?

We have now come to the end of this discussion; I would like to thank you very much for taking part in the discussion with me. Please feel free to comment anything or offer any additional explanations pertaining or even not pertaining our discussion.

Appendix 3: List of migrants' households' respondents, Ngorongoro

HH	Age	Sex	Occupation	R'ship with migrant	Village	Ward	Division	Date
# 1	56	M	Pastoralist	Father	Sakala	Ongosoroki	Loliondo	22.05.11
# 2	64	F	Pastoralist	Mother	Sakala	Ongosoroki	Loliondo	22.05.11
# 3	42	M	Pastoralist	Brother	Sakala	Ongosoroki	Loliondo	23.05.11
# 4	38	M	Pastoralist	Brother	Sakala	Ongosoroki	Loliondo	23.05.11
# 5	49	M	Pastoralist	Uncle	Sakala	Ongosoroki	Loliondo	24.05.11
# 6	59	F	Pastoralist	Mother	Ngwarrwa	Enguserosambu	Loliondo	25.05.11
# 7	69	F	Pastoralist	G. mother	Ngwarrwa	Enguserosambu	Loliondo	26.05.11
# 8	40	F	Pastoralist	Brother	Ngwarrwa	Enguserosambu	Loliondo	27.05.11
# 9	71	M	Pastoralist	G. father	Ngwarrwa	Enguserosambu	Loliondo	28.05.11
# 10	54	M	Pastoralist	Uncle	Ngwarrwa	Enguserosambu	Loliondo	29.05.11
# 11	31	F	Pastoralist	Wife	Oloipiri	Oloipiri	Loliondo	30.05.11
# 12	41	M	Pastoralist	Brother	Oloipiri	Oloipiri	Loliondo	01.06.11
# 13	57	M	Pastoralist	Father	Oloipiri	Oloipiri	Loliondo	02.06.11
# 14	35	M	Pastoralist	Brother	Oloipiri	Oloipiri	Loliondo	02.06.11
# 15	41	M	Pastoralist	Uncle	Oloipiri	Oloipiri	Loliondo	03.06.11
# 16	33	F	Pastoralist	Wife	Meshili	Olbalbal	Loliondo	03.06.11
# 17	58	M	Pastoralist	Father	Meshili	Olbalbal	Ngorongoro	05.06.11
# 18	28	F	Pastoralist	Wife	Meshili	Olbalbal	Ngorongoro	05.06.11
# 19	41	M	Pastoralist	Brother	Meshili	Olbalbal	Ngorongoro	05.06.11
# 20	35	M	Pastoralist	Brother	Meshili	Olbalbal	Ngorongoro	06.06.11
# 21	54	F	Pastoralist	Mother	Enduleni	Enduleni	Ngorongoro	07.06.11
# 22	64	M	Pastoralist	Father	Enduleni	Enduleni	Ngorongoro	08.06.11
# 23	60	M	Pastoralist	Father	Enduleni	Enduleni	Ngorongoro	09.06.11
# 24	66	M	Pastoralist	Father	Enduleni	Enduleni	Ngorongoro	10.06.11
# 25	54	M	Pastoralist	Uncle	Enduleni	Enduleni	Ngorongoro	10.06.11
# 26	55	M	Pastoralist	Father	Misigiyo	Oloirobi	Ngorongoro	11.06.11
# 27	64	M	Pastoralist	Father	Misigiyo	Oloirobi	Ngorongoro	11.06.11
# 28	49	F	Pastoralist	Mother	Misigiyo	Oloirobi	Ngorongoro	12.06.11
# 29	59	F	Pastoralist	Mother	Misigiyo	Oloirobi	Ngorongoro	12.06.11
# 30	57	F	Pastoralist	Mother	Misigiyo	Oloirobi	Ngorongoro	13.06.11

