

NOMINALISM IN COLOGNE:
THE STUDENT NOTEBOOK OF THE DOMINICAN
SERVATIUS FANCKEL
WITH AN EDITION OF A *DISPUTATIO VACANTIALIS*
HELD ON JULY 14, 1480
“UTRUM IN DEO UNO SIMPLICISSIMO SIT TRIUM
PERSONARUM REALIS DISTINCTIO”

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1.1 *Student Notebooks*

As is apparent from the statutes of the universities and the study programs of the religious orders, disputations played a crucial role in the academic life of the late-medieval and early modern period. Some disputations took place on a daily basis in the different colleges or *bursae* attached to the university (*disputationes nocturnae*), others weekly during the summer recess from academic courses (*disputationes vacantiales*). Also, disputations were held at special academic occasions, for example when the bachelor opened his lectures on Peter Lombard's *Sentences* (*principia*), when he applied for his license (*disputatio de forma*) or when the licentiate acquired his doctor's degree (*vesperiae* and *aulae*).¹

¹ Particularly instructive here are the statutes of the arts faculty and the theological faculty of the University of Cologne, which provide many details on the different kinds of disputations. See Franz J. von Bianco, *Die alte Universität Köln und die spätern Gelehrten-Schulen dieser Stadt*, vol. 1/1: *Die alte Universität Köln* (Cologne, 1856), Appendices, pp. 34–50 (Theological Faculty), and pp. 59–73 (Arts Faculty); and Franz Gescher, “Die Statuten der theologischen Fakultät an der alten Universität Köln,” in *Festschrift zur Erinnerung an die Gründung der alten Universität Köln im Jahre 1388* (Cologne, 1938), pp. 43–108. As for the religious orders, the importance of the disputation is underscored by the rules issued at the Dominican General Chapter held in Rome 1501, in: *Acta Capitulum Generalium Ordinis Praedicatorum IV: 1501–1553*, ed. Benedictus M. Reichert, *Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum Historica* 9 (Rome, 1901), pp. 4–17, esp. p. 15: “(...) nullus de cetero promoveatur ad baccalaureatum seu ad legendum sententias pro forma et gradu magisterii, nisi in aliquo studio generali per tres annos studuerit et in disputationibus et circulatorum frequentia exercitatus fuerit (...)” For further information, with extensive bibliographical references, see Mariken Teeuwen, *The Vocabulary of Intellectual Life in the Middle Ages*, *Études sur le vocabulaire intellectuel du moyen âge* 10 (Turnhout, 2003), p. 440 (index II s.v. “Disputatio”-“Disputationes Sorbonicae”).

Each of these disputations had its own participants and public audience. The *principia* were each scheduled on a single day, the one after the other, with no other classes or academic obligations, so that all members of the faculty could attend. Also the *disputationes vacantiales*, the *aulae* and the *vesperiae* were open to a wide academic public, unlike the *disputationes nocturnae*, which as a rule took place only within the limited circle of the inhabitants of a college or *bursa*.²

Students had to attend these disputations and maintained notes on how often they visited each kind of disputation, to comply with the conditions for earning their degrees. Several early printed editions survived with hand written notes on their pages, distinguishing the different disputations and indicating with vertical bars the total number of visits for each disputation.³ Other students kept special notebooks in which they recorded the arguments put forward during the different disputations—sometimes over a period of many years covering their career from student to master—presumably to have a stock of arguments which would assist them in preparing for the disputations in which they had to act as an opponent or respondent.⁴

² See the sources mentioned in the preceding footnote. For information about the daily practiced *disputatio nocturna*, see, for example, *The Mediaeval Statutes of the Faculty of Arts of the University of Freiburg im Breisgau*, eds. Hugo Ott and John M. Fletcher, Texts and Studies in the History of Mediaeval Education 10 (Notre Dame, 1964), p. 119, n. 48: “Statuit arcium facultas atque ordinavit ut quilibet conventorum in qualibet via per diem habeat unam disputationem pro omnibus suppositis, baccalau-reis et scolaribus, per integram horam durantem (...)”

³ A good example is an edition of the *Expositio Petri Tartareti super textu logices Aristotelis*, printed in Lyon by Claude Davost shortly after 1500, and preserved in the University Library of Freiburg. The top of the title page reads: “Complevi disputationes magistrorum 14, baccalaurii 15, bursales 5.” The first two numbers are represented by vertical bars, whereas the last is written as “iiiiii.”

⁴ That producing arguments was difficult for young students who had to act as opponent is documented in the preface of the *Promptuarium argumentorum*, written to help the students preparing for disputations and printed several times in Cologne. Here the anonymous author explains that he has published the treatise because the students were not able to make up the arguments themselves and therefore needed a booklet that provided them. See *Promptuarium argumentorum*, Cologne 1496, fol. Aii: “(...) libellus (...) ad novellorum scholarium in logicis exercitium collectus, quorum saepius audivi lachrimosas petitiones pro argumentis ut opponendi tempore satisfacerent magistrorum praeceptis.” For further information on this treatise (often wrongly attributed to Heymericus de Campo on the authority of Martin Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik*, 3 vols. (München, 1926–1956), 2:382, who provides no proof however), see my “Late Medieval Schools of Thought in the Mirror of University Textbooks. The *Promptuarium Argumentorum* (Cologne 1492),” in *Philosophy and Learning. Universities in the Middle Ages*, eds. Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen, J.H. Josef Schneider and Georg Wieland,

A number of these notebooks have been preserved in manuscript form and their collectors identified. Most prominent are the notebooks of two Dominicans, Georg Schwartz and Servatius Fanckel, both compiled in Cologne in the second half of the fifteenth century. Some notebooks were designed very carefully, distinguishing between different kinds of disputations and indicating the dates of the disputations as well as the names of the presiding master, of the respondent and of the opponents, as is the case with the notebook of Servatius Fanckel. Others were less carefully made and just give a summary of the different arguments.⁵

Bearing in mind the ubiquity of the disputation in academic life, it is without doubt that the notebooks documenting university debates provide an important source of information, not only for understanding which items were at stake, but also for localizing and dating academic discussions and for attributing opinions to individuals, something which is much more difficult when using commentaries on

Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance 6 (Leiden, 1995), pp. 329–69. A similar anonymous treatise, also printed in Cologne as an aid for the young students who had to participate in the disputations held in their *bursa*, was the *Thesaurus sophismatum* (Cologne, 1495). The title page reads: "(...) iuxta disputativum processum magistrorum bursae Montis, singulis secundis, quartis et sextis feriis quamdiutissime observatum ad profectum neophitorum inibi studentium lucubratisime collectus." For information on this treatise see Ernst Voulliéme, *Der Buchdruck Kölns bis zum Ende des fünfzehnten Jahrhunderts* (Bonn, 1903; repr. Düsseldorf, 1978), pp. 487–88, n. 1135; and Carl von Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*, 4 vols. (Leipzig, 1855–1870; repr. Graz, 1955), 4:225.

⁵ The notebook of Servatius Fanckel is extensively discussed in Gabriel M. Löhr, *Die theologischen Disputationen und Promotionen an der Universität Köln im ausgehenden 15. Jahrhundert*, Quellen und Forschungen zur Geschichte des Dominikanerordens in Deutschland 21 (Leipzig, 1926); and that of Georg Schwartz in my "Tradition and Renewal. The Philosophical Setting of Fifteenth-Century Christology. Heymericus de Campo, Nicolaus Cusanus, and the Cologne *Quaestiones Vacantiales* (1465)," in *Christ among the Medieval Dominicans. Representations of Christ in the Texts and Images of the Order of Preachers*, eds. Kent Emery, Jr., and Joseph P. Wawrykow (Notre Dame, 1998), pp. 462–92, with a partial edition on pp. 481–85. Other notebooks, such as those by Johannes Bremis, Augustine of Weilheim, and of a bachelor called Simon are treated in Michael H. Shank, *Unless You Believe, You Shall Not Understand. Logic, University and Society in Late Medieval Vienna* (Princeton, 1988), pp. 205–19 (Johannes Bremis); and Christoph Flüeler, "Teaching Ethics at the University of Vienna. The Making of a Commentary at the Faculty of Arts (A Case Study)," in *Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages. Commentaries on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, 1200–1500*, ed. István Bejczy (Leiden, 2008), pp. 277–346 (Augustine of Weilheim, Simon). References to further notebooks from within the Dominican and Franciscan order are given by Gabriel M. Löhr, *Die Kölner Dominikanerschule vom 14. bis zum 16. Jahrhundert* (Cologne, 1948), pp. 75–76.

Aristotle or Peter Lombard.⁶ Of course, the arguments preserved in these notebooks are abbreviated and schematized and therefore sometimes difficult to understand, even if one is familiar with the background of the debates. In this respect the notebooks are inferior to the often well structured arguments presented in the commentaries. But where the opinions discussed in these commentaries cannot always be easily identified or attributed (the author can take them from unknown sources), with the information provided by the notebooks the situation is different. As a rule, the owners indicated when and where a specific disputation took place and sometimes even meticulously supplied the names of the students and masters whose arguments were reported, occasionally adding important biographical details.⁷

Since some notebooks record a large number of disputations held at one place, the information provided there helps to establish the intellectual profile of an academic community. This is especially so when these notebooks cover a considerable period of time, as is the case with those of Georg Schwartz and Servatius Fanckel. These notebooks, for example, allow a scholar to see in detail how the Cologne debates developed from the 1460s to the 1480s and what the crucial topics of debate were. Also, they can show why and when a certain issue became a point of contention and divided the students and masters.⁸

In this paper, using the notebook of Servatius Fanckel, I will focus on one such topic, which I think is of considerable historical importance for our understanding of the so-called *Wegestreit*, that is the debate between Nominalists and Realists, as it sheds light on the role of Aristotle within this dispute as well as on the late-medieval reception of Ockham.⁹

⁶ The astonishing insights that the study of notebooks can provide is persuasively demonstrated by the article of Christoph Flüeler mentioned in the preceding footnote.

⁷ Dates are provided in the notebook of Georg Schwartz. The anonymous notebook preserved in Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, O. III. 45, gives dates and names of the respondents (see Gabriel M. Löhr, *Die Teutonia im 15. Jahrhundert. Studien und Texte vornehmlich zur Geschichte ihrer Reform, Quellen und Forschungen zur Geschichte des Dominikanerordens* 19 [Leipzig, 1924], pp. 167–71, where parts of this notebook are edited). Servatius Fanckel noted not only dates and names of respondents, but also of opponents, and thus is of special significance.

⁸ In his study of the notebook of Servatius Fanckel, Gabriel M. Löhr observed the importance of such issues as the Immaculate Conception, indulgences, and the relationship between Pope and Council. See Löhr, *Die theologischen Disputationen*, p. 22. Löhr concentrated less on the use of Aristotle within theology or the *Wegestreit*, even if he mentions these items occasionally.

⁹ On the late-medieval *Wegestreit*, see my “*Via Antiqua and Via Moderna in the Fifteenth Century. Doctrinal, Institutional and Political Factors in the Wegestreit*,”

At stake here was a question traditionally dealt with in the commentaries on the Book I of the *Sentences*, namely what property or properties distinguished the three persons of the Divine Trinity.¹⁰ As the notebook of Servatius Fanckel shows, it was on this occasion that the Realists took a stand against the views of the Nominalist Johannes Alen. The Realists were not willing to accept his reading of Aristotle, and being completely unable to follow his references to Ockham, provide a detailed example of the late-medieval *Wegestreit* on the spot. To delineate the background of this debate, a few words on the role of Aristotle in the *Wegestreit* and on the position of the University of Cologne are necessary.

1.2 Aristotle and the *Wegestreit*

As is well-known, in the fifteenth century several philosophers and theologians were of the opinion that Aristotle's philosophy was the best tool to defend matters of faith. Prominently, this view was held at the beginning of the century by the Parisian Albertist Johannes de Nova Domo.¹¹ Later on the Thomist, Lambertus de Monte, put forward the same belief in his famous *Salvatio Aristotelis* published in Cologne in 1498, and this position became the central topic at the University of

in *The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400–1700*, eds. Russell L. Friedman and Lauge O. Nielsen (Dordrecht, 2003), pp. 9–36 (contains a bibliography), and with special information concerning Cologne, Götz-Rüdiger Tewes, *Die Bursen der Kölner Artisten-Fakultät bis zur Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts*, Studien zur Geschichte der Universität zu Köln 13 (Cologne, 1993), pp. 279–394.

¹⁰ As a rule, in the late-medieval period this question was dealt with when commenting on the twenty-sixth distinction of the First Book of the Lombard's *Sentences*. See, for example, Johannes Capreolus, *Defensiones theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis* 1.26.1.1, ed. Ceslaus Paban and Thomas Pègues (Tours, 1900; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1967), pp. 214–35, and Denys the Carthusian, *In IV libros Sententiarum* 1.26.1–4, Opera omnia 20 (Tournai, 1902), pp. 199–227. Thomas addressed the same issue in his *Summa theologiae* 1.40.2, Opera omnia 4 (Rome, 1888), pp. 413–14. By the time Servatius made his notes, Thomas's *Summa* was commented upon regularly and used as a starting point for disputations. For example, Servatius's notebook contains a disputation on the *Summa*. See Löhr, *Die theologischen Disputationen*, pp. 40–41, n. 27.

¹¹ See Luca Bianchi, *Censure et Liberté Intellectuelle à l'Université de Paris (XIII^e–XIV^e Siècles)* (Paris, 1999), p. 162. Bianchi discusses a passage from Johannes's *Commentum aureum*. Another telling statement can be found in the preface to Johannes's *Tractatus de esse et essentia*, edited in Gilles G. Meersseman, *Geschichte des Albertismus I: Die Pariser Anfänge des Kölner Albertismus* (Paris, 1993), p. 92: "Ad hoc enim cuilibet fideli data est licentia philosophandi, potissime in via peripatheticorum, in qua inter coeteras philosophias minor est recepta contradictio, necnon maior conformitas ad veritatem nostrae religionis."

Ingolstadt in the attacks of the Realists against the Nominalists towards the end of the century.¹²

It was especially the Albertists and Thomists who took this stand. They saw themselves backed by the writings of their most important authorities, Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. These two Dominicans not only had commented on the writings of Aristotle, it was argued, but also used his writings in their theological treatises. It was this latter state of affairs that was highlighted by the Albertists and Thomists in Cologne to endorse what they called the “indissolubilis connexio” between philosophy and theology.¹³

However, their view did not remain undisputed. It was the Nominalists who had a different opinion, referring here to the writings of William of Ockham, Adam Wodeham, John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen.¹⁴ These authors showed another understanding of Aristotle, the Nominalists claimed, which led to the opposite conclusion, namely that the philosophy of Aristotle went against Christian faith at crucial points. This was not only the case with such classic issues as the eternity of the world and the immortality of the human soul, but also with those of divine foreknowledge and divine omnipotence.¹⁵ For the Nominalists of the fifteenth century, therefore, it was not necessary, or even helpful,

¹² See Hans G. Senger, “Was geht Lambert von Heerenberg die Seligkeit des Aristoteles an?” in *Studien zur mittelalterlichen Geistesgeschichte und ihren Quellen*, ed. Albert Zimmermann, *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 15 (Berlin, 1982), pp. 293–311; and Franz Ehrle, *Der Sentenzenkommentar des Peter von Candia des Pisaner Papstes Alexanders V. Ein Beitrag zur Scheidung der Schulen in der Scholastik des vierzehnten Jahrhunderts und zur Geschichte des Wegestreits*, *Franziskanische Studien Beiheft* 9 (Münster, 1925), p. 334 (edition of texts from the University of Ingolstadt): “Ex quibus clare patet, quanto doctrina aliqua et singularum scientiarum doctrine fidei et sacre scripture (...) est conformior tanto est perfectior et magis approbanda. Hinc est quod doctrina Aristotelis dictis aliorum philosophorum preferatur.”

¹³ Ehrle, *Der Sentenzenkommentar des Peter von Candia*, p. 284 (edition of texts from the University of Cologne). For comments see Zénon Kaluza, “Les étapes d’une controverse. Les nominalistes et les réalistes parisiens de 1339 à 1482,” in *La controverse religieuse et ses formes*, ed. Alain Le Boulluec (Paris, 1995), pp. 297–317, esp. p. 314.

¹⁴ These names appear among the Nominalists in the documents edited in Ehrle, *Der Sentenzenkommentar des Peter von Candia*, pp. 282 and 284 (Cologne), pp. 313 and 323 (Paris), p. 329 (Ingolstadt).

¹⁵ See Olaf Pluta, *Kritiker der Unsterblichkeitsdoktrin in Mittelalter und Renaissance*, *Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie* 7 (Amsterdam, 1986), esp. pp. 41 and 85; Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen, “Marsilius von Inghen in der Geistesgeschichte des 14. und 15. Jahrhunderts,” in *Philosophie und Theologie des ausgehenden Mittelalters. Marsilius von Inghen und das Denken seiner Zeit*, eds. Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen and Paul J.J.M. Bakker (Leiden, 2000), pp. 21–45, esp. pp. 35–42, and Henrik Wels, *Aristotelisches Wissen und Glauben im 15. Jahrhundert. Ein anonymer Kommentar zum Pariser Verurteilungsdekret von 1277 aus dem Umfeld des Johannes de Nova Domo*, *Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie* 41 (Amsterdam, 2004), pp. cxxxvii–cxxxviii and clv–clvi.

to defend the authority of Aristotle when discussing theological issues. The Heidelberg theologian Marsilius of Inghen had set a good example here, they argued, by using Aristotle in his commentary on the *Sentences* whenever functional, but putting him aside as insufficient as soon as the truth of faith forced him to do so. At the end of the fifteenth century, this attitude was still appreciated as perhaps the best model for those defending the *via moderna*, not only among Nominalists but also for Humanists like Jacobus Wimpfeling.¹⁶

As a consequence, Nominalists in the fifteenth century were much less keen on reading and explaining Aristotle in such a way that his views were compatible with the Christian faith on all points. This provoked a sharp reaction from the side of the Albertists and Thomists, who were anxious that the educational program of the Arts Faculty, which was founded on the writings of Aristotle, would no longer provide a stable foundation for the study of theology. Telling in this respect is a document produced by the theologian Johannes of Adorff at the University of Ingolstadt in which he listed over several pages all of those items where the Nominalist reading of Aristotle was in conflict with faith and thus provoked heresies.¹⁷

1.3 *The University of Cologne*

It was at the University of Cologne that the issue came to a head. In the already mentioned *Salvatio Aristotelis*, Lambertus de Monte underscored that there were no points whatsoever where Aristotle was

¹⁶ See *Marsilius von Inghen. Gedenkschrift 1499 zum einhundertsten Todestag des Gründungsrektors der Universität Heidelberg*, eds. Dorothea Walz and Reinhard Düchting, *Lateinische Literatur im deutschen Südwesten 1* (Heidelberg, 2008), esp. pp. 35–46.

