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THE TRANSITION OF ACADEMIC KNOWLEDGE, SCHOLASTICISM IN THE GHENT BOETHIUS (1485) AND OTHER COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSOLATIO*

1. Introduction

Medieval philosophy was related to the educational system of the schools and the universities, especially since the thirteenth century. It was institutional in character and expressed itself in a form which has been labelled as ‘scholasticism’, to underscore its intimate relationship with the schools and the universities. Education at the medieval universities was based on the reading of a relatively fixed list of texts, which in philosophy consisted mainly of the works of Aristotle, and in theology of the Sentences of Peter Lombard and the Bible. These works were studied and commented upon with standard procedures and with the use of concepts and theories, which most often were taken from the list of set texts or from a select group of acclaimed interpreters. A great number of medieval commentaries on Aristotle, the Sentences, and the Bible have survived in manuscripts and early printed editions, bearing witness to this prominent aspect of medieval thinking.¹

Because medieval thinking was so closely connected with the universities and their educational program, modern research has been mainly concentrated on the theories that were developed at the universities and

¹ Research for this paper was funded by the Netherlands Organization of Scientific Research (NWO). I would like to thank Faye Getz, Lodl Nauta, and Paul Wackers for their helpful comments.

¹ In addition to the commentaries on the texts of the curriculum, the disputation played an important role in university education as well. The commentary and the disputation are the most significant ways philosophical thinking expressed itself at the medieval schools and universities. On this subject, see A. Kenny and J. Pinborg, ‘Medieval Philosophical Literature’, The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg, Cambridge 1982, 11-42; Philosophy and Learning, Universities in the Middle Ages, ed. M. J. F. M. Hoenen, J. H. J. Schneider, G. Wieland, Leiden 1995 (Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, 6), and O. Weijers, La ‘disputatio’ à la Faculté des Arts de Paris (1200-1350 environ), Turnhout 1995 (Studia Artistarum, 2).
the discussions between the university masters. This approach is legitimate and valuable for the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. It studies the development of philosophical thinking within its proper educational context. Yet, for the later period, the situation differs. Although the universities still play a prominent role (their number is even growing), they no longer exclusively determine the intellectual climate of the time. New intellectual approaches and aspirations are developed outside the universities, a movement that is exemplified by the rise of humanism. Also the universities themselves are changing in character from more-or-less closed institutions to organizations with narrow ties to the cities and other secular powers. Intellectual knowledge is depersonalizing.

1.1. Non-academic philosophy

This means that the history of late medieval philosophical thinking must be studied from a broad perspective. Not only the developments at the universities need to be studied, but also the growing intellectual interests and needs outside the universities. This is not an easy task. The many forms of non-academic philosophy are very different and they cannot be reduced to each other. There are the translations of Latin works into the vernacular, made for the court or for an intellectually interested lay public. And there are the sermons and writings mainly of Dominican authors like Meister Eckhart and John Tauler, in which philosophical notions developed at the university were adapted to and transmitted to a spiritually affected public.

Also, there are the many ‘ex-c’ academic philosophical and schools outside the universi
giae veritatis of Hugo Ripe or ‘Philosophia pauperum.’ It is difficult to find the exact clue to the transition of knowledge from the universities medieval thinking, not all the wails of the university events happened that were philosophical as well. It is important to have a thorough and detailed knowledge of the development of the world outside. I will mention one particular period.

Albert the Great is the first commentary on all the works known by them. He began his reading and studying of the philosophy of the curriculum of the Arts, and many commentaries on the characteristic of medieval schola.

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2. For a review of modern research in medieval philosophy, see Gli studi di filosofia medievale fra otto e novecento, ed. R. Imbach and A. Maior, Rome 1991 (Storia e letteratura).

3. A recent account of the development of humanism is Ch. G. Nauert Jr., Humanism and the Culture of Renaissance Europe, Cambridge 1995 (New Approaches to European History, 6), which contains an extensive bibliography.

4. A general background of this cultural change is provided by the Handbook of European History 1400-1600. Late Middle Ages, Renaissance and Reformation, ed. Th. A. Brady Jr., P. A. Oberman, J. D. Tracy, 2 vols., Leiden, New York, Cologne 1994-1995. See also with an extensive bibliography, E. Meuthen, Das 15. Jahrhundert, München 1984 (Oldenbourg Grundriß der Geschichte, 9).


6. A. de Libera, La mystique rhétorique (Poiass Sagesse); id., Eckhart, Suso, Sturles, Tauler im Kontext. Die philosophische Lehre des deutschen Neuplatonikers, deutschen Sprache und Literatur, 10.


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6 A. de Libera, La mystique rhénane. D’Albert le Grand à Maître Eckhart, Paris 1984
(Points Sagesse); id., Eckhart, Suso, Tauler et la divinisation de l’homme, Paris 1996, and L.
Sturlese, ‘Tauler im Kontext. Die philosophischen Voraussetzungen des ”Seelengrundes“ in
der Lehre des deutschen Neuplatonikers Berthold von Moosburg’, Beiträge zur Geschichte der

’Compendium theologicae veritatis’ im deutschen Spätmittelalter, Tübingen 1981 (Texte und
Textgeschichte, 2); id., ‘Das Compendium theologicae veritatis des Hugo Ripelin von
Straßburg. Anregungen zur Bestimmung seines Verhältnisses zu Albertus Magnus’, Albertus
Magnus und der Albertismus. Deutsche philosophische Kultur des Mittelalters, ed. M. J.
Hoener and A. de Libera, Leiden 1995 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittel-
lalters, 48), 133-154, and B. Geyer, Die Albert dem Großen zugeschriebene Summa naturalis
Münster 1938 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, 13/1-
5).

F. Van Steenberghen, La philosophie au XIIIe siècle, 2nd edition, Louvain-La-Neuve
1991 (Philosophes Médiévaux, 28), 322f.

spirually affected public that had almost no philosophical training. Also, there are the many ‘compendia’ with abbreviations and extracts of academic philosophical and theological works, which were used at the schools outside the universities. Examples are the Compendium theologicae veritatis of Hugo Ripelin of Strasbourg and the Summa naturalium or Philosophia pauperum. The diversity of these sources makes it difficult to find the exact clue to understand the mechanisms that underlie the transition of knowledge from the universities to the lay public outside.

Although the universities played a distinctive role in the shaping of medieval thinking, not all the important developments took place within the walls of the university lecture hall. Outside the academic world events happened that were momentous for the history of medieval philosophy as well. It is important to reflect on these events, because only a thorough and detailed knowledge of the historical facts allows for an adequate evaluation of the reciprocal relationship between universities and the world outside. I will mention briefly three examples, each from a different period.

Albert the Great is the first scholastic author who wrote an extensive commentary on all the works of the ‘corpus aristotelicum’ that were known by then. He began his project about 1250, the period in which the reading and studying of the ‘corpus aristotelicum’ became officially part of the curriculum of the Arts Faculty at Paris. The historical importance of this undertaking cannot be underestimated. It paved the way for the many commentaries on the works of Aristotle that were to become characteristic of medieval scholasticism. Remarkably, however, Albert did
not write his commentaries at the University of Paris, where he had worked until 1248, but at the ‘studium’ of the Dominicans in Cologne.9

The second example again concerns Cologne, but almost a century later. At the beginning of the fourteenth century, a new and important development in the use of logic and semantic techniques for solving philosophical and theological problems made its appearance at the universities in England. This development was not taken over on the Continent immediately. It was only in the 1340s that theologians at the University of Paris used the writings of English authors in which these techniques were employed.10 The reception of this new form of theology (‘theologia anglica’) was not confined to the university. Also outside it attracted the attention of theologians, perhaps even earlier than in Paris. The earliest summarizing redaction of the Lectura Oxoniensis of Adam Wodeham, one of most important theologians who contributed to the development of the ‘theologia anglica’, was made in Cologne between 1334 and 1348, two generations before the foundation of the university in 1388, probably in the Franciscan ‘studium’.11

Thirdly, scholastic thinking in the late medieval period is characterized by the emergence of different schools of thought.12 Although these schools played a role until at least the eighteenth century, in retrospect we can say that the most important philosophical movements did not come from the adherents of these schools, but from those outside. This development begins already in the early fifteenth century. Nicolas Cusanus, the most modern of the medieval thinkers, wrote his works without ever being affiliated with the university as a teacher. In 1435 he refused a professorship at the newly-founded Theological Faculty of the

12 M. J. F. M. Hoenen, ‘Late Medieval Schools of Thought in the Mirror of University Textbooks. The Promptuarium argumentorum (Cologne 1492)’, Philosophy and Learning, ed. Hoenen and others, 329-369.

University of Louvain.13 In his scholastic philosophy (compendiose) was too much linked with Albert that Cusanus used concepts of university teachers, especially Albert’s philosophical methodology, hardly any resemblance to canons. His writings were not received at the university by the academy. Cusanus had not been a student at the university, with the monks of Ter Apel.

1.2. Transition of knowledge

Thus, a study of the mediaval universities in the world of the universities inside and outside and the rela-

13 On the foundation of the Theologische Akademie (Theo-

14 Nikolaus Cusanus, De docta iure, Leipzig 1932 (Opera omnia, 1), 163 (on

15 On Albert the Great and Heynich, Albert, wie Cusans ihn sah’, Albert

16 The reception of the thinking of the 15th century was


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University of Louvain. In his De docta ignorantia he explicitly rejected scholastic philosophy (communion via philosophorum), which for him was too much linked with Aristotelianism. Notwithstanding the fact that Cusanus used concepts that were developed in the writings of university teachers, especially Albert the Great and Heymericus de Campo, his philosophical methodology and the design of his writings have hardly any resemblance to current fifteenth-century scholasticism, but reveal the burgeoning spirit of the modern period. Almost naturally, his writings were not received at the universities, but criticized and attacked by the academy. Cusanus had his admirers outside the walls of the university, with the monks of Tegernsee.