Appendix 4: List of the interviewed Maasai migrant youth, Dar es Salaam

Respondent #	Residence in Dar es Salaam	Arrival year	Age	Sex	Marital Status	Education	Place last visited		Interview date
							Region	District	
1	Mbezi-beach, Kinondoni	2006	28	M	Single	Nil	Tanga	Handeni	12.05.11
2	Kigamboni, Temeke	2007	32	M	Married	Primary	Arusha	Mondulu	14.05.11
3	Tazara, Temeke	2009	25	M	Single	Primary	Arusha	Simanjiro	19.05.11
4	Kigamboi, Temeke	2009	29	M	Single	Nil	Arusha	Simanjiro	12.05.11
5	Buguruni, Ilala	2004	31	F	Married	Primary	Arusha	Arumeru	20.05.11
6	Ubungu, Kinondoni	2006	34	M	Married	Nil	Kilimanjaro	Same	01.04.11
7	Kigamboni, Temeke	2006	30	M	Single	Primary	Arusha	Simanjiro	02.04.11
8	Temeke	2009	30	M	Married	Primary	Arusha	Simanjiro	21.04.11
9	Buguruni, Ilala	2008	28	M	Married	Primary	Arusha	Longido	20.04.11
10	Kimara, Kinondoni	2008	28	M	Single	Nil	Arusha	Manyara	29.04.21
11	Kimara, Kinondoni	2009	29	M	Married	Nil	Aruha	Manyara	11.05.11
12	Kariakoo, Ilala	2007	32	M	Married	Nil	Arusha	Lengido	10.05.11
13	Mbezi , Kinondoni	2006	31	M	Single	Nil	Arusha	Monduli	11.05.11
14	Tandika, Temeke	2008	28	M	Single	Primary	Arusha	Monduli	12.05.11
15	Kigamboni, Temeke	2007	29	M	Married	Nil	Arusha	Manyara	13.05.11
16	Buguruni, Ilala	2008	26	F	Married	Nil	Arusha	Simanjiro	01.03.11
17	Tazara, Temeke	2009	29	F	Married	Nil	Arusha	Simanjiro	01.03.11
18	Kigamboni, Temeke	2008	29	M	Married	Nil	Arusha	Monduli	02.03.11
19	Kariakoo, Ilala	2007	28	M	Single	Primary	Arusha	Longido	02.03.11
20	Mbagala, Temeke	2008	28	M	Married	Primary	Arusha	Monduli	03.03.11
21	Keko, Temeke	2008	28	M	Married	Primary	Tanga	Handeni	03.03.11
22	Buguruni, Ilala	2009	25	F	Married	Nil	Arusha	Monduli	04.03.11
23	Kariakoo, Ilala	2009	23	M	Single	Primary	Arusha	Longido	18.05.11
24	Vingunguti, Ilala	2007	27	M	Single	Nil	Arusha	Simanjiro	05.03.11
25	Tabata, Ilala	2006	26	M	Single	Nil	Arusha	Simanjiro	06.03.11
26	Kigamboni, Temeke	2005	28	M	Single	Nil	Arusha	Simanjiro	07.03.11
27	Boma, Ilala	2007	27	M	Single	Secondary	Arusha	Arumeru	08.03.11
28	Sinza, Kinondoni	2007	24	M	Single	Primary	Arusha	Longido	13.05.11
29	Jangwani, Ilala	2006	21	M	Single	Nil	Arusha	Monduli	09.03.11
30	Mikocheni, Kinondoni	2007	25	M	Single	Primary	Arusha	Monduli	10.03.11
31	Tazara, Temeke	2007	24	M	Single	Primary	Kilimanjaro	Same	11.03.11
32	Boma, Ilala	2009	25	M	Single	Nil	Arusha	Simanjiro	27.04.11
33	Kariakoo , Ilala	2008	29	M	Single	Nil	Singida	Singida	12.03.11
34	Buguni, Illa	2009	25	M	Single	Primary	Arusha	Simanjiro	13.03.11
35	Pugu, Ilala	2004	33	M	Single	Nil	Mtwara	Mtwara	14.03.11
36	Boma, Ilala	2004	30	M	Single	Primary	Mbeya	Mbeya	25.03.11
37	Tandika,Temeke	2009	27	M	Single	Primary	Arusha	Manyara	05.07.11
38	Pugu, Ilala	2005	34	M	Married	Nil	Arusha	Manyara	05.03.11
39	Mbezi,Kinondoni	2007	32	M	Married	Nil	Tanga	Handeni	05.07.11
40	Mikocheni, Kinondoni	2009	27	M	Single	Nil	Kilimanjaro	Sanya Juu	19.03.11
41	Kijitonyama, inonodoni	2009	29	M	Married	Nil	Arusha	Ngorongor	04.03.11
42	Mwenge, Kinondoni	2006	24	M	Married	Nil	Tanga	Hndeni	02.07.11
43	Sinza, Kinondoni	2009	28	M	Single	Nil	Tanga	Handeni	02.07.11
44	Sinza Kindononi	2007	27	M	Single	Primary	Morogoro	Kilosa	03.07.11
45	Mbezi Kinondoni	2008	27	M	Single	Primary	Pwani	Ruvu	03.07.11
46	Mbezi Kinondoni	2009	30	M	Single	Primary	Pwani	Ruvu	04.07.11
47	Tegeta, Kinondoni	2009	32	M	Married	Nil	Arusha	Simanjiro	04.07.11
48	Tegeta Kinondoni	2007	30	M	Married	Primary	Tanga	Handeni	05.03.11
49	Mwananyamala, Kinondoni	2007	22	M	Single	Nil	Tanga	Handeni	06.03.11
50	Kijitonyama, Kinondoni	2009	23	M	Single	Nil	Kilimanjaro	Same	07.03.11

Appendix 5: A Letter of consent to the respondents

Ref: Rural-urban migration and Resilience of the Maasai Nomadic Pastoralist youth in Tanzania (Cases in Ngorongoro District, Arusha and Dar es Salaam City)

Dear.....