¹⁷ This document is edited in Ehrle, *Der Sentenzenkommentar des Peter von Candia*, pp. 338–42. The list bears the following rubric, *ibid.*, p. 338: “Infra notantur positiones et dicta (...), que videntur contrariare dictis sanctorum patrum et discrepare ab his, que tenet ecclesia catholica.” Unfortunately, the manuscript (Munich, Universitätsbibliothek, 2° Cod. ms. 482) has been lost. See *Die lateinischen mittelalterlichen Handschriften der Universitätsbibliothek München. Die Handschriften aus der Filiereihe*, eds. Natalia Daniel, Gerhard Schott and Peter Zahn, *Universitätsbibliothek München. Handschriften der Universitätsbibliothek München 5* (Wiesbaden, 1979), p. 60. On the *Wegestreit* in Ingolstadt see my “*Secundum vocem concordare, sensu tamen discrepare*. Der Streit um die Deutung des Aristoteles an der Universität Ingolstadt im späten 15. und frühen 16. Jahrhundert,” in *Politischer Aristotelismus und Religion in Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit*, eds. Alexander Fidora, Johannes Fried, Matthias Lutz-Bachmann and Luise Schorn-Schütte, *Wissenskultur und gesellschaftlicher Wandel 23* (Berlin, 2007), pp. 67–87.

contrary to the faith. It was for that reason, he argued, that the Roman Church had erected philosophical faculties at the universities and that the writings of Aristotle were taught there. He still went one step further and claimed that the principles of the Aristotelian philosophy were in no way opposed to those of the faith. For him, as well as for other Realists, therefore, it went without saying that one could retain the ideas of Aristotle even in those doctrines that were not addressed in his writings, and could not have been discussed there, since they were dependent on the Christian revelation, such as the Trinity.¹⁸

In such an intellectual environment it is only natural that there was almost no place for a reading of Aristotle as practiced by the Nominalists. Now indeed, in the second half of the fifteenth century, the number of Nominalists at Cologne was minimal. This, however, had been different in the past. In the late fourteenth century the tradition of John Buridan was followed at Cologne. By 1414 the masters of the Arts Faculty still showed themselves to be very critical towards a reading of Aristotle as practiced by some Thomists, who were expelled from Paris because of their view on the Immaculate Conception and had made their way to Cologne.¹⁹ Already in 1425, however, the

¹⁸ See Lambertus de Monte, *Quaestio magistralis ostendens quid dici possit de salvatione Aristotelis* (Cologne, 1498), fol. Bi^{rb}: "Sicut autem supra in parte et infra Deo dante patebit: Aristoteles in nullo doctrinae aut legi Christi contrariatur, immo est ei per omnia conformis. Et ideo sancta Romana Ecclesia et sancti patres instituerunt studia universalis philosophiae in quibus studiis luce clarius apparet omnia studia christianorum in philosophia eligere doctrinam Aristotelis tanquam conformem sacrae Scripturae ac dictis sanctorum." Biographical details on Lambertus are provided by Tewes, *Die Bursen der Kölner Artisten-Fakultät*, p. 34. As to the complex history of the promotion of Aristotle by the Roman Church in the early years of the Parisian university—to which Lambertus may have been referring to first and foremost, as Paris was the *alma mater* of all other universities—see Luca Bianchi, "Aristotle as a Captive Bride. Notes on Gregory IX's Attitude towards Aristotelianism," in *Albertus Magnus and the Beginnings of the Medieval Reception of Aristotle in the Latin West*, eds. Ludger Honnefelder et al., *Subsidia Albertina* 1 (Münster, 2005), pp. 777–91, with a critical discussion of the views of Grabmann and Van Steenberghen.

¹⁹ See Anton G. Weiler, *Heinrich von Gorkum (†). Seine Stellung in der Philosophie und der Theologie des Spätmittelalters* (Hilversum, 1962), pp. 56–58, and Tewes, *Die Bursen der Kölner Artisten-Fakultät*, pp. 279–96, and pp. 348–50. Remarkably, between 1334 and 1348 the *Sentences* commentary of Adam Wodeham was read in Cologne, most likely in the Franciscan convent, which shows an early interest in authors that were later to be considered as Nominalist, even before the founding of the university. See William J. Courtenay, *Adam Wodeham. An Introduction to His Life and Writings*, *Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought* 21 (Leiden, 1978), pp. 213–22. As to the debates about the Immaculate Conception and the position of the Thomists, see William A. Hinnebusch, *The History of the Dominican Order*, 2 vols. (New York, 1966–1973), 2:171–80.

Thomists had gained the upper hand, being supported by the Albertist Heymericus de Campo, a student of Johannes de Nova Domo, who was famous for his attacks on Nominalism. In the time to come, the Albertists and Thomists kept their predominance and even reinforced it, making Cologne into a stronghold of Realism.²⁰ In the second half of the fifteenth century, many German universities officially institutionalized both Nominalism and Realism by introducing separate programs of study for both philosophical schools, as for example in Heidelberg (1452), Tübingen (1477) and Freiburg (1487). But in Cologne things were different. There was no such official Nominalist program alongside that of the Realists.²¹

Revealing in this respect is also the publication program of the printers who were linked to the university. Cologne was one of the most important centers for the publication of schoolbooks with famous printers such as Ulrich Zell, Johannes Koelhoff and Henricus Quentell. All of the schoolbooks published in Cologne in the fifteenth century, however, were written by either Albertists or Thomists. Not a single textbook had a Nominalist signature.²² Besides the many schoolbooks, mostly commentaries on Peter of Spain or Aristotle, the works of Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great were also printed in large quantities. In Cologne Nominalist works by authors such as William of Ockham, John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen, however,

²⁰ This predominance is underscored by the university's reaction in 1425 to a letter of the Prince Electors, in which the latter urged the university to follow the tradition of John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen. In its reply, sealed by all the four faculties, the university argued that it is the tradition of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas rather than that of John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen which is the best guarantee of a good education. This letter has survived in both Latin and German versions. See Ehrle, *Der Sentenzenkommentar des Peters von Candia*, pp. 281–309 (edition of the document), and Tewes, *Die Bursen der Kölner Artisten-Fakultät*, pp. 367–75.

²¹ Information on the *viae* at the different universities in the German Empire is provided by Astrik L. Gabriel, "Via Antiqua and Via Moderna and the Migration of Paris Students and Masters to the German Universities in the Fifteenth Century," in *Antiqui und Moderni. Traditionsbewußtsein und Fortschrittsbewußtsein im späten Mittelalter*, ed. Albert Zimmermann, *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 9 (Berlin, 1974), pp. 439–83. In Cologne, there existed a Nominalist *bursa* until the 1440s. After that date there is no longer evidence of such an institution. See Tewes, *Die Bursen der Kölner Artisten-Fakultät*, p. 296.

²² For an almost exhaustive record of incunabula printed in Cologne, see Voulliéme, *Der Buckdruck Kölns*, with a helpful chronological listing of all of the publications of the printers on pp. xcv–cxxxiv and with new materials provided by Severin Corsten in the "Nachwort" (1978), *ibid.*, pp. 544–52.

did not leave the press. The focus of the printers was exclusively on Albertism and Thomism, thus reflecting the intellectual setting of the university.²³

Taking a closer look at these schoolbooks by Albertists and Thomists, it is striking that they seldom refer to Nominalist authors or theories. There is no real debate with Nominalism, at least not in the books that were written in Cologne.²⁴ Slightly different is the situation with those schoolbooks that were printed in Cologne, but written elsewhere, as is the case with the commentaries on Aristotle by the Parisian Master Johannes Versor. But then again, there are only a few references, mostly concerning standard debates such as those concerning the nature of universals.²⁵

The modern reader of these schoolbooks gets the impression that for the Masters in Cologne, Nominalism was not a serious partner for intellectual exchange. Significant here is the position of Heymericus de Campo, who shaped Albertism in Cologne. As he argued in his *Tractatus problematicus*, authors like John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen had excluded themselves from the Aristotelian tradition by defending Ockham's Nominalism, which in Heymericus's eyes was just

²³ It was not unusual that printers matriculated at the university, as was the case with Ulrich Zell. See Voulliéme, *Der Buckdruck Kölns*, p. iii. For information on printing in Cologne, see Severin Corsten, *Studien zum Kölner Frühdruck*, Kölner Arbeiten zum Bibliotheks- und Dokumentationswesen 7 (Cologne, 1985); and idem, *Untersuchungen zum Buch- und Bibliothekswesen*, Arbeiten und Bibliographien zum Buch- und Bibliothekswesen 5 (Frankfurt am Main, 1988).

²⁴ In the earlier mentioned *Thesaurus sophismatum*, for example, the position of the Nominalists is mentioned only on four occasions. See *Thesaurus sophismatum*, ed. 1495, fols. Biii^r, Biiii^r, Dii^r and Diii^r. The subject of this treatise was the so-called *Parva logicalia*, which were dealt with differently by Nominalists and Realists, so one could expect far more discussion here. Generally, the Realists commented upon the *Parva logicalia* as contained in the *Tractatus* or *Summulae* of Peter of Spain (this was the case in Cologne, as is clear from the *Thesaurus sophismatum*), whereas the Nominalists used the *Parva logicalia* of Marsilius of Inghen or of any other Nominalist author (see, for example, *The Mediaeval Statutes of the Faculty of Arts of the University of Freiburg im Breisgau*, eds. Ott and Fletcher, p. 40, n. 4: "Parva Logicalia magistri Marsilii." This quotation is taken from the earliest statutes, written in 1463 when only the *via moderna* was followed in Freiburg).

²⁵ See, for example, Johannes Versor, *Quaestiones super totam veterem artem Aristotelis* (Cologne 1494; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1967), fol. [aviii]^{vb}: "Secunda opinio fuit quorundam qui vocantur nominales qui nunc moderni dicuntur, qui dixerunt universalia totum suum esse habere in intellectu (...)." For Versor's intellectual profile see Pepijn Rutten, "Secundum Processum et Mentem Versoris. John Versor and His Relation to the Schools of Thought Reconsidered," *Vivarium* 43 (2005), 292–336. More than thirty incunabula were printed under the name of Johannes Versor in Cologne.

a malicious corruption of Aristotle.²⁶ This treatise, written at Cologne in 1422 or 1423, first dealt with Nominalism in an introductory prologue, which in the manuscripts bears the title *Contra Modernos*. Here Heymericus showed that because of their philosophical views Nominalists were unable to do science as Aristotle had defined it. Then he moved to the body of his treatise, which was exclusively focused on the debates between Albertists and Thomists and on their reading of Aristotle.²⁷ These two groups he called the followers of the “antiquorum peritia” and the “principales huius temporis philosophiae defensores,” no longer mentioning the Nominalists.²⁸

Since most texts written in Cologne are not engaged in a detailed discussion with Nominalism, it is difficult to get explicit information on how the Albertists and Thomists positioned themselves against Nominalism as it was defended in the second half of the fifteenth century at several other universities in the German Empire, such as

²⁶ Heymericus de Campo, *Tractatus problematicus* (Cologne, 1496), fol. aiii^v: “Et ut omnia dicam: taliter dicentes (sc. the Nominalists, MH) non sunt professores peripateticae veritatis cuius archidoctor fuit et princeps Aristoteles, sed sunt (...) sequentes (...) Occanicam discoliam cum collegiis suis, scilicet Buridano et Marsilio, qui Occam anglicus fuit aemulator paternarum traditionum et non insecutor Aristotelis.” As Pepijn Rutten, “*Contra Occanicam Discoliam Modernorum*. The So-Called *De Universali Reali* and the Dissemination of Albertist Polemics against the *Via Moderna*,” *BPM* 45 (2003), 131–65, has shown, this refutation of Nominalism is authentic and not an adaptation of a treatise attributed to Johannes de Nova Domo. He corrects the view of Anton G. Weiler, “Un traité de Jean de Nova Domo sur les Universaux,” *Vivarium* 6 (1968), 108–54, who argued that Heymeric in *Contra Modernos* had reworked a treatise of his master Johannes de Nova Domo, a view which was uncritically accepted by many researchers, including myself.

²⁷ For a discussion of the *Tractatus*, see Gilles G. Meersseman, *Geschichte des Albertismus II: Die ersten Kölner Kontroversen* (Rome, 1935), pp. 23–60. According to Meersseman, Heymericus wrote his treatise about 1424–1425. However, two manuscripts of the *Tractatus* date from an earlier time, namely 1423 (Schlägl, Stiftsbibliothek [O. Praem.], Cpl. 168, and Strasbourg, Bibliothèque universitaire et régionale, Ms. 55 [Latin 53]), which means that the treatise was written no later than 1423, perhaps already in 1422, when Heymericus arrived in Cologne. I owe this dating to Pepijn Rutten (Nijmegen), who is preparing a critical edition of the *Tractatus problematicus* in which the manuscripts and their owners will be discussed. For a list of manuscripts see Rutten, “*Contra Occanicam Discoliam Modernorum*,” pp. 162–63.

²⁸ Heymericus de Campo, *Tractatus problematicus*, fol. aii^r and fol. hiii^r. An echo of his considering the Nominalists only pseudo-philosophers can be found in the *Thesaurus sophismatum*, where the anonymous author reminds the reader of the fact that the Nominalists (*moderni*) have a supposition theory which differs from that of the Realists (*antiqui*), calling the Realists those who rightly philosophize. See *Thesaurus sophismatum*, ed. 1495, fol. Biiii^r: “*Moderni circa terminorum suppositiones discrepant in quinque punctis a recte philosophantibus antiquis.*”

Vienna or Erfurt. It is here that the notebook of Servatius Fanckel is of assistance.

As is apparent from this notebook, among the many Albertists and Thomists there was at least one Nominalist present in the Convent of the Dominicans in Cologne between the late 1470s and early 1480s, namely Johannes Alen. Fanckel labeled him as “modernus,” most likely because Johannes Alen had received his education at the University of Erfurt, which by then was an important center of Nominalism.²⁹ Remarkably, according to a student manual written in the 1480s, the so-called *Latinum ydeoma*, the Realists were not allowed to teach in Erfurt.³⁰ Erfurt therefore was the Nominalist counterpart of Cologne, where Realism had the upper hand. Why Johannes Alen came to Cologne remains unclear. In any case, it was not just a temporary visit. He participated at least once as respondent in a *disputatio vacantialis*, which as a rule was only open to regular bachelors of theology.³¹

The case of Johannes Alen is important because here we see that it was not only the various interpretations of Aristotle which caused such excitement among his colleagues in Cologne, but also, and perhaps even more, the fact that for him Aristotle was not a necessary tool for doing theology and for clarifying the mysteries of faith, such as the

²⁹ See Löhr, *Die theologischen Disputationen*, p. 28: “mgr Johannes Alen, modernus.” As is clear from the student registers, Johannes Alen matriculated at Cologne in 1465 as a student of theology with a Master’s degree from Erfurt. See Hermann Keussen, *Die Matrikel der Universität Köln 1389 bis 1559*, 3 vols., Publikationen der Gesellschaft für rheinische Geschichtskunde 8 (Bonn, 1892–1931), 1:556, no. 306.43: “Joh. Ryppe de Aylen, m. art. Erf. (...), theol. (...).” On Nominalism in Erfurt, see Götz-Rüdiger Tewes, “Die Erfurter Nominalisten und ihre thomistischen Widersacher in Köln, Leipzig und Wittenberg. Ein Beitrag zum deutschen Humanismus am Vorabend der Reformation,” in *Die Bibliotheca Amploniana. Ihre Bedeutung im Spannungsfeld von Aristotelismus, Nominalismus und Humanismus*, ed. Andreas Speer, *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 23 (Berlin, 1995), pp. 447–88. Probably, the remark in Fanckel’s notebook on fol. 21: “Quidam magister arcium, modernus, baccalareus biblicus” is referring to Johannes Alen as well. If so, he was already active as a respondent in a *disputatio vacantialis* in 1476.

³⁰ See Gerhard Streckenbach, “Paulus Nivius *Latinum ydeoma pro novellis studentibus*. Ein Gesprächsbüchlein aus dem letzten Viertel des 15. Jahrhunderts II,” in *Mittellateinisches Jahrbuch* 7 (1972), pp. 187–251, esp. p. 208: “(...) colunt viam modernorum (sc. in Erfurt, MH), antiquos si qui sunt non admittunt neque ipsis concessum est aut legere aut exercere.”

³¹ This disputation is edited in the Appendix below, pp. 128–44. In the same year (1480) Johannes Alen also acted as an opponent at a *disputatio vacantialis* and as a *responsio formalis pro forma*. See Löhr, *Die theologischen Disputationen*, p. 61, n. 95 and p. 117, n. 233.

Trinity. His critics accused him of departing from what they thought were the principles of Aristotle's philosophy: "Dixit eum negare omnia fundamenta Aristotelis." Alen, for his part, was in no way negatively affected by these attacks. For him, understanding the Trinity was beyond human reason. He argued against his opponents that it was not necessary to follow Aristotle here, but only the Christian faith: "Plura hic oportet dicere que intellectus non capit."³²

During the debate many other issues were touched upon as well. Considering the views defended by Alen, a significant observation can be made. A substantial number of his positions were similar to those highlighted as typical of Nominalism in the writings of late-medieval Realists.³³ This is not without importance. These writings were very polemical, so that for the modern reader it remains unclear to which degree these statements were actually defended by Nominalists or just made up for the sake of the argument, as for example John Wyclif did in his debate with the mysterious "doctores signorum."³⁴ The notebook of Servatius Fanckel, however, makes clear that here this is not the case and that these statements, at least a significant number of them, were indeed held by fifteenth-century Nominalists.

Before entering into an analysis of the debate, it is first necessary to have a closer look at the notebook of Servatius Fanckel and the genre of the *disputatio vacantialis*. Following this discussion I will turn to the philosophical and theological side of the debate, first by discussing Johannes Alen's position and that of his Albertist and Thomist opponents and sketching his profile as a Nominalist, and second by working out the doctrinal antagonisms between Albertism, Thomism, and Nominalism in Cologne. Finally, I will draw a few conclusions that will bring these various aspects together.

Attached to this article is an edition of the relevant *disputatio vacantialis*. The genre of the notebook is such that the arguments of the participants are only briefly reported, which sometimes makes it difficult to locate the arguments historically and to understand them. For that reason, a number of explanatory footnotes have been added to the edition.

³² These quotations are taken from the edition below, p. 138 and p. 141.

³³ For details see section 2.4 below.

³⁴ See William J. Courtenay, *Ockham and Ockhamism. Studies in the Dissemination and Impact of His Thought*, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 99 (Leiden, 2008), p. 379.

2.1 *Servatius Fanckel and his Notebook*

Servatius Fanckel's notebook survived in manuscript Frankfurt, Stadt und Universitätsbibliothek, Ms. Praed. 102.³⁵ The manuscript contains 176 written folios having notes of more than 250 disputations, many of them held in the Dominican Convent at Cologne in the period between 1475 and 1488.³⁶ Servatius entered the Convent in 1467 and began studying theology in 1475, the year in which he also recorded the first disputation. He was for the first time actively engaged as an opponent in a disputation in 1478. Six years later, in 1484, he earned his bachelor's degree in theology. From 1488 onwards he was prior of the Convent, where he remained until his death in 1508. It was in his first year as prior that he stopped recording the disputations.³⁷

Besides the reports of the disputations, the notebook also contains lists with the names of the doctors and bachelors that were active in Cologne.³⁸ Servatius Fanckel noted for example the names of the masters who delivered the ordinary lectures in 1484, the first year that he was a bachelor, as well as those of all the bachelors of theology between 1475 and 1480.³⁹ On one of these lists he also identified

³⁵ For a description of the manuscript see *Die Handschriften des Dominikanerklosters und des Leonardstifts in Frankfurt am Main*, ed. Gerhardt Powitz, Kataloge der Stadt- und Universitätsbibliothek Frankfurt am Main 2/1 (Frankfurt, 1968), pp. 236–37.

³⁶ A detailed list with all the titles and dates of the disputations as given in the notebook has been assembled in Löhr, *Die theologischen Disputationen*, pp. 34–120. The disputations held in the Dominican Convent were open to the public, and members of different faculties participated. See, for example, Löhr, *ibid.*, p. 61, n. 97 and p. 63, n. 102, where Fanckel reports the intervention of a bachelor from the Medical Faculty. Also in the disputation edited below, several seculars and members of different religious orders acted as opponents.

³⁷ For Fanckel's biography (partly based on information provided by Fanckel himself in his notebook), see Löhr, *Die theologischen Disputationen*, pp. 1–3. See also Jacques Quéfif and Jacques Echar, *Scriptores ordinis Praedicatorum recensiti*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1719; repr. New York, 1959), 1:904–05. Since he died in 1508, he is not included in Thomas Kaeppli and Emilio Panella, *Scriptores ordinis Praedicatorum medii aevi*, 4 vols. (Rome, 1970–93).