1.2. Transition of knowledge

Thus, a study of the medieval philosophical culture cannot limit itself to the world of the universities, but has to investigate the developments outside and examine the relationship between the currents at the universities and those outside. In the period between 1200 and 1500, it were mainly the universities that developed the standards for philosophical and theological reasoning, especially with regard to methodology and the subject-matters discussed. The academy had an impact on the mod-

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elling of the philosophical and theological knowledge cultivated and developed outside the universities, not vice versa. This also goes for the first two examples given above. The study program at the ‘studia’ of the mendicant orders was modelled according to that of the universities and some of the ‘stadia’ were even incorporated into the university. Also the texts that were studied and the methods that were used in commenting these texts were taken over from the university curriculum. Yet, this dependency of the ‘studia’ on the universities does not mean that the intellectual level was only secondary or behind, as the above examples have shown.

A systematic study of the relationship between the universities and the intellectual culture outside has to take this normative role of the universities into consideration. Yet, not all the subjects and problems that were dealt with in the academic commentaries were also discussed at the ‘studia’ and elsewhere. There are at least three different aspects that need to be distinguished when dealing with the transition of academic knowledge to the outside.

The first aspect is that of delay. Works that were written outside of the universities do not always give an up-to-date account of academic discussions. Authors may have used older sources (Augustine, Peter Lombard, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas) and taken over the debates reported by these sources, presenting them as if they were still current.

Secondly there is the point of eclecticism. Authors may use very different sources and put texts together that are not always clearly connected, guided by encyclopedic interests, even at the expense of systematic coherence. Opposing or divergent opinions may be collected and quoted without indication of which opinion is adhered to or preferred.

Finally there is the aspect of simplification. The knowledge that is taken over from the academic sources is adapted and simplified. Not all the details are given, but only the essence or a few quotations, a phenomenon that was fostered by the use of so-called ‘conclusiones’ in the scholastic treatises since the fourteenth century.18


18 The ‘conclusiones’ were summarizing statements (not conclusions) on which the reasoning was focused. For an interesting example, see the ‘conclusiones’ extracted from the

1.3. The commentaries on the foreknowledge

The tradition of the comment and its importance for the study of foreknowledge, both synchronically and diachronically, forms a hermeneutic centre of gravity in the broad field of foreknowledge commentary. It is a multidisciplinary research area that encompasses a wide range of literary genres, periods, and regions. The aim of this section is to provide a brief overview of the main themes and methods used in the study of foreknowledge commentary, with a particular focus on the medieval period.

The tradition of the comment is a rich and complex one, with a long history that dates back to antiquity. It is a genre that is characterized by a close relationship between the text being commented and the commentary itself. The commentator, in effect, is the author of a new text that is designed to elucidate, interpret, and expand upon the original text.

The commentator, in turn, is often guided by the scholastic tradition, which emphasizes the importance of reason and logic in the study of foreknowledge. The commentator is expected to use arguments and reasoning to support their interpretation of the text.

In the medieval period, the commentator was often a scholar who had a deep understanding of the text and the intellectual tradition associated with it. The commentator would often use a variety of methods to interpret the text, including looking for analogies, identifying patterns, and making connections between different texts.

The commentator would often use a variety of methods to interpret the text, including looking for analogies, identifying patterns, and making connections between different texts. This process would often take place in a specific context, such as a university or a monastic school, where the commentator would have access to a wide range of resources and expertise.

In conclusion, the commentator is a central figure in the study of foreknowledge commentary. Their role is to provide a new interpretation of the text that is based on reason and logic, and that is informed by the intellectual tradition associated with the text. The commentator is a key figure in the process of knowledge creation, and their work is essential for our understanding of the intellectual tradition of foreknowledge commentary.
knowledge cultivated and developed. This also goes for the program at the ‘stúdia’ of the universities and its transition into the university. Also the cases that were used in commenting on the university curriculum. Yet, this does not mean that the idea of a normative role of the university curriculum was discussed in the mid to late fourteenth century, as the above examples show.

6. Between the universities and the ‘stúdia’ the normative role of the unique subjects and problems that were discussed at the universities was also discussed at the ‘stúdia’. What are the three different aspects that distinguish the transition of academic knowledge that were written outside of the universities (Augustine, Peter Damian, especially Alcuin) and taken over by the universities as if they were still current.

7. Authors may use very different words that are not always clearly connotated at the expense of systematic discussion. They may be collected and adhered to or preferred.

8. The knowledge that is extracted and simplified. Not all or a few quotations, a phenomenon called ‘conclusiones’ in the fourteenth century. 

9. See A. Wulf, ‘Compendium Historiae der Geschichte des Studienwesens der Hochschule und Gesellschaft’, Bochumer Studien (1997), for a list of conclusions on which the readers’ ‘conclusiones’ extracted from the

1.3. The commentaries on the ‘Consolatio’ and the problem of divine foreknowledge

The tradition of the commentaries on the Consolatio philosophiae is an interesting field for studying the different aspects of the transition of knowledge, both synchronically and diachronically. This tradition begins already in the ninth century, long before the medieval universities were founded and continues in the modern period. It includes Latin as well as vernacular commentaries. Importantly, many of these commentaries were written outside the walls of the university. The reading of the Consolatio was not part of the regular curriculum at the universities, it was only lectured upon ‘extraordinaria’. Yet, in the treatise a number of problems are discussed, that were closely related to the subjects of the academic debates, such as the theory of the soul, the ordering of the cosmos, and the problem of divine foreknowledge. Especially the subject of divine foreknowledge is important for our investigation. It is discussed at great length in the last book of the Consolatio and recurs in many commentaries. The discussion in the commentaries on the Consolatio is paralleled by that in the commentaries on the Sentences and on the De interpretatione, works that were read as part of the regular university curriculum. This makes the problem of divine foreknowledge an appropriate subject for exploring the relationship between on the one hand the regular academic treatment of specific philosophical problems and on the other the ‘extraordinaria’ and non-academic discussion.

In addition, the problem of divine foreknowledge enables us to adequately investigate the three aspects of delay, eclecticism, and simplification. In the late middle ages, the development of the problem is in a constant state of flux. The discussions in the second half of the thirteenth century on the Sentences of John of Ripa in: John of Ripa, Conclusiones, ed. A. Combes, Paris 1957 (Études de philosophie médiévale, 44).


century are different from those in the fourteenth century and later.\textsuperscript{21} This allows for the study of the aspect of delay. Also, the problem is closely connected to the important developments that shaped medieval thinking, such as the debate about the works of Aristotle in the thirteenth century and the introduction of the logico-semantic approach in the fourteenth century. Although the issue of divine foreknowledge is among the oldest philosophical problems, in the mid-thirteenth century it received a new impulse by the growing acquaintance with the works of Aristotle, who seems to deny that God has knowledge of creation.\textsuperscript{22} The introduction of the logico-semantic approach in philosophy and theology again stimulated a new development of the problem. The debate became more logically orientated. The problem was no longer discussed by concentrating on the understanding of the essence of God, but by a semantic analysis of propositions about the essence of God and the knowledge that goes with the divine essence.\textsuperscript{23} As a result of this last development, the problem became more technical than before. This gives us the possibility to study the aspect of simplification and to see whether in the non-academic and 'extraordinarie' writings the same technical level is reached as in the regular academic treatises. Finally, the issue of divine knowledge allows for the study of the aspect of eclecticism. Through the years, a number of different solutions to the problem were put forward. Some authors stressed the divine eternity (Thomas Aquinas), others the divine will (John Duns Scotus), and others underscored the impossibility of human understanding (William of Ockham). These traditions are different in outlook and methodology and they were also recognized as such by contemporaries, although some of them tried to reconcile them.\textsuperscript{24} The question now is, whether these views were referred to or taken over in non-academic writings and whether they were taken over in their pure form or mixed with each other.


\textsuperscript{22} Aristotle, \textit{Metaphysics}, XII, c. 9, 1074b15-1075a10.

\textsuperscript{23} See p. 205 below.

\textsuperscript{24} An interesting case is that of Robert Cowton, who tried to bring together the views of Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus. See H. Schwamm, \textit{Robert Cowton über das göttliche Vorherwissen}, Innsbruck 1931 (Philosophie und Grenzwissenschaften, 3/5).

1.4. The Ghent Boethius

In this paper, we will study the so-called Ghent Boethius, consisting of a Latin text, a translation into Middle Dutch. The comments are in Middle Dutch and the text was printed in 1485. It had a wide circle of readers and is still in use today.

1.4.1. The authorship

Unfortunately, the book is written in Latin, but it is not clear who wrote it. The author is implied in the preface saying he worked for the library of the University of Ghent. He must have been a student there.\textsuperscript{26} It has been assumed that he was a student of a certain John Duns Scotus.\textsuperscript{27} Yet, the author is familiar with the work of the other commentators of the text and he has knowledge of the foreknowledge and human knowledge.

In the fifteenth century, it is not clear who the author was. The only contemporary who mentions the text is Albertist Heymericus de Caricium, who lived in the Library of Louvain after finishing his studies.

\textsuperscript{25} For further details on the Ghent Boethius, see J. Machiels, \textit{De boekdrukkersnederlandse vertalingen van Boethius’ De consolatione}, Leiden 1987.