I am Emmanuel J. Munishi, a PhD student in Development Studies at the Department of Physical Geography (IPG), Freiburg University in Germany. I am also a lecturer at the College of Business Education, Dar es Salaam Campus, Tanzania.

As a requirement of my PhD studies, I am undertaking a research project leading to a thesis, aiming to understand the impact of the rural-urban migration of Maasai migrant youth on the migrants' and local households' resilience, taking Ngorongoro district and Dar es Salaam city in Tanzania as case studies.

The ultimate goal is to recommend ways of strengthening both migrants' and households' capacities to cope with their various migration-related threats encountered to ensure better livelihoods among them.

With this information, I am glad to invite you to freely participate in the study by sharing your insights, practices, experiences and observations about this topic

You are free to offer any responses, given that the discussion does not regard any point as false or correct. You are also free to withdraw from discussion at any stage without any question. Your contributions will be handled with maximum care and will not be used for any reasons other than my academic report. You will not be able to be identified in my report. I will strictly protect the confidentiality of the information you provide.

If you wish, you will receive a copy of my work upon the completion of research report writing. I am thankful in advance for your great support in helping me to accomplish my academic task, which is at the same time important for the Maasai people and the whole nation of Tanzania.

If you have any questions concerning this undertaking, please feel free to contact the following people:

1. My supervisor, Prof. Dr Axel Drescher Axel.Drescher@geographie.unifreiburg
2. My employer CBE Dar es Salaam via principalbel@cbe.com
3. Emmanuel J. Munishi via ekemu@yahoo.co.uk:

Thank you

Appendix 6: Research permit: No. 2011-291-NA-2011-149

TANZANIA COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (COSTECH)



Telegrams: COSTECH

Telephones: (255 - 022) 2775155 - 6, 2700745/6
Director General: (255 - 022) 2700750&2775315
Fax: (255 - 022) 2775313
Email: rclearance@costech.or.tz

Ali Hassan Mwinyi Road

P.O. Box 4302
Dar es Salaam
Tanzania

RESEARCH PERMIT

No. 2011-291-NA- 2011-149

22nd August 2011

1. Name : Emanuel J. Munishi
2. Nationality : Tanzanian
3. Title : Rural-Urban Migration of the Maasai Nomadic Pastoralist Youth in Tanzania(Case of Dar es Salaam and Ngorongoro)
4. Research shall be confined to the following region(s): Arusha, Manyara and Dar es Salaam
5. Permit validity 22nd August 2011 to 21st August 2012
6. Local Contact/collaborator Dr. Honest P. Ngowi, Mzumbe University, Dar es Salaam
7. Researcher is required to submit progress report on quarterly basis and submit all Publications made after research.



M. Mushi

for: DIRECTOR GENERAL

Appendix 7: Vital Maasai vocabularies used in this thesis

Word	Meaning
Aleguanan	Also aleguanak (plural): these are age set leaders.
Arkasis	Literary rich men, those who seem to have a lot of wealth, particularly in terms of cattle and children.
Emutai	Period between the 1880s and 1890s, characterised by a series of disasters, notably an outbreak of contagious bovine pleuropneumonia and rinder-pest, which devastated the cattle population.
Enkaji	Household or a nuclear family! It is the smallest social unit, consisting of a wife and her children.
Enkang (Boma)	Maasai homestead within a thorn bush enclosure, encompassing the houses of a man and his wives, children, other dependents and their animals at night. The Kiswahili word is <i>boma</i> , which also seems to be used frequently by Maasai people in the city.
Enkishomi	(translated as the gate) or olmarei (extended family or boma in Swahili): consists of a man, his wives and dependents.
Illkarash	also known as shuka: The Maasai traditional garment.
Moipo	Used by the Maasai community to refer to part of the large inland Maasai Steppe area of Tanzania, also known as “Kiteto.”
Ogilata	Means a clan, formed by all male Maasai of a certain clan, forming the basic unit for mutual aid and the redistribution of livestock
Olodondolit	Literary means a red marrow. This is the Maasai name for the 2005-2006 drought that killed a significant number of cows. It was called <i>the red marrow</i> because when the cattle died, their marrow turned red.
Oloip	literally means “shade,” as of a tree, a preferred gathering place.
Olosho:	Territorial sections whereby all members have access to grazing resources.
(Il-Muran)	Literary a warrior youth of (14-30). Their main task is ensuring the security of their society, protecting the community’s wealth (cattle) from enemies and increasing it through raiding (cattle) from neighbours.
Emorata	Means initiation (or circumcision) ceremony, which each Il-moran group must undergo.
Enkai	Maasai God
Laibon	Maasai spiritual leader who acts as the liaison between the people and God.
Il-Moruak	Maasai elder
Waswahili	(Mswahili singular) Literally from the Kiswahili, which is the national language in Tanzania. The word used by the Maasai to identify other non-Maasai people.