³⁸ These lists are published with extensive comments in Löhr, *Die theologischen Disputationen*, pp. 23–32.

³⁹ According to the Statutes (Bianco, *Die alte Universität Köln*, p. 40), as a bachelor of theology Fanckel had to respond to questions of each of the masters (*regentes*) who delivered ordinary lectures. It is for that reason that he noted their names in 1484.

himself as the compiler of the notebook: "Frater Seruatius Fanckel, ordinis Predicatorum, thomista, collector huius libelli. 1484."⁴⁰

These lists are of considerable importance because they contain invaluable prosopographical information. In many cases Fanckel added to the names information concerning the student's or master's academic vita.⁴¹ Also, he noted the doctrinal affiliation of the doctors and bachelors. As is apparent from the quotation given above, he considered himself a Thomist. Others were labeled as "albertista", "scotista", "aegidianus", or "modernus" as in the case of Johannes Alen.

Besides the disputations and the lists of names, the notebook contains a systematic index of all disputations and some small extracts from the statutes of the theological faculty, mentioning the oaths that students of theology had to take when they started commenting on the Bible and the *Sentences*.⁴² There were no further items added to the manuscript. There is, for example, no inclusion of philosophical or theological treatises nor of extracts thereof. Fanckel devoted his notebook exclusively to the collection of disputations to which only some personal and practical information was added.⁴³

The largest part of the notebook is covered by *disputationes vacantiales*. These disputations were held every Friday during the academic summer recess. They were especially important for bachelors of theology, since they had to act as a respondent at least once in their tenure as a bachelor.⁴⁴ In addition to the *disputationes vacantiales* three other forms of disputations are recorded: (1) disputations which students of theology, who came from other universities, had to participate in to be accepted as a bachelor, (2) *responsiones pro prima* and *secunda forma*

⁴⁰ Löhr, *Die theologischen Disputationen*, p. 31.

⁴¹ See for example Löhr, *ibid.*, p. 30: "mgr Andreas Schirmer de Franconia, thomista, Doctor factus est anno 1486 in Quadragesima."

⁴² For the index see Löhr, *ibid.*, p. 33. Fanckel noted the index on blanks left throughout the first pages of the manuscript. It is therefore divided into six sections (Frankfurt, Stadt und Universitätsbibliothek, Ms. Praed. 102, fol. 2^v, fol. 3^r, fol. 4^r, fol. 5^v, fol. 6^r, fol. 8^v). The extracts from the statutes are on the first flyleaf of the manuscript, which is not foliated. See Bianco, *Die alte Universität Köln*, pp. 43–44.

⁴³ In contrast, the notebook of Johannes Bremis discussed in Shank, *Unless You Believe*, contains extracts from different theological treatises, mostly commentaries on the *Sentences*.

⁴⁴ See Bianco, *Die alte Universität Köln*, pp. 36 and 37: "Item ordinamus quod in vacacionibus magnis fiant disputationes (...) singulis sextis feriis de mane. (...) nec licenciabitur quis in Theologica facultate qui in vacacionibus sic non responderit, saltem semel."

which were necessary to be recognized as a licentiate, and (3) the *vesperiae* and *aulae* with which the licentiate finished his studies and acquired the doctor's degree.⁴⁵

The manuscript was written by a single hand, namely that of Servatius Fanckel, even if this hand uses different styles of writing, as we will see below.⁴⁶ Yet, it is not clear when exactly Fanckel recorded the information in his notebook. It is certain that at least some small notes were added later on, as is the case with biographical updates to some persons' names already listed, for example that the person had died.⁴⁷ More important, however, is the question at what time Fanckel entered the reports of the disputations in his notebook. As can be concluded from their placement in the manuscript, in all probability he did not write them down during the actual debates but shortly thereafter. Generally, the disputations are noted in chronological order, where one disputation follows upon the other. Occasionally, however, there are blanks between the disputations. Sometimes these blanks are completely empty.⁴⁸ Sometimes only the disputation's title with the so-called *materiae* (see below) are given.⁴⁹ If he had written down the disputations in the manuscript immediately and on the spot, he would have continued writing and these blanks would be difficult to explain. Obviously, therefore, during the debates Fanckel used provisional sheets, which he then copied only later into his notebook, generally before the next disputation took place, as is clear from the chronological order of the notes. From time to time he was unable to do this and left a blank space, to record the information later, and copied the notes concerning the latest disputation somewhat further on in the manuscript. As is clear from the actual state of the manuscript, he did not always fill these blank spaces. Now, the fact that Fanckel always at least tried to supply information on the latest disputation he attended allows for the conclusion that there must have been only a short span of time

⁴⁵ See Löhr, *Die theologischen Disputationen*, p. 41, n. 29: "pro temptamine ad baccalariatum"; p. 80, n. 176: "pro admissione ad bibliam"; pp. 85–98: "vesperia" "aulae doctorales"; and pp. 99–120: "responsiones formales."

⁴⁶ See also *Die Handschriften des Dominikanerklosters*, ed. Powitz, p. 236.

⁴⁷ This is the case with the "obiit" on Frankfurt, Stadt und Universitätsbibliothek, Ms. Praed. 102, fol. 24^r, which was added to the name of Georgius Roth at a later date. Roth died in Freiburg in 1490. See Adolf Poinsignon, "Das Prediger-Kloster zu Freiburg im Breisgau," *Freiburger Diözesan Archiv* 16 (1883), pp. 1–48, esp. p. 22. See also Löhr, *Die theologischen Disputationen*, p. 4.

⁴⁸ See, for example, Frankfurt, Stadt und Universitätsbibliothek, Ms. Praed. 102, fol. 13^{r-v} and 17^r.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, fol. 9^r and 15^r.

between the actual disputation and the report in the manuscript.⁵⁰ In the case of the *disputationes vacantiales* this was not more than one week. Therefore, even if the manuscript itself was not written during the disputations, it must still be taken seriously as a testimony to the debates being chronologically very close to the actual disputations.

2.2 *Disputationes vacantiales*

As was stated above, the majority of disputations recorded in the notebook are *disputationes vacantiales*. The question that is the particular subject of this paper belongs to this genre. *Disputationes vacantiales* were held each week between June 28 and September 15.⁵¹ This means that there were about ten such disputations per year. This is confirmed by the number of reports in Servatius Fanckel's notebook. The only exceptions were the years 1483 and 1484, when Fanckel recorded only three and four disputations respectively, a reduction which may have been due to the plague, as suggested by Gabriel M. Löhr.⁵²

As indicated by the statutes of Cologne the *disputationes vacantiales* were presided over by a so-called *prior vacantialis*, who had to have a master's degree from the Arts Faculty and at the same time was a student of theology without being a member of a religious order. As a rule they were a bachelor or bachelor formatus, which means that most priors were already engaged in reading the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard.⁵³ For each year there was only one *prior vacantialis*. He was

⁵⁰ This was also the conclusion of Löhr, *Die theologischen Disputationen*, p. 4, who was the first to study the manuscript in detail.

⁵¹ For the dating of the academic summer recess in Cologne, where the academic calendar of Paris was followed, see Bianco, *Die alte Universität Köln*, p. 36: "Item ordinamus quod vacaciones magne estivales sint iuxta ritum Parisiensis Studii, a vigilia Apostolorum Petri et Pauli (29 June, MH) usque ad crastinum Exaltationis sancte Crucis inclusive (14 September, MH)." Because of its focus on the arts faculty, in the otherwise very informative work of Olga Weijers, *La disputatio dans les Facultés des arts au moyen âge*, *Studia artistarum* 10 (Turnhout, 2002), there is no mention of the *disputationes vacantiales*. Information on these disputations is also lacking in Teeuwen, *The Vocabulary of Intellectual Life*.

⁵² Löhr, *Die theologischen Disputationen*, p. 18. As medieval and early modern chronicles show, in the years 1483 and 1484 there was a plague not only in Cologne, but also in other German cities. See *Die Chroniken der deutschen Städte vom 14. bis ins 16. Jahrhundert*, vol. 10 (Leipzig, 1872), pp. 369–70; vol. 23 (Leipzig, 1894), p. 43; vol. 36 (Stuttgart, 1931), p. 146.

⁵³ Bianco, *Die alte Universität Köln*, p. 37: "(...) sit presidens Magister in Artibus secularis et saltem studens in Theologia." The condition of the degree of bachelor formatus is on p. 40.

also responsible for the subject of the disputations, which were normally chosen according to the order of the *Sentences*, that is first the status of theology was dealt with, then the Trinity, then the divine attributes, then creation and so forth.⁵⁴

As is clear from Servatius's notebook the respondent answered his question by making a complex syllogism of three arguments, each containing three propositions. Each set of three propositions dealt with a specific part of the question, again in syllogistic form. The last set then gave the answer to the question as a whole. Each set of propositions was called a *materia*. A similar format was also used in the other kinds of disputations recorded by Fanckel. Since it can also be found elsewhere, it seems to be characteristic of late-medieval disputations.⁵⁵

In the manuscript, the question itself and the *materiae* were written in a larger and more careful hand, to distinguish them from the actual disputation that was noted down in a much smaller form.⁵⁶ What is absent from the notebook are the arguments that were given by the respondent to defend his *materiae*. It is not clear why Servatius Fanckel did not report them. In the notes of the other disputations, these arguments do not appear either, with only one exception, which allows one to see how they were organized.⁵⁷ In this case they proceeded according to the standard scholastic model of putting forward authorities and rational arguments. As is apparent from this example, the different propositions that constituted the *materiae* were divided into separate parts, as was done with the title, each of which was treated individually. In the disputations recorded by Fanckel, time and again there are references to these missing arguments. This makes it difficult, at times, to understand what the opponent is exactly pointing at.

⁵⁴ The subject order of Lombard's *Sententiae* is treated in Philipp W. Rosemann, *Peter Lombard* (Oxford, 2004), esp. pp. 54–70.

⁵⁵ A comparable format was used e.g. for the *responsio formalis pro secunda forma*. However, in the example transcribed by Löhr, *Die theologischen Disputationen*, pp. 99–100, there is only mention of the first and the second *materiae*. On the other hand, Heymericus de Campo, in his commentary on the *Sentences*, basically used the system of the three *materiae*. See my "Academic Theology in the Fifteenth Century. The *Sentences* Commentary of Heymericus de Campo († 1460)," in *Chemins de la pensée médiévale*, ed. Paul J.J.M. Bakker, Textes et études du moyen âge 20 (Turnhout, 2002), pp. 513–59, esp. pp. 539–54 (edition).

⁵⁶ This is also the case in the notebook of Georg Schwartz. See, for example, the notebook's picture in *Christ among the Medieval Dominicans*, plate 71 (Eichstätt, Universitätsbibliothek, Cod. st 688, fol. 263^r).

⁵⁷ See Löhr, *Die theologischen Disputationen*, pp. 100–05.

After the respondent had presented his arguments, the actual debate started. The first person to oppose was the *prior vacantialis*, who tested the intellectual flexibility of the respondent by asking him a whole range of small questions touching upon the different aspects of the *materiae* put forward in the argument, often without a clear systemic line of reasoning. In the notebook these questions end with the remark added by Fanckel "huc prior."⁵⁸ Then the licentiates and the doctors opposed, followed by the bachelors and the students. The former, however, did not have to wait their turn but could intervene whenever they thought appropriate, as is also the case in our disputation.⁵⁹ In many cases, especially with the disputations from the period between 1477 and 1485, Fanckel noted the names of the respondents and opponents in the margin of his notebook. Thus he gave modern research a unique instrument to identify these objections, an instrument which will be employed throughout this paper.⁶⁰

The disputation under consideration was held on July 14, 1480.⁶¹ Henry of Cologne acted as *prior vacantialis*, a Thomist according to the notes of Servatius Fanckel. Among the opponents were the Albertists Conradus de Campis and Gerald of Harderwijck, the latter of which was to become the author of many schoolbooks printed in Cologne, as well as the Thomists Theodor of Susteren and Servatius Fanckel himself.⁶²

Striking is a note which Fanckel added in the margin at the beginning of the disputation, which says that the Nominalist Johannes Alen had put forward views that were unusual and that therefore he had been brushed off by his opponents: "Magister Johannes Alen, modernus, qui posuit Colonie inconsueta et bene scobatus fuit." Which views

⁵⁸ See below, p. 135 note 30.

⁵⁹ Jacobus Sprenger, who was a Master, intervened during the opposition of the *prior vacantialis* Henry of Cologne.

⁶⁰ As far as our disputation is concerned, these names are given in the titles of the edition below. Löhr listed a considerable amount of names mentioned in the notebook in his study, which is indexed in Löhr, *Die theologischen Disputationen*, pp. 121–23.

⁶¹ There is no explicit date mentioned in the manuscript. However, our disputation was the second of the series of *disputationes vacantiales* delivered in 1480, the first and the third of which were dated. The first disputation was held on July 7, the third on July 21 (Frankfurt, Stadt und Universitätsbibliothek, Ms. Praed. 102, fol. 80^r and 82^r). This allows for a secure dating of our disputation on the Friday in between, that is July 14, 1480.

⁶² For the schoolbooks published under the name of Gerald of Harderwijck, see Voulliéme, *Der Buchdruck Kölns*, pp. 194–201, nn. 438–46. These were commentaries on Aristotle's logical and physical works, as well as on Peter of Spain's *Summulae*.

were uncommon for the bachelors and masters in Cologne, and how they responded, will become clear if we now turn to the content of the disputation.

2.3 *The Divine Trinity*

Throughout the disputation the issue at stake was the question of whether in the one and undivided divine nature there exist three divine persons that are really distinct. In the background here is a tenet of Christian faith that states that the divine nature is one and that the divine persons are distinguished from each other.⁶³ This provoked the problem of how to distinguish the three persons of the Trinity, if the divine nature is indeed undivided. In the course of time, several answers to this question were given. John Duns Scotus reported four different views on this point, which were also mentioned by William of Ockham, Adam Wodeham, and Gabriel Biel, thus giving testimony to the complexity of the issue.⁶⁴ Earlier, Thomas Aquinas brought up two

⁶³ See, for example, the Pseudo-Athanasianum *Quicumque*, the creed which was mostly referred to in the late-medieval period when discussing trinitarian issues, in *Enchiridion symbolorum definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum*, eds. Heinrich Denzinger and Peter Hünermann, 41st ed. (Freiburg, 2007), p. 51, n. 75: “Fides autem catholica haec est, ut unum Deum in Trinitate, et Trinitatem in unitate veneremur, neque confundentes personas, neque substantiam separantes: alia est enim persona Patris, alia [persona] Filii, alia [persona] Spiritus Sancti (...)” Important also were the declarations of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), *ibid.*, p. 357, n. 800: “Haec sancta Trinitas, secundum communem essentiam individua, et secundum personales proprietates discreta (...)” and the Council of Florence (1442), *ibid.*, p. 461, n. 1330: “Patrem non esse Filium aut Spiritum Sanctum; Filium non esse Patrem aut Spiritum Sanctum; Spiritum Sanctum non esse Patrem aut Filium (...)” For a discussion of late-medieval trinitarian views, see Michael Schmaus, *Der Liber propugnatorius der Thomas Anglicus und die Lehrunterschiede zwischen Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus*, 2. Teil: *Die trinitarischen Lehrdifferenzen*, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 29/1 (Münster, 1930); Hester G. Gelber, *Logic and the Trinity. A Clash of Values in Scholastic Thought, 1300–1335*, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1974; and Russell L. Friedman, *In principio erat verbum. The Incorporation of Philosophical Psychology into Trinitarian Theology, 1250–1325*, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Iowa, 1997.

⁶⁴ John Duns Scotus, *Lectura in librum primum Sententiarum* 1.26.un., Opera omnia 17 (Vatican City, 1966), pp. 318–41, esp. p. 318: “In ista quaestione sunt quattuor modi dicendi.” See also William of Ockham, *Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum. Ordinatio* 1.26.1, ed. Girardus I. Etzkorn and Franciscus E. Kelly, Opera theologica 4 (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1979), pp. 143–53; Adam Wodeham, *Lectura secunda in librum primum Sententiarum* 1.26.1, § 2, vol. 3, ed. Rega Wood and Gedeon Gál (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1990), pp. 414–18; Gabriel Biel, *Collectorium circa quattuor libros Sententiarum* 1.26.1.1, vol. 1, ed. Wilfridus Werbeck and Udo Hofmann (Tübingen, 1973), pp. 526–29.

different opinions, one of which he labeled as insufficient. That was the view according to which the distinction between the three persons is not primarily grounded in the relations between the persons but in the distinction between the so-called *origines* or *processiones originis*.⁶⁵

Thomas Aquinas criticized this view as untenable in his *De potentia*: “Haec opinio non videtur convenienter posse stare,” and even more clearly in his *Summa theologiae*: “Hoc non potest stare.”⁶⁶ His main argument was that a distinction between things, in this case the divine persons, must primarily be related to something that is inherent to these persons and not to something that precedes them, as the origins do. For him, then, it was not so much the *origines*, but the so-called *relationes*, the relations between the persons, that accounted for their distinction.⁶⁷ To do so, these relations needed to have a special property. They had to be in opposition to each other, Thomas claimed, because only oppositions are able to really distinguish non-material things. Since there are three divine persons, of which the Son was generated by the Father, and the Holy Ghost by both the Father and the Son, four such relations were necessary, namely that from the Father to the Son (*paternitas*) and its opposite, that of the Son to the Father (*filiatio*), as well as that from the Father and the Son to the Holy Spirit (*spiratio activa*) and its opposite, that of the Holy Ghost to the Father and the Son (*spiratio passiva*).⁶⁸

If we now turn to the position of Johannes Alen, it is noteworthy that he defended a view which accepted the *origines* as equally essential to articulating the distinction between the divine persons as the

⁶⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *De potentia* 8.3, ed. Paulus M. Pession (Rome, 1953), pp. 220–21: “(...) circa hoc sunt duae opiniones: quarum prima est, quod relationes in divinis non constituunt hypostases, nec distinguunt (...). Et ideo ponit haec opinio, quod hypostases in divinis constituantur origine (...) et quod relatio paternitatis et filiationis secundum intellectum consequatur ad constitutionem et distinctionem personarum (...). Sed haec opinio non videtur convenienter posse stare.” See also his *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* 1.26.2.2, vol. 1, ed. Pierre Mandonnet (Paris, 1929), pp. 633–34, and his *Summa theologiae* 1.40.2, ed. 1888, p. 413.

⁶⁶ See the references in footnote 65 above.

⁶⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.40.2, ed. 1888, p. 413: “(...) ad hoc quod aliqua duo distincta intelligantur, necesse est eorum distinctionem intelligi per aliquid intrinsecum utrique (...). Unde melius dicitur quod personae seu hypostases distinguantur relationibus, quam per originem.”

⁶⁸ *Ibid.* 1.36.2, p. 377: “Relationes autem personas distinguere non possunt, nisi secundum quod sunt oppositae.” For a discussion of Thomas’s view, see Gilles Emery, *La Trinité Créatrice. Trinité et création dans les commentaires aux Sentences de Thomas d’Aquin et de ses précurseurs Albert le Grand et Bonaventure*, Bibliothèque Thomiste 47 (Paris, 1995), pp. 445–54.

relations and thus contradicted Thomas Aquinas with his stress on the primacy of the relations. This is all the more striking as the *prior vacantialis* was a Thomist, namely Henry of Cologne. In the third *materia* of his response, Johannes Alen stated that the two *processiones originis* account for the fact that in God there are several distinct real relations: “Due originis processiones monstrant in diuinis plures esse realiter differentes relationes.” These two processions cause the real relations, which in their turn produce the real distinction between the divine persons. For Alen, therefore, not only the relations, but also the *origines* constitute the distinction.⁶⁹

Before discussing the disapproval voiced by the opponents participating at the disputation, first it is important to realize that Johannes Alen not only accepted something as fundamental to the distinction that was rejected as being such by Thomas, namely the *origines*, but more importantly, that the view he put forward had been held by Ockham.⁷⁰ To be sure, that Alen departed from Thomas would not necessarily have aroused much disturbance among the opponents as it actually did. Among the participants there were not only Thomists but also Albertists, and ever since Heymericus had published his *Tractatus problematicus*, highlighting the differences between Thomists and Albertists, the Thomists were used to criticism of their saintly Master, even in Cologne.⁷¹ Furthermore, Thomas had said himself that the *origines* were in some way responsible for the distinction between the divine persons, even if not principally (*prius et principalius*). So there was an easy way to settle the matter and find a common ground, if the disputants had wanted to.⁷²

Much more delicate and provocative, however, was the fact that Alen defended Ockham's position, who on that occasion had called Thomas's solution absolutely wrong and contradictory.⁷³ Ockham's criticism was a direct consequence of his Nominalist interpretation of Aristotle. For

⁶⁹ See the three propositions of the third *materia* in the Appendix below, p. 130.

