Nominalism in Cologne:  
The Student Notebook of the Dominican Servatius Fanckel  
With an Edition of a Disputatio Vacantialis  
Held on July 14, 1480  
"Utrum in deo uno simplicissimo sit trium personarum realis distinctio"  
Maarten J.E.M. Hoenen

1.1 Student Notebooks

As is apparent from the statutes of the universities and the study programs of the religious orders, disputations played a crucial role in the academic life of the late-medieval and early modern period. Some disputations took place on a daily basis in the different colleges or bursae attached to the university (disputationes nocturnae), others weekly during the summer recess from academic courses (disputationes vacantiales). Also, disputations were held at special academic occasions, for example when the bachelor opened his lectures on Peter Lombard’s Sentences (principia), when he applied for his license (disputatio de forma) or when the licentiate acquired his doctor’s degree (vesperiae and aulae).¹

¹ Particularly instructive here are the statutes of the arts faculty and the theological faculty of the University of Cologne, which provide many details on the different kinds of disputations. See Franz J. von Bianco, Die alte Universität Köln und die späteren Gelehrten-Schulen dieser Stadt, vol. 1/1: Die alte Universität Köln (Cologne, 1856, Appendix, pp. 34–50 (Theological Faculty), and pp. 59–73 (Arts Faculty); and Franz Gescher, "Die Statuten der theologischen Fakultät an der alten Universität Köln," in Festschrift zur Erinnerung an die Gründung der alten Universität Köln im Jahre 1388 (Cologne, 1938), pp. 43–108. As for the religious orders, the importance of the disputation is underscored by the rules issued at the Dominican General Chapter held in Rome 1501, in: Acta Capitularum Generalium Ordinis Praedicatorum IV: 1501–1553, ed. Benedictus M. Reichert, Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum Historica 9 (Rome, 1901), pp. 4–17, esp. p. 15: "(...)nullus de cetero promoverat ad baccalauri- ratum seu ad legendum sentencias pro forma et gradu magistri, nisi in aliquo studio generali per tres annos studierit et in disputacionibus et circulum frequenter exer- citatus fuerit (...)." For further information, with extensive bibliographical references, see Mariken Tceuwen, The Vocabulary of Intellectual Life in the Middle Ages, Études sur le vocabulaire intellectuel du moyen âge 10 (Turnhout, 2003), p. 440 (index II s.v. "Disputatio"-"Disputationes Sorbonicae").
Each of these disputations had its own participants and public audience. The *principia* were each scheduled on a single day, the one after the other, with no other classes or academic obligations, so that all members of the faculty could attend. Also the *disputationes vacantiales*, the *aulae* and the *vesperiae* were open to a wide academic public, unlike the *disputationes nocturnae*, which as a rule took place only within the limited circle of the inhabitants of a college or *bursa.*

Students had to attend these disputations and maintained notes on how often they visited each kind of disputation, to comply with the conditions for earning their degrees. Several early printed editions survived with hand written notes on their pages, distinguishing the different disputations and indicating with vertical bars the total number of visits for each disputation. Other students kept special notebooks in which they recorded the arguments put forward during the different disputations—sometimes over a period of many years covering their career from student to master—presumably to have a stock of arguments which would assist them in preparing for the disputations in which they had to act as an opponent or respondent.

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2 See the sources mentioned in the preceding footnote. For information about the daily practiced *disputatio nocturna*, see, for example, *The Mediaeval Statutes of the Faculty of Arts of the University of Freiburg im Breisgau*, eds. Hugo Ott and John M. Fletcher, Texts and Studies in the History of Mediaeval Education 10 (Notre Dame, 1964), p. 119, n. 48: "Statuit arcium facultas atque ordinavit ut quilibet conventerum in qualibet via per diem habeat unam disputationem pro omnibus suppositis, baccalauriis et scolaribus, per integrum horam duratam (…)."

3 A good example is an edition of the *Expositio Petri Tartarei super textu logices Aristotelis*, printed in Lyon by Claude Davost shortly after 1500, and preserved in the University Library of Freiburg. The top of the title page reads: "Complexi disputationes magistrorum 14, baccalaurii 15, bursae 5." The first two numbers are represented by vertical bars, whereas the last is written as "iii."

4 That producing arguments was difficult for young students who had to act as opponent is documented in the preface of the *Promptuarium argumentorum*, written to help the students preparing for disputations and printed several times in Cologne. Here the anonymous author explains that he has published the treatise because the students were not able to make up the arguments themselves and therefore needed a booklet that provided them. See *Promptuarium argumentorum*, Cologne 1496, fol. Aii: "(…) libellus (…) ad novellorum scholiarum in logices exercitium collectus, quorum saepius audivi lachromas petitiones pro argumentis ut opponendi tempore satisfacient magistrorum praecepsit." For further information on this treatise (often wrongly attributed to Heymericus de Cologne on the authority of Martin Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik*, 3 vols. (München, 1926–1956), 2:382, who provides no proof however), see my "Late Medieval Schools of Thought in the Mirror of University Textbooks. The *Promptuarium Argumentorum* (Cologne 1492)." In *Philosophy and Learning. Universities in the Middle Ages*, eds. Maarten J.E.M. Hoenen, J.H. Josef Schneider and Georg Wieland, *Education and Society in the Middle Ages* (Cologne, 1948), pp. 75–76.

A number of these notebooks, form and their collectors identified, of two Dominicans, Georg Schweller in Cologne in the second half of the 15th century, were designed very carefully. The kinds of disputations and indications of the place as well as the names of the presiding magisters and opponents, as is the case with the *Promptuarium*, Others were less carefully made and contain arguments.

Bearing in mind the ubiquity of the use of the notebooks, without doubt that the notebook provide an important source of information which items were at stake, and for academic discussions and for argumentation, something which is much more detailed in the notebooks.
A number of these notebooks have been preserved in manuscript form and their collectors identified. Most prominent are the notebooks of two Dominicans, Georg Schwartz and Servatius Fanckel, both compiled in Cologne in the second half of the fifteenth century. Some notebooks were designed very carefully, distinguishing between different kinds of disputations and indicating the dates of the disputations as well as the names of the presiding master, of the respondent and of the opponents, as is the case with the notebook of Servatius Fanckel. Others were less carefully made and just give a summary of the different arguments.

Bearing in mind the ubiquity of the disputations in academic life, it is without doubt that the notebooks documenting university debates provide an important source of information, not only for understanding which items were at stake, but also for localizing and dating academic discussions and for attributing opinions to individuals, something which is much more difficult when using commentaries on
Aristotle or Peter Lombard. Of course, the arguments preserved in these notebooks are abbreviated and schematized and therefore sometimes difficult to understand, even if one is familiar with the background of the debates. In this respect the notebooks are inferior to the often well-structured arguments presented in the commentaries. But where the opinions discussed in these commentaries cannot always be easily identified or attributed (the author can take them from unknown sources), with the information provided by the notebooks the situation is different. As a rule, the owners indicated when and where a specific disputation took place and sometimes even meticulously supplied the names of the students and masters whose arguments were reported, occasionally adding important biographical details.

Since some notebooks record a large number of disputations held at one place, the information provided there helps to establish the intellectual profile of an academic community. This is especially so when these notebooks cover a considerable period of time, as is the case with those of Georg Schwartz and Servatius Fanckel. These notebooks, for example, allow a scholar to see in detail how the Cologne debates developed from the 1460s to the 1480s and what the crucial topics of debate were. Also, they can show why and when a certain issue became a point of contention and divided the students and masters.

In this paper, using the notebook of Servatius Fanckel, I will focus on one such topic, which I think is of considerable historical importance for our understanding of the so-called Wegestreit, that is the debate between Nominalists and Realists, as it sheds light on the role of Aristotle within this dispute as well as on the late-medieval reception of Ockham.

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6 The astonishing insights that the study of notebooks can provide is persuasively demonstrated by the article of Christoph Flüeler mentioned in the preceding footnote.

7 Dates are provided in the notebook of Georg Schwartz. The anonymous notebook preserved in Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, O. III. 45, gives dates and names of the respondents (see Gabriel M. Löhr, Die Teutonia im 15. Jahrhundert. Studien und Texte vornehmlich zur Geschichte ihrer Reform, Quellen und Forschungen zur Geschichte des Dominikanerordens 19 [Leipzig, 1924], pp. 167–71, where parts of this notebook are edited). Servatius Fanckel noted not only dates and names of respondents, but also of opponents, and thus is of special significance.

8 In his study of the notebook of Servatius Fanckel, Gabriel M. Löhr observed the importance of such issues as the Immaculate Conception, indulgences, and the relationship between Pope and Council. See Löhr, Die theologischen Disputationen, p. 22. Löhr concentrated less on the use of Aristotle within theology or the Wegestreit, even if he mentions these items occasionally.

9 On the late-medieval Wegestreit, see my "Via Antiqua and Via Moderna in the Fifteenth Century. Doctrinal, Institutional and Political Factors in the Wegestreit,"
The arguments preserved in the notebooks are of the highest quality, as one is familiar with the back-
to-back format of the commentaries. But the notebooks are inferior to the commentaries. Just as one cannot be familiar with the notebooks, the situation is similar when and where a specific argument is mentioned. The notebooks provide the missing information, but the substantive details are lacking.

The number of disputations held at the University of Cologne helps to establish the importance of these debates. This is especially so when one considers the historical importance of the Wegestrait. The notebooks, for the most part, were written by the students who attended the seminars. When a certain topic became important, the students would gather and discuss the issue. The notebooks are important because they provide insight into the intellectual life of the University of Cologne.

If Servatius Fanckel, I will focus on the historical importance of the Wegestrait. This is the debate between the students and masters of the University of Cologne. The notebooks can provide a persuasive case for the importance of the Wegestrait. The notebooks can provide evidence for the importance of the debate. The notebooks can provide evidence for the importance of the Wegestrait. The notebooks can provide evidence for the importance of the debate. The notebooks can provide evidence for the importance of the Wegestrait. The notebooks can provide evidence for the importance of the debate.

"Via Antiqua and Via Moderna in the Westphalian Political Factors in the Wegestrait,"

At stake here was a question traditionally dealt with in the commentaries on the Book I of the Sentences, namely what property or properties distinguished the three persons of the Divine Trinity. As the notebook of Servatius Fanckel shows, it was on this occasion that the Realists took a stand against the views of the Nominalist Johannes Alen. The Realists were not willing to accept his reading of Aristotle, and being completely unable to follow his references to Ockham, provide a detailed example of the late-medieval Wegestrait on the spot. To delineate the background of this debate, a few words on the role of Aristotle in the Wegestrait and on the position of the University of Cologne are necessary.

1.2 Aristotle and the Wegestrait

As is well-known, in the fifteenth century several philosophers and theologians were of the opinion that Aristotle's philosophy was the best tool to defend matters of faith. Prominently, this view was held at the beginning of the century by the Parisian Albertist Johannes de Nova Domus. Later on the Thomist, Lambertus de Monte, put forward the same belief in his famous Salvatio Aristotelis published in Cologne in 1498, and this position became the central topic at the University of Cologne in The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400-1700, eds. Russell L. Friedman and Lauge O. Nielsen (Dordrecht, 2003), pp. 35-36 (contains a bibliography), and with special information concerning Cologne, Götz Rüdiger Tewes, Die Burgen der Köln Artisten-Fakultät bis zur Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts, Studien zur Geschichte der Universität zu Köln 13 (Cologne, 1993), pp. 279-394.

10 As a rule, in the late-medieval period this question was dealt with when commenting on the twenty-sixth distinction of the First Book of the Lombard's Sentences. See, for example, Johannes Capreolus, Defensiones theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis 1.26.1.1, ed. Ceslaus Paban and Thomas Péguès (Tours, 1990; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1967), pp. 214-35, and Denys the Carthusian. In IV libro Sententiarum 1.26.1-4, Opera omnia 20 (Tournai, 1902), pp. 199-227. Thomas addressed the same issue in his Summa theologicae 1.40.2, Opera omnia 4 (Rome, 1888), pp. 413-14. By the time Servatius made his notes, Thomas's Summa was commented upon regularly and used as a starting point for disputations. For example, Servatius's notebook contains a discussion on the Summa. See Lohr, Die theologischen Disputationen, pp. 40-41, n. 27.

11 See Luca Bianchi, Censure et Liberté Intellectuelle à l'Université de Paris (XIIe-XVIIe siècles) (Paris, 1999), p. 162. Bianchi discusses a passage from Johannes's Commentum aureum. Another telling statement can be found in the preface to Johannes's Tractatus de esse et essentia, edited in Gilles G. Meersseman, Geschichte des Albertismus I: Die Pariser Anfänge des Kölner Albertismus (Paris, 1993), p. 92: "Ad hoc enim cuilibet fidei data est licentia philosophandi, potissime in via peripateticorum, in qua inter coeteras philosophias minor est recepta contradictio, necnon maior con-
formitas ad veritatem nostræ religionis."
Ingolstadt in the attacks of the Realists against the Nominalists towards the end of the century.\textsuperscript{12}

It was especially the Albertists and Thomists who took this stand. They saw themselves backed by the writings of their most important authorities, Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. These two Dominicans not only commented on the writings of Aristotle, it was argued, but also used his writings in their theological treatises. It was this latter state of affairs that was highlighted by the Albertists and Thomists in Cologne to endorse what they called the “indissolubilis connexio” between philosophy and theology.\textsuperscript{13}

However, their view did not remain undisputed. It was the Nominalists who had a different opinion, referring here to the writings of William of Ockham, Adam Wodeham, John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen.\textsuperscript{14}

These authors showed another understanding of Aristotle, the Nominalists claimed, which led to the opposite conclusion, namely that the philosophy of Aristotle went against Christian faith at crucial points. This was not only the case with such classic issues as the eternity of the world and the immortality of the human soul, but also with those of divine foreknowledge and divine omnipotence.\textsuperscript{15} For the Nominalists of the fifteenth century, therefore, it was not necessary, or even helpful,

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\textsuperscript{14} These names appear among the Nominalists in the documents edited in Ehrle, Der Sentenzenkommentar des Peter von Canda, pp. 282 and 284 (Cologne), pp. 313 and 323 (Paris), p. 329 (Ingolstadt).


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\textsuperscript{12} See Marsilius von Inghen. Gedenkorte, Gründungsrektor der Universität Heidelberg, Dichtung, Lateinische Literatur in deutschen Universitäten, p. 35–46.


1.3 The University of Cologne

It was at the University of Cologne that the already mentioned Salvatio Aristotelis was scored that there were no points
against the Nominalists towards the end of the thirteenth century. Thair works were not unchallenged, and the writings of William of Ockham, the Scotus, and Marsilius of Inghen provided serious competition. The ground was prepared for the Nominalist reply by Thomas Aquinas, who argued against the notion of the indivisibility of the essence. The nominalists opposed the realists on the point of the universals, but this was not the end of the debate. The Nominalists went on to develop a critique of the realists, and the debate continued for many years. The Nominalists were not content with a simple rejection of the realist position, but sought to develop their own position, which was to be the basis of the modern school of thought.


15.3 The University of Cologne

It was at the University of Cologne that the issue came to a head. In the already mentioned Salvatio Aristotelis, Lambertus de Monte underscored that there were no points whatsoever where Aristotle was
contrary to the faith. It was for that reason, he argued, that the Roman Church had erected philosophical faculties at the universities and that the writings of Aristotle were taught there. He still went one step further and claimed that the principles of the Aristotelian philosophy were in no way opposed to those of the faith. For him, as well as for other Realists, therefore, it went without saying that one could retain the ideas of Aristotle even in those doctrines that were not addressed in his writings, and could not have been discussed there, since they were dependent on the Christian revelation, such as the Trinity.

In such an intellectual environment it is only natural that there was almost no place for a reading of Aristotle as practiced by the Nominalists. Now indeed, in the second half of the fifteenth century, the number of Nominalists at Cologne was minimal. This, however, had been different in the past. In the late fourteenth century the tradition of John Buridan was followed at Cologne. By 1414 the masters of the Arts Faculty still showed themselves to be very critical towards a reading of Aristotle as practiced by some Thomists, who were expelled from Paris because of their view on the Immaculate Conception and had made their way to Cologne. Already in 1425, however, the

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18 See Lambertus de Monte, Quaestio magistralis ostendens quid dici possit de salutio Aristotelis (Cologne, 1498), fol. B6v: “Sicut autem supra in parte et infra Deo dante patebit: Aristotelis nullo doctrinae aut legi Christi contrarieta, immo est ei per omnia conformis. Et ideo sancta Romana Ecclesia et sancti patres institerunt studia universalia philosophiae in quibus studiis luce clarus apparat omnium studia christianorum in philosophia eligere doctrinam Aristotelis tanquam conformem sacrae Scripturae ac dictis sanctorum.” Biographical details on Lambertus are provided by Tewes, Die Bursen der Kölner Artisten-Fakultät, p. 34. As to the complex history of the promotion of Aristotle by the Roman Church in the early years of the Parisian university— to which Lambertus may have been referring to first and foremost, as Paris was the alma mater of all other universities— see Luca Bianchi, “Aristotle as a Captive Bride. Notes on Gregory IX’s Attitude towards Aristotelianism,” in Albertus Magnus and the Beginnings of the Medieval Reception of Aristotle in the Latin West, ed. Ludger Honnefelder et al., Subsidia Albertina 1 (Münster, 2005), pp. 777–91, with a critical discussion of the views of Grabmann and Van Steenbergen.


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20 This predominance is underscored by the letter of the Prince Electors, in which they asked the tradition of John Buridan and Marsilius of Padua for faculties, the university argued that the works of Thomas Aquinas rather than that of John Buridan were the best guarantee of a good education. This can be seen in the different versions of Der Senztenkommentar, (edit. of the document), and Tewes, Die Bursen der Kölner Artisten-Fakultät, pp. 367–75. For a history of the development of the profession of the printers provided by Astrid L. Gabriel, “Via Antiqua et Moderna. Traditionsbewahrung und Pariser Studenten und Mästers zu den Gerichtsurteilen,” in Antiqui und Moderni. Traditionsbewahrung und Zeittafel, ed. Albert Zimmermann, (Berlin, 1978), pp. 439–83. In Cologne, there existed a printing establishment and date there is no longer evidence of significant activity of the printers in Cologne. For an almost exhaustive record of the "Nachwort" (1778), ibid., pp. 544–52.
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Thomists had gained the upper hand, being supported by the Albertist 
Heymericus de Campo, a student of Johannes de Nova Domu, who 
was famous for his attacks on Nominalism. In the time to come, the 
Albertists and Thomists kept their predominance and even reinforced 
it, making Cologne into a stronghold of Realism. In the second half 
of the fifteenth century, many German universities officially institu-
tionalized both Nominalism and Realism by introducing separate 
programs of study for both philosophical schools, as for example in 
Heidelberg (1452), Tübingen (1477) and Freiburg (1487). But in 
Cologne things were different. There was no such official Nominalist 
program alongside that of the Realists.