\textsuperscript{26} J. Machiels, \textit{De boekdrukkersnederlandse vertalingen van Boethius’ De consolatione}, Leiden 1987, p. 22.

\textsuperscript{27} A. van de Vyver, 'Over de Nederlandse vertalingen van Boethius’ De consolatione', Leiden 1987.
14. The Ghent Boethius

In this paper, we will study the above-mentioned problems by analyzing the so-called Ghent Boethius, an impressive incunabulum (1485) consisting of a Latin text, a translation and an extensive commentary in Middle Dutch. The commentary was composed between 1444 and 1477, perhaps about 1455, and printed several years later by Arend de Keysere in 1485. It had a wide circulation and many copies have survived, some of which are beautifully decorated.25

1.4.1. The authorship

Unfortunately, the book is written anonymously. It is possible, however, to give a profile of its author. The dialect of the Ghent Boethius and a remark in the preface saying that the author has left a corrected copy of his work in the library of the St Veerle (Verelde) Chapter indicate that the author must have been connected with Ghent and the St Veerle Chapter there.26 It has been suggested that the author therefore must have been a canon of that chapter, but there is no further evidence for that.27 Yet, the author is familiar with scholastic thought and reasoning and knows how to handle the technical aspects of the problem of divine foreknowledge. Unlike Pseudo-Thomas and Dionysius the Cretansian, two other commentators of the Consolatio, our author inserts in his work lengthy discussions of the logical intricacies of how to reconcile divine foreknowledge and human freedom. This makes it likely that he must have had university training.

In the fifteenth century, it is not unusual that academics continue their career as writers outside the university. An interesting example is the Albertist Heymericus de Campo, who between 1420 and 1422 went to Diest near Louvain after finishing his studies at Paris. At Diest he wrote

25 For further details on the Ghent Boethius, see the contributions of Goris and Wissink elsewhere in this volume.
26 J. Machiels, De boekdrukkants te Gent tot 1560, Ghent 1994 (Bijdragen tot de bibliothekswetenschap, 7), 19-22, esp. 22 (with further literature), and the Ghent Boethius, ed. A. de Keysere, Ghent 1485 (Den Haag, Koninklijke Bibliotheek, 171 A 2), De prologe, fol. a3r:
"(...) so heb ik (...) den alleersten bouc van dezer translacie met mijnder hand gecorrigirt te sente Verelde te Ghent in de librairie doen leggherfe(...)."
his first treatise, the *Compendium divinorum*, a large handbook of metaphysics. The *Compendium* is of a high intellectual level and betrays the hand of university-educated scholar. 

Against a probable university training of our author it might be objected that in his commentary he quotes at large from the works of others, without mentioning his sources, as we will see. This however does not argue against university training or academic habits. In the *Tractatus problematicus*, written at the University of Cologne in 1425-1426, Heymericus de Campo quotes from the work of Johannes de Nova Domo anonymously. And Peter of Ailly parts of the work of Gregory of Rimini in his commentary on the *Sentences*, again without mentioning the source. 

At which school or university our author was educated is difficult to determine. Regarding his thorough knowledge of theological problems, he in all probability must have received his training at a theological faculty. This seems to be confirmed by a reference to the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, which were used as a standard textbook at every late medieval theological faculty. Unfortunately, this reference is taken from one of the sources he had at his desk. Yet, independently of this source, he discusses a number of issues that are dealt with in the commentaries on the *Sentences* and that are usually not discussed in the commentaries on the *Consolatio*. It remains hypothetical, but if he were educated at a university, it may have been the University of Louvain, which had a

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32 Ghent Boethius (Den Haag, KB, 171 A 2), Lib. 5, pros. 6, fol. [T5]²b, ‘(...) ende dese materiae es int langhe ghedeer termineert libro primo Sententiarum, daerse de clekhe besouken mogen.’ 

33 Reinter of St Truiden, Liège, Bibliothèque de l’Université, Cod. 348C, fol. 164²b. 

34 See note 153 below.
1.4.2. The author's intention

In the preface (de prologhe), the author discusses the design and the methodology that he followed in composing the treatise. The preface consists of three sections of unequal length. In the first section, he introduces the treatise of Boethius to the reader using the scheme of the Aristotelian four causes. In the next section, he gives account of his translating the Consolatio—how he rendered the verse and the prose parts into Middle Dutch. Finally, the commentary that is attached to the translation is discussed. In this section, the author highlights that in his commentary he added things that are meant to be morally edifying and comforting. This may suggest that the author primarily had a practical and ethical intention. A careful study of the commentary, however, shows that his ambition covers more. He also intends to educate his readership with interesting details and philosophical digressions. He gives minute information on personalities or natural phenomena. And in the discussion of divine foreknowledge he elaborately deals with the logical puzzles involved in that problem. The commentary provides more than just comfort. It is a ‘Compendium to the Consolatio’, containing all the information needed to understand and use the text. The author not only intended to edify his readers, but also to educate.

35 On the relationship between the Universities of Louvain, Cologne, and Paris, see A. G. Weiler, 'Les relations entre l’Université de Louvain et l’Université de Cologne au XV° siècle', The Universities in the Late Middle Ages, ed. J. Dhewjijn and J. Pasquer, Louvain 1978, 49-81, and in the same volume A. L. Gabriel, 'Intellectual Relations between the University of Louvain and the University of Paris in the 15th Century', 82-132.

36 Ghent Boethius (Den Haag. KB, 171 A 2), De prologhe, fol. A²⁻⁰, A⁻². For a contemporary example (1452) of the use of this scheme in the Latin tradition, see M. J. F. M. Hoenen, Speculum philosophiae medii aevi. Die Handschriftensammlung des Dominikaners Georg Schwerts († nach 1484), Amsterdam 1994 (Bochumer Sadeden zur Philosophie, 22), 99f.

37 Ibid., fol. A²⁻⁰. See Goris and Wissink elsewhere in this volume.

38 Ibid., fol. A⁻⁰. "Flebbe (...) ooc onderwiten wat sedelics vertroostens over al gheventy."
1.4.3. The sources

In writing the commentary, the author invoked many different sources. Recent research has shown that he directly or indirectly used the commentaries of William of Conches, Pseudo-Thomas and Reinier of St Truiden.\(^{40}\) Interestingly these three commentaries are written in Latin, not in the vernacular.

Apart from these commentaries, he also used other kinds of sources. Especially striking are the many references to the Church Fathers. Occasionally, they are so numerous and so systematically arranged that the assumption seems justified that he used one or more 'florilegia'. A clear example can be found toward the end of the commentary, where a large number of 'auctoritates' on the issues of humbleness (oottmoedichheid) and tears (tranen) are quoted. To following sample may illustrate the use of these 'auctoritates'.\(^{41}\)


It is not unusual for a medieval author to employ 'florilegia' as an aid for composing his works. Remarkable however is that our author uses this genre massively and seems to take over large sections. The most well-known 'florilegia' with quotations from the Church Fathers were


\(^{41}\) Ghent. Boetius (Den Haag, KB, 171 A 2), Lrb. 5, pros. 6, fol. [V7]?r-b-v (italics are raine).
...ked many different sources. Or indirectly used the comp-
...Thomas and Reinier of St Truiden are written in Latin,
...used other kinds of sources. Oc-
...to the Church Fathers. Oc-
...he more 'florilegia'. A clear
... commentary, where a large
...enleness (ootmoedichheid) of

Husen: Hets emmer eene drooge bede, vastdelicte: Thiere van eenen yghe-
...ond dat noch rauwe noch leed-
...der penitencien zijn den ingerellen
...smake van gracien, ighervoelen
...verrander kinderheyt ende on-
...zoethet van eenen geheerte-
...my vanden behinne minne be-
...devocie van tranen, troost in
...hec hem weder geven, diet hem
...mundi': O salighe traesen, die de
...Sallis zijn de oogen die daer

Employ 'florilegia' as an aid


**43** Ebene, *Speculum philosophiae medii aevi*, 59f.


**45** Also here, our author may have used 'florilegia'. For medieval anthologies of the works of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, see J. Hamesse, 'Les florilèges philosophiques, instruments de travail des intellectuels à la fin du moyen âge et à la renaissance', *Filosofia e teologia nel trecento. Studi in ricordo di Eugenio Randi*, ed. L. Bianchi, Louvain-La-Neuve 1994 (Textes et Études du Moyen Âges, 1), 479-508; M. Grabmann, *Methoden und Hilfsmittel des Aristote-
Summa Halensis, Lib. 1, Ad Claras Aquas 1925, n. 63, 91f.

Contra 1, Dan. 12, 3: ‘Qui ad justitiam erudiant multos, fulgebunt quasi stelae in perpetuas aeternitates’; sed hoc nihil esse dicturn dictum, nisi aeternitas aliquo modo receptoris multiplicationes. (…) Sed aliqua multiplicacio cadit in eumtate. Igitur eternitas non est essencia divina. (…) Minor decla-ratur, quia dictur Danielli 12: Qui ad justi-tiam erudiant multos ful-genebunt quasi stelle in per-petuas aeternitates. (…) Item, in der eewichiteit valt menichvulcidoit: Danielli 12, daer staat dat de ghone die ter gheechen-ticiteit andre beweghen als sterren in donhende-lijke eewichiteit blecken sullen. (…) Ten andreu dat in der eewichheit gheene menichvulcidoit valt: want al machmeene int plurale bescriven, dat dient alleene ten bewije der menichvulcidoit van haren ghewercken ende ter menichvulcidoit van haer naturen niet.