⁷⁰ William of Ockham, *Scriptum* 1.26.2, ed. Etzkorn and Kelly, p. 176: “(...) tam origo quam relatio constituit et distinguit personas.”

⁷¹ Although Heymericus's criticism was fundamental, he never explicitly said that Thomas was wrong, but only that his way of arguing was not as convincing as that of Albert the Great. See, for example, his *Tractatus problematicus*, ed. 1496, fol. [Iii]: “Non enim sum tam petulans ut audeam asserere alicubi sanctum Thomam simpliciter errasse (...) sed verisimilius puto veritatem eius in multis indigere correctione pie moderationis, eo quod sententia sua in superficie verborum non continet tantam probabilitatem sicut sententia doctoris mei domini Alberti Magni.”

⁷² Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.40.2, ed. 1888, p. 413.

⁷³ William of Ockham, *Scriptum* 1.26.2, ed. Etzkorn and Kelly, p. 169: “In ista opinio [namely, that of Thomas Aquinas] dicuntur multa falsa et sibi invicem repugnantia.

him, the *origines* and the relations were the same, as far as their being was concerned. In his view, therefore, it was contradictory to deny that the *origines* constituted the differences between the divine persons, if at the same time it was said that the relations do.⁷⁴ Thomas, for that matter, had distinguished between different modes of signifying. Both the *origines* and the relations play a role as being constitutive of the divine persons, he said, but for human understanding the relations are more fundamental.⁷⁵ Here again Ockham was harsh in his criticism of Thomas. Modes of signifying concern only words and thoughts, but not things, whereas here the distinction between things, namely the divine persons, is at stake. Therefore, if it is argued that the relations constitute the persons, it follows that the *origines* must also constitute the persons. Denying this would imply a contradiction, Ockham claimed.⁷⁶

In all likelihood, the theologians in Cologne were familiar with Ockham's attack on Thomas, as in the late fifteenth century Ockham's *Sentences* commentary was commented upon at several universities in the German Empire such as Tübingen and Freiburg. It must be assumed, therefore, that the opponents recognized the background of Alen's position and thus reacted accordingly.⁷⁷

2.3.1 Aristotle and the Trinity

Alen defended Ockham's view in his third *materia*, identifying the *origines* and the relations, which constitute the divine persons.

Primum quod dicit quod personae non constituuntur per origines, est simpliciter falsum.⁷⁴

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.40.2, ed. 1888, p. 413: "Inveniuntur autem in divinis personis duo secundum quae differunt: scilicet origo, et relatio. Quae quidem quamvis re non differant, differunt tamen secundum modum significandi (...)."

⁷⁶ William of Ockham, *Scriptum* 1.26.2, eds. Etzkorn and Kelly, p. 173: "Ex praedictis patet esse manifeste falsum quod iste (sc. Thomas, MH) frequenter dicit quod duo sunt in Deo, scilicet origo et relatio, quae licet in Deo idem sint secundum rem, differunt tamen ratione et modo significandi. Quia illa relatio, quae est eadem realiter cum origine, nullo modo differt modo significandi nec ratione ab origine illa cum qua est eadem realiter. Quia illa quae differunt secundum modum significandi, non sunt nisi signa, quae non sunt idem realiter. Unde illa origo, quae Deus est, nullum modum significandi habet, et ideo modus significandi nihil facit ad hoc quod ipsa constituat vel non constituat." And *ibid.*, p. 169: "(...) quando aliqua sunt idem omnibus modis, et unum vere praedicatur de reliquo, si unum constituit, et reliquum constituit."

⁷⁷ Gabriel Biel, in his *Collectorium circa quattuor libros Sententiarum*, highlighted this criticism. See *Collectorium* 1.26.2, eds. Werbeck and Hofmann, p. 543: "Doctor [namely, Ockham] in hac quaestione primum recitat et impugnat opinionem beati

He again made the same point in his answer to the Albertist Gerald of Harderwijck. On that occasion he claimed that a relation cannot be distinguished from its bearer, even in the case of the Trinity. In the further course of the disputation, in his reply to the Thomist Walter of Dordrecht, he went even further, saying that the relations are identical with the three persons, and these again with the divine essence, as Ockham had also maintained.⁷⁸

With Alen's claim that the relations do not differ from their bearers, the disputation came to its most controversial point. It was also here that Alen's loyalty to Aristotle was addressed. The Albertist Gerald of Harderwijck tried to force Alen into a contradiction by arguing that if the relations were identical with the persons, there would be only three relations. But these three relations would imply that there were six persons, as every relation has two extremes. In his reply, Alen kept to his original position that the relation and its bearer were really the same by claiming that there is no real distinction between the categories, thus revealing his conception of the status of the Aristotelian categories.⁷⁹ Gerald of Harderwijck then confronted Alen with the argument that there are ten categories which are all really distinct from each other. Among these there is one category of substance and another of relation. Therefore relations cannot be identified with their bearers, the substances, without contradiction, he argued.⁸⁰

Alen replied to this attack with an answer traditionally given by many who denied the real distinction between all categories, namely that Aristotle himself had predicated two different categories of one and the same thing and that therefore they cannot be really distinct

Thomae I q. 40 art. 2 tenentis quod (...) personae constituunt et distinguuntur non per origines, sed per relationes (...)."

⁷⁸ See Appendix below, p. 136–137 (reply to Gerald of Harderwijck) and p. 143 (reply to Walter of Dordrecht): "Quattuor relationes sunt tres res, que sunt persone, sicut tres persone sunt una res, que est essentia." In his commentary on the *Sentences*, Ockham underscored that notwithstanding their differences, these relations are really the same as the one and undivided divine essence. See William of Ockham, *Scriptum* 1.26.1, eds. Etzkorn and Kelly, p. 153. This passage is quoted in full in the Appendix below, p. 137 note 38.

⁷⁹ See Appendix below, p. 137: "Negavit iste [namely, Johannes Alen] distinctionem predicamentorum realem." Again, the same view was held by Ockham, *Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis* 10, ed. Gedeon Gál, *Opera philosophica* 2 (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1978), p. 229. For a full quotation of this passage see the Appendix below, p. 137 note 39.

⁸⁰ See Appendix below, p. 137: "Contra: Sunt decem entia realia primo diuersa."

according to his opinion.⁸¹ Gerald then responded by referring to the notion of immediate propositions, a concept used by Aristotle in his *Posterior analytics* to designate propositions for which there are no other prior propositions and which therefore can be used as principles of demonstration. In such propositions the predicate is necessarily affirmed or denied of the subject, without the intervention of a middle term. Therefore their truth can immediately be affirmed. According to Gerald, the proposition *p* "No substance is a quantity" provides an example here. Alen, however, refused to accept this and claimed that the proposition *p* is immediate only under special conditions, namely when taken with reduplication of the subject (*cum reduplicatione*), that is, when *p* is understood as "No substance *as substance* is a quantity." Alen here again defended a view put forward by Ockham. In his *Summa logicae* the Venerable Inceptor had said that when dealing with immediate propositions Aristotle did not maintain that the proposition *p* is an immediate one, notwithstanding the reading of some interpreters.⁸²

Thus two different readings of Aristotle were opposed here. With his understanding that a relation does not differ from its bearer, Alen delivered an answer to the disputed question from a Nominalist perspective. His opponents, however, did not accept this point of view. According to them it would lead to the absurdity that there were not three persons, but only two, four or six, which obviously contradicted the Christian faith. According to Fanckel's notes, the controversy ended with Alen denying the foundations of Aristotle's philosophy: "Dixit eum negare omnia fundamenta Aristotelis." If this account is true, Alen would have rejected the entirety of Aristotle. This however is not very plausible and not in accordance with the rest of the disputation. Possibly Alen had argued that he did not accept the foundations which Gerald of Harderwijck considered to be Aristotle's, without implying

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 138: "Dicit [namely, Johannes Alen] quod non, quia dicit Aristoteles quod actio sit passio." See again William of Ockham, *Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum* 16, ed. Gál, p. 298: "(...) non est intentio Philosophi ponere ista sex praedicamenta importare res distinctas ab aliis rebus absolutis. De actione et passione patet, nam secundum principia Philosophi (...)."

⁸² See Appendix below, p. 138 note 42, and Aristotle, *Analytica posteriora* 1.2, 72a8. See also William of Ockham, *Summa logicae* 3–3.9, eds. Philotheus Boehner, Gedeon Gál and Stephanus Brown, *Opera philosophica* 1 (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1974), p. 630. This last passage is quoted in full in the Appendix below.

that he himself departed from Aristotle. This is all the more probable, since Ockham and other Nominalists regarded the position defended here by Alen as the correct reading of Aristotle, criticizing such interpretations as given by Gerald of Harderwijck.⁸³ Fanckel's report that Alen had denied the Aristotelian principles, therefore, rather reflects that he refused to accept the viewpoint of his Thomist and Albertist opponents. Since in Cologne the Nominalists were a minority, it was only natural that the Realists considered their view on Aristotle as the only sensible reading.

2.4 Alen as a Nominalist

By holding the above position, Alen clearly revealed himself to be an adherent of Ockham. He also mentioned his name at one occasion during the dispute. Besides Ockham and Durandus, no further authorities were quoted by him.⁸⁴ Alen also followed Ockham on other points. For example this was the case in his debate with the Thomist Theodor of Susteren, who also questioned Alen's view that the *origines* would account for the distinctions between the persons and asked what then

⁸³ See William of Ockham, *Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum* Prooemium, ed. Gál, p. 136: "Et ignorantia istius intentionis Aristotelis in hoc libro [namely, the *Categories*] facit multos modernos [Ockham is referring here to some of his contemporaries. This meaning of "moderni" should be distinguished from the later meaning of "moderni" as "nominales" or "terministae," as used in the quotation from Bartholomaeus of Usingen further on in this footnote] errare, credentes hic multa dicta pro rebus, quae tamen pro solis vocibus – et proportionaliter pro intentionibus seu conceptibus in anima – vult intelligi." See also *ibid.*, cap. 7, pp. 157–61, and Bartholomaeus of Usingen, *Quaestio de quidditate quantitatis continae in disputatione de quolibet Erfordie A.D. 1497 determinata*, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wöhler, in *Bochumer philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter* 6 (2001), pp. 137–95, esp. p. 184: "(...) antiqui supponunt predicamenta esse res et concludunt decem esse re generalissime differentes (...). Sed illud dictum antiquorum non est necessarium nec videtur habere rationem sufficientem. Ideo scola moderna alia via incedit dicens predicamenta esse signa rerum. (...) Ad confirmationem dicitur, quod Philosophus ponit novem predicamenta accidentium, que ideo vocantur accidentalialia, quia sunt termini accidentaliter connotantes, non quia sunt novem res accidentales generalissime et realiter distincte (...)."

⁸⁴ Judging from the subject, the reference to Durandus (see Appendix below, p. 139) is a reference to his commentary on the *Sentences*. In the late-medieval period, this commentary was often used as a textbook by theologians. Marsilius of Inghen, for example, borrowed many distinctions from Durandus. See Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen, Manuel Santos Noya and Manfred Schulze, "Einleitung," in Marsilius of Inghen, *Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum*, ed. Manuel Santos Noya, 2 vols., *Studies in the History of Christian Thought* 87–8 (Leiden, 2000), 1:xxix–xxx and 300 (index auctorum).

caused the distinction between the *origines*.⁸⁵ Although Theodor did not refer to Thomas Aquinas, it was probably Thomas's view that non-material things can only be distinguished by opposites which was in the background here. Thomas had argued that the distinction between the divine persons could not be grounded in the divine essence from which they proceed, since the divine essence is completely undivided. Nor could it be explained by the distinction between the divine attributes, as this distinction is not real but only rational, being caused by the human mind. Therefore only the relations of opposition remained as a sufficient explanation.⁸⁶

Again, Alen's reply was resolute. For him, it was absolutely no problem that different things proceed from a principle that is one and undivided. Exactly the same view was held by Ockham in his commentary on the *Sentences*.⁸⁷

Alen also followed Ockham in his reply to the opposition of Godfrey of Groningen, who like some of his colleagues touched upon the question regarding how different persons can proceed from something that was undivided.⁸⁸ Alen responded that when dealing with the Trinity, there are many things that transcend human understanding, something which Ockham had underscored by pointing out that natural reason cannot prove that there are three divine persons.⁸⁹ Alen thus conveyed to his opponents the image of a Nominalist, who in the footsteps of Ockham did not permit human reason, or Aristotle, to stipulate which trinitarian views had to be adhered to, but only faith itself.

As said, Alen mentioned Ockham on only one occasion. At this point in the debate the discussion was not on the Trinity itself but on the divine attributes, touched upon by him in his second *materia*.

⁸⁵ See Appendix below, p. 140.

⁸⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *De potentia* 8.1, ed. Pession, p. 214; and *ibid.* 8.3, p. 220. For Thomas's argument that the distinction between the divine attributes was only rational, see *Summa theologiae* 1.13.4, ed. 1888, pp. 144–45.

⁸⁷ William of Ockham, *Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum. Ordinatio* 1.2.1, eds. Stephanus Brown and Gedeon Gál, *Opera theologica* 2 (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1970), p. 34. This passage is quoted in full in the Appendix below, p. 141 note 54.

⁸⁸ See Appendix below, p. 141.

⁸⁹ William of Ockham, *Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum. Ordinatio* 1.9.1, ed. Girardus I. Etzkorn, *Opera theologica* 3 (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1977), p. 275; and *ibid.* 1.10.1, p. 328. According to Gabriel Biel, this view was held by many theologians, who in the fifteenth century were labelled as Nominalists. See his *Collectorium* 1.10.1.1, eds. Werbeck and Hofmann, p. 354: "Verum est alius modus loquendi Occam, Gregorii, Oyta, Cameracensis, Adam, Holcot etc., tenentium omnes dictas conclusiones sola fidei auctoritate et non propter rationes ad eas factas (...)."

In the discussion Alen defended a view put forward by Ockham in his *Quodlibeta*, when the Venerable Inceptor no longer held the opinion that universals are objects of human thinking, but thought them to be qualities of the intellectual soul. This particular view had direct consequences for the theory of the divine attributes, which Ockham understood to be either the perfections of the divine nature itself, or the concepts used by man to speak about these perfections.⁹⁰ In the first case, the attributes were identical with the divine nature, implying no distinction whatsoever. But in the second case things were different. In his *Quodlibeta* Ockham had argued that concepts were real qualities of the human soul and that every distinction between real things was considered as a real distinction, thus the distinction between the “conceptual” attributes was a real distinction too.⁹¹

In his reply to the arguments of Henry of Cologne, the *prior vacationalis*, Alen defended exactly this view. He argued that the rational distinction between the attributes is the same as the real distinction between different rational concepts used to refer to the same thing, namely the divine nature: “*Distinctio rationis non est aliud nisi realis diuersitas rationum eandem rem significantium.*”⁹² Fankel added to this note “*Dicit ‘Ockham,’*” indicating that Alen had referred to Ockham here. Alen did so, we can assume, because this view was difficult to understand for Thomists and Albertists, who did not accept that concepts were real or had real being.⁹³ That this was indeed the case becomes clear from the remainder of the dispute. The Albertist Conradus de Campis immediately reacted with the remark that this was not the right way to speak about the divine attributes. It is impossible, he said, that there is a real distinction between concepts that refer to one and the same thing.

⁹⁰ For this distinction see William of Ockham, *Scriptum* 1.2.2, eds. Brown and Gál, p. 61.

⁹¹ William of Ockham, *Quodlibeta septem* 3.2, ed. Joseph C. Wey, *Opera theologica* 9 (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1980), p. 211. Again, see also Gabriel Biel, *Collectorium* 1.2.2.2, eds. Werbeck and Hofmann, p. 150: “*Si vero conceptus sunt qualitates animae, distinguuntur [namely, the attributes] realiter tam inter se quam a divina essentia.*” Biel attributes a similar opinion to Henry of Oyta and Gregory of Rimini.

⁹² See Appendix, p. 135.

⁹³ According to Johannes Parreut, who was a master at the University of Ingolstadt in the late fifteenth century, the Realists attributed real being only to extra-mental things, a view which he denied. See his *Exercitata veteris artis*, Ingolstadt 1492, fol. Sv^v: “*(...) ens proprie dictum non vocatur ens extra animam tantum sicut antiqui volunt (...)*” See also Johannes Gerson, in a letter from December 7, 1426 in *Oeuvres Complètes*, ed. Palémon Glorieux, 10 vols. (Paris, 1960–1974), 2:276–80, n. 58, esp. p. 279: “*Tradunt nonnulli, unde mirandum videtur, quod conceptus et entia rationis non sunt vere res nec entia (...)*”

A real distinction can only exist between real things.⁹⁴ Obviously, he had not understood the point made by Alen. For Alen there are real things involved here, namely the different human concepts. The real distinction for Alen is on the level of human thinking, not on that of the divine essence. Again, Fankel's notes show that Alen's Ockhamist view caused confusion and disturbance among his colleagues in Cologne.⁹⁵

By the fifteenth century, when Alen was active at the University of Cologne, the Nominalist tradition had been influenced by authors such as Robert Holcot, Gregory of Rimini, John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen.⁹⁶ He therefore not only stayed within the limits set by Ockham but also went further in significant ways. This is apparent from his view, articulated during the debate, that the term "God" falls under a genus.⁹⁷ Ockham had denied this. He remained within the lines drawn by Thomas and Duns Scotus, although he was not convinced by the power of their arguments.⁹⁸ But the later Nominalists no longer found Ockham's position attractive. In the fifteenth century the notion that God was a generic term, and as such fell under the category of substance, was a commonly held view of the Nominalists.⁹⁹

⁹⁴ See Appendix, p. 136.

⁹⁵ As is apparent from the *Dialectica* of the Johannes Eck, the view that concepts had real being was a standard Nominalist tenet at the time. See Johannes Eck, *Aristotelis Stragyrite Dialectica* (Augsburg, 1517), fol. 14^{rb-va}.

⁹⁶ This is apparent from the authorities quoted in Nominalist schoolbooks. A telling example is Johannes Eck, *Bursa Pavonis. Logices exercitamenta* (Strasbourg, 1507), which was used at the University of Freiburg and in which, next to Ockham, all the authors mentioned were abundantly quoted. Remarkably, although this treatise was a logic textbook, there were many references to theological works, such as the commentaries on the *Sentences* of Ockham, Gregory of Rimini and Marsilius of Inghen. Ockham's *Quodlibeta* were also referred to. For further details on Johannes Eck and his Nominalism, see Arno Seifert, *Logik zwischen Scholastik und Humanismus. Das Kommentarwerk Johann Ecks*, Humanistische Bibliothek 1/31 (München, 1978), esp. pp. 58–73.

⁹⁷ See Appendix below, p. 130–31.