Revealing in this respect is also the publication program of the 
printers who were linked to the university. Cologne was one of the 
most important centers for the publication of schoolbooks with 
famous printers such as Ulrich Zell, Johannes Koelhoff and Henricus 
Quentell. All of the schoolbooks published in Cologne in the fifteen 
century, however, were written by either Albertists or Thomists. Not 
a single textbook had a Nominalist signature. Besides the many 
schoolbooks, mostly commentaries on Peter of Spain or Aristotle, 
the works of Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great were also printed 
in large quantities. In Cologne Nominalist works by authors such as 
William of Ockham, John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen, however,

20 This predominance is underscored by the university's reaction in 1425 to a 
letter of the Prince Electors, in which the latter urged the university to follow 
the tradition of John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen. In its reply, sealed by all 
the four faculties, the university argued that it is the tradition of Albert the Great 
and Thomas Aquinas rather than that of John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen which is the 
best guarantee of a good education. This letter has survived in both Latin and German 
versions. See Ehrle, Der Sentenzenkommentar des Peters von Candia, pp. 281–309 
(edition of the document), and Tewes, Die Bursen der Kölner Artisten-Fakultät, 
pp. 367–75.

21 Information on the vias at the different universities in the German Empire is 
provided by Astrid L. Gabriel, "Via Antiqua and Via Moderna and the Migration of 
Paris Students and Masters to the German Universities in the Fifteenth Century," in 
Antiqua und Moderni. Traditionsbewußtsein und Fortschrittsbewußtsein im frühen 
Mittelalter, ed. Albert Zimmermann, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 9 (Berlin, 1974), 
pp. 439–83. In Cologne, there existed a Nominalist bursa until the 1440s. After that 
date there is no longer evidence of such an institution. See Tewes, Die Bursen der 
Kölner Artisten-Fakultät, p. 296.

22 For an almost exhaustive record of incunabula printed in Cologne, see 
Voulliéme, Der Buchdruck Kölns, with a helpful chronological listing of all of the publications 
of the printers on pp. xcv–xxxiv and with new materials provided by Severin Corsten in 
the "Nachwort" (1978), ibid., pp. 544–52.
did not leave the press. The focus of the printers was exclusively on Albertism and Thomism, thus reflecting the intellectual setting of the university.23

Taking a closer look at these schoolbooks by Albertists and Thomists, it is striking that they seldom refer to Nominalist authors or theories. There is no real debate with Nominalism, at least not in the books that were written in Cologne.24 Slightly different is the situation with those schoolbooks that were printed in Cologne, but written elsewhere, as is the case with the commentaries on Aristotle by the Parisian Master Johannes Versor. But then again, there are only a few references, mostly concerning standard debates such as those concerning the nature of universals.25

The modern reader of these schoolbooks gets the impression that for the Masters in Cologne, Nominalism was not a serious partner for intellectual exchange. Significant here is the position of Heymericus de Campo, who shaped Albertism in Cologne. As he argued in his Tractatus problematicus, authors like John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen had excluded themselves from the Aristotelian tradition by defending Ockham's Nominalism, which in Heymericus's eyes was just

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23 It was not unusual that printers matriculated at the university, as was the case with Ulrich Zell. See Voüliéine, Der Buckdruck Köln, p. iii. For information on printing in Cologne, see Severin Corsten, Studien zum Kölner Frühdruck, Kölner Arbeiten zum Bibliotheks- und Dokumentationswesen 7 (Cologne, 1985); and idem, Untersuchungen zum Buch- und Bibliothekswesen, Arbeiten und Bibliographien zum Buch- und Bibliothekswesen 5 (Frankfurt am Main, 1988).

24 In the earlier mentioned Thesaurus sophismatum, for example, the position of the Nominalists is mentioned only on four occasions. See Thesaurus sophismatum, ed. 1495, fols. Biü’, Biü’, Diü’ and Diü’. The subject of this treatise was the so-called Parva logicallia, which were dealt with differently by Nominalists and Realists, so one could expect far more discussion here. Generally, the Realists commented upon the Parva logicallia as contained in the Tractatus or Summulae of Peter of Spain (this was the case in Cologne, as is clear from the Thesaurus sophismatum), whereas the Nominalists used the Parva logicallia of Marsilius of Inghen or of any other Nominalist author (see, for example, The Mediaeval Statutes of the Faculty of Arts of the University of Freiburg im Breisgau, eds. Ott and Fletcher, p. 40, n. 4: "Parva Logicallia magistri Marsilii." This quotation is taken from the earliest statutes, written in 1465 when only the via moderna was followed in Freiburg).

25 See, for example, Johannes Versor, Quaestiones super totam veteran artem Aristotelis (Cologne 1494; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1967), fol. [avii]: "Secunda opinio fuit quorumdam qui vocantur nominalia qui nunc moderni dicitur, qui dixerunt universalia totem sequi esse habere in intellectu (...)." For Versor's intellectual profile see Pepijn Rutten, "Secundum Procesum et Mentem Versoris, John Versor and His Relation to the Schools of Thought Reconsidered," Vivarium 43 (2005), 292–336. More than thirty incunabula were printed under the name of Johannes Versor in Cologne.

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26 Heymericus de Campo, Tractatus...

27 He was an important figure in the development of the Realists' position in early 1400s. His work, De Universali Reali et dei...
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26 Heymericus de Campo, Tractatus problematicus (Cologne, 1496), fol. aii: “Et ut omnia dicam: taliter dicentes (sc. the Nominalists, Mf) non sunt professores peripateticæ veritatis cuibus archidóctor fuit et princeps Aristotelis, sed sunt (...) sequentes (...). Oecaniam discoliam cum collegius suis, scilicet Buridano et Marsilio, qui Occam anglicus fuit aculator paternarum traditionum et non insector Aristotelis.” As Pepijn Rutten, “Contra Oecaniam Discoliam Modernorum. The So-Called De Universali Reali and the Dissemination of Albertist Polemics against the Via Moderna,” BPM 45 (2003), 131–65, has shown, this refutation of Nominalism is authentic and not an adaptation of a treatise attributed to Johannes de Nova Domo. He corrects the view of Anton G. Weiler, “Un traité de Jean de Nova Domo sur les Universaux,” Vivarium 6 (1968), 108–54, who argued that Heymeric in Contra Modernor had reworked a treatise of his master Johannes de Nova Domo, a view which was uncritically accepted by many researchers, including myself.

27 For a discussion of the Tractatus, see Gilles G. Meersseman, Geschichte des Albertismus: Die ersten Kölner Kontroversen (Rome, 1935), pp. 23–60. According to Meersseman, Heymericus wrote his treatise about 1424–1425. However, two manuscripts of the Tractatus date from an earlier time, namely 1423 (Schilg, Stiftsbibliothek [O. Praem.], Cpl. 168, and Strasbourg, Bibliothèque universitaire et régionale, Ms. 55 [Latin 53]), which means that the treatise was written no later than 1423, perhaps already in 1422, when Heymericus arrived in Cologne. I owe this dating to Pepijn Rutten (Nijmegen), who is preparing a critical edition of the Tractatus problematicus in which the manuscripts and their owners will be discussed. For a list of manuscripts see Rutten, “Contra Oecaniam Discoliam Modernorum,” pp. 162–63.

28 Heymericus de Campo, Tractatus problematicus, fol. aii and fol. iii. An echo of his considering the Nominalists only pseudo-philosophers can be found in the Thesaurus sophismatum, where the anonymous author reminds the reader of the fact that the Nominalists (moderni) have a supposition theory which differs from that of the Realists (antiqui), calling the Realists those who rightly philosophize. See Thesaurus sophismatum, ed. 1495, fol. Bii: “Moderni circa terminorum suppositiones discrepant in quinque punctis: a recte philosophantibus antiquis.”
Vienna or Erfurt. It is here that the notebook of Servatius Fanckel is of assistance.

As is apparent from this notebook, among the many Albertists and Thomists there was at least one Nominalist present in the Convent of the Dominicans in Cologne between the late 1470s and early 1480s, namely Johannes Alen. Fanckel labeled him as "modernus," most likely because Johannes Alen had received his education at the University of Erfurt, which by then was an important center of Nominalism.²⁹ Remarkably, according to a student manual written in the 1480s, the so-called Latium ydeoma, the Realists were not allowed to teach in Erfurt.²⁹ Erfurt therefore was the Nominalist counterpart of Cologne, where Realism had the upper hand. Why Johannes Alen came to Cologne remains unclear. In any case, it was not just a temporary visit. He participated at least once as respondent in a disputatio vacantialis, which as a rule was only open to regular bachelors of theology.³¹

The case of Johannes Alen is important because here we see that it was not only the various interpretations of Aristotle which caused such excitement among his colleagues in Cologne, but also, and perhaps even more, the fact that for him Aristotle was not a necessary tool for doing theology and for clarifying the mysteries of faith, such as the


³¹ This disputation is edited in the Appendix below, pp. 128–44. In the same year (1480) Johannes Alen also acted as an opponent at a disputatio vacantialis and as a responsio formalis pro forma. See Löh, Die theologischen Disputationen, p. 61, n. 95 and p. 117, n. 233.
The notebook of Servatius Fanciel is of importance because here we see that it was not a necessary tool for the Nominalist and Realist theories of the late 1470s and early 1480s. Among the many Albertists and Thomists, the Nominalist present in the Continent of the Conventuals is labeled as “modernus,” and received his education at the University of Paris. This was an important center of education for students studying to become priests. In this era, the Realists were not allowed to be Nominalist counterparts of the Conventuals. Why Johannes Alen was not allowed to be as a Nominalist counterpart of the Conventuals, is not necessarily the case that he was not a Nominalist. In any case, it was not just a temporary solution as respondent in a disputatio vacantialis. The notebook of Servatius Fanciel, however, makes clear that here this is not the case and that these statements, at least a significant number of them, were indeed held by fifteenth-century Nominalists.

Before entering into an analysis of the debate, it is first necessary to have a closer look at the notebook of Servatius Fanciel and the genre of the disputatio vacantialis. Following this discussion I will turn to the philosophical and theological side of the debate, first by discussing Johannes Alen’s position and that of his Albertist and Thomist opponents and sketching his profile as a Nominalist, and second by working out the doctrinal antagonisms between Albertism, Thomism, and Nominalism in Cologne. Finally, I will draw a few conclusions that will bring these various aspects together.

Attached to this article is an edition of the relevant disputatio vacantialis. The genre of the notebook is such that the arguments of the participants are only briefly reported, which sometimes makes it difficult to locate the arguments historically and to understand them. For that reason, a number of explanatory footnotes have been added to the edition.

32 These quotations are taken from the edition below, p. 138 and p. 141.
33 For details see section 2.4 below.
2.1 Servatius Fanckel and his Notebook

Servatius Fanckel's notebook survived in manuscript Frankfurt, Stadt und Universitätsbibliothek, Ms. Praed. 102. The manuscript contains 176 written folios having notes of more than 250 disputations, many of them held in the Dominican Convent at Cologne in the period between 1475 and 1488. Servatius entered the Convent in 1467 and began studying theology in 1475, the year in which he also recorded the first disputation. He was for the first time actively engaged as an opponent in a disputation in 1478. Six years later, in 1484, he earned his bachelor's degree in theology. From 1488 onwards he was prior of the Convent, where he remained until his death in 1508. It was in his first year as prior that he stopped recording the disputations.

Besides the reports of the disputations, the notebook also contains lists with the names of the doctors and bachelors that were active in Cologne. Servatius Fanckel noted for example the names of the masters who delivered the ordinary lectures in 1484, the first year that he was a bachelor, as well as those of all the bachelors of theology between 1475 and 1480. On one of these lists he also identified himself as the compiler of the Note-ordinis Predictorum, thomist, etc.

These lists are of considerable value prosopographical information, for example, to the information concerning the vita. Also, he noted the doctrinal position of the disputators. As is apparent from the questioned himself a Thomist. Others were labeled as "prolifer" or "modernus" as in the case of...

Besides the disputations and the master lists, the manuscript contains a systematic index of all disputations from the statutes of the theological faculty, the students of theology had to take when they completed the Bible and the Sentences. There is, for example, a list of all the theological treatises or of extracts from theologicalesque book exclusively to the collection of personal and practical information about theological history.

The largest part of the notebook consists of the disputations. These disputations were held during the summer recess. They were especially important for the theological training, since they had to act as a responsum for the disputation. If a student accepted as a bachelor, (2) respondentes

35 For a description of the manuscript see Die Handschriften des Dominikanerklosters und des Leonardstifts in Frankfurt am Main, ed. Gerhardt Powitz, Kataloge der Stadt- und Universitätsbibliothek Frankfurt am Main 2/1 (Frankfurt, 1968), pp. 236–37.
36 A detailed list with all the titles and dates of the disputations as given in the notebook has been assembled in Lühr, Die theologischen Disputationen, pp. 34–120. The disputations held in the Dominican Convent were open to the public, and members of different faculties participated. See, for example, Lühr, ibid., p. 61, n. 97 and p. 63, n. 102, where Fanckel reports the intervention of a bachelor from the Medical Faculty. Also in the disputation edited below, several seculars and members of different religious orders acted as opponents.
37 For Fanckel's biography (partly based on information provided by Fanckel himself in his notebook), see Lühr, Die theologischen Disputationen, pp. 1–3. See also Jacques Quétif and Jacques Echard, Scriptores ordinis Praedicatorum recensiti, 2 vols. (Paris, 1719; repr. New York, 1959), 1:904–05. Since he died in 1508, he is not included in Thomas Kaeppeli and Emilio Panella, Scriptores ordinis Praedicatorum mediæ aevi, 4 vols. (Rome, 1970–93).
38 These lists are published with extensive comments in Lühr, Die theologischen Disputationen, pp. 23–32.
39 According to the Statutes (Bianco, Die alte Universität Köln, p. 40), as a bachelor of theology Fanckel had to respond to questions of each of the masters (regentes) who delivered ordinary lectures. It is for that reason that he noted their names in 1484.
40 Lühr, Die theologischen Disputationen, p. 30, n. 33. For the index see Lühr, ibid., p. 33. For the first page of the manuscript, it is see Stadt und Universitätsbibliothek, Ms. Praed. 102. The extracts from the statutes are on fols. 17–18. The extracts from the statutes are on fols. 30–31, 33–34. See Bianco, Die alte Universität Köln, p. 40. In contrast, the notebook of Johann Ebel, is not foliated. See Bianco, Die alte Universität Köln, p. 43.
Historically, the notebook itself is inscribed in manuscript Frankfurt, Praed. 102. The manuscript contains more than 250 disputations, held at the Convent at Cologne in the period 1467 and 1488, in which he also recorded his first time actively engaged as an assistant. In 1484, he earned the title of bachelor. From 1488 onwards he was prior of the Convent, until his death in 1508. It was in his capacity as prior that he was responsible for the publication of the disputations.

The notebook also contains records of the activities of the Convent, including the names of the masters who taught there. In 1484, the first year of his tenure as prior, he recorded the names of all the masters of theology. In subsequent years, he continued to update the lists of names he had identified earlier.

Die Handschriften des Dominiener-Main, ed. Gerhard Powitz, Katalog der Handschriften am Main 2/1 (Frankfurt, 1968), 34–120. The notebook contains records of the disputations as given in the Passionsdisputationen, pp. 1–3. See also Lühr’s article in the same publication.

Information provided by Fanckel himself in his Praductorium necissiti. The extracts from the statutes are on the first flyleaf of the manuscript, which is not foliated. See Bianco, Die alte Universität Köln, pp. 43–44.

In contrast, the notebook of Johannes Brems discussed in Shank, Unless You Believe, contains extracts from different theological treatises, mostly commentaries on the Sentences.

See Bianco, Die alte Universität Köln, pp. 36 and 37: “Item ordinatus quod in vacacionibus magnis fiant disputaciones (... singulis sextis feris de manc. (... nec licenciatur quis in Theologia facultate qui in vacacionibus sic non respondet, saltem semel.”

himself as the compiler of the notebook: “Frater Seruatus Fanckel, ordinis Predicatiorum, thomista, collector huius libelli. 1484.”

These lists are of considerable importance because they contain invaluable prosopographical information. In many cases Fanckel added to the names information concerning the student’s or master’s academic vita. Also, he noted the doctrinal affiliation of the doctors and bachelors. As is apparent from the quotation given above, he considered himself a Thomist. Others were labeled as “albertista”, “scotista”, “aegidianus”, or “modernus” as in the case of Johannes Alen.

Besides the disputations and the lists of names, the notebook contains a systematic index of all disputations and some small extracts from the statutes of the theological faculty, mentioning the oaths that students of theology had to take when they started commenting on the Bible and the Sentences. There were no further items added to the manuscript. There is, for example, no inclusion of philosophical or theological treatises nor of extracts thereof. Fanckel devoted his notebook exclusively to the collection of disputations to which only some personal and practical information was added.

The largest part of the notebook is covered by disputaciones vacantiales. These disputations were held every Friday during the academic summer recess. They were especially important for bachelors of theology, since they had to act as a respondent at least once in their tenure as a bachelor. In addition to the disputaciones vacantiales three other forms of disputations are recorded: (1) disputations which students of theology, who came from other universities, had to participate in to be accepted as a bachelor, (2) responsiones pro prima and secunda forma
which were necessary to be recognized as a licentiate, and (3) the vesperiae and aulae with which the licentiate finished his studies and acquired the doctor's degree. 45

The manuscript was written by a single hand, namely that of Servatius Fanckel, even if this hand uses different styles of writing, as we will see below. 46 Yet, it is not clear when exactly Fanckel recorded the information in his notebook. It is certain that at least some small notes were added later on, as is the case with biographical updates to some persons’ names already listed, for example that the person had died. 47 More important, however, is the question at what time Fanckel entered the reports of the disputations in his notebook. As can be concluded from their placement in the manuscript, in all probability he did not write them down during the actual debates but shortly thereafter. Generally, the disputations are noted in chronological order, where one disputation follows upon the other. Occasionally, however, there are blanks between the disputations. Sometimes these blanks are completely empty. 48 Sometimes only the disputation's title with the so-called materiae (see below) are given. 49 If he had written down the disputations in the manuscript immediately and on the spot, he would have continued writing and these blanks would be difficult to explain. Obviously, therefore, during the debates Fanckel used provisional sheets, which he then copied only later into his notebook, generally before the next disputation took place, as is clear from the chronological order of the notes. From time to time he was unable to do this and left a blank space, to record the information later, and copied the notes concerning the latest disputation somewhat further on in the manuscript. As is clear from the actual state of the manuscript, he did not always fill these blank spaces. Now, the fact that Fanckel always at least tried to supply information on the latest disputation he attended allows for the conclusion that there must have been only a short span of time between the actual disputation and the writing down of the disputationes vacatiales. Therefore, even if the manuscript was written during the debates, it must still be acknowledged that the disputationes vacatiales are not necessarily written down in chronological order.