Ad illud ergo quod primo obicit dicendum quod ae-ternitas dictur pluraliter, non quia ipsa aeternitas plurificetur in se, sed propter diversas participations aeternitatis ex parte creaturae vel propter virtutem continenti multiplicem in ef-fectu, proet dictum est.

(…) cum ergo dictur plu-raliter eeternitatis, non dictur quia ipsa eternitas plurificetur in se, sed propter diversas participations eternitatis ex parte creaturae vel propter virtutem continenti multiplicem in effectu.

The works of Alexander of Hales and Thomas Aquinas had been attracting attention especially since the third quarter of the fourteenth century at the universities as well as outside. Then, many theologians return in their writings to sources from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, such as Richard of St Victor, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas. This movement can be recognized in the works of Marsilius of Inghen, John Gerson, and Denys the Carthusian. It makes manifest that the quoting of these thirteenth century sources by Reinier of St Truiden and by our author cannot be regarded as a characteristic of non-academic works. It is a general phenomenon that is part of a broader development.

On the other hand, these quotations reveal how scholastic elements enter into vernacular texts. This may happen anonymously and indirectly, as we have seen. Again, this does not mean that the anonymous quotation of sources is a distinguishing feature of non-academic writings. It can also be found in many commentaries on Aristotle and the

Sentences, especially in theTHE TRANSITIC

1.5. Different forms of comm

As was argued at the outset of this chapter, different forms of the comm on the one hand and the ‘quod’ relatively near to the text that these words or concepts in the text that is commented upon serve the problems that are sometimes observed in the treatment of these problems can be read in a different direction. The case of Ailly is a case in point here.⁴⁶

In between the two extreme are many different hybrids, some of the text, but add digressions, ‘du’, put forward by the original text group. The relationship with Latin is divided into relatively independent parts. Both translation are given.⁴⁸ The cases are not all of the same length and, whereas others give a different perspective. Boethius and include the thematic of the scholastic ‘praeceptio’ argumentation is narrative a

⁴⁶ A further characterization of
Gisbert et commentaires de textesϕ
131. See also Naat's first contribu-
⁴⁷ M. Chappuis, Le Traite de Pi-
dam 1993 (Bochumer Studien zur Ph-
deurandis verahingen, 109-193.
⁴⁸ For a discussion of the Latin
trivium à la Faculté des Arts de Par-
iques d'enseignement dans les uni-
1994 (Textes, Études, Congrès, 16), 5.
Ghent Boethius (KB, Den Haag, 171 A 2), Lib. 5, pros. 6, fol. [R6]

Item, in der eeuwicheit valt menichvuldichkeit: Daniells 12. daer staat dat de ghone die eer gheerechtigheyt andre beweeghen als sterren in donhende-lijke eeuwicheit bleeken zullen. (…)

Ten anden dat in der eeuwicheit gheene menichvuldichkeit valt: want al machmen innt plurale beschrieven, dat dient alleene ten bewijs der menichvuldichkeit van haren ghwerckenden ende ter menichvuldichkeit van harer naturen niet.

As Aquinas had been attracted to the question of the eleventh century scholastics, many theologians return in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, such as John of Mirecourt, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas. In the works of Marsilius of Padua and Dunstan, it makes manifest that the acceptance of scholasticism by Reinier of St Truiden can be characterized as non-academic. This is part of a broader development among the scholastics.

It is important to note how scholastic elements were often presented anonymously and in isolation. This means that the anonymous presence of scholastic elements in non-academic writers is a phenomenon that requires further investigation. For example, the commentator on Aristotle and the

Sentences, especially in the works of John of Mirecourt, Peter of Ailly, Marsilius of Inghen, and Heymericus de Campo.

1.5. Different forms of commentary

As was argued at the outset of the paper, the commentary is one of the forms in which medieval thinking expressed itself. Yet, there are many different forms of the commentary. The two extremes are the 'glossae' on the one hand and the 'quaestiones' on the other. The 'glossae' stay relatively near to the text they comment upon. The commentator annotates words or concepts in the text. He almost never departs from the subjects dealt with in the text. The 'quaestiones' are different. The text that is commented upon serves as a starting point for the discussion of problems that are sometimes only loosely related to the text. The treatment of these problems can be independent from the source and may go in a different direction. The commentary on the Consolatio by Peter of Ailly is a case in point here.

In between the two extremes of the 'glossae' and the 'quaestiones' are many different hybrids, such as commentaries that stay close to the text, but add digressions, 'dubia', or 'quaestiones' to develop the issues put forward by the original text. The Ghent Boethius is part of this last group. The relationship with the original text is maintained. The Consolatio is divided into relatively small pericopes or sections, that are commented upon separately. Both the Latin text and the Middle Dutch translation are given. The commentaries that follow these pericopes are not all of the same length and nature. Some only paraphrase the text, whereas others give a detailed discussion of the issues touched upon by Boethius and include quotations from other sources. The typical form of the scholastic 'quaestio' is almost never used. The structure of the argumentation is narrative and expository, rather than syllogistic, al-

46 A further characterization of the 'glossae' with examples is given by E. Jeanneau, ‘Glosses et commentaires de textes philosophiques (IXe-XIIe s.)’, Les genres littéraires, 117-131. See also Naude’s first contribution in this volume.
47 M. Chappuis, Le Traité de Pierre d’Ailly sur la Consolation de Boëce, Qu. 1, Amsterdam 1993 (Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie, 20).
48 For a discussion of the Latin text and the Middle Dutch translation, see Hoek, De Middeleeuwse vertalingen, 109-193.
49 The format of the scholastic 'quaestio' is explored in O. Weijers, ‘L’enseignement du trivium à la Faculté des Arts de Paris: La questio’, Manusci, programmes de cours et techniques d’enseignement dans les universités médiévales, ed. J. Hamesse, Louvain-La-Neuve 1994 (Textes, Études, Congrès, 16), 57-74.
though the commentator sometimes employs the latter form, as we will see. There is no grammatical analysis (lectio) of the Consolatio. The emphasis is on the contents of the text.

The commentary of Reiniert of St Truiden was written before 1381 at Mechelen, where Reiniert held the office of ‘regens’ of the local school (scola).\(^50\) It is one of the main sources of the Ghent Boethius, but has a different format. It is divided by short lemmata that each time give only a few words of the Consolatio. These lemmata are followed by expositions of the text, which are not very extensive. Generally, they are only a few columns long and begin with a ‘divisio textus’, which normally is absent in the Ghenti commentary.\(^51\) In these expositions, Reiniert stays close to the original. There are almost no digressions. The syllogistic style of the reasoning is influenced by scholastic traditions. Reiniert often inserts ‘notabilia’, as is customary in scholastic commentaries on Aristotle and the Sentences. Each separate part of the commentary is closed by a grammatical analysis of the Consolatio, which in the manuscript is called the ‘construatur’\(^52\).

The commentary of Pseudo-Thomas, composed probably in the second part of the fifteenth century and directly or indirectly dependent on Nicolas Treves, is partly similar to that of Reiniert. It is divided into smaller parts that are each preceded by a lemma. These parts all begin with a ‘divisio textus’ and a paraphrase of the text. Subsequently, a number of ‘notabilia’ follow in which the author elaborates upon the text. Unlike Reiniert, however, the structure of the argumentation is not syllogistic and there is no grammatical analysis.\(^53\)

The commentary of Denys the Carthusian was written shortly before 1471, when Denys was living at the Charterhouse at Roermond, which he entered after his study at the University of Cologne in 1424 or 1425 and which he left only occasionally.\(^54\) It is designed as a dialogue be-

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\(^50\) Patin, ‘Reinius van St-Truiden’, 310 and 317.

\(^51\) The ‘divisio textus’ that appears in the Ghent Boethius on fol. [86]\(^b\) (Book V prose 6) has been taken over from Reiniert of St Truiden, Liège, Bibliothèque de l’Université, Cod. 348\(^C\), fol. 162\(^b\).

\(^52\) For further details see Courcelle, *La Consolation de Philosophie*, 325; Patin, ‘Reinius vaa St-Truiden’, 298-319; Angenent, ‘Het Gento Boethiuscommentaar’, 274-310.

\(^53\) The commentary was printed by Anton Koberger at Nürnberg in 1473. There are no earlier manuscripts known, which seems to indicate that the commentary belongs to the second part of the fifteenth century. On this commentary, see Courcelle, ibid., 322 f.; Palmer, ‘Latin and Vernacular’, 363 and 399 note 7, and Palmer’s contribution elsewhere in this volume. The commentary of Nicolas Treves is discussed by Neuta, also in this volume.

\(^54\) Concerning Denys’ biography, see A. Snoelen, ‘Denys le Chartreux’, *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité, Ascétique et Mystique*, vol. 3, Paris 1987, 430-449.

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between the master (Denys) and the pupil. The commentary, which discusses an extensive part of the text of Boethius is folio paraphrase, a procedure the Dominicans use. In addition, they are not introduc-

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\(^55\) Further details are provided by J. Wippel, *Metaphysical Themes in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy*.
y is the latter form, as we will see, the "articiulatio" (articulatio) of the Consolatio. The Consolatio was written before 1381 at the behest of the local school of the regens of the local school at Ghent Boethius, but has a regens that each time gives the name of the textus, which is a common practice in medieval commentaries and is a reflection of the syllogistic tradition. In the medieval commentaries on Aristotle, the commentary is closed by the articiulatio, which in the manuscripts is usually written in black ink. The articiulatio is a summary of the text or indirectly dependent on the text of the commentary. Subsequently, the articiulatio is elaborated upon the text of the commentary by the author. The articiulatio is not only a reflection of the syllogistic tradition but also makes sense within the context of the philosophical and educational practices of the time.