⁹⁸ William of Ockham, *Scriptum* 1.8.1, ed. Etkorn, p. 177: "(...) dico quod Deus non est in genere. Hoc tamen difficile est probare." Ockham said that the arguments to this effect put forward by Thomas Aquinas were contradictory and absolutely wrong. See *ibid.*, p. 158: "Quidquid sit de conclusione, istae rationes [namely, those of Thomas Aquinas] nihil valent. Primo ergo ostendo quod contradicat sibi ipsi; secundo, quod rationes accipiunt multa falsa."

⁹⁹ See the anonymously extended version of Heymericus de Campo's *Contra Modernos*, as edited in Ruten, "Contra Occanicam Discoliam Modernorum," p. 165: "(...) Deus ponatur in praedicamento substantiae, sicut plures immo breviter omnes terministae vel nominales opinantur." Notably, Gabriel Biel departed from Ockham on this point as well. See his *Collectorium* 1.8.1, eds. Werbeck and Hofmann, p. 305: "Sed quamvis Auctor [namely William of Ockham] hanc conclusionem teneat cum aliis [namely, that God does *not* fall under a genus or predicate], tamen oppositum videtur multo probabilius, ut satis late ostendit Gregorius de Arimino (...)."

Also regarding other points, Alen defended notions that—according to late-medieval doxography, especially as produced by Realists—belonged to the standard Nominalist contentions. The synopsis on pp. 115–18 below juxtaposes a number of the views voiced by Alen in this disputation with two lists composed by Realists at the University of Ingolstadt towards the end of the fifteenth century. The first anonymous list entitled *Differentie inter Realistas et Modernos* recorded those points at which the Nominalist reading of Aristotle departed from that of the Realists. The second one is compiled by Johannes of Adorff, and was referred to earlier in this article.¹⁰⁰ This second list reveals which Nominalist claims, from the Realists' perspective, were considered to entail theological difficulties, not only concerning the Trinity, but also Creation and Christology. The first list corresponds with the position of Alen on five points, the second list corresponds on all eight points. From these matches it becomes clear that even if Alen would not have mentioned Ockham, the Realists in Cologne would immediately have recognized him as a straightforward Nominalist holding views that were not only contrary to their interpretation of Aristotle but also a clear source of theological errors.¹⁰¹

2.5 *The Debates between the Schools*

Having worked out the Nominalist profile of Johannes Alen, the dynamics between the different schools of thought as displayed in the

¹⁰⁰ The first list follows the different works of the Corpus Aristotelicum and is edited in Ehrle, *Der Sentenzenkommentar des Peter von Candia*, pp. 334–38. To give an impression of the meticulousness with which the list was composed: concerning the Three Books of *De anima* twenty-eight differences were noted. With the other books of Aristotle the numbers are similar. For information on the second list, the manuscript and the historical background, see footnote 17 above.

¹⁰¹ Such lists were not exceptional. In his *Contra Modernos*, Heymericus de Campo organized a similar list of dissensions, mentioning some of the same views as in the *Differentie inter Realistas et Modernos*. This list was extended in the anonymous adaptation of *Contra Modernos*, edited in Rutten, "Contra Occanicam discoliam," pp. 164–65, esp. p. 165. The first flyleaf of the copy of Florentis Diel, *Modernorum summulae logicales* (Speyer, 1489), as preserved in Wolfenbüttel, Herzog August Bibliothek, contains a handwritten list entitled *Errores notabiles logicae nominalis*. This list was probably composed by Nikolaus A. Granus (1569–1631), whose name is in a similar hand on the titlepage. From 1611 onwards Granus taught at the Arts Faculty of Helmstedt, see *Die Universität Greifswald in der Bildungslandschaft des Ostseeraums*, eds. Dirk Alvermann et al. (Münster, 2007), p. 206. If this attribution is correct, the Realists' attacks against the Nominalists continued well into the modern period.

<p>Vtrum in deo uno simplicissimo sit trium personarum realis distinctio</p>	<p>Views defended by the Nominalist Johannes Alen in his <i>disputatio vacantialis</i> and attacked by his Realist opponents. The <i>disputatio</i> is edited in the Appendix below.</p>	<p>• In nullis rebus inter esse et essentiam est realis differentia. (p. 129)</p>
<p>Differentie inter Realistas et Modernos</p>	<p>Anonymous list composed at Ingolstadt listing the Nominalist readings of Aristotle that were considered to be wrong, edited in Ehrle, <i>Der Sentenzenkommentar des Peter von Candia</i>, pp. 334–38.</p>	<p>• Tenent enim Nominales quod (...) creatura subsistens sit suum esse. (pp. 337–38)</p>
<p>Positiones et dicta (...), que videntur contrariare dictis sanctorum patrum et discrepare ab his, que tenet ecclesia catholica</p>	<p>List composed by Johannes of Adorff showing that the philosophical views of the Nominalists contradicted the views of the catholic church, edited in Ehrle, <i>Der Sentenzenkommentar des Peter von Candia</i>, pp. 338–42.</p>	<p>• Tenet ecclesia quod natura angeli potest esse et non esse et quod est in potentia ad esse, quod concedere non possunt <nisi> distinguentes essentiam ab esse. (p. 339)</p> <p>• Tenet (sc. ecclesia, MH) quod celum et terra a Deo in esse processerunt, cui contradicunt dicentes, quod essentia ab esse non distinguitur. (p. 339)</p> <p>• Tenet (sc. ecclesia, MH) quod omnia creata indigent a Deo conservari in esse, quod non esset, si essent ipsum esse. (p. 339)</p>

- In nullis rebus inter naturam et suppositum est realis differentia. (p. 129)
- Tenent enim Nominales quod in rebus materialibus non differt secundum rem natura et suppositum. (p. 337)
- Deus est in genere. (p. 130)
- Tenet ecclesia quod in Christo sunt due nature et unum suppositum (...), cui veritati contrariantur non distinguentes realiter naturam a supposito. (pp. 339–40)
- Tenet ecclesia quod in Deo perfectiones omnium rerum reperiuntur (...) cui renituntur, qui eum in genere predicabili ponere non dedignantur. (p. 339)
- Tenet ecclesia catholica quod natura divina est una numero in tribus personis, cui contrariantur qui Deum dicunt esse speciem aut universale. (pp. 338–39)
- Tenet (sc. ecclesia, MH) quod Deus sit actus purus (...) cui contrariantur, qui Deum in predicamento ponunt. (p. 339)
- Tenet (sc. ecclesia, MH) quod omnes perfectiones creaturarum sunt in Deo, quod dicere non possunt, qui concedunt, quod nomina a perfectionibus imposita univoce de Deo et creatura predicantur. (p. 339)
- Substantia dicitur univoce de substantia creata et increata. (p. 132)

- Quantitas discreta non est distincta a re quanta. (p. 134)
- Principalter discrepant (sc. Nominales, MH) a doctrina Realium in phisicalibus et ponunt (...) quod quantitas non sit distincta a substantia realiter. (p. 336)
- Relatio non distinguitur a suo fundamento. (p. 136)
- Item circa predicamentum relationis, aliis modernis ponentibus quod non sit extra animam nec a suo fundamento distinctum, aliis vero oppositum tenentibus cum Aristotele quod sit ens reale; quod predicamentum nisi quis sane intelligat, cum loquitur de distinctione divinarum personarum, sicut cecus de coloribus, saltem fundamentaliter et secundum doctrinam theologiam, quod notandum est. (p. 336)
- Tenet (sc. ecclesia, MH) quod post Christi nativitatem Christus mortuus sit, secundum quantitatem non secundum substantiam, cui oviant non distinguentes inter substantiam et quantitatem. (p. 340)
- Tenet ecclesia quod in sacramento eucharistie sit quantitas vel divisio (lege dimensio, MH) panis sine substantia panis, quod salvare non possunt non distinguentes quantitatem a substantia. (p. 341)
- Tenet quoque ecclesia, quod incarnatio filii Dei temporalis, a matre fluens, fuit transiens, sed filiatio, que est relatio supereterna tali generationi fundata est perpetuo manens, cui adversantur dicentes, quod relatio a fundamento realiter non distinguitur. (p. 340)

- *Distinctio predicamentorum non est realis.* (p. 139)
 - *Principaliter discrepant (sc. Nominales, MH) a doctrina Aristotelis et Realium doctorum circa librum predicamentorum Aristotelis.* (p. 335)
 - *Tenet (sc. ecclesia, MH) quod vi verborum convertitur substantia in substantiam, non quantitas in quantitatem, nec qualitas in qualitatem, quod non salvant predicamenta confundentes.* (p. 341)
 - *Quatuor relationes sunt tres res, que sunt persone, sicut tres persone sunt una res, que est essentia.* (p. 143)
 - *Tenet ecclesia quod divine persone relationibus distinguuntur, cui contrariari videntur, qui relationem a sua substantia non distinguunt.* (p. 338)
-

disputation deserves consideration, as striking observations can be made at this point. First of all, it was especially the Albertists, not the Thomists, who attacked Johannes Alen, even if Alen himself did not reject the views of Albert the Great but rather those of Thomas Aquinas. Thus, there seems to be some incongruity here.¹⁰² Also, Servatius Fanckel noted on several occasions “non soluit” to indicate that Johannes Alen was not able to answer the arguments of his opponents.¹⁰³ In some cases, however, he actually provided an answer, contrary to what Fanckel’s report suggests. The best example here is the debate with the Albertist Conradus de Campis concerning the divine attributes discussed earlier, the latter arguing that it is impossible that there is a real distinction between different concepts of one and the same thing. Fanckel did not report any answer by Alen, but just noted “non soluit.” This is surprising however, as just prior, in his final answer to the *prior vacantialis*, Johannes Alen explained the theory behind his belief, arguing that the content of a concept can have rational being, but that a concept itself, as a quality of the soul, has real being. Therefore, real distinctions between concepts are possible for him. That Conradus de Campis began his question with “impossible est,” shows that he did not understand Alen’s answer to the *prior vacantialis*.¹⁰⁴ Indeed, according to the principles of Conradus de Campis, it is impossible that there be a real distinction between concepts. But the answer is completely different if one accepts Ockham’s view proposed in the *Quodlibeta*. Therefore, in all probability Conradus de Campis misunderstood Alen’s answer to his question and consequently considered it unsatisfactory. This then caused Servatius Fanckel, who shared the same Realist convictions as Conradus de Campis, to simply record “non soluit” without reporting Alen’s response. As is clear for the example just given, examining these and similar remarkable irregularities within the text can help to better understand the debates between the late-medieval

¹⁰² It needs to be noted, however, that Albert and Thomas shared the same view on the issue that was at stake during the disputation. See Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia Dei* 1.1.9.38, eds. Dionysius Siedler, Wilhelm Kübel and Hans G. Vogels, *Opera omnia* 34/1 (Münster, 1978), p. 289. This similarity was common knowledge in the fifteenth century, as can be deduced from the works of Denys the Carthusian, who explicitly mentioned the agreement between Thomas and Albert on this point. See his *In IV libros Sententiarum* 1.26.2, (as in n. 10), p. 209: “At vero de hac re Albertus non scribit diffuse, sed introductis ad utramque partem motivis respondet (...). Ex quibus verbis elicitor, quod positio Thomae concordat Alberto.”

¹⁰³ See the Appendix below, p. 136 and pp. 138–39.

¹⁰⁴ See the Appendix below, p. 136.

schools of thought. Therefore it is important to discuss the information provided by the dispute in further detail.

2.5.1 *Nominalism and Albertism*

Besides the *prior vacantialis*, who was a Thomist, there were three Albertists active as opponents: Conradus de Campis, Gerald of Harderwijck, and Godfrey of Groningen, as well as three Thomists: Theodor of Susteren, Walter of Dordrecht, and Servatius Fanckel. Furthermore, there were two additional opponents: Antonius and an Augustinian monk, whose doctrinal affiliation is not clear. When one compares the total number of Albertists and Thomists with the division of the two schools among the total number of bachelors and masters listed in Servatius Fanckel's notebook, the presence of three Albertists over against three Thomists is striking. To be sure, the Albertists were an important school in Cologne, with its own *bursa*, the so-called *Bursa Laurentiana*.¹⁰⁵ But as has already been noticed by Gabriel M. Löhr, the majority of all bachelors and masters were labeled as "thomista" by Fanckel. This applied to all those who were members of a religious order, as well to all the rest.¹⁰⁶ Therefore, one would expect that in the disputation under consideration the Thomists would outnumber the Albertists. But that is not the case. That the Albertists were strongly present needs an explanation. As it seems, this was not just a coincidence. The Albertists were not only the first to criticize Johannes Alen, but also the most foundational, focusing on Alen's use of Aristotle. As said before, the first to oppose in a *disputatio vacantialis* were the licentiates and doctors. In our case this was the Albertist Conradus de Campis. All of the remaining opponents were bachelors, as far as can be determined on the basis of Fanckel's notes. The first bachelor who entered into the dispute was an Albertist, namely Gerald of Harderwijck. His opposition was the most critical, as it was here that Fanckel reported that Alen had denied the principles of Aristotle. Obviously, it was the Albertists in particular who felt challenged by

¹⁰⁵ On the *Bursa Laurentiana* and its Masters, see Tewes, *Die Bursen der Kölner Artisten-Fakultät*, pp. 47–73. For a map locating the *Bursa Laurentiana*, see Hermann Keussen, *Die alte Universität Köln. Grundzüge ihrer Verfassung und Geschichte* (Cologne, 1934), pp. 64–65. As is clear from this map, the *Bursa Laurentiana* was situated much farther away from the Dominican Convent than the Thomistic *Bursa Montana*, itself located next to the convent right across the street.

¹⁰⁶ See Löhr, *Die theologischen Disputationen*, p. 16.

Alen's Nominalism. This fits with the broader picture of the debates between the schools in fifteenth-century Cologne. Heymericus de Campo, in the first part of his *Tractatus problematicus*, attacked the Nominalists, arguing that their reading of Aristotle was inconsistent and not in line with the traditional view, the *sententia peripateticorum*, as we have seen. In the second half of the fifteenth century, the *Tractatus problematicus* still attracted attention in the German Empire, as is testified by its manuscript tradition and its printing in 1496.¹⁰⁷ On the other hand, the Thomists were not as opposed to the Nominalists as were the Albertists. Some Thomists in Cologne defended views which at least to a certain extent resembled those of the Nominalists, not only in the field of logic, but also on issues as put forward by Johannes Alen during the debate, such as the idea that God is a generic term. As the *Promptuarium argumentorum* shows, Thomists and Albertists were divided on this point, the former group holding the view that God indeed belongs to a genus, whereas the latter denied this.¹⁰⁸ This anonymous treatise was highly successful, printed three times in Cologne in the 1490s. Therefore we can safely assume that it referred to opinions that were actually defended by Thomists and Albertists at the time.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ In addition, in 1456 Gerardus de Monte remarked that the *Tractatus* was widely used, which he deplored, because in his mind the treatise gave the wrong picture of the views of Albert and Thomas Aquinas. It was for this reason that he published a response, the *Tractatus concordans*. See my "Commont lire les grand maîtres? Gérard de Monte, Heymeric de Campo et la question de l'accord entre Albert le Grand et Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue Thomiste* 108 (2008), 105–30, esp. 114–16.

¹⁰⁸ To understand the following quotation, the reader has to know that in this treatise the Albertists are represented by a student called Lilius, the Thomists by Spineus. *Promptuarium argumentorum*, ed. 1496, fol. [Jvii]: "Quibus expeditis ponit Lilius istam conclusionem 'Deus non est in aliquo predicamento'. Contra hoc sic opponit Spineus. Arguitur: Deus est in aliquo praedicamento. Ergo conclusio minus vera (...)' Predicaments were also called "genera." (See e.g. Thomas Aquinas, *De ente et essentia*, Opera omnia 43 [Rome, 1976], p. 369: "(...) ens per se dupliciter dicitur: uno modo quod diuiditur per decem genera, alio modo quod significat propositionum ueritatem.") It is for this reason that the question whether God falls under a genus is sometimes labelled whether God falls under a predicament or category (*praedicamentum*). For some striking parallels in the field of logic, see Henk A.G. Braakhuis, "Heymeric van de Velde (a Campo), denker op een kruispunt van wegen. De logische kwestie uit zijn Problemata inter Albertum Magnum et Sanctum Thomam," *Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte* 75 (1983), 13–24, esp. pp. 18–20, and my "Late Medieval Schools of Thought," p. 352.

¹⁰⁹ To be sure, in the fifteenth century a number of major defenders of Thomas such as Johannes Capreolus and Petrus Nigri did not maintain the position defended by Spineus. Capreolus and Nigri, who followed Capreolus on this point, argued against the view of Gregory of Rimini. See Johannes Capreolus, *Defensiones theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis* 1.8.2, eds. Ceslaus Paban and Thomas Pègues (Tours, 1900; repr.

2.5.2 *Nominalism and Thomism*

That it was particularly the Albertists who wanted to settle scores with the Nominalists like Johannes Alen did not mean that Alen's own critique was particularly directed toward the views of Albertists. As said, it is striking that Alen defended those views of Ockham, where the latter had attacked Thomas Aquinas. Obviously, his main intention was to strike at the Thomists, not the Albertists. This is not only the case in the debates over the Trinity, but also concerning the issue of whether or not God is a generic term. Here again Ockham explicitly argued against Thomas Aquinas, saying that Thomas contradicted himself and that his argument contained many things that were untrue.¹¹⁰ The resemblance in the way Ockham portrayed Thomas's position in those cases indicates that Alen intentionally looked for such issues, trying to provoke the Thomists by defending those Nominalist views that presented themselves as solutions to apparent contradictions in the works of Thomas Aquinas. In the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth century, a number of Thomists tried to defend Thomas Aquinas against such attacks. Examples are Johannes Capreolus's *Defensiones* and Petrus Nigri's *Clypeus Thomistarum*.¹¹¹ These works were highly appreciated among Thomists. Having defended his beliefs, Alen thus demonstrated to his colleagues that he did not accept these Thomistic defenses of Thomas Aquinas but retained the anti-Thomism voiced by Ockham. Summarizing these observations, the following picture emerges: it was especially the Albertists that reacted to the Nominalist views of Johannes Alen, whereas Johannes himself was much more concerned with the Thomists. Taking into consideration that in Cologne the Thomists were the dominant party, Alen had indeed chosen the right environment to articulate his criticism of Thomas.

2.5.3 *Incommensurate Discourses*

To paint a clear picture of the nature of the debates between the schools, it is necessary to return once more to the case where Servatius Fanckel

Frankfurt am Main, 1967), pp. 331–63, and Petrus Nigri, *Clypeus Thomistarum* (Venice, 1487; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1967), fol. [v6]^{ra}-x1^{va}.

¹¹⁰ See footnote 98 above.

¹¹¹ Petrus Nigri mentioned the Nominalist criticism explicitly in his introduction. See his *Clypeus Thomistarum*, ed. 1967, fol. a2^v: "Afferam deinde nonnullos litterarum fama atque scientiae praestantissimos viros (...) terministas ac nominales, quorum omnium in Thomam opiniones argumenta contrarietates destruere, solvere, confutare est hoc in opere propositi mei."

noted "non soluit" to indicate that Alen was not able to give a satisfactory response. This phrase is recorded three times in the record. In another but similar situation Fanckel wrote that Alen could not escape the argument: "Non euasit istud argumentum." In one case the question was posed by a Thomist, in the other three cases it was Albertists. As said, it is not always easy to determine the exact nature of the "non soluit," as it is possible that it reflects a misunderstanding on the part of Servatius Fanckel rather than Alen's inability to respond. This was probably the case with the debate over the divine attributes referred to earlier. If we now have a closer look at the other occurrences, the situation seems to be similar. In two instances the problems at stake were of unmistakably Nominalist origin, namely, again, Alen's view that God is a generic term, and his contention that there is no real distinction between the categories.¹¹² These were such standard Nominalist views that it is almost unthinkable that Alen would have been unable to answer the objections of his opponents. Rather, it seems that the opponents were in no way satisfied with Alen's response. Taking into consideration that in three out of four cases it was debates with Albertists who were much more hostile towards the Nominalists than the Thomists, it seems rather natural that the opponents were unwilling to understand the response and therefore called it inadequate.