2.2 Disputationes Vacatiales

As was stated above, the majority of the disputationes vacatiales in the manuscript belong to the subject of Theology. As an example, the disputationes vacatiales on the subject of this paper belongs to the year 1480, when the disputations were held each week between June and December. It is possible that there were about ten such disputations per year, as indicated by the number of reports in Section X. The exceptions were the years 1483 and 1485, when all three and four disputations respectively were held at the same time due to the plague, as suggested by the parish registers. As indicated by the statutes of the faculty, the disputations were presided over by a so-called praeses, who was responsible for awarding the master's degree from the Arts faculty. The student of theology without being a bachelor or doctorate had to pass a series of disputationes vacatiales. Information on these disputations can be found in the calendar of Paris and the other universities of the time. In the case of Freiburg, the calendar is missing for the years 1480 and 1481, but other calendars from German universities are available. These calendars show that the disputationes vacatiales were held each week, as indicated in the case of Freiburg. 50

The Vocation of Intellectual Life.

Bianco, Die altae Universität Köln, p. 131. Theennis et saltem studiendi in Theologia, prae matus is on p. 40.
nominalism in Cologne

As was stated above, the majority of disputationes recorded in the notebook are disputationes vacantiales. The question that is the particular subject of this paper belongs to this genre. Disputationes vacantiales were held each week between June 28 and September 15.\(^{51}\) This means that there were about ten such disputationes per year. This is confirmed by the number of reports in Servatius Fanckel’s notebook. The only exceptions were the years 1483 and 1484, when Fanckel recorded only three and four disputationes respectively, a reduction which may have been due to the plague, as suggested by Gabriel M. Löhr.\(^{52}\)

As indicated by the statutes of Cologne the disputationes vacantiales were presided over by a so-called prior vacantialis, who had to have a master’s degree from the Arts Faculty and at the same time was a student of theology without being a member of a religious order. As a rule they were a bachelor or bachelor formatus, which means that most priors were already engaged in reading the Sentences of Peter Lombard.\(^{53}\) For each year there was only one prior vacantialis. He was

\(^{50}\) This was also the conclusion of Löhr, Die theologischen Disputationen, p. 4, who was the first to study the manuscript in detail.

\(^{51}\) For the dating of the academic summer recess in Cologne, where the academic calendar of Paris was followed, see Bianco, Die alte Universität Köln, p. 36: “item ordinarius quod vacaciones magne ostivales sint tuxta ritum Parisiensis Studii, a vigilia Apostolorum Petri et Pauli (29 June, MH) usque ad cras Kim exaltationis sancte Crucis inclusive (14 September, MH).” Because of its focus on the arts faculty, in the otherwise very informative work of Olga Weiers, La disputatio dans les Facultés des arts au moyen âge, Studia artistarum 10 (Turnhout, 2002), there is no mention of the disputationes vacantiales. Information on these disputationes is also lacking in Tceuwea, The Vocabulary of Intellectual Life.

\(^{52}\) Löhr, Die theologischen Disputationen, p. 18. As medieval and early modern chronicles show, in the years 1483 and 1484 there was a plague not only in Cologne, but also in other German cities. See Die Chroniken der deutschen Stämme vom 14. bis ins 16. Jahrhundert, vol. 10 (Leipzig, 1872), pp. 369–70; vol. 23 (Leipzig, 1894), p. 43; vol. 36 (Stuttgart, 1931), p. 146.

\(^{53}\) Bianco, Die alte Universität Köln, p. 37: “(...) sit presidens Magister in Artibus secularis et saltem studens in Theologia.” The condition of the degree of bachelor formatus is on p. 40.
also responsible for the subject of the disputations, which were normally chosen according to the order of the Sentences, that is first the status of theology was dealt with, then the Trinity, then the divine attributes, then creation and so forth.\textsuperscript{54}

As is clear from Servatius's notebook the respondent answered his question by making a complex syllogism of three arguments, each containing three propositions. Each set of three propositions dealt with a specific part of the question, again in syllogistic form. The last set then gave the answer to the question as a whole. Each set of propositions was called a materia. A similar format was also used in the other kinds of disputations recorded by Fanckel. Since it can also be found elsewhere, it seems to be characteristic of late-medieval disputations.\textsuperscript{55}

In the manuscript, the question itself and the materiae were written in a larger and more careful hand, to distinguish them from the actual disputation that was noted down in a much smaller form.\textsuperscript{56} What is absent from the notebook are the arguments that were given by the respondent to defend his materiae. It is not clear why Servatius Fanckel did not report them. In the notes of the other disputations, these arguments do not appear either, with only one exception, which allows one to see how they were organized.\textsuperscript{57} In this case they proceeded according to the standard scholastic model of putting forward authorities and rational arguments. As is apparent from this example, the different propositions that constituted the materiae were divided into separate parts, as was done with the title, each of which was treated individually. In the disputations recorded by Fanckel, time and again there are references to these missing arguments. This makes it difficult, at times, to understand what the opponent is exactly pointing at.

\textsuperscript{54} The subject order of Lombard's Sententiae is treated in Philipp W. Rosemann, Peter Lombard (Oxford, 2004), esp. pp. 54–70.
\textsuperscript{55} A comparable format was used e.g. for the responsio formalis pro secunda forma. However, in the example transcribed by Lörh, Die theologischen Disputationen, pp. 99–100, there is only mention of the first and the second materiae. On the other hand, Heyméricus de Campo, in his commentary on the Sentences, basically used the system of the three materiae. See my "Academic Theology in the Fifteenth Century. The Sentences Commentary of Heyméricus de Campo († 1460)," in Chemins de la pensée médiévale, ed. Paul J.J.M. Bakker, Textes et études du moyen âge 20 (Turnhout, 2002), pp. 513–59, esp. pp. 539–54 (edition).
\textsuperscript{56} This is also the case in the notebook of Georg Schwartz. See, for example, the notebook's picture in Christ among the Medieval Dominicans, plate 71 (Eichstätt, Universitätsbibliothek, Cod. st 688, fol. 263).
\textsuperscript{57} See Lörh, Die theologischen Disputationen, pp. 100–65.

After the respondent had presented his case, the first person to oppose him was the intellectual flexibility of the disputants, a range of small questions touched upon by both sides, put forward in the answer line of reasoning. In the notebook added by Fanckel "huc prior," opposed, followed by the bachelors. However, the disputant did not have to wait their turn either, as is also the case in other disputations, especially with the disputant of the late 1485, Fanckel noted the number of the disputant in the margin of his notebook. The bachelors were an instrument to identify these other disputations employed throughout this paper.\textsuperscript{58}

The disputation under consideration in 1480, in which Henry of Cologne acted as prior, is the disputation notes of Servatius Fanckel. Among the disputants, Conradus de Campis and Gerardus was to become the author of many books, as well as the Thomists Theophrastus and Johannes of Saxony.\textsuperscript{59}

Striking is a note which Fanckel took down in the margin of the disputation, which says that the disputant was put forward views that were underdeveloped and brushed off by his opponents: "qui posit Colonie incusssuet."\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{58} See below, p. 135 note 30.
\textsuperscript{59} Jacobus Sprenger, who was a Master of Arts and also prior vacantialis Henry of Cologne.
\textsuperscript{60} As far as our disputation is concerned, the date 1480 is consistent with Lörh's edition below. Lörh listed a considerable number of disputes in his study, which is indexed in Lörh, Die theologischen Disputationen, pp. 513–59, esp. p. 539–54 (edition).\textsuperscript{61} There is no explicit date mentioned, but the context suggests that the disputations took place in the third of the series of disputations. The first and third of the disputations took place in 1479, the second and third of the disputations were held in 1480.\textsuperscript{62} For the schoolbooks published in the early 16th century by Simon, Voillième, Der Buchdruck Kölns, pp. 18–19, and on Aristotle's logical and physical work.
After the respondent had presented his arguments, the actual debate started. The first person to oppose was the *prior vacantialis*, who tested the intellectual flexibility of the respondent by asking him a whole range of small questions touching upon the different aspects of the *materiae* put forward in the argument, often without a clear systemic line of reasoning. In the notebook these questions end with the remark added by Fanckel "huc prior." Then the licentiates and the doctors opposed, followed by the bachelors and the students. The former, however, did not have to wait their turn but could intervene whenever they thought appropriate, as is also the case in our disputation. In many cases, especially with the disputation from the period between 1477 and 1485, Fanckel noted the names of the respondents and opponents in the margin of his notebook. Thus he gave modern research a unique instrument to identify these objections, an instrument which will be employed throughout this paper.

The disputation under consideration was held on July 14, 1480. Henry of Cologne acted as *prior vacantialis*, a Thomist according to the notes of Servatius Fanckel. Among the opponents were the Albertists Conradus de Campis and Gerald of Harderwijk, the latter of which was to become the author of many schoolbooks printed in Cologne, as well as the Thomists Theodor of Susteren and Servatius Fanckel himself.

Striking is a note which Fanckel added in the margin at the beginning of the disputation, which says that the Nominalist Johannes Alen had put forward views that were unusual and that therefore he had been brushed off by his opponents: "Magister Johannes Alen, modernus, qui posuit Colonie inconsueta et bene scobatus fuit." Which views

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58 See below, p. 135 note 30.
59 Jacobus Sprenger, who was a Master, intervened during the opposition of the *prior vacantialis* Henry of Cologne.
60 As far as our disputation is concerned, these names are given in the titles of the edition below. Löhr listed a considerable amount of names mentioned in the notebook in his study, which is indexed in Löhr, *Die theologischen Disputationen*, pp. 121–23.
61 There is no explicit date mentioned in the manuscript. However, our disputation was the second of the series of *disputationes vacantiales* delivered in 1480, the first and the third of which were dated. The first disputation was held on July 7, the third on July 21 (Frankfurt, Stadt und Universitätsbibliothek, Ms. Praed. 102, fol. 80’ and 82’). This allows for a secure dating of our disputation on the Friday in between, that is July 14, 1480.
62 For the schoolbooks published under the name of Gerald of Harderwijk, see Voullième, *Der Buchdruck Kölns*, pp. 194–201, nos. 438–46. These were commentaries on Aristotle’s logical and physical works, as well as on Peter of Spain’s *Summulae.*
were uncommon for the bachelors and masters in Cologne, and how they responded, will become clear if we now turn to the content of the disputation.

2.3 The Divine Trinity

Throughout the disputation the issue at stake was the question of whether in the one and undivided divine nature there exist three divine persons that are really distinct. In the background here is a tenet of Christian faith that states that the divine nature is one and that the divine persons are distinguished from each other. This provoked the problem of how to distinguish the three persons of the Trinity, if the divine nature is indeed undivided. In the course of time, several answers to this question were given. John Duns Scotus reported four different views on this point, which were also mentioned by William of Ockham, Adam Wodeham, and Gabriel Biel, thus giving testimony to the complexity of the issue. Earlier, Thomas Aquinas brought up two different opinions, one of which he viewed according to which the distinction between the so-called not primarily grounded in the relationes, the relations between the three persons and not to something else. For him, then, it was not so much the relationes, the relations between the three persons, but the distinction. To do so, these relations had to be considered because only oppositions are able to articulate things. Since there are three divine persons, the Father, the Holy Spirit, and the Son, four such relations were necessary: the relation (spatio activa) and its opposite, the relation; and the Son (spatio passiva).

If we now turn to the position of Thomas Aquinas, we see that he defended a view which according to Aquinas, the Son, was opposed to articulating the distinction between the

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63 See, for example, the Pseudo-Athanasianus Quicumque, the creed which was mostly referred to in the late-medieval period when discussing trinitarian questions, in Enchiridion symbolorum definition et declaration de rebus fidei et morum, eds. Heinrich Denzinger and Peter Hübnermann, 41st ed. (Freiburg, 2007), p. 51, n. 75: “Vides autem catholica haec est, ut unum Deum in Trinitate, et Trinitatem in unitate veneremur, neque confudentes personas, neque substantiam separantes: alia est enim persona Patris, alia [persona] Filii, alia [persona] Spiritus Sancti (…).” Important also were the declarations of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), ibid., p. 357, n. 800: “Hae sancta Trinitas, secundum communem essentiam individua, et secundum personales proprietates discrēta (…);” and the Council of Florence (1442), ibid., p. 461, n. 1350: “Patrem non esse Filium aut Spiritum Sanctum; Filium non esse Patrem aut Spiritum Sanctum; Spiritum Sanctum non esse Patrem aut Filium (…)”. For a discussion of the late-medieval trinitarian views, see Michael Schmaus, Der Liber propagatoriarum der Thomas Anglicus und die Lehrerschiede zwischen Thoma von Aquin und Duns Scotus, 2. Teil: Die trinitarischen Lehrrerweisen, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 29/1 (Münster, 1930); Hester G. Gelber, Logic and the Trinity. A Clash of Values in Scholastic Thought, 1300–1335, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1974; and Russell L. Friedman, In principio erat verbum. The Incorporation of Philosophical Psychology into Trinitarian Theology, 1250–1325, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Iowa, 1997.


65 Thomas Aquinas, De potentia 8.3, ed. F. C. Ciceri (Paris, 1930), 21: “(…) circa hoc sunt duo opiniones: quae non constituitur hypostasis, nec distinguuntur in divinis constituturum originem et constituendum intellectum consequatur ad corpus Christi (…). Sed haec opinio non videtur convenire the son (paternitas) and its opposite, the spirit (spiratio activa) and its opposite, the son (spiratio passiva).

If we now turn to the position of Thomas Aquinas, we see that he defended a view which according to Aquinas, was opposed to articulating the distinction between
and masters in Cologne, and how we now turn to the content of these matters.

The Trinity

The issue at stake was the question of whether in the nature there are three divine persons. The background here is a tenet of Thomas Aquinas, namely that in the Trinity there are three persons, each one distinct and independent of the other. This provoked a激烈 debate among Catholic theologians. In the course of time, several views were advanced, and Thomas Aquinas brought up two of them.

In his De potentia, Thomas Aquinas criticized this view as untenable: "Haec opinio quod videtur id quod est posse," and even more clearly in his Summa theologiae: "Hoc non potest stare." His main argument was that there is a distinction between things, in this case the divine persons, that must primarily be related to something that is inherent to these persons and not to something that precedes them, as the origins do. For him, then, it was not so much the origines, but the so-called relationalis, the relations between the persons, that accounted for their distinctness.

To do so, these relations needed to have a specific property. They had to be in opposition to each other. Thomas claimed, because only oppositions are able to really distinguish non-material things. Since there are three divine persons, of which the Son was generated by the Father, and the Holy Ghost by both the Father and the Son, four such relations were necessary, namely that from the Father to the Son (pateritas) and its opposite, that of the Son to the Father (filiatio), as well as that from the Father and the Son to the Holy Spirit (spiratio activa) and its opposite, that of the Holy Ghost to the Father and the Son (spiratio passiva).

If we now turn to the position of Johannes Alen, it is noteworthy that he defended a view which accepted the origines as equally essential to articulating the distinction between the divine persons as the different opinions, one of which he labeled as insufficient. That was the view according to which the distinction between the three persons is not primarily grounded in the relations between the persons but in the distinction between the so-called origines or processiones originis.


Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1.40.2, ed. 1888, p. 413: "(...) ad hoc quod aliqua duo distincta intelligantur, necesse est eorum distinctionem intelligenti per aliquid intrinsecum utrique (...). Unde melius dicitur quod personae seu hypostases distinguantur relationibus, quam per origines."

If we now turn to the position of Johannes Alen, it is noteworthy that he defended a view which accepted the origines as equally essential to articulating the distinction between the divine persons as the different opinions, one of which he labeled as insufficient. That was the view according to which the distinction between the three persons is not primarily grounded in the relations between the persons but in the distinction between the so-called origines or processiones originis.65

Thomas Aquinas criticized this view as untenable in his De potentia: "Haec opinio quod videtur id quod est posse," and even more clearly in his Summa theologiae: "Hoc non potest stare." His main argument was that there is a distinction between things, in this case the divine persons, that must primarily be related to something that is inherent to these persons and not to something that precedes them, as the origins do. For him, then, it was not so much the origines, but the so-called relationalis, the relations between the persons, that accounted for their distinctness.67 To do so, these relations needed to have a specific property. They had to be in opposition to each other. Thomas claimed, because only oppositions are able to really distinguish non-material things. Since there are three divine persons, of which the Son was generated by the Father, and the Holy Ghost by both the Father and the Son, four such relations were necessary, namely that from the Father to the Son (pateritas) and its opposite, that of the Son to the Father (filiatio), as well as that from the Father and the Son to the Holy Spirit (spiratio activa) and its opposite, that of the Holy Ghost to the Father and the Son (spiratio passiva).68

If we now turn to the position of Johannes Alen, it is noteworthy that he defended a view which accepted the origines as equally essential to articulating the distinction between the divine persons as the
relations and thus contradicted Thomas Aquinas with his stress on the primary of the relations. This is all the more striking as the prior vacationalis was a Thomist, namely Henry of Cologne. In the third materia of his response, Johannes Alen stated that the two processiones originis account for the fact that in God there are several distinct real relations: “Due originis processiones monstrant in diuinis plures esse realiter differentes relationes.” These two processiones cause the real relations, which in their turn produce the real distinction between the divine persons. For Alen, therefore, not only the relations, but also the originis constitute the distinction.69

Before discussing the disapproval voiced by the opponents participating at the disputation, first it is important to realize that Johannes Alen not only accepted something as fundamental to the distinction that was rejected as being such by Thomas, namely the originis, but more importantly, that the view he put forward had been held by Ockham.70 To be sure, that Alen departed from Thomas would not necessarily have aroused much disturbance among the opponents as it actually did. Among the participants there were not only Thomists but also Albertists, and ever since Heymericus had published his Tractatus problematicus, highlighting the differences between Thomists and Albertists, the Thomists were used to criticism of their saintly Master, even in Cologne.71 Furthermore, Thomas had said himself that the originis were in some way responsible for the distinction between the divine persons, even if not principally (prius et principalis). So there was an easy way to settle the matter and find a common ground, if the disputants had wanted to.72

Much more delicate and provocative, however, was the fact that Alen defended Ockham’s position, who on that occasion had called Thomas’s solution absolutely wrong and contradictory.73 Ockham’s criticism was a direct consequence of his Nominalist interpretation of Aristotle. For

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69 See the three propositions of the third materia in the Appendix below, p. 130.
71 Although Heymericus’s criticism was fundamental, he never explicitly said that Thomas was wrong, but only that his way of arguing was not as convincing as that of Albert the Great. See, for example, his Tractatus problematicus, ed. 1496, fol. [H]: “Non enim sum tam petulant ut audeam assere aliqui sanctum Thomam simpliciter errasse (…) sed verisimilius puto veritatem eius in multis indigere correctione piae moderationis, eo quod sententia sua in superficie verbum non continet tantam probabilitem sicut sententia doctoris mei domini Alberti Magni.”
72 William of Ockham, Summa theologiae 1.40.2, ed. 1888, p. 413.
him, the *origines* and the relations were the same, as far as their being was concerned. In his view, therefore, it was contradictory to deny that the *origines* constituted the differences between the divine persons, if at the same time it was said that the relations do. Thomas, for that matter, had distinguished between different modes of signifying. Both the *origines* and the relations play a role as being constitutive of the divine persons, he said, but for human understanding the relations are more fundamental. Here again Ockham was harsh in his criticism of Thomas. Modes of signifying concern only words and thoughts, but not things, whereas here the distinction between things, namely the divine persons, is at stake. Therefore, if it is argued that the relations constitute the persons, it follows that the *origines* must also constitute the persons. Denying this would imply a contradiction, Ockham claimed.