The Consolatio philosophiae was written shortly before Boethius' death in 498. It is divided into two parts: the first part is devoted to the study of the nature of reality and the second part is devoted to the study of the nature of the human soul. The second part of the work is the more important one, as it is here that Boethius develops his idea of the soul as a contraction or a reduction of the whole. The articiulatio of the second part is therefore more important than the articiulatio of the first part, as it reflects the main points of the work.

The Consolatio philosophiae is one of the most important sources used in the medieval discussion of divine foreknowledge. Although the work had always been available, it was only since the mid-thirteenth century that the views of Boethius on divine foreknowledge held the spotlight of discussion, especially when they were taken over and further developed in the writings of Thomas Aquinas. The reception of Boethius by Thomas Aquinas contributed substantially to his reputation among the scholastics. Generally, the views of Boethius on the issue of divine foreknowledge were defended by Dominican authors in their commentaries on the Sentences. By a decision of the general chapter in 1286, the Dominicans pledged themselves to defend the teachings of Boethius in their commentaries on the Sentences, which is his earliest treatment of the issue, and in the De veritate. In his later writings, such as the Summa contra Gentiles and the Summa theologae, he remained faithful to his early position. On the Boethian background of Thomas' discussion of divine foreknowledge see J. F. Wippel, Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas, Washington, D.C., 1984 (Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, 10), 245-248.
Thomas Aquinas. As a result, the position of Boethius as presented by Thomas Aquinas was elaborated upon in the writings of the Dominican theologians and the problems connected with it were discussed in the debates between Dominicans and Franciscans. These debates took place in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Shortly after that, the Boethian view on the necessity of divine foreknowledge became heavily criticized by the defenders of a position that was developed by the Franciscans Robert Grosseteste and Bonaventure and revived by John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. This criticism was taken over in the academic writings of many late medieval thinkers. In the further course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, combinations of the Boethian position and that of Robert Grosseteste and Bonaventure occurred, among others in the work of Marsilius of Inghen. Whether or not this development took place in non-academic writings as well will be investigated below.

1.7. Divine foreknowledge in the 'Consolatio'

In the Consolatio, Boethius conveys the idea that creation is ordered and guided by God, who is the highest good possible and therefore directs the world in the best possible way. The world is not governed by blind fortune (fortuna), but by an intelligent maker, who helps to purify the good man by letting him suffer. The evil eventually will help to glorify the good, although this cannot always be grasped easily by human beings.

The idea of an intelligent God who destinations the course of the world and has knowledge of all future events is difficult to reconcile with free will. A complete answer to this problem is impossible to reach for man, because man’s thinking has no full access to the divine. Yet, there are a few philosophical insights that according to Boethius may help to understand the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and free will. Firstly, knowledge does not change the nature of what is known. God can see at

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57 See F. J. Roensch, Early Thomistic School, Dubuque, Iowa, 1964, 17.
59 Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum, Strasbourg 1501, reprinted Frankfurt am Main 1966, Lib. 1, q. 40, fol. 164vb, 170vb.
60 Boethius, Philosophiae consolation, Lib. 5, pros. 4, n. 2, ed. L. Bieler, Turnhout 1967 (Corpus Christianorum Series Latina, 94/1), 95.

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one glance both the necessary (the walking on the street), and the contingent being changed. Why should it be different in the neoplatonic point of epistemology, in the way of the knower: 'suum centum comprehendit' the knowledge also is. In his own words: present to him as if it were future, the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and free will also is. God knows the future because his knowledge does not change, and it is present to him.

2. Boethius about the future

In the discussion of the problem of foreknowledge, Boethius attracted the attention of medieval thinkers to the nature of the things known. The divine knowledge and its object involves the future. The question of the compatibility of divine knowledge and free will is a central issue in medieval scholasticism, and is addressed in many commentaries on the Consolatio.

2.1. The presence of things in the future

Boethius defines the divine knowledge as the 'prior knowledge of an endless life: 'interminatio'. This definition is crucial for the articulation of the nature of the divine knowledge. Because divine eternal knowledge, there is nothing that escapes its gaze, nothing that does not become present to it, nor its future. It is always present to it.
one glance both the necessary (the rising of the sun) and the contingent (the walking on the street), without the modality of the necessary or the contingent being changed. This is true even of human knowledge, so why should it be different in God, he argues. Secondly, there is the neoplatonic point of epistemological subjectivism. The known is known in the way of the knower: ‘omne quod cognoscitur secundum cognosc- centium comprehenditur facultatem’. God is eternal and therefore his knowledge also is. In his eternal mode of being, every temporal being is present to him as if it were actually existing. These two points explain the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and free will. By reason of his eternal mode of being, God has infallible knowledge of the future and because his knowledge does not change the nature of the known, he knows the future without destroying free will.

2. Boethius and the late medieval debate about divine foreknowledge

In the discussion of the problem, Boethius touched on some issues that attracted the attention of medieval authors: 1. the divine eternity and the way in which the things known are present to God, 2. the modality of the divine knowledge and its object, and 3. the possible influence of human beings on the divine knowledge. In the following part of the paper, I will investigate these issues and explore how they were dealt with in the medieval scholastic discussion and how this discussion is reflected in the commentaries on the Consolatio, especially in the Ghent Boethius.

2.1. The presence of things in God’s eternal mode of being

Boethius defines the divine eternity as the perfect possession altogether of an endless life: ‘interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecte possesso’. This definition is crucial for our understanding of the divine omniscience. Because divine eternity is the perfect possession of an endless life, there is nothing that escapes it, not the present, nor the past, nor the future. It is always present to itself (praesens sibi) and has the infinity of

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61 Ibid., Lib. 5, pros. 6, n. 18-24, 102f.
62 Ibid., pros. 4, n. 24-30, 96f.
63 Ibid., pros. 6, n. 15, 102.
64 Ibid., n. 4, 101.
moveable time (infinitas mobilis temporis) present to itself as well.\textsuperscript{65} The divine eternity is no perpetual duration, but an everlasting present, unmovable and simple. The same characteristics apply to divine knowledge. God’s knowing is a never-ending present, but an everlasting present that embraces all moments of time. God sees all things that will happen as if they happen already (iam gerauritur). It is the knowledge of a never-fading instant of the present: ‘scientia nunquam deficientis instantiae’\textsuperscript{66}.

Boethius does not discuss the ontological nature of the objects that are known by God in his eternal mode of being. The only point he makes is that the known is known in the way of the knower and that there is a difference between the known considered in itself and as referred to the divine knowledge.\textsuperscript{67} This seems to imply that God knows things differently from what they are in themselves. They are known by a mode of being that is unlike in character to their own timely being. Boethius makes a comparison between the object known by the senses and the same object known by the intellect.\textsuperscript{68} In the former case it is known individually, in the latter case generally. Similarly, a thing in the divine mode of being is known differently from the way it exists outside. In the divine mode of being it is known as present, whereas outside it may not yet exist.

2.1.1. The scholastic discussion

In the scholastic treatises of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the nature of the object known by God was frequently discussed. At the center of interest was the way Thomas Aquinas expounds the theory of Boethius. Special attention was given to the question of whether the things that are known by God in his eternal mode of being really do exist presently or only ‘as if’.\textsuperscript{69} The criticism was particularly directed against the real presence of the object. It would mean that the things that are known by God have eternal existence, an implication that was erro-

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., n. 8, 101.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., n. 15ff., 102.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., pros. 4, n. 24-30, 96ff.; pros. 6, n. 1, 15 and 26, 101, 102 and 103.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., pros. 6, n. 36, 104.
\textsuperscript{69} For a general discussion of the subject, see J. de Finance, ‘La présence des choses à l’éternité d’après les scolastiques’, Archives de Philosophie, 19 (1956), 24-62, and M. Th. Liske, ‘Was meint Thomas von Aquin mit “Gott weiss das Künftige als gegenwärtig”?’, Theologie und Philosophie, 60 (1985), 520-37. As is clear from these essays, there is no agreement on the correct interpretation of Thomas’ thought. According to de Finance, Thomas meant real presence, whereas Liske reads Thomas as saying only ‘as if’ presence.
neous. This kind of criticism was put forward by Franciscan authors and take over by many Dominicans.

In the *Correctorium fratris Thomae*, an attack on the teachings of Thomas Aquinas by the Franciscan William de la Mare, the view that the things in God's eternal mode of being have real presence was considered as 'simpliciter falsum et erroneum'. The treatise was written before 1279, probably in 1277 or 1278, but was still being read in the fifteenth century. William de la Mare chooses the second of the two alternatives. He submitted that God knows the things as if (ac si) they were present, through his knowledge of causal concepts and ideas. For what does not yet exist cannot itself be present to eternity.

The same view was maintained in the so-called *Littera septem sigilorum*, a list of twenty-two theses drafted by seven Franciscan theologians at the request of the Franciscan minister-general Bonagrata and directed against Peter of John Olivi. As a direct consequence of this, the view that God knows the things only 'as if' they were present assumed a more-or-less official authority for Franciscans of the time. A significant detail here was that the libel also stated that the criticized view, according to which God knows the things themselves, should not be called heretical, as William de la Mare did. Bonagrata probably wanted to evade an official discussion of the orthodoxy of Thomas' view.

The *Lectura thomasina* by the Dominican William Peter of Godin, written 1296-1300, made reference to the criticism by William de la Mare. The author spoke of adversaries who criticized the view of Thomas as being erroneous. To the allegation that the view of Thomas was contrary to faith, he replied that eternity coexists with all moments in time, while the reverse does not hold. From this fact he also inferred that two different moments \( t_1 \) and \( t_2 \), while both present to eternity, do not coincide.