Obviously in the debate between Alen and his Albertist and Thomist opponents, two worlds clashed and were unable to find common ground. In his *Tractatus problematicus*, after having underscored that the Nominalists were no followers of Aristotle, Heymericus invoked a passage from Aristotle's *Physics* saying that there can be no debate between those who do not agree on basic principles, pointing here to the Nominalists. This passage from the *Physics* became a key word in the *Wegestreit*, especially in the memorable form in which it was abbreviated in the *Auctoritates Aristotelis*: "Contra negantem principia non est disputandum."¹¹³ Students noted this motto on the books they used

¹¹² See the table above. Furthermore, Petrus Nigri attributes to the Nominalists the view that the ten categories mentioned by Aristotle are only names used to denote concepts in the mind unequivocally. See his *Clypeus Thomistarum*, ed. 1967, fol. S2^{vb}: "Prima opinio est modernorum, quod liber Praedicamentorum est de decem terminis qui secundum suos modos significandi incomplexos generalissimos adinvicem distinctos et formaliter non coincidentes significant decem primas intentiones." He opposes this view to the received view at his time, the "opinio communis scholae." See *ibid.*, fol. S3^{ra}.

¹¹³ Heymericus de Campo, *Tractatus problematicus*, ed. 1496, fol. [aiii^v]: "(...) solum disputationem praesentem assumpsi contra illos qui mecum conveniunt in veritate

in the classroom.¹¹⁴ The disputation under consideration here provides a good example of such a debate, especially because Servatius Fanckel explicitly reported that the participants did not agree on what the principles of Aristotle were. The repeated notes “non soluit” point in the same direction, as well as the comment that Alen’s statements were regarded as “inconsueta.” The weight of a long and steady Realist tradition that had excluded Nominalism made it almost completely impossible for bachelors and masters in Cologne to enter into a serious debate with Johannes Alen. That for Fanckel the debate was a clear victory of Albertism and Thomism over Nominalism, saying that Alen was “bene scobatus,” is therefore to be considered as a statement colored by his Realism, rather than a remark provoked by the intellectual potential of the respondent.

3. Conclusion

In the famous *Chronicle of the Holy City of Cologne*, published by Johannes Koelhoff in 1499, Cologne was praised as having the most renowned Theological Faculty: “Zo Collen in Duitschlant is die hoechste ind beste schoil in der hilligen gotlicher schrift.” Similar to Mother Mary, it is argued, who after the death of her Son Jesus was the master and teacher of all the Apostles, who then went out in the world to preach and teach everywhere, so now Cologne is the leading institution in the spreading and teaching of Christian faith.¹¹⁵ This reputation was explained by the fact that both Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great had taught in Cologne and that their teachings were accepted not only in Cologne itself, but also by all other schools and

Aristotelis, quia cum aliis in scientia Aristotelis disputare recusamus.” See Aristotle, *Physics* 1.1, 184b25–185a2; and *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis. Un florilège médiéval. Étude historique et édition critique*, ed. Jacqueline Hamesse, Philosophes Médiévaux 17 (Louvain, 1974), p. 140 (2, 6): “Contra negantem principia non est disputandum.”

¹¹⁴ See the copy of Petrus Tartaretus, *Expositio in Summulas Petri Hispani* (Basel, 1514), as preserved in the University Library of Freiburg. The maxim was written prominently on the title page in the words of the *Auctoritates Aristotelis*. Next to this saying, another motto that played a crucial role in the *Wegestreit* was noted, namely “Non est ponenda pluralitas sine necessitate.” In the fifteenth century, this was regarded as one of the fundamental principles of Nominalism. See Bartholomaeus of Usingen, *Quaestio de quiditate quantitatis continua*, ed. Wöhler, p. 168: “(...) est commune fundamentum vie moderne, quo utuntur moderni contra antiquos, scilicet quod non sit ponenda pluralitas sine necessitate (...)”

¹¹⁵ *Die Cronica van der hilliger stat van Coellen*, in *Die Chroniken der deutschen Städte vom 14. bis ins 16. Jahrhundert* (as in n. 52), 13:289.

universities.¹¹⁶ Koelhoff's *Chronicle* is especially copious concerning the relationship between Cologne and Albert the Great. It not only brings parts of Albert's biography to light, underscoring his political achievements to restore peace in Cologne after the strife between the city and archbishop Engelbert II, but also mentions day-to-day facts such that on the night of October 7, 1434, during a heavy storm, the beech tree planted by Albert the Great in front of the church was uprooted and fell down, together with many others.¹¹⁷

Against the background of Koelhoff's *Chronicle* it once again becomes clear why the Thomists and Albertists were so upset by Johannes Alen's Nominalist views. The theologians in Cologne considered themselves to be the most important defenders of Christian faith, standing in the tradition of Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great, who had both used Aristotle on a large scale in their theological writings. William of Ockham and his followers departed from this tradition. Therefore, the idea among the Bachelors and Masters in Cologne was that Ockham's views needed to be ignored, or severely attacked in cases when they were defended. Johannes Alen, being so audacious as to adhere to the teachings of the Venerable Inceptor, and even frankly mentioning his name, naturally provoked a heavy rebuttal by his opponents, none of whom were willing to accept his understanding of Aristotle or his views on the Trinity. That it was especially the Albertists who became active in the debate, can be explained not only by their adherence to Heymericus de Campo, but also by the fact that the holy city of Cologne had a special affiliation with Albert the Great, as the *Chronicle* made manifest. The Albertists therefore may have felt themselves to be the first to eradicate errors and reinstate harmony among the students, so as to keep alive the holy reputation of the city and its theological faculty, which was so directly linked with the deeds of their master.

And how was it with the Thomists? From a modern point of view, dominated by the Neo-Scholastic stress on the unity of the thomistic

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 289 and p. 464: "Zom 19. is dat ein groisse und hoiche wirdichheit, dat in der hilliger stat Coellen gewoint ind geleret haven die groisten lichter der hilliger kirchen, der leire sonderlich ind intgemein nu in allen universiteten ind hohen schoilen uisgesait ind vermannichfeldiget wirt, as sin Albertus Magnus bischof zu Regensburg, under dem selven sent Thomas van Aquinen geleiret hait zu Coellen."

¹¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 123, 463, 530–31, and 633–38. On the role of Albert the Great in the conflict between the city and Engelbert II, see Hugo Stehkämper, "Albertus Magnus und politisch auswegslose Situationen in Köln," in *Albertus Magnus zum Gedenken nach 800 Jahren. Neue Zugänge, Aspekte und Perspektiven*, eds. Walter Senner et al. (Berlin, 2001), pp. 359–73.

system, it might seem strange, but in the fifteenth century there was no unity among the Thomists, not even among the Thomists in Cologne. Partially, this was caused by the difficulty of how to interpret the writings of Thomas Aquinas, which at many points seemed to contradict each other. In the famous *Etymologiae seu Concordantiae conclusionum Thomae Aquinatis in quibus videtur sibi contradicere* composed by Peter of Bergamo, 200 contradictions were listed and solved. This treatise was printed in Cologne in 1480 – the same year that our disputation took place. It was used by Thomists, as is clear from the manuscript Cologne, Historisches Archiv der Stadt Köln, G.B.F. 200, which contains in its final part, alongside works of Gerardus de Monte in which he criticized Heymericus de Campo, also a copy of Peter of Bergamo's *Etymologiae* as well as Gerardus's own *Decisionum sancti Thomae concordantiae*, a similar treatise discussing forty-seven alleged contradictions.¹¹⁸ For the Nominalists, who were looking for reasons to demonstrate that Realism was wrong and contradictory, Thomism therefore was a much better target than Albertism. Seen from this perspective, it is only natural that Johannes Alen directs his attack especially on the position of Thomas, looking for those passages which Ockham had already labeled as contradictory.¹¹⁹

That Johannes Alen referred to Ockham is not self-evident, even if Ockham was among the traditional authors considered as the fathers of Nominalism. At most universities where the *via moderna* was taught, the works of John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen were used, not those of Ockham. Only towards the end of the century was there a growing interest in the writings of the Venerable Inceptor himself. Exemplary here is a development at the University of Freiburg. In 1470 the masters of the theological faculty urged their colleagues at the Arts

¹¹⁸ See Voulliéme, *Der Buckdruck Kölns*, p. 404, n. 912 and Gerardus de Monte, *Decisionum s. Thomae concordantiae*, ed. Gilles G. Meersseman (Rome, 1934), with a description of the manuscript on pp. 16–19. An expanded version of Petrus de Bergamo's work compiled by Ambrosius de Alemania contained 1200 contradictions. It was edited together with the *Tabula Aurea* in Venice in 1497 and later. The edition of 1773 was reprinted in Florence in 1982 under the title of *Concordantiae textuum discordantium divi Thomae Aquinatis*.

¹¹⁹ Also in Ingolstadt, the Nominalists highlighted that among the Thomists there was much discussion about the right interpretation of Thomas, referring here to a visit of Peter Schwartz, the author of the *Clypeus Thomistarum*, to Ingolstadt. During this visit Peter had argued that the masters in Ingolstadt misunderstood Thomas. See Ehrle, *Der Sentenzenkommentar des Peter von Candia*, p. 332: "(...) eos dixit [namely, Peter Schwartz] non intelligere scripta Thome."

Faculty to read the works of Aristotle according to the commentaries of John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen, without mentioning Ockham. Towards the end of the century, however, the name of Ockham appears more and more in the official documents of both the Faculties of Arts and of Theology. In the former, the *via moderna* is entitled “via Ockham” and in the latter Ockham’s *Sentences* commentary was commented upon regularly.¹²⁰ In Johannes Eck’s *Bursa Pavonis*, Ockham is among the authors most frequently quoted, even with the reverential addition of “doctor noster” to his name.¹²¹ Johannes Alen fits within this general pattern of a growing interest for the Venerable Inceptor himself, which gradually overshadowed the traditional sympathy for his followers John Buridan, Marsilius of Inghen and Gregory of Rimini, even if the latter has also left his footprint on Alen’s arguments, as was shown earlier.¹²²

It was the details from Servatius Fankel’s notebook which enabled the meticulous portrayal of the above situation. Especially when dealing with a period which is extremely complex because of the debates between the different schools of thought, the disapproval of scholastic thinking inside and outside the universities and the upcoming reformation with its criticism of Aristotle, such documents help to discover and delineate the battle lines between the different parties involved. Even if in recent scholarship promising steps have been taken by Michael Shank and Christoph Flüeler, most of these notebooks still remain unstudied. It is therefore time that these sources gain a regular place at the desks of the researchers of late-medieval thought and be reckoned among the necessary means for better understanding the debates behind the positions referred to in the traditional commentaries on Aristotle or Peter Lombard.¹²³

¹²⁰ For more details see my “Philosophie und Theologie im 15. Jahrhundert. Die Universität Freiburg und der Wegestreit,” in *Von der hohen Schule zur Universität der Neuzeit*, eds. Dieter Mertens and Heribert Smolinsky, 550 Jahre Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg 2 (Freiburg, 2007), pp. 67–91.

¹²¹ Johannes Eck, *Bursa Pavonis. Logices exercitamenta*, ed. 1507, fol. Bi^v, fol. Bii^v, fol. Cii^r.

¹²² Remarkably, Eck uses the epithet of “venerabilis inceptor” time and again in his *Bursa Pavonis*. See, for example, *ibid.*, fol. Biii^v, fol. [Cv^r], fol. Eiii^r.

¹²³ I would like thank John Slotemaker, Friederike Schmiga, and the anonymous reader for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

APPENDIX

This appendix offers a complete edition of the *disputatio vacantialis*, held on the 14th of July 1480 at Cologne, in which the Nominalist Johannes Alen acted as a respondent. As far as we know, this disputation is only recorded in the notebook of Servatius Fanckel, preserved in the manuscript Frankfurt, Stadt- und Universitätsbibliothek, MS. Praed. 102.¹ The disputation is on fol. 81^r-82^r and bears the number “lxxxvij.” Incomplete sentences are completed by myself according to their immediate context. These additions are identified by pointed brackets. Punctuation is in accordance with modern usage and intended to help the reader understanding the sometimes very brief arguments. The answers given by Johannes Alen and the views attributed to him are underlined. The sources referred to in the text are identified in the footnotes, and the implicit sources are noted. If helpful, the relevant passages from these sources are quoted in full. When appropriate, short comments in the footnotes elucidate the arguments put forward by Alen and his opponents. For further information on the form, the content, and the historical significance of the disputation, the reader is referred to the preceding article.

Abbreviations used:

add. = addidit

in marg. = in margine

ms. = manuscript

<...> = words supplied by the editor

[...] = words that should be deleted

¹ The manuscript is described in *Die Handschriften des Dominikanerklosters und des Leonardstifts in Frankfurt am Main*, ed. Gerhardt Powitz, Kataloge der Stadt- und Universitätsbibliothek Frankfurt am Main 2/1 (Frankfurt, 1968), pp. 236–37.

VTRUM IN DEO UNO SIMPLICISSIMO
SIT TRIUM PERSONARUM REALIS DISTINCTIO

Magister Johannes Alen, modernus,
qui posuit Colonie inconsueta,
et bene scobatus fuit.¹

<PROPOSITIONES>

<Prima materia de unitate dei>

- <1> Pluralitas tum summorum bonorum, tum infinitorum, tum omnipotentium diuersorum, tum causarum primarum et ultimarum est impossibilis.
- <2> Deus est summum bonum, infinitum, omnipotens, in genere cause efficientis et finalis alpha et o<mega>.
- <3> Ob id impossibile est plures esse deos et per consequens tantum unus est deus.

<Secunda materia de simplicitate dei>

- <4> In nullis rebus inter esse et essentiam, naturam et suppositum est realis differentia.²

¹ magister ... fuit] *in marg.* In what follows there is no explicit explanation of which "inconsueta" are being referred to here. However, on the basis of the discussion and information provided in the study above we can infer that the following theses were called into question by the opponents: "deus est in genere," "substantia dicitur uniuoce de substantia creata et increata," "ens dicitur uniuoce de substantia et accidente," "quantitas discreta non est distincta a re quanta," "numerus non distinguitur a re numerata," "distinctio rationis non est aliud nisi realis diuersitas diuersarum rationum eandem rem significantium," "relatio non distinguitur a suo fundamento," "distinctio predicamentorum non est realis," "ab uno principio possunt procedere plures emanationes," "quatuor relationes sunt tres res, que sunt persone, sicut tres persone sunt una res, que est essentia."

² The opinion which Johannes defended here—according to which there is never (*in nullis rebus*) a real difference between being and essence and between nature and person, not even in corporeal creatures—was labelled nominalist at the end of the 15th century. Cf. Franz Ehrle, *Der Sentenzenkommentar des Peter von Candia des Pisaner Papstes Alexanders V. Ein Beitrag zur Scheidung der Schulen in der Scholastik des vierzehnten Jahrhunderts und zur Geschichte des Wegestrits*, Franziskanische Studien Beiheft 9 (Münster, 1925), p. 337: "Tenent enim Nominales quod in rebus materialibus non differt secundum rem natura et suppositum. Item quod quid est non differt ab eo cuius est. Item tenent quod creatura subsistens sit suum esse."

- <5> Deus existens in genere omnis compositionis realis expers: esse et essentie, nature et suppositi, substantie et accidentis, forme et materie.
- <6> Igitur deus est simplicissimus, nichilominus omnium attributalium perfectionum fecundissimus. (fol. 81^v)

Tertia materia <de reali distinctione trium personarum>

- <7> Due originis processiones monstrant in diuinis plures esse realiter differentes relationes.
- <8> Has in creaturis uti in deo esse fundamentum personarum, notiones et proprietates personales omni consonum est ueritati.
- <9> Igitur proprietates relatiue personas constituentes efficiunt quod in diuinis est trium personarum realis distinctio.

<DISPUTATIO>

<Oppositio prioris uacantialis Henrici Jonge de Colonia, thomiste³>

Arguitur.⁴ Non est summum malum, ergo non est summum bonum, 1 Celi: ‘Si unum contrariorum etc.’⁵

Dicit quod non opponuntur contrarie, sed priuatiue.

Contra. Bonum et malum sunt genera. Priuatio est non ens. Ergo malum, cum sit genus, non potest esse priuatio.

Dicit quod priuatio aliquid ponit ut subiectum, ut iniustum priuat actum, sed relinquit aptitudinem. Alia est priuatio que nichil ponit, ut cecitas, surditas.

Contra. Omnis priuatio hoc ponit, scilicet subiectum, quia hec est differentia inter oppositionem contradictoriam et priuatiuam, quia ibi est unum extremum simpliciter non ens; inter priuatiue opposita non est ita. Ergo.

Dicit quod contradictionis extremum nichil est, sed extremum priuatiuum ponit subiectum et aptitudinem, sed priuat actum.

³ Fanckel provides the following details about Henry of Cologne in his notebook on fol. 24^r: “Magister Hinricus de Colonia. Huius uidi licencias. Thomista.” Cf. also *Die Matrikel der Universität Köln 1389 bis 1559, vol. I: 1389–1466*, ed. Hermann Keussen, (Bonn, 1892), p. 548 (304, 45): “Heinricus Jonge de Colonia; art.” For the activities of the *prior vacantialis*, see p. 101–103 above.

⁴ Cf. above “<1> Pluralitas tum summorum bonorum (...)”

⁵ Aristotle, *De caelo et mundo* 2.3, 286a23–25; and *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis. Un florilège médiéval. Étude historique et édition critique*, ed. Jacqueline Hamesse, Philosophes Médiévaux 17 (Louvain, 1974), p. 163 (3, 51): “Si unum contrariorum est in natura et reliquum est in natura, eadem est materia contrariorum.”

Contra. Priuatio non suscipit magis et minus nisi per ordinem ad habitum. Unde arguitur: Sicut opponitur malum bono, sic magis malum magis bono⁶ etc. Sic summum bonum opponitur summo malo.

<Oppositio magistri Jacobi Sprenger, thomiste⁷>

Dicit magister Sprenger quod summo bono, quod est extra genus, non opponitur malum in genere.

Sed fuit contra istum <sc. Johannem>, qui posuit ipsum deum in genere.⁸

Et uidetur quod non euasit istud argumentum.

<Oppositionis prioris continuatio>

Arguitur.⁹ Quicquid est summum bonum, est bonum per essentiam. Sed omne quod est bonum, est bonum per essentiam. Ergo sunt plura summa bona.

Dicit quod nichil est bonum per essentiam nisi summum.

⁶ bono] malo *ms.*

⁷ Fanckel provides the following information about Jacobus Sprenger on the third flyleaf of his notebook: "Hee inquam aule celebrate sunt, aula (...) magistri Jacobi Sprenger de Basilea, ordinis Predicatorum, tunc prioris (sc. "ordinis eiusdem conuentus Coloniensis", see *ibid.*, fol. 146^v, MH), thomiste." Further information about him can be found in Gabriel M. Löhr, *Die theologischen Disputationen und Promotionen an der Universität Köln im ausgehenden 15. Jahrhundert*, Quellen und Forschungen zur Geschichte des Dominikanerordens in Deutschland 21 (Leipzig, 1926), p. 24, n. 1. On the *aula magistralis*, see Franz Gescher, "Die Statuten der theologischen Fakultät an der alten Universität Köln," in *Festschrift zur Erinnerung an die Gründung der alten Universität Köln im Jahre 1388* (Cologne, 1938), pp. 43–108, esp. pp. 103–04.