In all likelihood, the theologians in Cologne were familiar with Ockham's attack on Thomas, as in the late fifteenth century Ockham's *Sentences* commentary was commented upon at several universities in the German Empire such as Tübingen and Freiburg. It must be assumed, therefore, that the opponents recognized the background of Alen's position and thus reacted accordingly.

### 2.3.1 Aristotle and the Trinity

Alen defended Ockham's view in his third *materia*, identifying the *origines* and the relations, which constitute the divine persons.

Primum quod dicit quod personae non constituantur per origines, est simpliciter falsum."

Ibid.


Gabriel Biel, in his *Collectarium circa quattuor libros Sententiarum*, highlighted this criticism. See *Collectarium* 1.26.2, eds. Werbeck and Hofmann, p. 543: "Doctor [namely, Ockham] in hac quaestionem primum recitavit et impugnat opinionem beati Aquinas with his stress on the more striking as the prior vacans-Cologne. In the third *materia* of the two *processiones originis* are several distinct real relations: in the *materia* in diuinis plures esse realiter etions cause the real relations, between the divine persons, also the *origines* voiced by the opponents participants important to realize that Johannes fundamenta to the distinction by Thomas, namely the *origines*, the put forward had been held by taught from Thomas would not anec among the opponents as it were not only Thomists but[cus had published his *Tractatus* between Thomists and criticism of their sainty Master, Thomas had said himself that the for the distinction between the et principalis). So there had find a common ground, if the, however, was the fact that Alen that occasion had called Thomas's victory. Ockham's criticism was an interpretation of Aristotle. For
He again made the same point in his answer to the Albertist Gerald of Harderwijk. On that occasion he claimed that a relation cannot be distinguished from its bearer, even in the case of the Trinity. In the further course of the disputation, in his reply to the Thomist Walter of Dordrecht, he went even further, saying that the relations are identical with the three persons, and these again with the divine essence, as Ockham had also maintained.  

With Alen’s claim that the relations do not differ from their bearers, the disputation came to its most controversial point. It was also here that Alen’s loyalty to Aristotle was addressed. The Albertist Gerald of Harderwijk tried to force Alen into a contradiction by arguing that if the relations were identical with the persons, there would be only three relations. But these three relations would imply that there were six persons, as every relation has two extremes. In his reply, Alen kept to his original position that the relation and its bearer were really the same by claiming that there is no real distinction between the categories, thus revealing his conception of the status of the Aristotelian categories. Gerald of Harderwijk then confronted Alen with the argument that there are ten categories which are all really distinct from each other. Among these there is one category of substance and another of relation. Therefore relations cannot be identified with their bearers, the substances, without contradiction, he argued. 

Alen replied to this attack with an answer traditionally given by many who denied the real distinction between all categories, namely that Aristotle himself had predicated two different categories of one and the same thing and that therefore they cannot be really distinct according to his opinion. Gerald of Harderwijk is somewhat critical of this opinion. In posterior analytics, he will make a distinction between the status of the relations and the status of the persons, thus giving a more precise notion of immediate propositions. Alen’s claim that all propositions are identical with the persons and that the three persons are identical with the divine essence is a simplification of the more precise notion of the status of the persons and the relations. In such propositions, the persons are either affirmed or denied of the subject term. Therefore their truth can only be determined by the divine essence, as Alen had also maintained.

Thus two different readings of Alen’s claims are possible: on the one hand, understanding that a relation does not differ from its bearer, Alen delivered an answer to the dispute concerning the status of the persons. On the other hand, Alen’s claim that the three persons are identical with the divine essence is a simplification of the more precise notion of the status of the persons and the relations. In such propositions, the persons are either affirmed or denied of the subject term. Therefore their truth can only be determined by the divine essence, as Alen had also maintained.

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78 See Appendix below, p. 136–137 (reply to Gerald of Harderwijk) and p. 143 (reply to Walter of Dordrecht): “Quattuor relationes sunt tres res, que sunt personae, sicut tres personae sunt una res, quae est essentia.” In his commentary on the Sentences, Ockham underscored that notwithstanding their differences, these relations are really the same as the one and undivided divine essence. See William of Ockham, Scriptum I.26.1, eds. Etzkorn and Kelly, p. 153. This passage is quoted in full in the Appendix below, p. 137 note 38.  

79 See Appendix below, p. 137: “Negavit iste [namely, Johannes Alen] distinctionem predicamentorum realem.” Again, the same view was held by Ockham, Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis 10, ed. Gedeon Gál, Opera philosophica 2 (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1978), p. 229. For a full quotation of this passage see the Appendix below, p. 137 note 39.  

80 See Appendix below, p. 137: “Contra: Sunt decem entia realia primo diversa.”


answer to the Albertist Gerald of
denied that a relation cannot be
the case of the Trinity. In the
replies to the Thomist Walter of
and the relations are identical
in with the divine essence, as

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Gerald of Harderwijk) and p. 143
iones sunt tres res, que sunt persone,
"In his commentary on the Sentences,
ir differences, these relations are really
See William of Ockham, Scriptum
usage is quoted in full in the Appendix

namely, Johannes Alen] distinctionem
view was held by Ockham, Expositio
Gedeon Gál, Opera philosophica 2
A full quotation of this passage see the

109
to the notion of immediate propositions, a concept used by Aristotle in his
Posterior analytics to designate propositions for which there are no
other prior propositions and which therefore can be used as principles
of demonstration. In such propositions the predicate is necessarily
affirmed or denied of the subject, without the intervention of a middle
term. Therefore their truth can immediately be affirmed. According to
Gerald, the proposition $p$ "No substance is a quantity" provides an
example here. Alen, however, refused to accept this and claimed that
the proposition $p$ is immediate only under special conditions, namely
when taken with reduplication of the subject (cum reduplicatione), that
is, when $p$ is understood as "No substance as substance is a quantity."
Alen here again defended a view put forward by Ockham. In his Summa
logicæ the Venerable Inceptor had said that when dealing with
immediate propositions Aristotle did not maintain that the proposition
$p$ is an immediate one, notwithstanding the reading of some
interpreters.\footnote{See Appendix below, p. 138 note 42, and Aristotle, Analytica posteriora 1.2, 72A8. See also William of Ockham, Summa logicæ 3–39, eds. Philotheus Boehner, Gedeon
Gál and Stephanus Brown, Opera philosophica 1 (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1974),
p. 630. This last passage is quoted in full in the Appendix below.}

Thus two different readings of Aristotle were opposed here. With his
understanding that a relation does not differ from its bearer, Alen
delivered an answer to the disputed question from a Nominalist
perspective. His opponents, however, did not accept this point of view.
According to them it would lead to the absurdity that there were not
three persons, but only two, four or six, which obviously contradicted
the Christian faith. According to Fankel's notes, the controversy ended
with Alen denying the foundations of Aristotle's philosophy: "Dixit
eum negare omnia fundamenta Aristotelis." If this account is true,
Alen would have rejected the entirety of Aristotle. This however is not
very plausible and not in accordance with the rest of the disputation.
Possibly Alen had argued that he did not accept the foundations which
Gerald of Harderwijk considered to be Aristotle's, without implying

109
that he himself departed from Aristotle. This is all the more probable, since Ockham and other Nominalists regarded the position defended here by Alen as the correct reading of Aristotle, criticizing such interpretations as given by Gerald of Harderwick.85 Fanckel’s report that Alen had denied the Aristotelian principles, therefore, rather reflects that he refused to accept the viewpoint of his Thomist and Albertist opponents. Since in Cologne the Nominalists were a minority, it was only natural that the Realists considered their view on Aristotle as the only sensible reading.

2.4 Alen as a Nominalist

By holding the above position, Alen clearly revealed himself to be an adherent of Ockham. He also mentioned his name at one occasion during the dispute. Besides Ockham and Durandus, no further authorities were quoted by him.84 Alen also followed Ockham on other points. For example this was the case in his debate with the Thomist Theodoric of Susteren, who also questioned Alen’s view that the *origines* would account for the distinctions between the persons and asked what then

cau sed the distinction between the *origines* not refer to Thomas Aquinas, it was the matter of things that could only be distinguished in the background here. Thomas had said, the divine persons could not be separated by which they proceed, since the divine attributes, as this distinction is not made by the human mind. Therefore remained as a sufficient explanation.

Again, Alen’s reply was resolved. Exactly the same view was held on the *Sentences.*87

Alen also followed Ockham in his defense of Groningen, who like some of his rivals, took a position regarding how different persons was undivided.88 Alen responded that there are many things that transcended the thing which Ockham had understood. The reason cannot prove that there are not conveyed to his opponents the importance of steps of Ockham did not permit late which trinitarian views had to be.

As said, Alen mentioned Ockham in point in the debate the discussion of the divine attributes, touched upon.
caused the distinction between the *origines*. Although Theodor did not refer to Thomas Aquinas, it was probably Thomas's view that non-material things can only be distinguished by oppositions which was in the background here. Thomas had argued that the distinction between the divine persons could not be grounded in the divine essence from which they proceed, since the divine essence is completely undivided. Nor could it be explained by the distinction between the divine attributes, as this distinction is not real but only rational, being caused by the human mind. Therefore only the relations of opposition remained as a sufficient explanation.

Again, Alen's reply was resolute. For him, it was absolutely no problem that different things proceed from a principle that is one and undivided. Exactly the same view was held by Ockham in his commentary on the *Sentences*.

Alen also followed Ockham in his reply to the opposition of Godfrey of Groningen, who like some of his colleagues touched upon the question regarding how different persons can proceed from something that was undivided. Alen responded that when dealing with the Trinity, there are many things that transcend human understanding, something which Ockham had underscored by pointing out that natural reason cannot prove that there are three divine persons. Alen thus conveyed to his opponents the image of a Nominalist, who in the footsteps of Ockham did not permit human reason, or Aristotle, to stipulate which trinitarian views had to be adhered to, but only faith itself.

As said, Alen mentioned Ockham on only one occasion. At this point in the debate the discussion was not on the Trinity itself but on the divine attributes, touched upon by him in his second *materia*.

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85. See Appendix below, p. 140.
86. Thomas Aquinas, *De potentia* 8.1, ed. Pession, p. 214; and ibid. 8.3, p. 220. For Thomas's argument that the distinction between the divine attributes was only rational, see *Summa theologiae* 1.13.4, ed. 1888, pp. 144–45.
88. See Appendix below, p. 141.
89. William of Ockham, *Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum. Ordinatio* 1.9.1, ed. Girardus I. Etzkorn, *Opera theologica* 3 (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1977), p. 275; and ibid. 1.10.1, p. 328. According to Gabriel Biel, this view was held by many theologians, who in the fifteenth century were labelled as Nominalists. See his *Collectorum* 1.10.1.1, eds. Werbeck and Hofmann, p. 354: "Verum est alius modus loquendi Occam, Gregorii, Oyya, Cameracensis, Adam, Holcot etc., tenentium omnes dictas conclusiones sola fidei auctoritate et non propter rationes ad eas factas (…)"
In the discussion Alen defended a view put forward by Ockham in his *Quodlibeta*, when the Venerable Inceptor no longer held the opinion that universals are objects of human thinking, but thought them to be qualities of the intellectual soul. This particular view had direct consequences for the theory of the divine attributes, which Ockham understood to be either the perfections of the divine nature itself, or the concepts used by man to speak about these perfections.  

In the first case, the attributes were identical with the divine nature, implying no distinction whatsoever. But in the second case things were different. In his *Quodlibeta* Ockham had argued that concepts were real qualities of the human soul and that every distinction between real things was considered as a real distinction, thus the distinction between the "conceptual" attributes was a real distinction too.  

In his reply to the arguments of Henry of Cologne, the *prior vacantialis*, Alen defended exactly this view. He argued that the rational distinction between the attributes is the same as the real distinction between different rational concepts used to refer to the same thing, namely the divine nature: "Distinctio rationis est aliud nisi reales diversitas rationum eandem rem significat."  

Finkel added to this note "Dicit "Ockham," indicating that Alen had referred to Ockham here. Alen did so, we can assume, because this view was difficult to understand for Thomists and Albertists, who did not accept that concepts were real or had real being.  

That this was indeed the case becomes clear from the remainder of the dispute. The Albertist Conradus de Campis immediately reacted with the remark that this was not the right way to speak about the divine attributes. It is impossible, he said, that there is a real distinction between concepts that refer to one and the same thing.  

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92 See Appendix, p. 135.  
93 According to Johannes Parreut, who was a master at the University of Ingolstadt in the late fifteenth century, the Realists attributed real being only to extra-mental things, a view he denied. See his *Exercitata veteris artis*, Ingolstadt 1492, fol. Sv: "(...) ens proprio dictum non vocatur ens extra animam tantum sicut antiqui voluit (...)"; See also Johannes Gerson, in a letter from December 7, 1426 in *Oeuvres Complètes*, ed. Palémon Glorieux, 10 vols. (Paris, 1960–1974), 2:2/6–80, n. 58, esp. p. 279: "Tradunt nonnulli, unde mirandum videtur, quod conceptus et entia rationis non sunt vere res nec entia (...)".

94 See Appendix, p. 136.  
95 As is apparent from the *Dialogica* had real being was a standard Nominalist position. See *Dialogica* (Augsburg, 1517).  
96 *This* is apparent from the author's explicit example in *Dialectica* (Augsburg, 1517). *Stragoryte Dialectica* was used at the University of Freiburg and was mentioned there abundantly quoted. In the Disputationes, there were many references to *Dialectica*. See ibid., p. 158: "Quodquid sit de concl. Aquinas nihil valent. Primo ergo ostendit rationes accipiant multa falsa."  
97 See Appendix below, p. 130–31.  
99 See the anonymously extended edition, *Modernos*, as edited in Ruten, "Contra Modernos".  
100 See on this point as well. See his *Collectoria Theologica* 1.1.24: "Sed quamvis Auctor [namely William of Ockham] in talibus [namely, that God does not fall under] videtur multo probabilis, ut satis late occurs.

By the fifteenth century, when the Nominalist tradition was well-established, such as Robert Holcot, Gregory of Rimini, and Thomas of Inghen. He therefore not only criticized Ockham but also went further. From his point of view, articulated during the *sentences* of a genus. Ockham had always emphasized the importance of Thomas and Duns Scotus, and was convinced by the power of their arguments. But he longer found Ockham's position on the nature of divine attributes was a commonly held position among the Realists.
A real distinction can only exist between real things. Obviously, he had not understood the point made by Alen. For Alen there are real things involved here, namely the different human concepts. The real distinction for Alen is on the level of human thinking, not on that of the divine essence. Again, Fankel's notes show that Alen's Ockhamist view caused confusion and disturbance among his colleagues in Cologne.

By the fifteenth century, when Alen was active at the University of Cologne, the Nominalist tradition had been influenced by authors such as Robert Holcot, Gregory of Rimini, John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen. He therefore not only stayed within the limits set by Ockham but also went further in significant ways. This is apparent from his view, articulated during the debate, that the term "God" falls under a genus. Ockham had denied this. He remained within the lines drawn by Thomas and Duns Scotus, although he was not convinced by the power of their arguments. But the later Nominalists no longer found Ockham's position attractive. In the fifteenth century the notion that God was a generic term, and as such fell under the category of substance, was a commonly held view of the Nominalists.

94 See Appendix, p. 136.

95 As is apparent from the Dialectica of the Johannes Eck, the view that concepts had real being was a standard Nominalist tenet at the time. See Johannes Eck, Aristotelis Stragryte Dialectica (Augsburg, 1517), fol. 14v-xxv.

96 This is apparent from the authorities quoted in Nominalist schoolbooks. A telling example is Johannes Eck, Bursa Pavonis. Logices exercitamenta (Strasbourg, 1507), which was used at the University of Freiburg and in which, next to Ockham, all the authors mentioned were abundantly quoted. Remarkably, although this treatise was a logic textbook, there were many references to theological works, such as the commentaries on the Sentences of Ockham. Gregory of Rimini and Marsilius of Inghen. Ockham's Quodlibeta were also referred to. For further details on Johannes Eck and his Nominalism, see Arno Seifert, Logik zwischen Scholastik und Humanismus. Das Kommentarwerk Johann Eck's, Humanistische Bibliothek 1/31 (München, 1978), esp. pp. 58–73.

97 See Appendix below, p. 130–31.

98 William of Ockham, Scriptum 1.8.1, ed. Etzkorn, p. 177: "(...) dico quod Deus non est in genere. Hoc tamen difficile est probare." Ockham said that the arguments to this effect put forward by Thomas Aquinas were contradictory and absolutely wrong. See ibid., p. 158: "Quidquid sit de conclusione, istae rationes [namely, those of Thomas Aquinas] nihil valent. Primo ergo ostendo quod contradictat sibi ipsi; secundo, quod rationes accipiant multa falsa."

99 See the anonymously extended version of Heymericus de Campo's Contra Modernos, as edited in Ruten, Contra Oceanicum Disolium Modernorum., p. 165: "(...) Deus ponatur in praedicamento substantiae, sicut plures immo breverit omnes terministae vel nominale opinantium." Notably, Gabriel Biel departed from Ockham on this point as well. See his Collectarium 1.8.1, eds. Werbeck and Hofmann, p. 305: "Sed quamvis Auctor [namely William of Ockham] hanc conclusionem tenetum cum aliis [namely, that God does not fall under a genus or predicate], tamen oppositum videtur mullo probabilis, ut satis late estendit Gregorius de Arimino (...)."
Also regarding other points, Alen defended notions that—according to late-medieval doxography, especially as produced by Realists—belonged to the standard Nominalist contentions. The synopsis on pp. 115–18 below juxtaposes a number of the views voiced by Alen in this disputation with two lists composed by Realists at the University of Ingolstadt towards the end of the fifteenth century. The first anonymous list entitled Differentiae inter Realistas et Modernos recorded those points at which the Nominalist reading of Aristotle departed from that of the Realists. The second one is compiled by Johannes of Adorff, and was referred to earlier in this article.\footnote{This second list reveals which Nominalist claims, from the Realists’ perspective, were considered to entail theological difficulties, not only concerning the Trinity, but also Creation and Christology. The first list corresponds with the position of Alen on five points, the second list corresponds on all eight points. From these matches it becomes clear that even if Alen would not have mentioned Ockham, the Realists in Cologne would immediately have recognized him as a straightforward Nominalist holding views that were not only contrary to their interpretation of Aristotle but also a clear source of theological errors.}\footnote{The first list follows the different works of the Corpus Aristotelicum and is edited in Ehrle, Der Sentenzenkommentar des Peter von Canda, pp. 334–38. To give an impression of the meticulousness with which the list was composed: concerning the Three Books of De anima twenty-eight differences were noted. With other books of Aristotle the numbers are similar. For information on the second list, the manuscript and the historical background, see footnote 17 above.}

2.5 The Debates between the Schools

Having worked out the Nominalist profile of Johannes Alen, the dynamics between the different schools of thought as displayed in the
Vtrum in deo uno simplicissimo
sit trium personarum realis
distinctio

Differentiae inter Realistas et
Modernos

Positiones et dicta (...), que videntur
contrariare dictis sanctorum patrum
et discrepare ab his, que tenet ecclesia katholica

Views defended by the Nominalist
Johannes Alen in his *disputatio
vacantialis* and attacked by his
Realist opponents. The *disputatio*
is edited in the Appendix below.