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71 The dating of the treatise is according to L. Hjöll, "Geistesgeschichtliche und literarkritische Erhebungen zum Korrektorenstreit (1277-1287)", *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 53 (1966), 81-114, esp. 82. For the use of the *Correctorium fratris Thomae* in the fifteenth century, see Hoenen, *Speculum philosophiae medii aevi*, 32-35.
72 *Le Correctorium corruptorii 'Quære*', a. 3, 18f.
73 See G. Fussenegger, *'Littera septem sigilorum contra doctrinam Petri Ioannis Olivi edita*", *Archivum franciscanum historicum*, 47 (1954), 45-53, esp. 51 (n. 5): "item dicere quod res non sunt, sint presentes Deo in sui propria natura et essentia, et alter quam per yeadam vel per suam causam, est falsum; et dicere quod sit hereticum, est erroneum." On this letter and on the condemnation of Peter of John Olivi, see J. Koch, *Kleine Schriften*, vol. 2, Rome 1973 (Storia e letteratura), 128, 191-274, esp. 209-211.
not coexist with each other. The objection: Godin was trying to meet here, that all things that are present to eternity must also be present to each other, is one that is frequently raised against Thomas, even by present-day writers on the subject. To William de la Mare’s objection that the future is not yet real and therefore cannot be present, Godin replied that a thing considered in itself is present to eternity only as long as it exists, but that God can see it from eternity. For with respect to God there is eternal ‘praesentialitas cogniti’. Godin rejected the eternal ‘praesentialitas rei’, thus following the criticism of William de la Mare. The same line was followed in the Quodlibeta of Peter of Auvergne (1299) and in the commentaries on the Sentences of Hervaeus Natalis and Durand of St Pourçain, two Dominican authors who were still widely read in the fifteenth century. The Dominican Jacob of Metz, however, interpreted Thomas as meaning real presence. He explicitly responded to the competing interpretation, which he claimed did not agree with the words of Thomas (a similar remark had been made by William de la Mare). As his own view, Jacob submitted that the things are not really present in God’s eternity, but have only an ‘as if’ presence. The interpretation of Thomas given by Jacob of Metz was criticized in the Correctorium addressed against him by Hervaeus Natalis, written 1302-1307 or about 1310. Hervaeus did not take issue with Jacob’s view of a merely ‘as if’ presence (which he actually shared), but rather with his reluctance to accept this view as the correct interpretation of Thomas.

74 See B. Decker, Die Gotteslehre des Jacob von Metz. Untersuchungen zur Dominikaner-Theologie zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts, Münster 1967 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, 42/1), 183f., with references to the relevant places in the Lectura thomistica. For the dating of the work, see ibid., 44.
75 Compare the criticism on Thomas by A. Kenny, The God of the Philosophers, Oxford 1986, 38f.
76 See Decker, Die Gotteslehre des Jacob von Metz, 184.
77 Ibid., 184f. (Peter of Auvergne), 186f. (Hervaeus Natalis), and 188 (Durand).
78 Ibid., 177 and 183 (with quotations from the sources). As to William de la Mare, see Le Correctorium corruptori ‘Quare’, a. 3, 18 and 20.
79 Ibid., 186f. For the Correctorium of Hervaeus, see Roenisch, Early Thomistic School, 107 and 115, and Decker, Die Gotteslehre des Jacob von Metz, 22.

2.1.2. The commentaries of Ghent

The discussion about the nature of the future turns in the commentaries of Ghent Boethius, then some final conclusions. If we consider the way in which Ghent Boethius knows everything in his edition, it is striking. The author treats the scholastic syllogism. Also the treatment of the subject and the

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Philos. 81 Compare the passage quoted above.

Maiores ratios hosit ut libri operative. Minor pontius

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In Godin was trying to meet the future is not yet real and that a thing considered in itself exists, but that God can see it there is eternal ‘praesentialitas realitatis rei’, thus following the same line was followed in the commentaries on the Domini- nelis of St Pourçain, two Dominicans in the fifteenth century. The need Thomas as meaning real and meaning interpretation, which is his own view, Jacob sub- enn, however, and God in God’s eternity, but have of Thomas given by Jacob of have addressed against him by Her- nesaus did not take in presence (which he actually accept this view as the correct

2.1.2. The commentaries on the ‘Consolatio’

The discussion about the nature of the objects that are known by God returns in the commentaries on the Consolatio. First let us consider the Ghent Boethius, then some other late-medieval commentaries.

If we consider the way in which the Ghent Boethius argues that God knows everything in his eternal mode of being, the technical terminology is striking. The author transforms the reasoning of Boethius into a scholastic syllogism. Also in the further course of his commentary, the treatment of the subject and the vocabulary used is scholastic in nature.

The use of this kind of terminology makes it plausible that the author used a scholastic source. Indeed, if we compare the Ghent Boethius with the commentary of Reinier of St Truiden, there can be no doubt about the origin of the syllogistic reasoning. Our author translated the Latin of Reinier almost verbatim into Middle Dutch. Obviously, in writing and compiling his vernacular commentary he did not omit or leave out sources that were heavily marked by the scholastic art of reasoning, even when discussing a subject so difficult and highly sophisticated as divine knowledge. He did not simplify his source by paraphrasing or summarizing, but quoted it literally. He must have assumed that his readership was able to grasp and deal with the difficult scholastic treatment of the subject. The question now is, how our author understands the present- ness of the thing known in God’s eternal mode of being and whether he conceptually has been influenced by the scholastic discussion on the subject.

There are several places where he discusses the problem, yet only briefly. As is manifest from these passages, he does not consider the present- ness to be real, but only ‘as if’. Especially the first time that he mentions the issue deserves our attention. There, he points out that there is a

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80 Ghent Boethius (Den Haag, KB, 171 A 2), Lib. 5, pros. 6, fol. [S4r]: “Alle sciencie begrijpt ende kent de dynghen die onder hare kenneves vallen, dat na de condice ende maniere des kemmers, also dicwylje boven bleken es. Nu, de staet der godlijker essencen es eewich ende altshels jeghenwoordich ende voroorhen. Ergo zou kent de dijghen ewichic ende voorwoordich. De major blycket boven in de voorledene naeste prose. Ende de minor es onlincs in dese bleken.” Cf. Boethius, Philosophiae consolationis, Lib. 5, pros. 6, n. 15, 102.
81 Compare the passage quoted in the last note with Reinier of St Truiden, Liège, Bibliothèque de l’Université, Cod. 348C, fol. 161v: “Omnis cognitio comprehendit illas que sibi subjecta sunt secundum statum et naturam suam, scilicet ipsius noticia. Sed status diuini essentia est eternus et simplicitat presentis. Ergo cognoscit rei eternali presentis presentari. Maior huius rationis ponitur ibi ‘Quotiam ignotum omne judiciu’ et probata est prius, huius libri quaera. Minor ponitur ibi ‘Est deo auem’ et declarata est in presentis parte presentis prose.”
real problem with the question of presentness. He begins the passage with an opening that is characteristic for the introduction to a scholastic dubium: ‘ende wilde yemand segghen’, which is a translation from the Latin ‘sed diceret’. It is unclear whether or not he is quoting from a source. The passage is not to be found in the commentaries of Reinier, Pseudo-Thomas, and Denys.

The objection of the anonymous opponent of the ‘dubium’ concerns the way in which things that do not yet exist or never will exist are present to God in his eternity. They have no existential being of their own and therefore cannot be present. In his response, our commentator maintains that all things are present to God ‘beeldelie ende geestelic in haren cause’, that is to say, God knows them as presently existing, because he knows them through the ideas in his mind and through the knowledge of the causes.

A similar wording is used at other occasions. God has infallible knowledge of the contingent future, because everything is present to him inasmuch as he sees it ‘in hare mogelijkhiet van geschiene of cause’. God knows what will happen, because he knows how it will happen: he knows everything by knowing its cause.

Since in both cases a similar terminology is employed, we can assume that ‘knowing through the causes’ is a standard and technical expression. This impression is corroborated by the scholastic debate on the issue, in which exactly the same wording is used. We therefore now have to return shortly to the debate on the reading of Boethius by Thomas Aquinas.

In the Summa theologiae, Thomas had stated that all things are present to God, not only because he has knowledge of their concepts (ideas), but also because his knowledge is aimed at the things insofar as they exist in their own presence. This remark led William de la Mare to surmise, in keeping with his general interpretation of Thomas, that

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82 Ghent Boethius (Den Haag, KB, 171 A 2), Lib. 5, pros. 6, fol. 53vb.
83 Ibid.: “En de wilde yemand senghen (...) zo zuldt dat svolviren ende segghen dat hem alle dynghen gheschiet ende noch te gheschiene na de voorroogenhiet ziner eeuwicheit beeldelie ende gheestelic in haren cause of na de mogelijkhiet van gheschiene, also zeker ende claar voorroogen staen (...).”
84 Ibid., fol. [53r]: “(...) want alle dese dynghen zijn gode present, ende voor zijn ghesichtte ghedetermineert claren ende dan sij ons werden als zij nader tijd ghevallen sullen, want bij jeghberwurdichlicher te tocommende dynghen in hare mogelijkhiet van gheschiene of cause ziet, dan wij in harer presencie de voorroogenhiet doen.”
85 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Pars i, q. 14, a. 13 c., ed. Leonina vol. 4, Rome 1888, 186b.