⁸ Cf. above "<5> Deus existens in genere (...)." For more information on the background of Johannes's position here, see pp. 113 and 121 above. When comparing this with the works of Ockham, whom Johannes treats as an authority in this discussion, an interesting observation can be made. In his commentary on the *Sentences*, Ockham criticizes those arguments which Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus used in order to prove that God cannot be subsumed under a genus. For Ockham, it is impossible to give any such proof. See William of Ockham, *Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum. Ordinatio* 1.8.1, ed. Girardus I. Etzkorn, *Opera theologica* 3 (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1977), p. 180: "(...) dico quod non potest per rationem sufficienter probari Deum non esse in genere, quia nec per simplicitatem Dei, sicut ostensum est, nec per necessitatem Dei. (...) Nec etiam potest sufficienter probari per infinitatem Dei." Notwithstanding this impossibility, Ockham sticks to the common doctrine that God does not belong to any genus at all. See *ibid.*, p. 156: "In ista quaestione communiter tenetur quod Deus non est in genere (...)."; and *ibid.*, p. 177: "(...) dico quod Deus non est in genere." Johannes Alen, by arguing that God falls under a genus, goes one step beyond Ockham. His approach shows that he was influenced by authors like Robert Holcot and Gregory of Rimini.

⁹ Cf. above "<2> Deus est summum bonum (...)."

Arguitur.¹⁰ Quod est hic et non alibi, non est ubique. Sic: Quod est hoc et non aliud, non est infinitum. Sed deus secundum uos [deus] est in genere.¹¹ Quod est in genere uno, non habet aliorum generum perfectiones. Si autem habeat omnium generum perfectiones,¹² erit transcendens <et infinitum et ergo non erit in genere>.

Dicit quod aliquid est in genere dupliciter. Uno modo loycaliter. Et sic est aliquid in genere, quia significat suum subiectum sub modo unius predicamenti et non alterius. Sic <hoc nomen> ‘deus’, licet <ipse deus> habeat omnium rerum perfectiones, tamen significat suum subiectum per modum substantie et non aliorum predicamentorum.¹³ Metaphysically autem ponitur res in predicamento et sic etiam deus est in predicamento, quia est substantia et terminus <‘deus’> significat substantiam. Ergo est in predicamento substantie.¹⁴

<Questio prioris>

Utrum substantia sit uniuocum ad substantiam creatam et increatam.

Dicit quod sic.¹⁵ Et similiter ens dicitur uniuoce de substantia et accidente.

Contra. Non est eadem ratio entis ‘per se’ et ‘in alio’.

¹⁰ Cf. above “<2> Deus est (...) infinitum.”

¹¹ Cf. above “<5> Deus existens in genere (...)”

¹² Cf. above “<6> Igitur deus est (...) omnium attributalium perfectionum fecundissimus.”

¹³ The argument concentrates on the term “God,” and refers to God in the manner of a substance. In this case the specification “substance” does not refer to the thing itself but to the term which refers to the thing. See William of Ockham, *Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum. Ordinatio* 1.2.4, eds. Stephanus Brown and Gedeon Gál, *Opera theologia* 2 (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1970), p. 132: “(...) potest dici ad intentionem Philosophi et Commentatoris in VII Metaphysicae, in diversis locis, quod frequenter accipiant substantiam pro nomine et termino significante substantiam.”

¹⁴ Here the focus is on God himself. In his commentary on Porphyry’s *Isagoge* Ockham mentions several meanings of belonging-to-a-genus. One of these meanings is identical with what Johannes Alen is referring to here. See William of Ockham, *Expositio in librum Porphyrii de praedicabilibus* 2, ed. Ernestus A. Moody, *Opera philosophica* 2 (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1978), p. 37: “(...) aliquid esse in genere potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo ut sit aliqua vera res contenta sub illo genere et quam illud genus significat et cuius essentiam illud genus exprimit et declarat (...)”

¹⁵ Here Johannes can again rely on Ockham’s arguments. Cf. Ockham, *Scriptum* 1.2.9, eds. Brown and Gál, p. 306: “(...) dico quod Deo et creaturae est aliquid commune uniuocum.”

Dicit: 'Per <se>' dicit circumstantiam cause formalis. Sic etiam accidens est per se. Si autem dicat circumstantiam cause materialis, sic accidens est in alio.¹⁶

Queritur, que est eadem ratio, quare substantia et accidens dicuntur ens.

Dicit quod est cognoscibilis¹⁷ et potest exprimi. Et substantia est ens et accidens est ens.¹⁸

<Oppositionis prioris continuatio>

Arguitur.¹⁹ Quicquid est in genere est compositum ex genere et differentia, ex actu et potentia.

Dicit quod hoc intelligitur de substantiis materialibus et non de immaterialibus.

Contra. Angelus est compositus ex genere et differentia. Utrum illa compositio sit in natura angeli uel non. Si sit simplex in natura, que est differentia inter simplicitatem dei et angeli?

Dicit quod est simplex angeli natura et similiter deus. Sed deus non est componibilis, sed angelus est componibilis. Item angelus compositus ex substantia et accidente. Deus non.

Contra.²⁰ Si angelus est componibilis, ergo est compositus in sua natura ex substantia et accidente, quia componibilis est accidens, que est de natura angeli secundum uos.

Dicit quod non est compositio.²¹

¹⁶ It is true for both substance and accident that they are what they are by themselves (*per se*): namely substance or accident. In this respect, according to Johannes, it is possible to speak of univocity. However, when it is taken into account that accidents exist in something else (*in alio*), which is not true for substances, then univocity does not obtain.

¹⁷ cognoscibilis] the word is written in a fold and is therefore difficult to read.

¹⁸ For Johannes, a thing can be determined as a being whenever it can be known or named.

¹⁹ Cf. above "<5> Deus existens in genere (...)."

²⁰ Here the *prior vacationalis* is trying to reduce Johannes's argument to a contradiction by contrasting the second statement that by nature an angel is "componibilis" with the first statement that the angel's nature is "simplex" and thus undivided.

²¹ Johannes distinguishes between "componibilis" and "compositio." The fact that angels by their very nature have the ability to be conjoined with other things does not imply that angels themselves are composed of their nature on the one hand and the property of being able to be conjoined with other things on the other.

Contra. <Sic> non ponit²² <positio respondentis> maiorem simplicitatem in deo quam in angelo nisi per respectum ad extra.²³

<Responsio respondentis non memorata.>

Arguitur de trinitate.²⁴ ‘Quod ponitur in numeris etc. <est numeratum a numeris distinctis a numerato>.’

Dicit quod quantitas discreta <sc. trium personarum> non est accidens in deo et dicit consequenter quod quantitas discreta non est distincta a re quanta.²⁵

Queritur. Quare albedo distinguitur a re alba et non numerus a re numerata?

Dicit quod ideo, quia sic non posset producere duas res, quia semper essent tres res, quia numerus distinctus a rebus.²⁶

Contra. Idem dicitur de albedine, quia sic non posset tantum duos homines albos, quia albedo distinguitur a re alba.

<Responsio respondentis non memorata.>

Arguitur. Ubi cumque est mensura, ibi est distinctio mensurae a rebus numeratis. Sed in deo sunt tres et mesurantur trinitate. Ergo illa mensura distinguitur a rebus.

Dicit quod nichil superaddit aliquid reale in deo, immo nec in rebus, sed bene aliquid in mente numerantis.²⁷

²² ponit] ponitur *ms.*

²³ The counter-argument makes manifest how Johannes’s position should be understood: the notion that angels are “simplex” by nature implies that angels are undivided, just as God, but in addition they are also dependent on something else, namely an external cause. This latter aspect does not hold true for God. The qualification “per respectum ad extra” here signifies the dependency on the part of the angels.

²⁴ Cf. above “<7> Due originis processiones (...)”

²⁵ According to Ockham, discrete quantities or discrete numbers are identical with the things quantified or numbered. Thus, Johannes follows Ockham at this point. See William of Ockham, *Expositio in librum Praedicatorum Aristotelis* 10, ed. Gedeon Gál, *Opera philosophica 2* (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1978), pp. 212–15, esp. p. 215: “Ex praedictis satis patet quod non est verum nec intentio Philosophi ponere quantitatem esse aliquam rem absolutam et per se unam et totaliter distinctam ab aliis rebus (...)” See also the reference to Ockham in the following footnote.

²⁶ Johannes’s argument goes as follows: If numbers were different from the things counted, it would be impossible to produce only two things. Then in order to produce two things the number “two” has to be produced as well, which means that three things would have been produced. Ockham uses a similar argument with respect to the Trinity. See William of Ockham, *Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum. Ordinatio* 1.24.2, eds. Girardus I. Etzkorn and Franciscus E. Kelly, *Opera theologica 4* (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1979), pp. 96–111, esp. p. 96: “Et ostendo quod numerus non est aliqua res una absoluta per se in genere distincta realiter a rebus numeratis.”

²⁷ Johannes is holding a position here that was expounded by Ockham in a discussion of Thomas Aquinas’s views. See Ockham, *Scriptum* 1.24.2, eds. Etzkorn and Kelly, pp. 120–21: “Non quod numerus sit aliquid accidens reale inhaerens Deo, sed tantum

Arguitur.²⁸ Per duas processiones non possunt procedere nisi due nature. Sed in deo non procedit nisi una natura <sc. trium personarum>. Ergo non sunt due processiones in deo.²⁹

<Responsio respondentis non memorata.>

Arguitur.³⁰ Summum bonum est cui nichil deest boni. Sed sunt multa diuersa bona. Si illa sint in deo, deus erit compositus.

Dicit quod omnes perfectiones sint in deo, tantum ratione distincte. Et dicit quod distinctio rationis non est aliud nisi realis diuersitas diuersarum rationum eandem rem significantium. Dicit 'Ockham.'³¹

est aliquis conceptus significans quod in Deo sunt Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus (...). Et sic intelligenda est opinio Magistri (sc. Petri Lombardi, MH) quod tales termini numerales non ponunt aliquid in Deo, hoc est, non significant aliquid adueniens Deo sicut accidens aduenit suo subiecto (...).²⁸ It should be noted that the *prior vacantialis*, Henry of Cologne—who is countering Johannes's arguments here—was a Thomist.

²⁸ Cf. above "<7> Due originis processiones (...)."

²⁹ Here the *prior vacantialis* is trying to show that the undivided divine nature (*una natura*) can produce only one and not two different processions (*processiones*) and hence only one person. The polysemy of the word "procession" is crucial to his argument. According to the specifications of Lateran IV (1215) the concept of procession refers to the process of the Holy Spirit only. See *Enchiridion symbolorum definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum*, ed. Heinrich Denzinger and Peter Hünermann, 41st edition (Freiburg, 2007), p. 357 (n. 800): "Pater generans, Filius nascens, et Spiritus Sanctus procedens." Similar statements can be found in the Decretum pro Iacobitis (1442), *ibid.*, p. 460 (n. 1330): "Sacrosancta Romana Ecclesia (...) firmiter credit (...) Patrem ingenitum, Filium ex Patre genitum, Spiritum Sanctum ex Patre et Filio procedentem." In the works of the theologians, however, the concept is used in a much broader sense referring to both the production of the Son as well as of the Holy Spirit. See for instance Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.27.3, Opera omnia 4 (Rome, 1888), p. 311: "Unde et praeter processionem verbi, ponitur alia processio in divinis, quae est processio amoris." In his objection to this, the *prior vacantialis* contrasts the broad meaning (*due originis processiones*) that Johannes is using in the third *materia* with the narrow one. Johannes's answer has not come down to us. He could have countered this with one of Ockham's doctrines, which he will use later on, stating that one single cause can produce different things. See the reference in footnote 52 below.

³⁰ arguitur] huc prior *add. in marg.* Cf. above "<2> Deus est summum bonum (...)."

³¹ In Ockham's view, the divine attributes are names or concepts that are used by man in order to attribute to God a specific perfection. If the being of these concepts is specified as a conceptual being, the differences between them are conceptual. If the being of these concepts is regarded as real being, the differences between them are real. Cf. Ockham, *Scriptum* 1.2.2, eds. Brown and Gál, p. 66: "Si conceptus sint tantum entia rationis, tunc illa attributa distinguuntur inter se sola ratione, quia sunt plura entia rationis (...). Si autem conceptus sint aliqua entia realia, sicut aliqui ponunt quod sunt quaedam qualitates mentis, tunc attributa distinguuntur realiter inter se et ab essentia divina (...)." In his *Scriptum*, Ockham decides in favour of the first position: The attributes are distinct "sola ratione." In a later work of his, the *Quodlibeta septem*, however, he takes the position that they are qualities of the human soul and therefore distinct not only by reason but also by reality. See William of Ockham, *Quodlibeta*

<Oppositio Conradi de Campis, albertiste³²>

Contra. Impossibile est, arguit Campis, quod sit diuersitas realis inter rationes tantum unius rei, quia realis relatio non potest fundari nisi in fundamentis realibus. Sed tales non sunt rationes rei.

Non soluit.³³ (fol. 82^r)

<Oppositio Gerardi Harderwic, albertiste³⁴>

Arguitur contra hoc quod dicitur quod relatio non distinguatur a suo fundamento.³⁵

septem 3.2, ed. Joseph C. Wey, Opera theologica 9 (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1980), pp. 209–10: “(...) nomina diversa distinguuntur ratione quando habent diversas definitiones. Ex quo patet quod sic distingui ratione possunt etiam illa quae distinguuntur realiter, quia nomina diversa distinguuntur realiter et etiam ratione.” And *ibid.*, p. 211: “(...) dico quod attributa divina sive nomina attributalia sunt diversa realiter et similiter ratione.” Johannes’s reference to Ockham refers to the arguments that the Venerabilis Inceptor defends in the *Quodlibeta septem*.

³² On the third flyleaf of his notebook Servatius Fanckel mentions Conradus de Campis as one of the masters who celebrated their *aula magistralis* and classifies him as an Albertist: “(...) aula (...) magistri Conradi de Campis, albertiste.” A similar remark is found on fol. 146^v: “(...) magister noster Conradus de Campis, albertista.” Further biographical information about him can be found in Götz-Rüdiger Tewes, *Die Bursen der Kölner Artisten-Fakultät bis zur Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts*, Studien zur Geschichte der Universität zu Köln 13, Cologne 1993, index s.v. “Conradus Vorn de Campis.”

³³ According to this remark by Servatius Fanckel, Johannes Alen was not capable of addressing the criticism of Conradus de Campis. But this is highly unlikely given that Johannes had already refuted this objection in the preceding answer to the arguments of the *prior vacantialis*. There, Johannes had argued that the attributes should be understood as concepts (*rationes*) in the human mind which refer to the one divine essence (*significantes eandem rem*). Since all these concepts, being qualities of the human soul, have their foundation in the soul, and since the human soul is something real, the concepts and therefore the attributes are real as well. Consequently they are really distinct from each other (*realis diuersitas diuersarum rationum*). It seems that Conradus de Campis did not understand this view of Johannes’s, which was based on Ockham, so that the discussion ended in mutual confusion. Servatius Fanckel, who seems to have shared Conradus de Campis’s view, was apparently led by this to the conclusion that Johannes could not defend his position (*non soluit*).

³⁴ albertiste] Harderwic *add. in marg.* Gerald of Harderwijck received his degree in the arts under Conradus de Campis, who opposed in the present discussion just before Gerald. On the relationship between the two, see Tewes, *Die Bursen der Kölner Artisten-Fakultät*, pp. 62–63. Gerald, too, was an Albertist. Servatius Fanckel comments on Gerald in his notebook on fol. 24^r: “Magister Gerardus Harderwic, albertista. Hunc uidi licentiatum.”

³⁵ It is unclear whether Johannes put forward this view during the preceding discussion about the attributes or even earlier with respect to the Trinity, just as he will do (again) later on. It is certain, however, that he is following in Ockham’s footsteps once more. According to Ockham a relation is identical with its relata. He attributes this position to Aristotle and the Holy Fathers such as Augustine. See Ockham, *Expositio*

<Responsio respondentis non memorata.>

Arguitur. Quecumque possunt separari etc. <sunt alia et alia et non idem re>. Sic est de relatione et suo fundamento.

<Responsio respondentis non memorata.>

Arguitur.³⁶ Si relationes sint reales in diuinis: uel erit una, due uel tres. Non una, quia relatio una habet tantum duo extrema et sic erunt due persone. Non due, quia ille requirunt quatuor extrema et sic e<r>unt quatuor persone etc.³⁷

Assumpsit de relatione et de fundamento etc. <quod relatio non distinguatur a suo fundamento>.³⁸

Negauit iste distinctionem predicamentorum realem.³⁹

Contra. Sunt decem entia realia primo diuersa.⁴⁰

in *librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis* 9, ed. Gál, p. 199: "(...) sequitur, secundum intentionem Aristotelis, quod relatio non est alia res ab absolutis." And Ockham, *Quodlibeta septem* 4.28, ed. Wey, p. 444: "(...) certum est quod non repugnat dictis suis (sc. Augustini, MH) nec aliorum Sanctorum dicere quod relatio non sit alia res a fundamento (...)."

³⁶ Cf. above "<7>: "(...) in diuinis plures esse realiter differentes relationes."

³⁷ Johannes seems to have claimed (in his answer to the foregoing question, which is not recorded by Fanckel, however) that with respect to the thing itself the "relationes reales" are identical with the three persons. The opponent is now trying to show that this could not possibly be the case. The view that there are only three "relationes reales," because there are only three divine persons, goes back to Ockham. See Ockham, *Scriptum* 1.11.2, ed. Etzkorn, p. 372: "(...) dico quod personae distinguuntur per relationes disparatas realiter distinctas, nec ex hoc sequitur quod sunt quattuor supposita in diuinis, quia non sunt quattuor relationes in diuinis realiter distinctae."

³⁸ Here, Johannes is not talking about the foundation of the person, but about the foundation of the relation (*relatio*). In his reply to the Thomist Walter of Dordrecht (Wolterus de Dordrac) later on, Johannes will emphasize that the relations are identical with the divine essence: "Quattuor relationes sunt tres res, que sunt persone, sicut tres persone sunt una res, que est essentia." On the basis of this assumption Gerald of Harderwijck's argument does not apply. Ockham, too, regards the divine essence as the foundation for the relation. Cf. Ockham, *Scriptum* 1.12.1, ed. Etzkorn, p. 376: "(...) fundamentum spirationis activa est unicum, puta divina essentia (...)." According to the specifications of Lateran IV, the divine essence is absolutely undivided. See *Enchiridion symbolorum*, ed. Denzinger and Hünermann, p. 357 (n. 800): "(...) tres quidem personae, sed una essentia, substantia seu natura simplex omnino." Arguing from this supposition, Johannes is in the position to claim that the relations are not in any way different from their foundation. See also Ockham, *Scriptum* 1.26.1, eds. Etzkorn and Kelly, p. 153: "(...) potest sustineri quod sunt tres relationes realiter differentes, et tamen quod una essentia sit realiter illae tres relationes (...)."

³⁹ In accordance with the preceding answers Johannes denies that all categories are really distinct. Ockham, too, disputed that there is a real distinction between all categories. Cf. his *Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis* 10, ed. Gál, p. 229: "(...) dico quod a parte rei praedicamenta non sunt distincta."

⁴⁰ According to this argument, real being is principally divided among the ten Aristotelian categories.

Dicit quod non, quia dicit Aristoteles quod actio sit passio.⁴¹

Contra. Ista est immediata: 'Nulla substantia est quantitas', ergo sua opposita est falsa immediate.⁴²

Dicit cum reduplicatione.⁴³ Alias est falsa, quia aliqua quantitas est substantia.

Contra. Ponit ibi tres propositiones: 'Nullus homo <est> animal', 'Nullum corporeum est incorporeum', 'Nulla substantia est quantitas'. Sed ista est uera immediata: 'Nullum corporeum est incorporeum'. Ergo et alia.

Non soluit. Assumpsit aliud, quia dixit eum negare omnia fundamenta Aristotelis.⁴⁴

<Arguitur.⁴⁵> Relatio presupponit personam. Ergo non constituit personam, quia paternitas sequitur generare, generare presupponit suppositum. Ergo relatio non constituit.