Anonymous list composed at
Ingolstadt listing the Nominalist
readings of Aristotle that were
considered to be wrong, edited in
Ehrle, *Der Sentenzenkommentar des

List composed by Johannes of Adorff
showing that the philosophical views of
the Nominalists contradicted the views
of the catholic church, edited in Ehrle,
*Der Sentenzenkommentar des Peter von
Candia*, pp. 338–42.

- In nullis rebus inter esse et
  essentiam est realis differentia.
  (p. 129)

- Tenet enim Nominales quod (...)
  creatura subsistens sit suum esse.
  (pp. 337–38)

- Tenet ecclesia quod natura angeli
  potest esse et non esse et quod est in
  potentia ad esse, quod concedere
  non possunt *< nisi >* distinguentes
  essentiam ab esse. (p. 339)

- Tenet (sc. ecclesia, MH) quod celum
  et terra a Deo in esse processerunt, cui
  contradicunt dicientes, quod essentia
  ab esse non distinguatur. (p. 339)

- Tenet (sc. ecclesia, MH) quod omnia
  creata indigent a Deo conservari in
  esse, quod non esset, si essent ipsum
  esse. (p. 339)
- In nullis rebus inter naturam et suppositum est realis differentia. (p. 129)
- Tenet enim Nominales quod in rebus materialibus non differt secundum rem natura et suppositum. (p. 337)
- Tenet ecclesia quod in Christo sunt due nature et unum suppositum (...), cui veritati contrariantur non distinguentes realiter naturam a supposito. (pp. 339–40)
- Deus est in genere. (p. 130)
- Tenet ecclesia quod in Deo perfectiones omnium rerum reperientur (...) cui renuntiunt, qui eun in genere predicabili ponere non designatur. (p. 339)
- Substantia dicitur univoce de substantia creada et increata. (p. 132)
- Tenet ecclesia katholica quod natura divina est una numero in tribus personis, cui contrariantur qui Deum dicunt esse speciem aut universale. (pp. 338–39)
- Quantitas discreta non est distincta a re quanta. (p. 134)
- Tenet (sc. ecclesia, MH) quod Deus sit actus purus (...) cui contrariantur, qui Deum in predicamento ponunt. (p. 339)
- Principaliter discrepant (sc. Nominales, MH) a doctrina Realium in phisicalibus et ponunt (...) quod quantitas non sit distincta a substantia realiter. (p. 336)
- Tenet (sc. ecclesia, MH) quod omnes perfectiones creaturarum sunt in Deo, quod dicere non possunt, qui concedunt, quod nomina a perfectionibus imposita univoce de Deo et creatura predicantur. (p. 339)
- Tenet ecclesia quod in sacramento eucharistiae sit quantitas vel divisio (lege dimensio, MH) panis sine substantia panis, quod salvare non possunt non distinguentes quantitatem a substantia. (p. 341)
- Substantia dicitur uniuoce de substantia creatae et increatae. (p. 132)

- Quantitas discreta non est distincta a re quanta. (p. 134)

- Relatio non distinguitur a suo fundamento. (p. 136)

- Principaliter discrepant (sc. Nominales, MH) a doctrina Realium in phisicalibus et ponunt (...) quod quantitas non sit distincta a substantia realiter. (p. 336)

- Item circa predicamentum relationis, aliis modernis ponentibus quod non sit extra animam nec a suo fundamento distinctum, aliis vero oppositum tenentibus cum Aristotele quod sit ens reale; quod predicamentum nisi quis sane intelligat, cum loquitur de distinctione divinarum personarum, sicut cecus de coloribus, saltem fundamentaliter et secundum doctrinam theologicae, quod notandum est. (p. 336)

- Tenet (sc. ecclesia, MH) quod Deus sit actus purus (...) cui contrariantur, qui Deum in predicamento ponunt. (p. 339)

- Tenet (sc. ecclesia, MH) quod omnes perfectiones creaturarum sunt in Deo, quod dicere non possunt, qui concedunt, quod nomina a perfectionibus imposita univoce de Deo et creatura predicantur. (p. 339)

- Tenet (sc. ecclesia, MH) quod post Christi nativitatem Christus mortuus sit, secundum quantitatem non secundum substantiam, cui oviart non distinguentes inter substantiam et quantitatem. (p. 340)

- Tenet ecclesia quod in sacramento eucharistie sit quantitas vel divisio (lege dimenso, MH) panis sine substantia panis, quod salvare non possunt non distinguentes quantitatem a substantia. (p. 341)

- Tenet quoque ecclesia, quod incarnatio filii Dei temporalis, a mater fluens, fuit transiens, sed filiatio, que est relatio supereterna tali generationi fundata est perpetuo manens, cui adversantur dicentes, quod relatio a fundamento realiter non distinguatur. (p. 340)
disputation deserves consideration made at this point. First of all, it Thomists, who attacked John reject the views of Albert the Great. Thus, there seems to be some incorrect noted on several occasions "non sapere was not able to answer the argument. cases, however, he actually pro-Fanckel’s report suggests. The best Albertist Conradus de Campi dis-cussed earlier, the latter arguing to the distinction between different con-Fanckel did not report any answer. This is surprising however, as just vacantialis, Johannes Alen explaining that the content of a concept itself, as a quality of the distinctions between concepts are Campis began his question with “I understood Alen’s answer to the question to the principles of Conradus de Con-fident if one accepts Ockham’s Therefore, in all probability Contra answered to his question and conse-This then caused Servatius Fanck-see Alen’s response. As is clear in these and similar remarkable help to better understand the

162 It needs to be noted, however, that the issue that was at stake during the disputatio sive de mirabilis scientia Dei 1.1.9.38 Hans G. Vogels, Opera omnia 34/1 (Münster, 1999) knowledge in the fifteenth century, the Carthusian, who explicitly mentioned on this point. See his In IV libros Sententiae hac re Albertus non scribit diffusus, sed respondet (…). Ex quibus verbis elicitur, …

163 See the Appendix below, p. 136 and

164 See the Appendix below, p. 136.
disputation deserves consideration, as striking observations can be made at this point. First of all, it was especially the Albertists, not the Thomists, who attacked Johannes Alen, even if Alen himself did not reject the views of Albert the Great but rather those of Thomas Aquinas. Thus, there seems to be some incongruity here.\textsuperscript{102} Also, Servatius Fanckel noted on several occasions “non soluit” to indicate that Johannes Alen was not able to answer the arguments of his opponents.\textsuperscript{103} In some cases, however, he actually provided an answer, contrary to what Fanckel’s report suggests. The best example here is the debate with the Albertist Conradus de Campis concerning the divine attributes discussed earlier, the latter arguing that it is impossible that there is a real distinction between different concepts of one and the same thing. Fanckel did not report any answer by Alen, but just noted “non soluit.” This is surprising however, as just prior, in his final answer to the prior vacantialis, Johannes Alen explained the theory behind his belief, arguing that the content of a concept can have rational being, but that a concept itself, as a quality of the soul, has real being. Therefore, real distinctions between concepts are possible for him. That Conradus de Campis began his question with “impossible est,” shows that he did not understand Alen’s answer to the prior vacantialis.\textsuperscript{104} Indeed, according to the principles of Conradus de Campis, it is impossible that there be a real distinction between concepts. But the answer is completely different if one accepts Ockham’s view proposed in the Quodlibeta. Therefore, in all probability Conradus de Campis misunderstood Alen’s answer to his question and consequently considered it unsatisfactory. This then caused Servatius Fanckel, who shared the same Realist convictions as Conradus de Campis, to simply record “non soluit” without reporting Alen’s response. As is clear for the example just given, examining these and similar remarkable irregularities within the text can help to better understand the debates between the late-medieval

\textsuperscript{102} It needs to be noted, however, that Albert and Thomas shared the same view on the issue that was at stake during the disputation. See Albert the Great, Summa Theologiae sive de mirabilis scientia Dei 1.1.9.38, eds. Dionysius Siedler, Wilhelm Kübel and Hans G. Vogels, Opera omnia 34/1 (Münster, 1978), p. 289. This similarity was common knowledge in the fifteenth century, as can be deduced from the works of Denys the Carthusian, who explicitly mentioned the agreement between Thomas and Albert on this point. See his In IV libros Sententiarum 1.26.2, (as in n. 10), p. 209: “At vero de hac re Albertus non scribit diffuse, sed introductis ad utramque partem motivis respondet (…). Ex quibus verbis elicitur, quod positio Thomae concordat Alberto.”

\textsuperscript{103} See the Appendix below, p. 136 and pp. 138–39.

\textsuperscript{104} See the Appendix below, p. 136.
schools of thought. Therefore it is important to discuss the information provided by the dispute in further detail.

2.5.1 Nominalism and Albertism

Besides the prior vacantialis, who was a Thomist, there were three Albertists active as opponents: Conratus de Campis, Gerald of Harderwijk, and Godfrey of Groningen, as well as three Thomists: Theodor of Susteren, Walter of Dordrecht, and Servatius Fanckel. Furthermore, there were two additional opponents: Antonius and an Augustinian monk, whose doctrinal affiliation is not clear. When one compares the total number of Albertists and Thomists with the division of the two schools among the total number of bachelors and masters listed in Servatius Fanckel's notebook, the presence of three Albertists over against three Thomists is striking. To be sure, the Albertists were an important school in Cologne, with its own bursa, the so-called Bursa Laurentiana. But as has already been noticed by Gabriel M. Löhr, the majority of all bachelors and masters were labeled as "thomista" by Fanckel. This applied to all those who were members of a religious order, as well as to all the rest. Therefore, one would expect that in the disputation under consideration the Thomists would outnumber the Albertists. But that is not the case. That the Albertists were strongly present needs an explanation. As it seems, this was not just a coincidence. The Albertists were not only the first to criticize Johannes Alen, but also the most foundational, focusing on Alen's use of Aristotle. As said before, the first to oppose in a disputatio vacantialis were the licentiates and doctors. In our case this was the Albertist Conratus de Campis. All of the remaining opponents were bachelors, as far as can be determined on the basis of Fanckel's notes. The first bachelor who entered into the disputation was an Albertist, namely Gerald of Harderwijk. His opposition was the most critical, as it was here that Fanckel reported that Alen had denied the principles of Aristotle. Obviously, it was the Albertists in particular who felt challenged by

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106 On the Bursa Laurentiana and its Masters, see Tewes, Die Bursen der Kölner Artisten-Fakultät, pp. 47–73. For a map locating the Bursa Laurentiana, see Hermann Keussen, Die alte Universität Köln. Grundzüge ihrer Verfassung und Geschichte (Cologne, 1934), pp. 64–65. As is clear from this map, the Bursa Laurentiana was situated much farther away from the Dominican Convent than the Thomistic Bursa Montana, itself located next to the convent right across the street.

107 In addition, in 1456 Gerardus de Montana, Heymeric de Campo and the quod quid dictum per decem genera, alio modo. It is for this reason that the question whether God falls under a predicate some striking parallels in the field of logic, but also on issues during the debate, such as the idea of de Velde (a Camp), denker op een kruitstreek, Problematia inter Albertum Magnum et Thomas d'Aquin," Revue Thomsite 108 (2016), pp. 209-216.

108 To understand the following quotation we refer to an anonymous treatise the Albertists are represented by a state in the Promptuarium argumentorum, ed. 1496, istam conclusionem. "Deus non est in aliquo praedicamento. It is for this reason that the question whether God falls under a predicate some striking parallels in the field of logic, but also on issues during the debate, such as the idea of de Velde (a Camp), denker op een kruitstreek, Problematia inter Albertum Magnum et Thomas d'Aquin," Revue Thomsite 108 (2016), pp. 209-216.

109 To be sure, in the fifteenth century, as Johannes Capreolus and Petrus Nigri spinaceus, Capreolus and Nigri, who follow the view of Gregory of Rimini. See John Thomaes Aquinis 1.8.2, eds. Ceslaus Pater.
important to discuss the information as well.

As a Thomist, there were three assistants de Campos, Gerard of Harderberg, and two others: Theodorus Fandekel. Furthermore, Antonius and an Augustinian were clear. When one compares the Divinity of the Albertists with the division of the two groups of bachelors and masters listed in the absence of the Albertists over Grove, we are sure, the Albertists were an unknown bursa, the so-called Bursa not noticed by Gabriel M. Lóvir, the so-called "thomista" by those who were members of a religious society, one would expect that in the homism would outnumber the intention that the Albertists were strongly in humanism, this was not just a coincidence, first to criticize Johannes Aen, who was the Albertist Conradus de lations were bachelors, as far as J. Jackel's notes. The first bachelor was an Albertist, namely Gerald of Aragon, most critical, as it was here that he defended the principles of Aristotle. Particular who felt challenged by

Alen's Nominalism. This fits with the broader picture of the debates between the schools in fifteenth-century Cologne. Heymericus de Campo, in the first part of his Tractatus problematicus, attacked the Nominalists, arguing that their reading of Aristotle was inconsistent and not in line with the traditional view, the sententia peripatetica, as we have seen. In the second half of the fifteenth century, the Tractatus problematicus still attracted attention in the German Empire, as is testified by its manuscript tradition and its printing in 1496. On the other hand, the Thomists were not as opposed to the Nominalists as were the Albertists. Some Thomists in Cologne defended views which at least to a certain extent resembled those of the Nominalists, not only in the field of logic, but also on issues as put forward by Johannes Alen during the debate, such as the idea that God is a generic term. As the Promptuarium argumentorum shows, Thomists and Albertists were divided on this point, the former group holding the view that God indeed belongs to a genus, whereas the latter denied this. This anonymous treatise was highly successful, printed three times in Cologne in the 1490s. Therefore we can safely assume that it referred to opinions that were actually defended by Thomists and Albertists at the time.

107 In addition, in 1456 Gerardus de Monte remarked that the Tractatus was widely used, which he deplored, because in his mind the treatise gave the wrong picture of the views of Albert and Thomas Aquinas. It was for this reason that he published a response, the Tractatus concordans. See my "Commont lere les grand maîtres? Gérard de Monte, Heymeric de Campo et la question de l'accord entre Albert le Grand et Thomas d'Aquin," Revue Thomiste 108 (2008), 105–30, esp. 114–16.

108 To understand the following quotation, the reader has to know that in this treatise the Albertists are represented by a student called Lilius, the Thomists by Spineus. Promptuarium argumentorum, ed. 1496, fol. [vii]: "Quibus expeditis ponit Lilius istam conclusionem 'Deus non est in aliquo predicamento. Contra hoc sic opponit Spineus. Arguitur: Deus est in aliquo praedicamento. Ergo conclusio minus vera (...)." Predicaments were also called "genera." (See e.g. Thomas Aquinas, De ente et essentia, Opera omnia 43 [Rome, 1976], p. 369: "(...) ens per se dupliciter diciitur: uno modo quod quid diuiditur per decem genera, alio modo quod significat propositumur unicum.") It is for this reason that the question whether God falls under a genus is sometimes labelled whether God falls under a predicament or category (praedicamentum). For some striking parallels in the field of logic, see Henk A.G. Braakhuis, "Heymeric van de Velde (a Campo), denker op een kruispunt van wegen. De logische kwestie uit zijn Problemat a int Albertum Magnum et Sanctum Thomam," Algemeen Nederlandsch Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 75 (1983), 13–24, esp. pp. 18–20, and my "Late Medieval Schools of Thought," p. 352.

109 To be sure, in the fifteenth century a number of major defenders of Thomas such as Johannes Capreolus and Petrus Nigri did not maintain the position defended by Spineus. Capreolus and Nigri, who followed Capreolus on this point, argued against the view of Gregory of Rimini. See Johannes Capreolus, Defensiones theologicae divi Thomae Aquinatis 1.8.2, eds. Ceslaus Paban and Thomas Pégues (Tours, 1900; repr.
2.5.2 Nominalism and Thomism

That it was particularly the Albertists who wanted to settle scores with the Nominalists like Johannes Alen did not mean that Alen's own critique was particularly directed toward the views of Albertists. As said, it is striking that Alen defended those views of Ockham, where the latter had attacked Thomas Aquinas. Obviously, his main intention was to strike at the Thomists, not at the Albertists. This is not only the case in the debates over the Trinity, but also concerning the issue of whether or not God is a generic term. Here again Ockham explicitly argued against Thomas Aquinas, saying that Thomas contradicted himself and that his argument contained many things that were untrue.\textsuperscript{110} The resemblance in the way Ockham portrayed Thomas's position in those cases indicates that Alen intentionally looked for such issues, trying to provoke the Thomists by defending those Nominalist views that presented themselves as solutions to apparent contradictions in the works of Thomas Aquinas. In the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth century, a number of Thomists tried to defend Thomas Aquinas against such attacks. Examples are Johannes Capreolus's \textit{Defensiones} and Petrus Nigri's \textit{Clypeus Thomistarum}\.\textsuperscript{111} These works were highly appreciated among Thomists. Having defended his beliefs, Alen thus demonstrated to his colleagues that he did not accept these Thomistic defenses of Thomas Aquinas but retained the anti-Thomism voiced by Ockham. Summarizing these observations, the following picture emerges: it was especially the Albertists that reacted to the Nominalist views of Johannes Alen, whereas Johannes himself was much more concerned with the Thomists. Taking into consideration that in Cologne the Thomists were the dominant party, Alen had indeed chosen the right environment to articulate his criticism of Thomas.

2.5.3 Incommensurate Discourses

To paint a clear picture of the nature of the debates between the schools, it is necessary to return once more to the case where Servatius Fanckel noted “non soluit” to indicate that the response is a perfunctory response. This phrase is relatively rare in another but similar situation Fanckel uses the argument: “Non easuit istud solutio was posed by a Thomist, in As said, it is not always easy to discover solutio,” as it is possible that it reflects Servatius Fanckel rather than Alen. We probably have the case with the debate earlier. If we now have a closer look at the annotation seems to be similar. In two cases of unmistakably Nominalist orientation, God is a generic term, and his contradiction between the categories.\textsuperscript{112} To answer the objections of his opponents, it was in no way sufficient to consider the categories in three out of four Albertists who were much more concerned with the Thomists, it seems rather natural to understand the response as follows.

Obviously in the debate between of the Nominalists, two worlds clashed on the ground. In his \textit{Tractatus problematum}, the Nominalists were no followers of Aristotle's \textit{Physics} between those who do not agree with the Nominalists. This passage from the \textit{Wegstreit}, especially in the participants in the \textit{Auctoritates Aristotelica} is disputandum.\textsuperscript{113} Students noted

\textsuperscript{110} See footnote 98 above.