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Thomas believed that God had knowledge of the things, which would be an alternative source for our ideas, then this source must have charged Thomas with presenting which he accepted (knowing the other (knowledge of the cause).

The view William de la Mare put forward by Thomas in his theological ideas in God’s mind, but also of matter, hence also of knowledge of the ideas of the objects, there is to know about a thing.

If we look at the Dominicanism in the so-called Corruptorium interpreted Thomas’ dispute from the commentary on the idea of God receiving knowledge means that, due to the disputation, the theory of Boethius in presence of the objects known.

86 Le Correctorium corruptorii... 87 Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum. P. Mandonnet, Paris 1929, 904: “(omnia) in re est; unde per ideam non tantum tempore, et omnes conditiones quae praebent.” 88 According to the Correctorium corruptorii...
Thomas believed that God is somehow the recipient of knowledge from the things, which would be repugnant to his nature as pure act. If there is an alternative source for God’s knowledge, other than concepts and ideas, then this source must lie outside of him. William de la Mare thus charged Thomas with presenting two modes of divine knowledge, one of which he accepted (knowledge through ideas and causes), while rejecting the other (knowledge of things in their own presence).

The view William de la Mare did not quarrel with, that God knows the existence of contingent things by means of the ideas and causes, was put forward by Thomas in his commentary on the Sentences. The practical ideas in God’s mind, he claimed, are not only the cause of form, but also of matter, hence also of the existence of each thing. Therefore knowledge of the ideas or the causes is sufficient for God to know all there is to know about a thing.

If we look at the Dominican reactions to William de la Mare’s criticism in the so-called Correctorium corruptorii, we see that some of them interpreted Thomas’ disputed view in the light of the above passage from the commentary on the Sentences. The idea that Thomas believed that God receives knowledge from outside is rejected as absurd. This means that, due to the discussion about the way in which Thomas explained the theory of Boethius, Dominican authors considered the presence of the objects known to God in his eternal mode of being as the

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60 Le Correctorium corruptorii ‘Quare’, a. 3, 20f.
67 Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, Lib. 1, d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1, ed. P. Mandonnet. Paris 1929, 904: “(…) idea quae est in mente divina, est causa omnis ejus quod in re est; unde per ideam non tantum cognoscit naturam rei, sed etiam hanc rem esse in ali tempore, et omnes conditiones quae consequuntur rem vel ex parte materiae vel ex parte formae.”
68 According to the Correctorium corruptorii ‘Quaestione’ which was probably the first reaction to William de la Mare, God knows all things in their presence through the intelligible forms (rationes), Le Correctorium corruptorii ‘Quaestione’, a. 3, 24: “(…) Deus qui habet penes se omnium rerum rationes praesentes, ipsas perfectissime intelligendo poterit aeternaliiter ferre intuitum intellectus sui praesentialiter: omni antequam essent (…).” In the Correctorium corruptorii ‘Quaestione’ the emphasis was placed on the fact that God has knowledge of the future because he is the creator of everything, including matter and being. Le Correctorium corruptorii ‘Quaestione’. Texte anonyme du ms. Merton 267, ed. J.-P. Muller, Rome 1954 (Studia Anselmiana), 35, a. 3, 20: “Cum autem ars divina sit productiva non tantum formae sed etiam materiae et etiam totius esse cunicumque creaturae, manifestum est quod Deus cognoscit omnes res etiam futuras perfecte.” On these Correctoriorum corruptoriorum, see M. J. F. M. Hoenen, The Literary Reception of Thomas Aquinas’ View on the Provability of the Eternity of the World in De la Mare’s Correctorium (1278-9) and the Correctioriorum corruptitorum (ca. 1279-86), The Eternity of the World in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas and his Contemporaries, ed. J. B. M. Wisink, Leiden 1990 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 27), 39-68.
presence in the ideas and the causes. It is this view that we can find in the Ghent Boethius. The commentaries of Pseudo-Thomas and Denys the Cartusian maintain a similar position.

There are at least two points in which the commentary of Pseudo-Thomas is comparable to the Ghent Boethius. In both treatises the argument of Boethius is cast into a syllogism and followed by a discussion about the nature of the objects that are known in the eternal mode of God's being. In the commentary of Pseudo-Thomas this discussion is introduced with the phrase 'aliquis dicetur'.

Yet, there are some distinctions. The syllogism is different. Nevertheless, the parallel is so striking that it cannot be excluded that the source of the Ghent Boethius, namely Reinier, had a text at his desk that was also used by Pseudo-Thomas, even if we consider that the syllogism is the most common form of scholastic reasoning and that the scholastics moulded almost every argumentation into a syllogism. If our assumption is correct, we have an example of how the argumentation of the one text is transposed into the other (Reinier and Pseudo-Thomas) and finally is taken over in the vernacular tradition (Ghent Boethius), similar to what happened to the passages from the Summa attributed to Alexander of Hales.

As to the nature of the objects known by God, Pseudo-Thomas distinguishes two ways of non-being: there are objects that do not exist and never will exist (such as a 'chimaera'), and there are objects that do not exist, but eventually will. Only the latter are present to God. Although they do not actually exist in their own being yet, they are present to eternity, because the divine eternity embraces all the moments of time. Being present to eternity therefore does not mean that the thing in itself

89 Pseudo-Thomas, In Boethii De consolatione philosophiae, edited in S. Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia, vol. 7, curante K. Busa, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1980, 121C-1212C, esp. Lib. 5, 171b: "(...) notandum, quia cognitio sequitur modum rei cognoscentis, idem cognitio et scientia dei sequitur statum at dispositionem dei: status autem dei est aeternitas et praesentarius, cum esse divinum metaphysica aeternitatum; ergo scientia dei est aeternitas et praesentia (...)."

90 Since the commentary of Pseudo-Thomas dates probably from the second part of the fifteenth century, it is unlikely that Reinier used Pseudo-Thomas as a source. Likewise, there is no positive evidence that Pseudo-Thomas had the commentary of Reinier at his disposal. The resemblance between the two commentaries is therefore probably due to the use of a common third source.

(simpliciter) exists already and are not necessarily present to God.

In the further course of his view by saying that God knows them as if presently there. The viewpoint is that the presence of things and of any eternal existence on the condition of the elaboration on the question is understood. Rather, the accent is clear that the flow of time and the passing of time and eternity. One of the examples is a tower sees at one instant and is below see only the one in the context of the image is also given by the tower which may be perhaps the one.

Denys the Cartusian in his treatises he stresses that all things are present to God as well. In contrast to Pseudo-Thomas according to him, God knows things in his knowledge is, as if already present, and that it has played a prominent role in the beatific vision. 'Ac si' means to him that things are present to him. They are only conceptually present inside the mind: 'et quod habet in mente divina'.

91 Ibid., 171c: "(...) unde notandum, quia aeternitas et praesentia est.
92 Ibid., 171c: "(...) deus suo est.
93 Ibid., 171c: "(...) notandum, quia aeternitas et praesentia est.
94 Denys the Chartusian, Enarrationes in Beatissimi De consolatione philosophiae, Tournai 1617 (Tobin 617b). See also ibid., 615aB: "(...) tempus (...)"
is view that we can find in the commentary of Pseudo-Thomas and Denys.

The argument is different. Nevertheless, it be excluded that the source text find itself in the same place that was considered the syllogism is valid and that the scholastics have use it in a syllogism.  If our assumption of the argumentation of the one (Pseudo-Thomas) and the other (Ghent Boethius), similar to the summa attributed to Alexander of Salvio, 170

Denys the Carthusian is following the same line. In his commentary he stresses that all things are only 'tamquam praesentia' present to God as well. In contrast to Pseudo-Thomas, he enters into the details. According to him, God knows everything 'ac si iam praesentialiter sit', that is, as if already present, and thereby uses the concept of 'ac si', which played a prominent role in the debate on the view of Thomas Aquinas. "Ac si" means to him that the things are not themselves present to God. They are only conceptually present, as objects of divine knowledge or ideas in the divine mind: 'quod esse suum cognoscibile et exemplare quod habit in mente divina'. 96 Denys is at this point very close to the authors...

91 Ibid., 171c: "(...) unde non sequitur, si aliquid coexistit aeternitati, quod pro tanto simpliciter existat; quia aeternitas etiam extendit se ad non existentia sicut ad praeteritum et futurum."

92 Ibid., 171c: "(...) deus suum aeterno intuitu omnia certit tamquam praesentia."

93 Ibid., 171c: "(...) notandum, de hoc quod dicitur deum praesentialiter omnia cognoscere, scilicet praeterita et futura, ponunt quidam exemplum (...). alius exemplum ponitur de aliquo qui vade per viam et non videt homines post se venientes; sed ille qui de alta turri respiceret, viderit totam viam et homines per eam transactum tam praeceidentem quam sequentes (...)." Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Pars 1, q. 14, a. 13, ad 3 (ed. Leonis, 4), 187b: "(...) Sic ut ille qui vade per viam, non videt illos qui post eum venient: sed ille qui ab alta altitudo totam viam intueretur, simul videt omnes transactum per viam."

94 Denys the Chartusian, Enarrationes seu commentaria in V libros B. Severini Boetii De consolatione philosophiae, Tournai 1906 (Opera omnia, 26), Lib. 5, pros. 6, a. 12, 616bC and 617bD. See also ibid., 615aB: "(...) simpliciter intuitu cognoscere et quasi praesentialiter intueri tempus (...)."

95 Ibid., 518aA.

96 Ibid., 615aB.
2.2. The modality of God’s foreknowledge and its object

Reflecting on God’s eternal mode of being, Boethius considers the necessity of God’s knowledge as a natural consequence of his eternity. This brings us to the second issue: the discussion about the modality of God’s foreknowledge and its object.