⁴¹ See Aristotle, *Physics* 3.3, 202b20–21; and *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. Hamesse, p. 148 (2, 101): "Actio et passio sunt unus motus et in passio sicut in subjecto."

⁴² An immediate proposition is a proposition which cannot be inferred from any other proposition. See Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* 1.2, 72a8. As is clear from Ockham's *Summa logicae*, some contemporaries believed that the proposition "Nulla substantia est quantitas" was used by Aristotle as an example of an immediate proposition. Ockham rejects this interpretation. See his *Summa logicae* 3–3.9, eds. Philotheus Boehner, Gedeon Gál and Stephanus Brown, *Opera philosophica* 1 (St. Bonaventure, New York, 1974), p. 630: "Et si dicatur quod secundum Philosophum, I Posteriorum, haec est immediata 'nulla substantia est quantitas' (...) dicendum quod Aristoteles falso allegatur in illo passu, quia non facit ibidem mentionem nec de substantia nec de quantitate (...)." The remark a few lines down that Johannes denied Aristotle's premises (*dixit eum negare omnia fundamenta Aristotelis*) indicates that Gerald of Harderwijk was among the followers of those who considered this proposition to be one of Aristotle's examples.

⁴³ In a reduplicative proposition (*propositio reduplicativa*) the subject is linked with a further specification in addition to the predicate. For instance: "Human beings *insofar as they are human beings* are endowed with sense organs." The proposition "Nulla substantia est quantitas" inferred by the opponent can be reformulated as a reduplicative in the following way: "Nulla substantia *inquantum substantia* est quantitas." Ockham discusses the reduplicative proposition in his *Summa logicae* 2.16, eds. Boehner, Gál and Brown, pp. 289–96.

⁴⁴ Since Johannes (along with Ockham) argues in favour of a different interpretation of Aristotle the Albertist Gerald of Harderwijk seems to have interpreted Johannes's explanation in such a way that it must have seemed to him as if Johannes denied the foundations of Aristotelian philosophy, whereas Johannes only rejected those doctrines which Gerald himself regarded as foundational. Just as in the discussion with the Albertist Conradus de Campis the debate resulted in a principal confusion, which led Fanckel to the conclusion that Johannes could not respond to his opponent.

⁴⁵ Cf. above "<9> Igitur proprietates relatiue personas constituentes (...)." As can be seen from the third *materia*, those relations that are really distinct (*relationes realiter differentes*) constitute, according to Johannes, the real difference (*realis distinctio*) between the three divine persons. Ockham held a similar view on this matter.

Dicit quod relatio secundum 'esse in' in ordine ad 'esse ad' constituit personas.⁴⁶

Qua relatione constituitur persona patris?

Dicit paternitate et generatione.

Contra. Illa presupponit suppositum constitutum.

Non soluit.

<Oppositio Theoderici Susteren, thomiste⁴⁷>

Arguitur.⁴⁸ Per nullam causam uel rationem cogimur ponere rationes uel perfectiones attributales. Non ratione causalitatis, quia ad hoc sufficit ratio ydealis. Non formaliter. Item non eminentie, quia potest causare calorem sol, non tamen est formaliter calidus.

Bonum argumentum non bene retineri. Uide Durandum.⁴⁹

Item. Quomodo distinguantur ratione?

Arguit Durandus fortiter de illa distinctione <rationis>.⁵⁰

Cf. Ockham, *Scriptum* 1.12.1, ed. Etzkorn, p. 376: "(...) quaelibet relatio divina quae a qualibet relatione divina realiter distinguitur, constituit suppositum distinctum."

⁴⁶ As can be seen from the reply to the next question, in the case of the Father the "esse in" of the relation refers to the "paternitas" whereas the "esse ad" to the "generatio filii." By analogy, in the case of the Son the "esse in" would refer to the "filiatio" and the "esse ad" to the "genitum ex patre."

⁴⁷ thomiste] Susteren *add. in marg.* Fanckel provides the following piece of information about Theodor of Susteren on fol. 24^r of his notebook: "Fratr Theodericus Susteren, ordinis fratrum Predicatorum, thomista. Huius uidi licentias et doctoratum 1484." Further information about him can be found in Löhr, *Die theologischen Disputationen*, p. 25 (footnote 8).

⁴⁸ Cf. above "<6> Igitur deus est (...) omnium attributalium perfectionum fecundissimus."

⁴⁹ With the remark "a good argument that has not been held back well" Johannes implies that the argumentation used by the Thomist Theodor of Susteren fits exactly what he himself wants to show and is therefore to his own advantage. But since his opponents were obviously determined to give him a hard time it would have been better if Theodor had not come up with this argument because he, Johannes, could now defend himself with Durandus. Durandus discussed the doctrine of the divine attributes at the beginning of his commentary on the *Sentences*. See Durandus de S. Pourçain, *In Sententias commentariorum libri IIII*, 1.2.2 (Venice, 1571; repr. Ridgewood, New Jersey, 1964), fol. 17th–19th.

⁵⁰ Durandus criticised the view that the divine attributes could be distinguished without reference to creation. According to him, the differences between the attributes are grounded in factual differences between created perfections, which then are predicated by man of the one and undivided God. Consequently, for Durandus the divine attributes are rationally distinguished by the human mind (*ratione distincta*) having at the same time a real foundation in creation (*fundamentum in re creata*). See Durandus, *ibid.*, fol. 18th: "Alia est opinio, quae mihi uidetur uerior, scilicet quod distinctio attributorum secundum rationem non potest sumi nisi per comparisonem ad aliquam realem diversitatem actu existentem in creaturis, vel possibilem. Quod probatur

Arguitur.⁵¹ Si processiones distinguantur: uel ex parte principiorum uel terminorum. Non principiorum, quia illa est diuina essentia et intellectus uel uoluntas, que distinguuntur ratione. Non ex parte terminorum, quia illi sunt posteriores processionibus.

Dicit quod distinctio est sumenda ex actionibus intellectus et uoluntatis cum respectu ad terminum processionum.⁵²

Contra. Nichil idem est sui distinctiuum. Sed actus intellectus et uoluntatis est processio.

Dicit quod distinguuntur seipsis et una <processio, sc. actus uoluntatis> presupponit aliam <sc. actus intellectus>.⁵³

primo sic. Differentia rationis, nisi sit falsa et uana, licet sit completive ab intellectu, oportet tamen quod habeat fundamentum in re. Sed differentia attributorum secundum rationem non potest habere sufficiens fundamentum in natura diuina absolute accepta, nisi comparetur ad realem diuersitatem quae in creaturis est uel esse potest. Ergo differentia attributorum secundum rationem non potest uere sumi nisi per comparationem ad creaturas.”

⁵¹ Cf. above “<7> Due originis processiones (...)”

⁵² Johannes’s claim here that the difference between the processions is based on the activities of the diuine intellect and will (insofar as these activities are related to the persons) does not imply that for him intellect and will are distinct principles prior to the processions. Later on in the discussion with Theodor of Susteren, he emphasises that both processions (*plures emanationes*) can be produced by the one diuine essence (*ab uno principio*). Thereby, Johannes again takes a position which can be traced back to Ockham. Ockham, too, believed that the difference between the processions need not to be explained by separate principles, which are prior to the processions. Instead, it is the essence itself that can produce different processions. See Ockham, *Scriptum* 1.2.1, eds. Brown and Gál, pp. 35–36: “(...) non oportet propter istam diuersitatem ponere talem distinctionem inter principia elicitiua, quia (...) idem totaliter indistinctum re et ratione potest esse principium naturale respectu unius et principium liberum respectu alterius (...)” Nevertheless, it is possible, according to Ockham, to link these processions with the diuine intellect and will, insofar as the intellect and the will refer to the diuine essence in different ways. See *ibid.*, p. 35: “(...) metaphoricè loquendo et large potest aliquo modo concedi quod una persona producitur per modum naturae sive intellectus, et alia per modum uoluntatis sive libertatis. Et hoc sic intelligendo quod intellectus et uoluntas uno modo, prout usitantur a Sanctis, connotant actum generandi et actum spirandi, ita quod intellectus dicit ipsam diuinam essentiam elicitiuam actus generandi, et uoluntas dicit ipsam diuinam essentiam elicitiuam actus spirandi.”

⁵³ If the two processions are produced by the one undivided diuine essence, then the difference between the two can only be expressed by saying that one of them is referred to as intellect and the other one as will. As has been shown by his reference to Durandus, Johannes postulates that the difference between the diuine attributes does not lie in God, but in the human mind, which makes statements about God on the basis of differences within creation. In accordance with this, the priority of the intellect before the will indicated here has to be regarded as a purely conceptual priority. Similar ideas can be found in Ockham, *Scriptum* 1.2.1, eds. Brown and Gál, p. 34: “Ultra dico quod non est talis ordo, ita quod unum realiter sit propinquius essentiae quam aliud; unum tamen potest nobis esse prius notum praedicari de Deo uel de pronomine demonstrante Deum quam aliud; et ad hoc sufficit distinctio talis conceptuum.”

Contra. Non potest dici: Quia sunt origines, ergo [non] distinguantur per seipsas. Item. Non est distinctio ex parte principiorum, quia principia distinguuntur tantum ratione.

Dicit quod ab uno principio possunt procedere plures emanationes.⁵⁴

Item. Non ex parte terminorum, quia termini non differunt specie. Ergo processiones non distinguuntur specie. Hoc enim uidetur derogare simplicitati nature.

<Responsio respondentis non memorata.>

**<Oppositio Baccalarii Pastoris alias Godefridi
de Groningen, albertiste⁵⁵>**

Arguitur.⁵⁶ Ubi est reperire aliquid et aliquid, non est simpliciter simplex. Sed sic est in personis.⁵⁷ Ergo.

Dicit quod quando reperitur aliquid et aliquid absolutum et absolutum, est compositum. Sed non quando est absolutum et respectuum. Et hoc respectuum secundum 'esse in' in respectu ad 'esse ad' constituit unionem.⁵⁸

Contra. 'Esse ad' presupponit personam constitutam. Ergo non constituit, quia relatio presupponit terminum.

Dicit quod plura hic oportet dicere que intellectus non capit.⁵⁹

⁵⁴ This claim goes back to the Venerabilis Inceptor as well. Cf. Ockham, *Scriptum* 1.2.1, eds. Brown and Gál, p. 34: "(...) dico quod distinctio emanationum divinarum non praesupponit distinctionem principiorum elicitorum, nec ex natura rei, nec distinctionem rationis; sed sicut videmus in creaturis quod idem principium totaliter est principium elicitivum diversorum, ita est in divinis."

⁵⁵ albertiste] Baccalarius Pastor *add. in marg.* He is identical with the Godfrey of Groningen, mentioned several times by Fanckel and identified by him as pastor and bachelor of theology. See for instance the beginning of the first *disputatio vacantialis* of the preceding year (1479), in Fanckel's notebook on fol. 63^v: "Questio prima disputata in uacantiis Colonie altera uisitacionis uirginis gloriose anno domini 1479 per uenerandum uirum in artibus magistrum sacre theologie baccalarium pastorem Groningensem (...)." In the list of bachelors drawn up by Fanckel on *ibid.*, fol. 24^r Godfrey of Groningen is called "albertista." There Fanckel refers also to the mentioned *disputatio vacantialis* of the year 1479. See *ibid.*, fol. 24^r: "Magister Godefridus de Groningen pastor ibidem in una ecclesiarum. Sub eo respondi in uacantiis anno 1479. Albertista."

⁵⁶ Cf. above "<6> Igitur deus est simplicissimus (...)."

⁵⁷ Here, the opponent asks whether the difference between essence and person endangers the absolute unity of God.

⁵⁸ Johannes considers the divine essence as something absolute (*absolutum*), that is, as something that exists by itself. The persons on the other hand are regarded as relative beings (*respectiva*), since they are constituted by the relations of being in (*esse in*) and being related to (*esse ad*).

⁵⁹ Ockham, too, had emphasised on several occasions that the Trinity as taught by faith cannot be argued for by natural reason. Cf. Ockham, *Scriptum* 1.9.1, ed.

<Oppositio Anthonii⁶⁰>

Arguitur.⁶¹ Processiones iste non distinguuntur, quia nec ex parte principiorum, nec terminorum.

Dicit ex utroque.⁶²

Contra. Sicut intellectus necessitatur a uero, sic uoluntas a summo bono. Sicut ergo generatio filii est necessaria,⁶³ sic etiam spiratio spiritus sancti erit necessaria.⁶⁴

Dicit: non est necessaria necessitate coactionis, sed immutabilitatis.

<Oppositio Wolteri de Dordraco, thomiste⁶⁵>

Arguitur.⁶⁶ In diuinis sunt quatuor reales relationes subsistentes. Ergo quatuor persone, quia persona non est aliud nisi relatio subsistens diuina.

Dicit quod relatio ut relatio non distinguit nec constituit, sed ut proprietates.⁶⁷

Contra. Relatio habet duo, scilicet ‘esse ad’ et ‘esse in’, et secundum illud <sc. ‘esse in’> transit in diuinam naturam et ergo secundum ‘esse ad’ constituit etc.

Etzkorn, p. 275: “(...) per nullam rationem naturalem potest probari esse plures personas in diuinis.” Also *ibid.* 1.10.1, p. 328: “(...) sola fide tenetur quod tantum sunt duae personae productae et una non-producta, et ideo trinitas personarum sola fide tenetur.”

⁶⁰ Anthonii] Anthonius *add. in marg.* He is identical with “Anthonius, pastor (...) sancti Pauli” mentioned among the bachelors by Fanckel in his notebook on fol. 25’.

⁶¹ Cf. above “<7> Due originis processiones (...)”

⁶² The remark “ex utroque” can be understood more fully in the light of a statement made by Johannes in the discussion with Theodor of Susteren, where he emphasised that the processions are both characterised by a twofold relation that distinguishes one from the other: “distinctio est sumenda ex actionibus intellectus et uoluntatis cum respectu ad terminum processionum.”

⁶³ necessaria] naturalis *ms.*

⁶⁴ necessaria] naturalis *ms.*

⁶⁵ thomiste] Wolterus *add. in marg.* He is to be identified with “Wolterus de Dordraco, thomista” whom Fanckel lists as one of the bachelors in his notebook on fol. 24’. He should not to be confused with Wolterus Hinrici de Dordraco who matriculated at the University of Cologne in 1504. For further details about the latter, see Tewes, *Die Bursen*, p. 91.

⁶⁶ Cf. above “<9> (...) in diuinis est trium personarum realis distinctio.”

⁶⁷ The properties (*proprietates*) of the divine persons also concern those characteristics which are not relative. Therefore the properties of the Father include not only “paternitas” and “communis spiratio,” which express his relation to the Son and the Holy Spirit, but also “ingenitum.”

Dicit secundum utrumque.⁶⁸

Arguitur.⁶⁹ Quatuor sunt relationes in diuinis. Ergo quatuor persone.

Dicit negando consequentiam, quia non tenet in diuinis.⁷⁰

Contra. Multiplicato inferiori oportet superiora multiplicari.

Dicit. Quatuor relationes sunt tres res, que sunt persone, sicut tres persone sunt una res, que est essentia. Non enim ille quatuor relationes habent oppositionem.⁷¹

<Oppositio Augustinensis⁷²>

Arguitur. De quibuscumque uerificantur contradictoria, realiter distinguuntur aut formaliter. Sed de essentia diuina et persona uerificantur contradictoria. Ergo. Maior probatur, quam admisit. Minor probatur, quia essentia communicatur, persona non communicatur etc.

Dicit quod illa non sunt realia contradictoria, quia contradictio est inter rem et rem, qualia non sunt 'communicari' et 'non communicari.'⁷³

⁶⁸ According to Johannes, the person is constituted by both aspects of the relation (*esse in* and *esse ad*) as he had already emphasised in the discussion with Gerald of Harderwijck and Godfrey of Groningen.

⁶⁹ Cf. above "<9> (...) in diuinis est trium personarum realis distinctio."

⁷⁰ Here, Johannes is following the tradition according to which "spiratio actiua" is regarded as a relation of its own. Since, however, "spiratio actiua" is in reality not distinct from "paternitas" or "filiatio," it is not endowed with its own person, in contrast to the other relations.

⁷¹ The relations are factually identical with the divine persons and the divine essence. But since the divine essence is undivided, the relations as such do not make up a real opposition. Hence the relations differ from one another only through themselves and through the fact that they constitute the divine persons as three real persons. Here, Johannes defends, against his Thomistic opponent, a doctrine which Ockham had already expounded in his criticism of Thomas Aquinas. Cf. Ockham, *Scriptum* 1.11.2, ed. Etzkorn, pp. 362–67, esp. p. 366.

⁷² Augustinensis] Augustinensis *add. in marg.* The opponent in question here seems to be an unknown Augustinian bachelor, who had already participated as an opponent in the preceding *disputatio vacantiæ*. See Fanckel's notebook on fol. 81^r (*in marg.*): "quidam baccalarius formatus ordinis Augustiniensis alterius uniuersitatis." He also appears in the following *disputatio vacantiæ* of the same year. See *ibid.*, fol. 82^v: "Contra. Dicit Augustinensis quod (...)"

⁷³ The term "communicari" refers to the divine essence, which, being undivided, is communicated to the three persons. The term "non communicari" denotes those characteristics through which the persons are distinguished from one another. This terminology reflects the specifications of Lateran IV. See *Enchiridion symbolorum*, eds. Denzinger and Hünermann, p. 357 (n. 800): "Haec sancta Trinitas, secundum communem essentiam individua, et secundum personales proprietates discreta." Each divine person is completely identical with the one divine essence. This is why the two expressions, "communicari" and "non communicari," cannot represent different things (*res et res*), as Johannes tries to show.

Item potest negari maior, quia distinctio rationis sufficit fundare contradictionem.⁷⁴

Contra. Actus essentialis non conuenit essentie nisi mediante persona.
Ergo nec actus notionalis conuenit essentie.

Dicit. Uerum est ratione essentie. Sed bene ratione persone. Unde.

<Oppositio Seruatii Fanckel, thomiste⁷⁵>

Argui ego quod spiritus sanctus adhuc distinguitur a patre, si non procedet⁷⁶ ab eo⁷⁷.⁷⁸

<Responsio respondentis non memorata.>

⁷⁴ Johannes seems to regard the concepts of “communicari” et “non communicari” as names that, according to Ockham’s teachings, are rationally distinct when their meaning differs (see footnote 31 above).

⁷⁵ Fanckel calls himself a Thomist on fol. 26^v of his notebook: “Frater Seruatius Fanckel, ordinis Predicatorum, thomista, collector huius libelli.”

⁷⁶ procedet] distinguitur *ms.*

⁷⁷ argui ... eo] *in marg.*

⁷⁸ Seruatius Fanckel’s question (which is strangely enough noted in the margin) recalls the famous debate regarding whether the Holy Spirit would differ from the Son if the former would not proceed from the latter. A negative answer was given by Thomas, who was criticised by Ockham in this matter. Cf. Ockham, *Scriptum* 1.11.2, ed. Etkorn, pp. 362–72. Fanckel speaks of the Father instead of the Son, but, the problem remains the same, namely what causes the distinction between the divine persons. Already at the end of the thirteenth century, this issue divided the minds of the theologians. See Antoine Dondaine, “Un catalogue de dissensions doctrinales entre les Maîtres Parisiens de la fin du XIII^e siècle,” *RTAM* 10 (1938), pp. 374–94, esp. 388–89: “Utrum Filius distingueretur a Spiritu Sancto si non procederet ab ipso? Dicunt Minores et Henricus quod sic. (...) Sed Thomas tenet contrarium.” It is unclear why Fanckel, who considers himself as a Thomist, defends Ockham’s position (since this would most certainly have been Johannes’s position as well). Did he attempt to trick Johannes into affirming this thesis, hoping that Johannes would subsequently be critiqued by his opponents?