\textsuperscript{111} Petrus Nigri mentioned the Nominalist criticism explicitly in his introduction. See his \textit{Clypeus Thomistarum}, ed. 1967, fol. 4r`: "Afferam deinde nonnullus litterarum fama atque scientiae praestantisimos viros (...) terministas ac nominales, quorum omnium in Thomam opiniones argumenta contrarietates destruere, solvere, confutare est hoc in opere propositi mel."
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not mean that Alcn’s own cri-
the views of Albertists. As said,
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ously, his main intention was
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the case where Servatius Fanckel

Petrus Nigri, Clypeus Thomistarum
fol. [v6]r–x1v.

criticism explicitly in his introduction.
: “Affermam deinde nonnullos litterarum
... terministas ac nominales, quorum
triaritetas destruire, solvere, confutare
noted “non soluit” to indicate that Alcn was not able to give a satisfac-
tory response. This phrase is recorded three times in the record. In
another but similar situation Fanckel wrote that Alcn could not escape
the argument: “Non euisit istud argumentum.” In one case the ques-
tion was posed by a Thomist, in the other three cases it was Albertists.
As said, it is not always easy to determine the exact nature of the “non
soluit,” as it is possible that it reflects a misunderstanding on the part of
Servatius Fanckel rather than Alcn’s inability to respond. This was
probably the case with the debate over the divine attributes referred to
earlier. If we now have a closer look at the other occurrences, the situa-
tion seems to be similar. In two instances the problems at stake were
of unmistakably Nominalist origin, namely, again, Alcn’s view that
God is a generic term, and his contention that there is no real distinc-
tion between the categories.112 These were such standard Nominalist
views that it is almost unthinkable that Alcn would have been unable
to answer the objections of his opponents. Rather, it seems that the
opponents were in no way satisfied with Alcn’s response. Taking into
consideration that in three out of four cases it was debates with
Albertists who were much more hostile towards the Nominalists than
the Thomists, it seems rather natural that the opponents were unwilling
to understand the response and therefore called it inadequate.

Obviously in the debate between Alcn and his Albertist and Thomist
opponents, two worlds clashed and were unable to find common
ground. In his Tractatus problematicus, after having underscored that
the Nominalists were no followers of Aristotle, Heymericus invoked a
passage from Aristotle’s Physics saying that there can be no debate
between those who do not agree on basic principles, pointing here to
the Nominalists. This passage from the Physics became a key word in
the Wegstreit, especially in the memorable form in which it was abbre-
viated in the Auctoritates Aristotelis: “Contra negantem principia non
est disputandum.”113 Students noted this motto on the books they used

112 See the table above. Furthermore, Petrus Nigri attributes to the Nominalists the
view that the ten categories mentioned by Aristotle are only names used to denote
concepts in the mind unequivocally. See his Clypeus Thomistarum, ed. 1967, fol. S2v:
“Prima opinio est modernorum, quod liber Pradicamentorum est de decem terminis
qui secundum suos modos significandi incomplexis generalissimos advincem distinc-
tios et formaliter non coincidentes significant decem primas intentiones.” He
opposes this view to the received view at his time, the “opinio communis scholae.” See
ibid., fol. S3r.
113 Heymericus de Campo, Tractatus problematicus, ed. 1496, fol. [aiii]: “(...) solum
disputationem praesentem assumpi contra illos qui mecum conveniunt in veritate
in the classroom.\textsuperscript{114} The disputation under consideration here provides a good example of such a debate, especially because Servatius Fankel explicitly reported that the participants did not agree on what the principles of Aristotle were. The repeated notes "non solvit" point in the same direction, as well as the comment that Alen's statements were regarded as "inconsuetum." The weight of a long and steady Realist tradition that had excluded Nominalism made it almost completely impossible for bachelors and masters in Cologne to enter into a serious debate with Johannes Alen. That for Fankel the debate was a clear victory of Albertism and Thomism over Nominalism, saying that Alen was "bene scobatus," is therefore to be considered as a statement colored by his Realism, rather than a remark provoked by the intellectual potential of the respondent.

3. Conclusion

In the famous \textit{Chronicle of the Holy City of Cologne}, published by Johannes Koelhoff in 1499, Cologne was praised as having the most renowned Theological Faculty: "Zo Collen in Duitschland is die hoechste ind beste school in der hilligen gotlicher schrift." Similar to Mother Mary, it is argued, who after the death of her Son Jesus was the master and teacher of all the Apostles, who then went out in the world to preach and teach everywhere, so now Cologne is the leading institution in the spreading and teaching of Christian faith.\textsuperscript{115} This reputation was explained by the fact that both Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great had taught in Cologne and that their teachings were accepted not only in Cologne itself, but also by all other schools and universities.\textsuperscript{116} Koelhoff's \textit{Chronicle} brings parts of Albert's biographic achievements to restore peace in the city and archbishop Engelbert I. It says that on the night of October 16, the beech tree planted by Albert the Younger was uprooted and fell down, together.

Against the background of this, it becomes clear why the Thomists, led by Johannes Alen, the Nominalist view themselves to be the most important and well-respected institution in the tradition of Thomas Aquinas, who had both used Aristotle on many occasions. William of Ockham and his followers. Therefore, the idea among them was that Ockham's views needed protection when they were defended, just as they adhered to the teachings of Thomas Aquinas by mentioning his name, naturally preferring, none of whom were willing to use Aristotle or his views on the Trinity, who became active in the debate over the adherence to Heymericus de Canicella. The city of Cologne had a special affinity for the \textit{Chronicle} made manifest. The All Saints created themselves to be the first to eradicate the errors of the students, so as to keep alive the theological faculty, which was so important for the master.

And how was it with the Thomists who were dominated by the Neo-Scholasticism?

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., p. 289 and p. 464: "Zom 19, in der hilliger stat Coelien gewoent ind kirchen, der leere sonderlich ind integemeisheit ussiegat ind vernamichfeldiget wert, as under dem selven schol Thomas van Aquinas versucht.

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., pp. 23, 146, 530–31, and 623, conflict between the city and Engelbert and politically ausweglose Situationen in nach 800 Jahren. Neue Zugänge, Aspekten und Schritte (Berlin, 2001), pp. 359–73.
under consideration here provides especially because Servatius Fanckel did not agree on what the principle notes "non soluit" point in the statement that Alen's statements were of a long and steady Realist tradition and made it almost completely impossible to enter into a serious debate because the debate was a clear victory of Realism, saying that Alen was "bene disputatione" as a statement colored by his disputation.

The City of Cologne, published by was praised as having the most follen in Duitschland is die hichste schrifft." Similar to Mother in her Son Jesus was the master who then went out in the world to show Cologne is the leading institution of Christian faith. This reputation both Thomas Aquinas and Albert had, and that their teachings were not also by all other schools and universities. Koelhoff's Chronicle is especially copious concerning the relationship between Cologne and Albert the Great. It not only brings parts of Albert's biography to light, underscoring his political achievements to restore peace in Cologne after the strife between the city and archbishop Engelbert II, but also mentions day-to-day facts such that on the night of October 7, 1434, during a heavy storm, the beech tree planted by Albert the Great in front of the church was uprooted and fell down, together with many others.

Against the background of Koelhoff's Chronicle it once again becomes clear why the Thomists and Albertists were so upset by Johannes Alen's Nominalist views. The theologians in Cologne considered themselves to be the most important defenders of Christian faith, standing in the tradition of Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great, who had both used Aristotle on a large scale in their theological writings. William of Ockham and his followers departed from this tradition. Therefore, the idea among the Bachelors and Masters in Cologne was that Ockham's views needed to be ignored, or severely attacked in cases when they were defended. Johannes Alen, being so audacious as to adhere to the teachings of the Venerable Inceptor, and even frankly mentioning his name, naturally provoked a heavy rebuttal by his opponents, none of whom were willing to accept his understanding of Aristotle or his views on the Trinity. That it was especially the Albertists who became active in the debate, can be explained not only by their adherence to Heymericus de Campo, but also by the fact that the holy city of Cologne had a special affiliation with Albert the Great, as the Chronicle made manifest. The Albertists therefore may have felt themselves to be the first to eradicate errors and reinstate harmony among the students, so as to keep alive the holy reputation of the city and its theological faculty, which was so directly linked with the deeds of their master.

And how was it with the Thomists? From a modern point of view, dominated by the Neo-Scholastic stress on the unity of the thomistic

116 Ibid., p. 289 and p. 464: "Zum 19. ist das ein groisse und hoiche wirthschaft, dat in der hilliger stat Coeloen gewoont ind geleert haven die groisten lichter der hilliger kirchen, der leete sonderlich ind integemel in alen universiteten ind hohen schoolen uigesait ind vermannichfledigt wirt, as sin Albertus Magnus bischof zu Regensburg, under dem selven sent Thomas van Aquinen geleert hait zu Coeloen."

system, it might seem strange, but in the fifteenth century there was no unity among the Thomists, not even among the Thomists in Cologne. Partially, this was caused by the difficulty of how to interpret the writings of Thomas Aquinas, which at many points seemed to contradict each other. In the famous Etymologiae seu Concordantiae conclusionum Thomae Aquinatis in quibus videtur sibi contradicere composed by Peter of Bergamo, 200 contradictions were listed and solved. This treatise was printed in Cologne in 1480 – the same year that our disputation took place. It was used by Thomists, as is clear from the manuscript Cologne, Historisches Archiv der Stadt Köln, G.B.F. 200, which contains in its final part, alongside works of Gerardus de Monte in which he criticized Heynricus de Campo, also a copy of Peter of Bergamo’s Etymologiae as well as Gerardus’s own Decisionum sancti Thomae concordanliae, a similar treatise discussing forty-seven alleged contradictions. For the Nominalists, who were looking for reasons to demonstrate that Realism was wrong and contradictory, Thomism therefore was a much better target than Albertism. Seen from this perspective, it is only natural that Johannes Alen directs his attack especially on the position of Thomas, looking for those passages which Ockham had already labeled as contradictory.

That Johannes Alen referred to Ockham is not self-evident, even if Ockham was among the traditional authors considered as the fathers of Nominalism. At most universities where the via moderna was taught, the works of John Buridan and Marsilius were used, not those of Ockham. Only towards the end of the century was there a growing interest in the writings of the Venerable Inceptor himself. Exemplary here is a development at the University of Freiburg. In 1470 the masters of the theological faculty urged their colleagues at the Arts Faculty to read the works of Aristotle and of John Buridan and Marsilius of Padua. Towards the end of the century, he was more and more in the official dogmatism of Theology. In the former, Ockham and in the latter Ockham was mentioned upon regularly. In Johannes Alen, among the authors most frequently attacked were “doctor noster” to him this general pattern of a growing interest in himself, which gradually overshadows his followers John Buridan, Marsilius even if the latter has also left his footprints shown earlier.

It was the details from Servatius’s manuscript the meticulous portrayal of the arguments with a period which is extremely between the different schools of thought thinking fine and outside the understanding with its criticism of Aristotle and delineate the battle lines between. Even if in recent scholarship by David Michael Shank and Christoph Feiner remains understudied. It is therefore to place at the desks of the researches reckoned among the necessary references to debates behind the positions referencies on Aristotle or Peter Lombard.

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118 See Vuillième, Der Buckdruck Kölns, p. 404, n. 912 and Gerardus de Monte, Decisionum sancti Thomae concordanliae, ed. Gilles G. Meersseman (Rome, 1934), with a description of the manuscript on pp. 16–19. An expanded version of Petrus de Bergamo’s work compiled by Ambrosius de Alemania contained 1200 contradictions. It was edited together with the Tabula Aurea in Venice in 1497 and later. The edition of 1773 was reprinted in Florence in 1982 under the title of Concordantiae textuum discordantium divi Thomae Aquinatis.

119 Also in Ingolstadt, the Nominalists highlighted that among the Thomists there was much discussion about the right interpretation of Thomas, referring here to a visit of Peter Schwarz, the author of the Gypezus Thomistarum, to Ingolstadt. During this visit Peter had argued that the masters in Ingolstadt misunderstood Thomas. See Ehrle, Der Sentenzenkommentar des Peter von Candia, p. 332: “(...) eos dixit [namely, Peter Schwarz] non intelligere scripta Thome.”

120 For more details see my “Philosophie der Universität Freiburg und der Wegesrecht,” Neusitz, eds. Dieter Mertens and Heribert Universität Freiburg 2 (Freiburg, 2007), p. 113.


122 Remarkably, Eck uses the epithet of Bursa Pavonis. See, for example, ibid., fol.
In the fifteenth century there was no
among the Thomists in Cologne.
identity of how to interpret the writ-
tory points seemed to contradict
 eius Concordantiæ conclusionum
sibi contradicere composed by
were listed and solved. This trea-
the same year that our disputa-
as, is clear from the manuscript
Stadt Köln, G.B.F. 200, which
works of Gerardus de Monte in
campo, also a copy of Peter of
ardus’s own Decisionum sancti-
e discussing forty-seven alleged
who were looking for reasons to
and contradictory, Thomism
than Albertism. Seen from this
hannes Alen directs his attack
ooking for those passages which
ictory. An expanded version of Petrus
ternania contained 1200 contradictions.
venue in 1497 and later. The edition of
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ion of Thomas, referring here to a visit
omistarum, to Ingolstadt. During this
ad misunderstood Thomas. See Ehrle,
404, n. 912 and Gerardus de Monte,
G. Meersseman (Rome, 1934), with a
An expanded version of Petrus
d of Albertus in Inglen was used, not
end of the century was there a
one Venerable Inceptor himself.
the University of Freiburg. In 1470
urred their colleagues at the Arts
Faculty to read the works of Aristotle according to the commentaries
of John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen, without mentioning Ockham.
Towards the end of the century, however, the name of Ockham appears
more and more in the official documents of both the Faculties of Arts
and of Theology. In the former, the via moderna is entitled “via
Ockham” and in the latter, Ockham’s Sentences commentary was com-
mented upon regularly. In Johannes Eck’s Bursa Pavonis, Ockham is
among the authors most frequently quoted, even with the reverential
addition of “doctor noster” to his name. Johannes Alen fits within
this general pattern of a growing interest for the Venerable Inceptor
himself, which gradually overshadowed the traditional sympathy for
his followers John Buridan, Marsilius of Inghen and Gregory of Rimini,
even if the latter has also left his footprint on Alen’s arguments, as was
shown earlier.

It was the details from Servatius Fankel’s notebook which enabled
the meticulous portrayal of the above situation. Especially when deal-
ing with a period which is extremely complex because of the debates
between the different schools of thought, the disapproval of scholastic
thinking inside and outside the universities and the upcoming refor-
mation with its criticism of Aristotle, such documents help to discover
and delinate the battle lines between the different parties involved.
Even if in recent scholarship promising steps have been taken by
Michael Shank and Christoph Flüeler, most of these notebooks still
remain unstudied. It is therefore time that these sources gain a regular
place at the desks of the researchers of late-medieval thought and be
reckoned among the necessary means for better understanding the
debates behind the positions referred to in the traditional comment-
aries on Aristotle or Peter Lombard.

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120 For more details see my “Philosophie und Theologie im 15. Jahrhundert. Die
Universität Freiburg und der Wegestreich,” in Von der hohen Schule zur Universität der
Neuzzeit, eds. Dieter Mertens and Heribert Smolinsky, 550 Jahre Albert-Ludwigs-
Universität Freiburg 2 (Freiburg, 2007), pp. 67–91.
121 Johannes Eck, Bursa Pavonis Logices exercitamenta, ed. 1507, fol. Bv, fol. Bii,
122 Remarkably, Eck uses the epithet of “venerabilis inceptor” time and again in his
123 I would like to thank John Slotemaker, Friederike Schmia, and the anonymous
reader for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
APPENDIX

This appendix offers a complete edition of the *disputatio vacantialis*, held on the 14th of July 1480 at Cologne, in which the Nominalist Johannes Alen acted as a respondent. As far as we know, this disputation is only recorded in the notebook of Servatius Fanckel, preserved in the manuscript Frankfurt, Stadt- und Universitätsbibliothek, MS. Praed. 102. The disputation is on fol. 81r-82r and bears the number "lxxxvij." Incomplete sentences are completed by myself according to their immediate context. These additions are identified by pointed brackets. Punctuation is in accordance with modern usage and intended to help the reader understanding the sometimes very brief arguments. The answers given by Johannes Alen and the views attributed to him are underlined. The sources referred to in the text are identified in the footnotes, and the implicit sources are noted. If helpful, the relevant passages from these sources are quoted in full. When appropriate, short comments in the footnotes elucidate the arguments put forth by Alen and his opponents. For further information on the form, the content, and the historical significance of the disputation, the reader is referred to the preceding article.

Abbreviations used:

add. = addidit
in marg. = in margine
ms. = manuscript
<...> = words supplied by the editor
[...] = words that should be deleted

1 The manuscript is described in Die Handschriften des Dominikanerklosters und des Leonardstifts in Frankfurt am Main, ed. Gerhard Powitz, Kataloge der Stadt- und Universitätsbibliothek Frankfurt am Main 2/1 (Frankfurt, 1968), pp. 236-37.
 Nominalism in Cologne

VTRUM IN DEO UNO SIMPLICISSIMO
SIT TRIUM PERSONARUM REALIS DISTINCTIO

Magister Johannes Alen, modernus,
qui posuit Colonic consistentia,
et bene scobatus fuit.

<PROPOSITIONES>

<Prima materia de unitate dei>

<1> Pluralitas tum sumorum bonorum, tum infinitorum, tum omnipotentium diuersorum, tum causarum primarum et ultimarum est impossibilis.

<2> Deus est summum bonum, infinitum, omnipotentem, in genere cause efficientis et finalis alpha et omega.

<3> Ob id impossible est plures esse deos et per consequens tantum unus est deus.

<Secunda materia de simplicitate dei>

<4> In nullis rebus inter esse et essentiam, naturam et suppositum est realis differentia.

1 magister ... fuit [in marg. In what follows there is no explicit explanation of which “consonns” are being referred to here. However, on the basis of the discussion and information provided in the study above we can infer that the following theses were called into question by the opponents: “deus est in genere,” “substantia dicitur unico de substantia creat a et increata,” “ens dicitur unico de substantia et accidente,” “quantitas discrete non est distincta a re qua,” “numero non distinguitur a re numerata,” “distinctio rationis non est allud nisi realis diuersitas diuersarum rationum eandem rem significat,” “relatio non distinguetur a suo fundamento,” “distinctio predicamentorum non est reals,” “ab uno principio possunt procedere plures emana-
tiones,” “quattuor relationes sunt tres res, que sunt persone, sicut tres persone sunt una res, que est essentia.”

2 The opinion which Johannes defended here—according to which there is never (in nullis rebus) a real difference between being and essence and between nature and person, not even in corporeal creatures—was labelled nominalist at the end of the 15th century. Cf. Franz Ehrle, Der Sentenzeinschluss des Peter von Candidus des Pisani Papstes Alexanders V. Ein Beitrag zur Scheidung der Schulen in der Scholastik des vierzehnten Jahrhunderts und zur Geschichte des Viete von der Welt, Franziskanische Studien Beihet 9 (Münster, 1925), p. 337: “Tenent enim Nominales quod in rebus materialibus non dierent secundum rem natura et suppositum. Item quod quid est non dierent ab eo cuius est. Item tenent quod creatura subsistens sit suum esse.”
<5> Deus existens in genere omnis compositionis realis expers: esse et essentie, nature et suppositi, substantiie et accidentiis, forme et materie.

<6> Igitur deus est simplicissimus, nichilominus omnium attributialium perfectionum fecundissimus. (fol. 81r)

Tertia materia <de reali distinctione trium personarum>

<7> Due originis processiones monstrant in diuinis plures esse realiter differentes relationes.

<8> Has in creaturis uti in deo esse fundamentum personarum, notiones et proprietates personales omni consonum est ureritati.

<9> Igitur proprietates relative personas constituentes efficient quod in diuinis est trium personarum reales distinctio.

<DISPUTATIO>

<Opposito prioris uacantialis Henrici Jonge de Colonia, thomiste³>

Arguitur.⁴ Non est sumnum malum, ergo non est sumnum bonum, 1 Celi: 'Si unum contrariorum etc.'⁵

Dicit quod non opponuntur contrarie, sed priuatiue.


Dicit quod priuatio aliquid ponit ut subiectum, ut inuestum priuat actum, sed relinquit aptitudinem. Alia est priuatio que nichil ponit, ut secitas, surditas.

Contra. Omnis priuatio hoc ponit, scilicet subjectum, quia hoc est differentia inter oppositionem condactoriam et priuatiuam, quia ibi est unum extremitatem simpliciter non ens; inter priuatiue opposita non est ita. Ergo.

Dicit quod contradistinctionis extremum nichil est, sed extremum priuatiuam ponit subjectum et aptitudinem, sed priuati actum.


⁵ Cf. above "<1> Pluralitas tum sumorum bonorum (...)."

⁶ bono] malo ms.

⁷ Fanckel provides the following information for the fylie of his notebook: "Heinr quaque am. Sprenger de Basilia, ordinis Predicatorum. Coloniensia. [see ibid., fol. 146v, MH] can be found in Gabriel M. Lühr, Die theologische Universitat Köln im ausgehenden 15. Geschicht des Dominikanerordens in Deutschland. In the aula magistralis, see Friez, Geschicht der alten Universität Köln," in Festschrift der Universität Köln im Jahre 1388 (Cologne, 1981).

⁸ Cf. above "<2> Deus existens in genere.

Contra. Priuatio non complexionem magistri. Unde arquitur: Sicut opponi magis bono etc. Sic summum bonum.

Da ut erit et quod non euasit istud a dei.

<Oppositionis proprie>

Arguitur.⁹ Quicquid est sumnum bonum, est bonus est summa bona.

Dicit quod nichil est bonum per se.
Contra. Priuiatio non suscipit magis et minus nisi per ordinem ad habitat. Unde arguitur: Sicut oppositum malo bono; sic magis malum magis bono⁶ etc. Sic summum bonum oppositum summum malo.

<Oppositoris magistri Iacobi Sprunger, Thomiste>

Dicit magister Sprunger quod summum bonum, quod est extra genus, non oppositum malum in genere.

Sed fuit contra istum <sc. Johanne>, qui posuit ipsum deum in genere.⁸ Et uidetur quod non easist istud argumentum.

<Oppositionis prorsis continuatio>

Arguitur.⁹ Quicquid est summum bonum, est bonum per essentiam. Sed omne quod est bonum, est bonum per essentiam. Ergo sunt plura summum bonum.

Dicit quod nihil est bonum per essentiam nisi summum.

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⁶ bono] malo ms.
⁷ Fancet provides the following information about Jacobus Sprunger on the third flyleaf of his notebook: "Hee inquam aule celebrate sunt, aula (…) magistri Jacobi Sprunger de Basilea, ordinis Predicatorum, tunc prorsis (sc. "ordinis eiusdem conuensiis Colonensis", see ibid., fol. 146', MH, Thomiste." Further information about him can be found in Gabriel M. Lohr, Die theologischen Disputationen und Promotionen an der Universität Köln im ausgehenden 15. Jahrhundert, Quellen und Forschungen zur Geschichte des Dominikanerordens in Deutschland 21 (Leipzig, 1936), p. 24, n. 1. On the aula magistralis, see Franz Gschier, "Die Statuten der theologischen Fakultät an der alten Universität Köln," in Festschrift zur Erinnerung an die Gründung der alten Universität Köln im Jahre 1388 (Cologne, 1938), pp. 43–108, esp. pp. 103–04.
⁸ Cf. above "<5> Deus existens in genere (…)" For more information on the background of Johannes's position here, see pp. 113 and 121 above. When comparing this with the works of Ockham, whom Johannes treats as an authority in this discussion, an interesting observation can be made. In his commentary on the Sentences, Ockham criticizes those arguments which Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus used in order to prove that God cannot be subsisted under a genus. For Ockham, it is impossible to give any such proof. See William of Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum. Ordinatio 1.8.1, ed. Girardus I. Etzkorn, Opera theologica 3 (St. Bonaventura, New York, 1977), p. 180: "(…) dico quod non potest per rationem sufficienter probari Deum non esse in genere, quia nec per simplicitatem Dei, sicut ostensum est, nec per necessitatem Dei. (…) Nec etiam potest sufficienter probari per infinitatem Dei. Notwithstanding this impossibility, Ockham sticks to the common doctrine that God does not belong to any genus at all. See ibid., p. 156: "In ista quaestione communiter tenetur quod Deus non est in genere (…)"; and ibid., p. 177: "(…) dico quod Deus non est in genere." Johannes Alen, by arguing that God falls under a genus, goes one step beyond Ockham. His approach shows that he was influenced by authors like Robert Holcot and Gregory of Rimini.
⁹ Cf. above "<2> Deus est summum bonum (…)"
Arguitur.10 Quod est hic et non aliubi, non est ubique. Sic: Quod est hoc et non aliud, non est infinitum. Sed deus secundum uos [deus] est in genere.11 Quod est in genere uno, non habet aliorum generum perfectiones. Si autem habeat omnium generum perfectiones,12 erit transcendens <et infinitum et ergo non erit in genere.> Dicit quod aliquid est in genere dupliciter. Uno modo loyaliter. Et sic est aliquid in genere, quia significat suum subiectum sub modo unius predicamenti et non alterius. Sic <hoc nomen> 'deus'; licet <ipse deus> habeat omnium rerum perfectiones, tamen significat suum subiectum per modum substantie et non aliorum predicamentorum.13 Metaphysiciter autem ponitur res in predicamento et sic etiam deus est in predicamento, quia est substantia et terminus <deus> significat substantiam. Ergo est in predicamento substantie.14

<Questio prioris>

Utrum substantia sit uniuocum ad substantiam creatam et increatam. Dicit quod sic.15 Et similiter ens dicitur uniuoce de substantia et accidente. Contra. Non est eadem ratio entis 'per se' et 'in alio'.

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10 Cf. above "<2> Deus est (...) infinitum."
11 Cf. above "<5> Deus existens in genere (...)".
12 Cf. above "<6> Igitur deus est (...) omnium attributalium perfectionum fecundissimus."
13 The argument concentrates on the term "God," and refers to God in the manner of a substance. In this case the specification "substance" does not refer to the thing itself but to the term which refers to the thing. See William of Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum. Ordinatio 1.2.4, eds. Stephanus Brown and Gedeon Gál, Opera theologia 2 (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1970), p. 132: "(...) potest dici ad intentionem Philosophi et Commentatoris in VII Metaphysicæ, in diversis locis, quod frequenter accipient substantiam pro nomine et termino significante substantiam."
14 Here the focus is on God himself. In his commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge Ockham mentions several meanings of belonging-to-a-genus. One of these meanings is identical with what Johannes Alen is referring to here. See William of Ockham, Expositio in librum Porphyrii de praedicabilibus 2, ed. Ernestus A. Moody, Opera philosophica 2 (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1978), p. 37: "(...) aliquid esse in genere potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo ut sit aliqua vera res contenta sub illo genere et quam illud genus significat et cuissus essentiam illud genus exprimit et declarat (...)"
15 Here Johannes can again rely on Ockham's arguments. Cf. Ockham, Scriptum 1.2.9, eds. Brown and Gál, p. 306: "(...) dico quod Deo et creaturae est aliquid commune uniuocum."
16 It is true for both substance and accidents (per se): namely substance or accident is possible to speak of univocity. However, not in something else (in alio), which is not obtain.
17 cognoscibilis] the word is written in nominative.
18 For Johannes, a thing can be determined.
19 Cf. above "<5> Deus existens in genere (...)"
20 Here the prior vacantis is trying to position by contrasting the second statement to the first statement that the angel's nature is.
21 Johannes distinguishes between 'comparison' by their very nature have the ability imply that angels themselves are composed property of being able to be conjoined with.
Dicit: 'Per <sec>,' dicit circumstantiam cause formalis. Sic etiam accidentis est per se. Si autem dicit circumstantiam cause materialis, sic accidentis est in alio.  

Queritur, que est eadem ratio, quare substantia et accidentis dicuntur ens.

Dicit quod est cognoscibilis et potest exprimi. Et substantia est ens et accidentis est ens.  

<Oppositionis prioris continuatio>

Arguitur. Quicquid est in genere est compositum ex genere et differentia, ex actu et potentia.

Dicit quod hoc intelligitur de substantiis materialibus et non de immaterialibus.

Contra. Angelus est compositus ex genere et differentia. Utrum illa compositio sit in natura angeli uel non. Si sit simplex in natura, que est differentia inter simplicitatem dei et angeli?

Dicit quod est simplex angelii natura et similiter deus. Sed deus non est componibilis, sed angelus est componibilis. Item angelus compositus ex substantia et accidens, Deus non.

Contra. Si angelus est componibilis, ergo est compositus in sua natura ex substantia et accidens, quia componibilis est accidentis, que est de natura angelii secundum uos.

Dicit quod non est compositio.  

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16 It is true for both substance and accident that they are what they are by themselves (per se): namely substance or accident. In this respect, according to Johannes, it is possible to speak of univocity. However, when it is taken into account that accidents exist in something else (in alio), which is not true for substances, then univocity does not obtain.

17 cognoscibilis] the word is written in a fold and is therefore difficult to read.

18 For Johannes, a thing can be determined as a being whenever it can be known or named.

19 Cf. above "<S> Deus existens in genere (..)"

20 Here the prior vacantis is trying to reduce Johannes's argument to a contradiction by contrasting the second statement that by nature an angel is "componibilis" with the first statement that the angel's nature is "simplex" and thus undivided.

21 Johannes distinguishes between "componibilis" and "compositio." The fact that angels by their very nature have the ability to be conjoined with other things does not imply that angels themselves are composed of their nature on the one hand and the property of being able to be conjoined with other things on the other.
Contra. <Sic> non ponit <posito respondentis> maiorem simplicitatem in deo quam in angelo nisi per respectum ad extra.

<Responso respondentis non memorata.>

Arguitur de trinitate. Quod ponitur in numeris etc. est numeratum a numeris distinctus a numerato.

Dict quod quantitas discreta <sc. trium personarum> non est accidents in deo et dicit consequenter quod quantitas discreta non est distincta a re quanta.

Queritur. Quare albedo distinguere a re alba et non numerus a re numerata?

Dict quod ideo, quia sic non posset producere duas res, quia semper essent tres res, quia numerus distinctus a rebus.

Contra. Idem dicitur de albedine, quia sic non posset tantum duas homines albos, quia albedo distinguere a re alba.

<Responso respondentis non memorata.>


Dict quod nihil superaddidit aliqul reale in deo, immo nec in rebus, sed bene aliqul in mente numeratibus.

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22 ponit ponitur ms.
23 The counter-argument makes manifest how Johannes's position should be understood: the notion that angels are "simplex" by nature implies that angels are undivided, just as God, but in addition they are also dependent on something else, namely an external cause. This latter aspect does not hold true for God. The qualification "per respectum ad extra" here signifies the dependency on the part of the angels.
24 Cf. above "<?> Due originis processiones (...)"
25 According to Ockham, discrete quantities or discrete numbers are identical with the things quantified or numbered. Thus, Johannes follows Ockham at this point. See Williams of Ockham, Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis 10, ed. Gideon Gál, Opera philosophica 2 (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1978), pp. 212–15, esp. p. 215: "Ex praedictis satis patet quod non est verum nec intentio Philosophi ponere quantitatem esse aliquam rem absolutam et per se unam et totaliter distinctam ab aliis rebus (...)." See also the reference to Ockham in the following footnote.
26 Johannes's argument goes as follows: If numbers were different from the things counted, it would be impossible to produce only two things. Then in order to produce two things the number "two" has to be produced as well, which means that three things would have been produced. Ockham uses a similar argument with respect to the Trinity. See Williams of Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum. Ordinatio 1.24.2, eds. Girardus I. Etzkorn and Francisce E. Kelly, Opera theologica 4 (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1979), pp. 96–111, esp. p. 96: "Et ostendo quod numerus non est aliqua res una absoluta per se in genere distincta realiter a rebus numeratibus."
27 Johannes is holding a position here that was expounded by Ockham in a discussion of Thomas Aquinas's views. See Ockham, Scriptum 1.24.2, eds. Etzkorn and Kelly, pp. 120–21: "Non quod numerus sit aliquod accidents reale inhaerens Deo, sed tantum..."
Nominalism in Cologne

Arguitur. Per duas processiones non possunt procedere nisi due nature. Sed in deo non procedit nisi una natura <sc. trium personarum>. Ergo non sunt due processiones in deo.

<Responsio respondentis non memorata.>

Arguitur. Summum bonum est cui nihil deest boni. Sed sunt multa diuersa bona. Si illa sint in deo, deus erit compositus. Dicit quod omnes perfectiones sint in deo, tantum ratione distincte. Et dicit quod distinctio rationis non est aliud nisi realis diuersitas diuer-

rrum rationum eandem rem significatium. Dicit "Ockham."
Oppositio Conradi de Campis, Albertiste

Contra. Impossible est, arguit Campis, quod sit diversitas realis inter rationes tantum unius rei, quia realis ratio non potest fundari nisi in fundamentis realibus. Sed tales non sunt rationes rei. Non solvit. (fol. 82')

Oppositio Gerardi Hardewic, Albertiste

Arguitur contra hoc quod dicitur quod ratio non distinguatur a suo fundamento.


33 On the third flyleaf of his notebook Servatius Fanchel mentions Conradus de Campis as one of the masters who celebrated their aula magistralis and classifies him as an Albertist: "(...) aula (...) magistri Conradi de Campis, Albertiste." A similar remark is found on fol. 146: "(...) magister noster Conradi de Campis, Albertista." Further biographical information about him can be found in Götz-Rüdiger Tewes, Die Bursen der Kölner Artisten-Fakultät bis zur Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts, Studien zur Geschichte der Universität zu Köln 13, Cologne 1993, index s.v. "Conradus Vorn de Campis."

35 According to this remark by Servatius Fanchel, Johannes Alen was not capable of addressing the criticism of Conradus de Campis. But this is highly unlikely given that Johannes had already refuted this objection in the preceding answer to the arguments of the prior vacantialis. There, Johannes had argued that the attributes should be understood as concepts (rationes) in the human mind which refer to the one divine essence (significantes eandem rem). Since all these concepts, being qualities of the human soul, have their foundation in the soul, and since the human soul is something real, the concepts and therefore the attributes are real as well. Consequently they are really distinct from each other (realis diversitas diversarum rationum). It seems that Conradus de Campis did not understand this view of Johannes's, which was based on Ockham, so that the discussion ended in mutual confusion. Servatius Fanchel, who seems to have shared Conradus de Campis's view, was apparently led by this to the conclusion that Johannes could not defend his position (non solvit).

36 Albertiste] Hardewic add. in marg. Gerald of Hardewic received his degree in the arts under Conradus de Campis, who opposed in the present discussion just before Gerald. On the relationship between the two, see Tewes, Die Bursen der Kölner Artisten-Fakultät, pp. 62-63. Gerald, too, was an Albertist. Servatius Fanchel comments on Gerald in his notebook on fol. 24: "Magister Gerardus Hardewic, Albertista. Hunc uidi licitiamat." It is unclear whether Johannes put forward this view during the preceding discussion about the attributes or even earlier with respect to the Trinity, just as he does (again) later on. It is certain, however, that he is following in Ockham's footsteps once more. According to Ockham a relation is identical with its relata. He attributes this position to Aristotle and the Holy Fathers such as Augustine. See Ockham, Expositio
Campis, Albertiste 32

Nisi, quod sit diversitas reals inter relatio non potest fundari nisi in sunt rationes rei.

Harderwich, Albertiste 34

Sed relatio non distinguatur a suo


Conradus de Campis, Albertiste. A similar noster Conradus de Campis, Albertiste. 30

Conradus de Campis, Albertiste. A similar noster Conradus de Campis, Albertiste. 30


Faneck, Johannes Alen was not capable of

But this is highly unlikely given that in the preceding answer to the arguments and argued that the attributes should be rational in which refer to the one divine mind. 

All these concepts, being qualities of the soul, and since the human soul is something real as well. Consequently they are

"Ita diversarum rationum.” It seems that is also the case. The view that are only three "relations reales," because there are only three divine persons, goes back to Ockham. See Ockham, Scriptum 1.11.2, ed. Etzkorn, p. 372: "(...) dico quod personae distinguuntur per relationes disparatas realiter distinctas, nec ex hoc sequitur quod sunt quattuor opposita in divinis, quia non sunt quattuor relations in divinis realiter distinctae.

Here, Johannes is not talking about the foundation of the person, but about the foundation of the relation (relation). In his reply to the Thomist Walker of Dordrecht (Wolterus de Dordraco) later on, Johannes will emphasize that the relations are identical in the divine essence: “Quatuor relationes sunt tres res, quae sunt personae, sit tres personae sunt una res, qua est essentia.” On the basis of this assumption Gerald of Harderwich’s argument does not apply. Ockham, too, regards the divine essence as the foundation for the relation. Cf. Ockham, Scriptum 1.12.1, ed. Etzkorn, p. 376: "(...) fundamentum spirationis activa est unicum, puta divina essentia (...)”. According to the specification of Lateran IV, the divine essence is absolutely undivided. See Enchiridion symbolorum, ed. Denzig and Hünemann, p. 357 (n. 800): "(...) tres quidem personae, sed una essentia, substantia seu natura simplex omnino.” Arguing from this supposition, Johannes is in the position to claim that the relations are not in any way different from their foundation. See also Ockham, Scriptum 1.26.1, ed. Etzkorn and Kelly, p. 153: "(...) potest sustinere quod sunt tres relations realiter distinctes, et tamen quod una essentia sit realiter illae tres relationes (....)."

In accordance with the preceding answers Johannes denies that all categories are really distinct. Ockham, too, disputed that there is a real distinction between all categories. Cf. his Expositio in librum Pracdicamentorum Aristotelis 10, ed. Gál, p. 229: "(...) dico quod una realis et realis non sunt distincta.

According to this argument, real being is principally divided among the ten Aristotelian categories.
Dicet quod non, quia dicit Aristoteles quod acto sit passio.\footnote{See Aristotle, \textit{Physica} 3.3, 202b20–21; and \textit{Les Auctoritates Aristotelis}, ed. Hamesse, p. 148 (2, 101); "Actio et passio sunt unus motus et in passo sicut in subiecto."}

Contra. Ista est immediata: 'Nulla substantia est quantitas', ergo sua opposita est falsa immediata.\footnote{An immediate proposition is a proposition which cannot be inferred from any other proposition. See Aristotle, \textit{Posterior Analytics} 1.2, 72a8. As is clear from Ockham's \textit{Summa logicae}, some contemporaries believed that the proposition "Nulla substantia est quantitas" was used by Aristotle as an example of an immediate proposition. Ockham rejects this interpretation. See his \textit{Summa logicae} 3–5, ed. Philotheus Boehner, Gedeon Gäl and Stephanus Brown, Opera philosophica (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1974), p. 630; "Et si dicatur quod secundum Philosophum, I Posteriorum, haec est immediata 'nulla substantia est quantitas' (...) dicendum quod Aristoteles falsus allegatur in illo passu, quia non facit ibidem mentionem nec de substantia nec de quantitate (...)" The remark a few lines down that Johannes denied Aristotle's premises (\textit{dicit eum negare omnia fundamenta Aristotelis}) indicates that Gerald of Harderwijk was among the followers of those who considered this proposition to be one of Aristotle's examples.}

Dicit cum reduplicacione.\footnote{In a reduplicative proposition (\textit{propositio reduplicativa}) the subject is linked with a further specification in addition to the predicate. For instance: "Human beings insofar as they are human beings are endowed with sense organs." The proposition "Nulla substantia est quantitas" inferred by the opponent can be reformulated as a reduplicative in the following way: "Nulla substantia inquantum substantia est quantitas," Ockham discusses the reduplicative proposition in his \textit{Summa logicae} 2.16, eds. Boehner, Gäl and Brown, pp. 289–96.}

Contra. Ponit inbices propositiones: 'Nullus homo <est> animal;' 'Nullum corporeum est incorporeum;' 'Nulla substantia est quantitas.' Sed ista est uera immediata: 'Nullum corporeum est incorporeum.' Ergo et alia.

Non soluit. Assumpsit aliud, quia dicit eum negare omnia fundamenta Aristotelis.\footnote{Since Johannes (along with Ockham) argues in favour of a different interpretation of Aristotle the Albertist Gerald of Harderwijk seems to have interpreted John's explanation in such a way that it must have seemed to him as if Johannes denied the foundations of Aristotelian philosophy, whereas Johannes only rejected those doctrines which Gerald himself regarded as foundational. Just as in the discussion with the Albertist Conrado de Campis the debate resulted in a principal confusion, which led Fancel to the conclusion that Johannes could not respond to his opponent.}

\textit{<Arguitur.> Relatio presupponit personam. Ergo non constituit personam, quia paternitas sequitur generare, generare presupponit supponit. Ergo ratio non constituit.}


\textit{Item. Quomodo distinctarunt ratio in argu. Durandus fortiter de illa dicit.\footnote{Durandus criticised the view that the same real foundation in creation is at the same time a real foundation in creation and, fol. 17r, 19r.}}
Nominalism in Cologne

Dicit quod relatio secundum 'esse in' in ordine ad 'esse ad' constituit personas.

Qua relatione constituitur persona patris?
Dicit paternitatem et generationem.

Contra. Illa presupponit suppositum constitutum.
Non soluit.

<Opposito Theodericus Sustenen, thomiste> 57

Arguitur. 58 Per nullum causam uel rationem cogimur ponere rationes uel perfectiones attributae. Non ratione causalitatis, quia ad hoc sufficient ratio ydealis. Non formaliter. Item non eminentiae, quia potest causare calorem sol, non tamen est formaliter calidus.

Bonum argumentum non bene retineri. Uide Durandus. 49

Item. Quomodo distinguantur ratione?
Arguit Durandus fortiter de illa distinctione <rationis>. 50


As can be seen from the reply to the next question, in the case of the Father the "esse in" of the relation refers to the "paternitas" whereas the "esse ad" to the "generationis filii." By analogy, in the case of the Son the "esse in" would refer to the "filiationis" and the "esse ad" to the "generitionis ex patre."

Cf. above "<de> Igitur deus est (...) omnium attributuum perfectionum fecundissimus."

With the remark "a good argument that has not been held back well?" Johannes implies that the argumentation used by the Thomist Theodoricus Sustenen fits exactly what he himself wants to show and is therefore to his own advantage. But since his opponents were obviously determined to give him a hard time it would have been better if Theodor had not come up with this argument because he, Johannes, could now defend himself with Durandus. Durandus discussed the doctrine of the divine attributes at the beginning of his commentary on the Sentences. See Durandus de S. Pourcain, In Sententias commentariorium libri III, 1.2.2 (Venice, 1571; repr. Ridgewood, New Jersey, 1964), fol. 17b. 19b.

Durandus criticised the view that the divine attributes could be distinguished without reference to creation. According to him, the differences between the attributes are grounded in factual differences between created perfections, which then are predicated by men of the one and undivided God. Consequently, for Durandus the divine attributes are rationally distinguished by the human mind (ratione distincta) having at the same time a real foundation in creation (fundamentum in re creatum). See Durandus, ibid., fol. 18b: "Alia est opinio, quae mihi videtur verior, scilicet quod distinctio attributiorum secundum rationem non potest sumi nisi per comparisonem ad aliquam realis diversitatem actu existentem in creaturis, vel possibilib. Quod probatur..."


Dicit quod distinguuntur seipsi et una <processio, sc. actus uoluntatis> presupponit aliam <sc. actus intellectus>. 53

primo sic. Differentia rationis, nisi sit falsa et vana, licet sit completiva ab intellectu, oportet tamen quod habet fundamentum in re. Sed differentia attributorum secundum rationem non potest habere sufficiens fundamentum in natura divina absoluta accepta, nisi comparatur ad realem diversitatem quae in creaturis est vel esse potest. Ergo differentia attributorum secundum rationem non potest vere summ nisi per comparationem ad creaturam. 52

52 Johannes’ claim here that the difference between the processes is based on the activities of the divine intellect and will (insofar as these activities are related to the persons) does not imply that for him intellect and will are distinct principles prior to the processes. Later on in the discussion with Theod of Susteren, he emphasises that both processes (flares emanationis) can be produced by the one divine essence (ab uno principio). Thereby, Johannes again takes a position which can be traced back to Ockham. Ockham, too, believed that the difference between the processes need not to be explained by separate principles, which are prior to the processes. Instead, it is the essence itself that can produce different processes. See Ockham, Scriptum 1.2.1, edn. Brown and Gál, pp. 35–36: “(…) non oportet propter istam diversitatem ponere talem distinctiunem inter principia elictiva, quia (…) idem totaliter indistinctum re et ratione potest esse priapicium naturale respectu unius et principium liberali respectu alterius (…)”. Nevertheless, it is possible, according to Ockham, to link these processes with the divine intellect and will, insofar as the intellect and the will refer to the divine essence in different ways. See ibid., p. 35: “(…) metaphoricque locuo et large potest aliquo modo concepi quod una persona producatur per modum naturae sive intellectus, et alia per modum voluntatis sive libertatis. Et hoc sic intelligendo quod intellectus et voluntas uno modo, prout usitaturn a Sanctis, connotant actum generandi et actum spirandi, ita quod intellectus dict ipsam divinam essentiam elictivam actus generandi, et voluntas dict ipsam divinam essentiam elictivam actus spirandi.”

53 If the two processes are produced by the one undivided divine essence, then the difference between the two can only be expressed by saying that one of them is referred to as intellect and the other one as will. As has been shown by his reference to Durandus, Johannes postulates that the difference between the divine attributes does not lie in God, but in the human mind, which makes statements about God on the basis of differences within creation. In accordance with this, the priority of the intellect before the will indicated here has to be regarded as a purely conceptual priority. Similar ideas can be found in Ockham, Scriptum 1.2.1, edn. Brown and Gál, p. 34: “Ultra dico quod non est talis ordo, ita quod unum reale sit propinquis essentiae quam alii; unum tamen potest nobis esse prius notum prae dicari de Deo vel de pronomine demonstrante Deum quam alii; et ad hoc sufficit distinctio talis conceptuum.”


Dicit quod ab uno principio possunt.

Item. Non ex parte terminorum.

Ergo processiones non distinguuntur.

Sed simplicitatia nature.

<Responsio respondentis non me est.

<Opposito Baccalaris de Groningen>

Arguitur. Ubi est reperire aliquis complex. Sed sic est in personis. Ergo,

Dicit quod quando reperitur unicum, est compositum. Sed non quid.

Et hoc respectui secundum est tuit unionem. 58

Contra. ‘Esse ad’ presupponit per se, tuit, quia relatio presupponit termine.

Dicit quod plura hic oportet dicere.

54 This claim goes back to the Venerabilis 1.2.1, edn. Brown and Gál, p. 34: “(…) dic non praesupponit distinctiunem principionem rationem; sed sicut videmus in principium eliciitum diversorum, ita est.

55 Albertiste] Baccalarius Pastor add. in Groningen, mentioned several times by a bachelor of theology. See for instance the preceding year (1479), in Fankel’s note in uacantius Colone alterius uisitationis uon erandum urum in artibus magistrorum Groningensem (…).” In the list of bachats Godfrey of Groningen is called “Albertiste” diiuplato uacantialius of the year 1479.

Groningen pastor thebou in uneclesian Albertista.”

56 Cf. above <6> Igirtus deus est simplex.

57 Here, the opponent asks whether endangers the absolute unity of God.

58 Johannes considers the divine essence as a something that exists by itself. The positive beings (respectiva), since they are cont and being related to (esse ad).

59 Ockham, too, had emphasised on by faith cannot be argued for by nature.
OMNIS HOC GENERIS


<Responsio respondentis non memorata.>

<Oppositio Baccalarii Pastor alias Godefri de Groningen, albertiste>

Arguitur. Ubi est reperiire aliquid et aliquid, non est simpliciter simplex. Sed sic est in personis. Ergo,

Dicet quod quando reperitur aliquid et aliquid absolutum et absolutum, est compositum. Sed non quando est absolutum et respectum. Et hoc respectuum secundum esse in' in respectu ad esse ad' constituit unionem.

Contra. 'Esse ad' presupponit personam constitutam. Ergo non constituit, quia relatio presupponit terminum.

Dicet quod plura hie oportet dicere que intellectus non capit.
<Oppositio Anthonii>  

Arguitur. Processiones iste non distinguuntur, quia nec ex parte principiorum, nec terminorum.  

Dictae ex utroque.  

Contra. Sicut intellectus necessitatur a uero, sic voluntas a summo bono. Sicut ergo generatio filii est necessaria, sic etiam spiratio spiritus sancti erit necessaria.  

Dictae: non est necessaria necessitate coactionis, sed immutabilitatis.

<Oppositio Wolteri de Dordraco, thomiste>

Arguitur. In diuinis sunt quatuor reales relationes subsistentes. Ergo quatuor personae, quia persona non est aliquid nisi relatio subsistens diuinam.  

Dictae quod relatio ut relatio non distinguat nec constituit, sed ut proprietates.  

Contra. Relatio habet duo, scilicet esse ad et esse in, et secundum illud <sc. esse in> transit in diuinam naturam et ergo secundum esse ad constituit etc.

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60 Anthonii] Antheros add. in marg. He is identical with "Anthonius, pastor (...) sancti Pauli" mentioned among the bachelors by Fanckel in his notebook on fol. 25v.
62 Cf. above "<9> Due originis processiones (...)."
63 The remark "ex utroque" can be understood more fully in the light of a statement made by Johannes in the discussion with Theodor of Susteren, where he emphasized that the processions are both characterised by a twofold relation that distinguishes one from the other: "distinctio est surnenda ex actionibus intellectus et voluntatis sicut respectu ad terminum processionis."
65 necessaria] naturalis ms.
66 necessaria] naturalis ms.
67 thomiste] Wolterus add. in marg. He is to be identified with "Wolterus de Dordraco, thomista" whom Fanckel lists as one of the bachelors in his notebook on fol. 24v. He should not to be confused with Wolterus Hinrici de Dordraco who matriculated at the University of Cologne in 1504. For further details about the latter, see Tewes, Die Bursen, p. 91.
68 Cf. above "<9> (...) in diuinis est trium personarum reallis distinctio."
69 The properties (proprietates) of the divine persons also concern those characteristics which are not relative. Therefore the properties of the Father include not only "parentiam" and "communis spiratio," which express his relation to the Son and the Holy Spirit, but also "ingenium."
Dicit secundum utrumque.\textsuperscript{68} Arguitur.\textsuperscript{69} Quatuor sunt relationes in diuinis. Ergo quatuor persone. Dicit negando consequientiam, quia non tenet in diuinis.\textsuperscript{70} Contra. Multiplicatio inferiori operant superiora multiplicari. Dicit. Quatuor relationes sunt tres res, que sunt persone, sicut tres personae sunt una res, quae est essentia. Non enim ille quatuor relationes habent oppositionem.\textsuperscript{71}

\textbf{<Opposition Augustiniensis>\textsuperscript{72}}

Arguitur. De quibuscumque universum aut contradictoria, realiter distinguuntur aut formaliter. Sed de essentia diuina et persona universantur contra dictoria. Ergo. Maior probatur, quam admissit. Minor probatur, quia essentia communicatur, persona non communicatur etc. Dicit quod illa non sunt realia contraria, quia contradictio est inter rem et rem, qualia non sunt 'communicari' et 'non communicari'.\textsuperscript{73}

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\textsuperscript{68} According to Johannes, the person is constituted by both aspects of the relation (esse in and esse ad) as he had already emphasised in the discussion with Geraldo Harderwick and Godfrey of Gruningen.

\textsuperscript{69} Cf. above "SI (…) in diuinis est trium personarum realis distinctio." Here, Johannes is following the tradition according to which "spiratio activa" is regarded as a relation of its own. Since, however, "spiratio activa" is in reality not distinct from "paternitas" or "filiatio," it is not endowed with its own person, in contrast to the other relations.

\textsuperscript{70} The relations are factually identical with the divine persons and the divine essence. But since the divine essence is undivided, the relations as such do not make up a real opposition. Hence the relations differ from one another only through themselves and through the fact that they constitute the divine persons as three real persons. Here, Johannes defends, against his Thomistic opponent, a doctrine which Ockham had already expounded in his criticism of Thomas Aquinas. Cf. Ockham, \textit{Scriptum} 1.11.2, ed. Etzkorn, pp. 362-67, esp. p. 366.

\textsuperscript{71} Cf. above "SI (…) in diuinis est trium personarum realis distinctio." Here, Johannes is following the tradition according to which "spiratio activa" is regarded as a relation of its own. Since, however, "spiratio activa" is in reality not distinct from "paternitas" or "filiatio," it is not endowed with its own person, in contrast to the other relations.

\textsuperscript{72} The term "communicari" refers to the divine essence, which, being undivided, is communicated to the three persons. The term "non communicari" denotes those characteristics through which the persons are distinguished from one another. This terminology reflects the specifications of Lateran IV. See \textit{Enchiridion symbolorum}, eds. Denzinger and Hünemann, p. 357 (n. 800): "Haec sancta Trinitas, secundum communem essentiam individua, et secundum personales proprietates discreta." Each divine person is completely identical with the one divine essence. This is why the two expressions, "communicari" and "non communicari," cannot represent different things (res et res), as Johannes tries to show.
Item potest negari maior, quia distinctio rationis sufficit fundare contradictionem.  
Contra. Actus essentialis non convenit essentiae nisi mediante persona. Ergo nec actus notionalis convenit essentiae.


 reprehensio respondentis non memorata.

<Opposito Seruatis Fanckel, thomiste>  
Argui ego quod spiritus sanctus adhuc distinguetur a patre, si non procedet ab eo.  

<Respensio respondentis non memorata.>

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24 Johannes seems to regard the concepts of "communicari" et "non communicari" as names that, according to Ockham's teachings, are rationally distinct when their meaning differs (see footnote 31 above).

25 Fanckel calls himself a Theist on fol. 26 of his notebook: "Frater Seruatius Fanckel, ordinis Predicatorum, thomista, collector huius libelli."

26 procedet distinguetur ms.

79 argui ... eoi in marg.

78 Seruatius Fanckel's question (which is strangely enough noted in the margin) recalls the famous debate regarding whether the Holy Spirit would differ from the Son if the former would not proceed from the latter. A negative answer was given by Thomas, who was criticized by Ockham in this matter. Cf. Ockham, Scriptum 1.11.2, ed. Eizkorn, pp. 362–72. Fanckel speaks of the "rather instead of the Son, but, the problem remains the same, namely what causes the distinction between the divine persons. Already at the end of the thirteenth century, this issue divided the minds of the theologians. See Antoine Dondaine, "Un catalogue de dissensiones doctrinales entre les Maîtres Parisiens de la fin du XIIIe siècle," R/AM 10 (1938), pp. 374–94, esp. 384–89: "Utrum Filius distinguetur a Spiritu Sancio si non procederet ab ipso? Dicunt Minores et Henricus quod sic. (...) Sed Thomas tenet contrarium." It is unclear why Fanckel, who considers himself as a Theist, defends Ockham's position (since this would most certainly have been Johannes's position as well). Did he attempt to trick Johannes into affirming this thesis, hoping that Johannes would subsequently be critiqued by his opponents?

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COGNITIVE THEORY AND THE SCHOLASTIC AND MYSTIC EXPLANATION OF THE CARthusian Denys: Why Denys the Carthusian Expounds the Doctrine of the Trinity of the Saints

Kent Larson

Denys the Carthusian (1402–1468), a native of Roermond, where he composed his most famous mystical work La Caravelle, first sought entrance among the Carthusians in 1427. In 1432 the Prior sent him to study at the University of Aix-en-Provence, where he achieved the degree of Master of Arts. In 1436 he entered the order under the Master Guillelmus de Brevis (1408–1469), and became engaged in a bitter dispute over the Holy Spirit. In 1448 Denys studied in the via Latina at the University of Cologne at the University of Bursa Montana. He may still have been under the influence of Thomas de Campo arrived there and established a monastery at Laurentiana), whose proponents, espousing a trinitarian doctrine of Albert the Great to the point of mystically physical and noetic questions. At the turn of the 1430s Denys had corresponded with Albertus Magnus, who had already achieved his degree in the art of mysticism through their correspondence. At Cologne, Denys joined the hospitallers, and he entered the College of the Theology, where he engaged in the study of mysticism. Although Denys had already achieved his degree in the art of mysticism, it is unclear how Denys's writings in his manuscripts of Cartusian Opera selecta: Prologomena, Cartusianica, 2 vols., CCCM 121–121a (Turnhout 1B). I shall cite Denys's writings from these works as Dionysii Cartusiani Opera omnia, cura et directione M. J. J. Toy in 4 vols. (Montreal-sur-Mer-Tournai 1901–1935), hereafter cited as Op. omn.).