As was said above, God’s knowing has no impact on the modality of the object, no more than human knowledge has. Man can know at the same time the rising of the sun and the walking on the street of his neighbor. The rising of the sun is necessary, but the walking of his neighbor. Human knowledge does not affect the modality of the events he considers. The same goes for divine knowledge. God knows necessary events as well as contingent. But his knowledge does not change the necessity nor the contingency of these events.\(^{97}\)

Nonetheless, Boethius thinks that the event, when it is known by God, will happen necessarily. This is not in contrast with the above, as in the former case the nature of the event or object is at stake, whereas in the latter case the relationship between God’s knowledge and the object known is concerned. By his eternal mode of being, God knows everything that will happen. He is omniscient. Consequently, when God knows that something will happen, it will happen, and impossibly cannot take place. Otherwise it would not have been known by God. The object known thus will happen necessarily, when it is referred to the divine knowledge: ‘cum ad divinam notionem refertur’. Yet, it may happen contingently and freely, when considered according to its own nature: ‘cum in sua natura perpenditur’.\(^{98}\)

This form of necessity, which is related to the divine knowledge and which leaves the nature of the object unharmed, is called by Boethius ‘conditional necessity’ (necessitas conditionis). It is the necessity that follows from the condition (conditio) of referring the object to the divine knowledge. He distinguishes it from the so-called ‘absolute necessity’ (necessitas absoluta), which depends solely on the nature of the thing it-

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\(^{97}\) Boethius, *Philosophiae consolation*, Lib. 5, pros. 6, n. 20-24, 102f.

\(^{98}\) Ibid., n. 26, 103.

self. It concerns things or events as the rising of the sun or the falling of rain.

2.2.1. Thomas Aquinas

The position of Boethius, that knowledge is necessary, was taken by Aquinas. Thomas affirmed all that of future contingents. Thus, the divine knowledge and God’s knowledge. His position is that logical subjectivism, accepting the idea of the necessity of the present, is much more.

Thomas explained this also. The that-clause in sentences have significative power. The activity expressed by the verb is the modality of the sentence obtained in the that-clause. Even if we say that Socrates is walking has been supplied to divine knowledge, what we know depend upon God’s omniscience.

That God’s knowledge of the past, a theory he reiterates, depends solely on God’s knowledge of the past event, notwithstanding it has ever existed, which must when examined.\(^{101}\) The fact that we cannot be sure is that it is beyond time. Although there

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\(^{101}\) Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum de dominio et materia aliqua*, 6, 1139b, 10, idea of the necessity of the present.
Boethius considers the necessity of his eternity. The question about the modality of knowledge, and its impact on the modality of knowing, is what Theodorus. Man can know at the moment of an event, but the walking of his leg does not affect the modality of the event. God knows what his knowledge does not affect the event, when it is known by God. Consequently, whenever God is open and no event is at stake, whereas in the divine knowledge and the object of it, it is referred to the divine good. Yet, it may happen according to its own nature: the divine knowledge and its object. It is the necessity that is open for the object to the divine knowledge. The term ‘absolute necessity’ refers to the nature of the thing itself.

self. It concerns things or events which in themselves are necessary, such as the rising of the sun or the mortality of man.

2.2.1. Thomas Aquinas

The position of Boethius, that the object, when referred to God’s knowledge, is necessary, was taken over and further developed by Thomas Aquinas. Thomas affirmed the necessity of God’s knowledge, including that of future contingents. This necessity he derived from the nature of the divine knowledge and the manner in which things are the object of God’s knowledge. His position is a clear example of Boethian epistemological subjectivism, according to which the mode of knowledge depends entirely on the subject and not on the object of knowledge.

Thomas explained this subjectivism in terms of linguistic analysis. The that-clause in sentences like ‘I say that Socrates is walking’ does not have significative power. It functions only as the material object of the activity expressed by the verb ‘to say’. Therefore the truth value and the modality of the sentence as a whole are not affected by the verb contained in the that-clause. Even if Socrates is not walking, the sentence ‘I say that Socrates is walking’ can be true.

When this principle is applied to divine knowledge, we find that the modality and truth of what is known depend upon God’s knowledge.

That God’s knowledge is necessary, Thomas inferred from the necessity of the past, a theory that goes back to the writings of Aristotle. If God has foreknowledge, then this knowledge must somehow be like a past event, notwithstanding the fact that He does not exist in time. The event has existed, which means that it is impossible for it not to have existed when it existed.

Thomas took issue with the view that God retains the possibility not to have known, because his knowledge is beyond time. Although there is no outside force to constrain him, Thomas

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99 Ibid., n. 27-30, 103.
argued, God’s immutability implies that it is impossible for him to know more or less presently than he would have known previously. 102

Thus equipped, Thomas turned to the conditional sentence ‘If God knew that A will happen, then A will happen’, of which he gave the following analysis. The antecedent is necessary because God’s knowledge is necessary. Because the antecedent is about God’s act of knowledge, A must be taken as known in the consequent as well, this time not as a material object but as present to eternity. Now, God knows contingent things as if they exist. What exists cannot not-exist. Hence, considered with respect to God’s knowledge, A is necessary. Therefore, the consequent ‘A will happen’ is necessary. 103 This analysis has often been critically discussed in the secondary literature. 104

Considered in relation to God’s knowledge, the known is necessary. From this it does not follow, however, that it is necessary in itself, or that it is produced by a necessary cause. Thomas explained himself here by invoking the distinction between ‘de dicto’ and ‘de re’, which parallels the distinction between ‘necessitas conditionis’ and ‘necessitas absoluta’ used by Boethius. 105 It has its roots in Aristotle and was developed in the medieval literature on the fallacies of speech. 106 The assertion, ‘Whatever God knows is necessary’, is true when taken ‘de dicto’. Taken in this sense, it states the necessary truth that whatever God knows exists. This necessity does not affect the contingency of what is known, but merely expresses the fact that all things are present to God. Taken ‘de re’, however, the same assertion means that everything that is known by God is a necessary being. In this sense it is false, for there actually are contingent things (God has made causes that work contingently) which are known by God in his omniscience.

102 ibid.
103 Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 2, a. 13, ad 7 (ed. Leonina, 22/1), 86a: ‘(...) hoc antecedens est simpliciter necessarium et consequens est necessarium absolute e modo quo ad antecedens sequitur.’

2.2.1.1. Criticism of Boethius

The view defended by Boethius in Consolation of Philosophy remains contingent, and the view was developed in the thirteenth century by Bonaventure. According to Bonaventure, it is also true of the consequent ‘A will happen’. Now, let the antecedent be contingent. Then the consequent, ‘A will happen’, will also be contingent, with regard to the assertions in A. We should distinguish, on the one hand, the ‘principal signification’, the structure of the object, and, on the other, the knowledge of the object: ‘connotatum’ is contingent, and ‘connotatum’ will be also contingent.

A similar view was put forward by Duns Scotus. In contrast to Boethius, God’s knowledge of contingent things follows the modality of the contingent, and the known is not necessary. Likewise, it does not follow that God is able to know contingent things. It is precisely this answer that distinguishes Scotus from Aquinas.

108 Bonaventure, Commentary on Aquinas’s De claris Aquis, 39, q. 1-5, Vatican City 1966 (Opera Omnia, vol. 20).
impossible for him to know
what he knew previously.

The conditional sentence ‘If God
knows’, of which he gave the fol-
lowing reason, because God’s knowledge
is a part of God’s act of knowledge. Ac-
knowledged by all, this time not as a
necessary, God’s knowledge is contingent
and not existent. Hence, considered
as a necessary. Therefore, the necessary
analysis has often been criti-
cised. Nevertheless, the known is necessary.

If it is necessary in itself, or
that which is necessary.

Kenny, ‘Divine Foreknowledge and
Propositions’, Routledge, London 1972 (Lessico intel-
legendo, sensus divinis et Proposi-
tiva, ‘Modal Logic’, The Cambridge

2.2.1.1. Criticism of Boethius and Thomas Aquinas

The view defended by Boethius and Thomas Aquinas is that the knowl-
edge is necessary, when referred to God’s knowledge, was by no means the standard
view among the medieval theologians. Mostly, theologians were of the opinion that a contingent object, when it is related to God’s knowledge,
remains contingent, and that God’s knowledge of this contingent object is contingent and not necessary, as Boethius and Thomas claimed. This
view was developed in the thirteenth century by Robert Grosseteste and
Bonaventure. According to Grosseteste, what is true of the antecedent is
also true of the consequent, provided the second follows upon the first.
Now, let the antecedent be, ‘The Antichrist will not be’, which is contingent.
Then the consequent, ‘God knows from eternity that the Antichrist will not be’, will also be contingent. Bonaventure’s position was that
with regard to assertions of the form ‘God knows that A will be’, we
should distinguish, on the one hand, the divine act of knowledge (as the
‘principale significatum’), and on the other hand, the relation of the fu-
ture contingent to this act (as the ‘connotatum’). The divine act of
knowledge itself is necessary, for it coincides with God. Because the
‘connotatum’ is contingent, however, the assertion ‘God knows that A
will be’ will also be contingent, taken as a whole.

A similar view was put forward by Richard of Middletown and John
Duns Scotus. In contrast with Thomas Aquinas, the latter held that
God’s knowledge of contingents is itself contingent and not necessary. It
follows the modality of the objects of knowledge. That God has knowl-
edge is necessary, but that he has knowledge of a contingent object is
not necessary. Likewise, it is necessary that man is a living being, but
not that he is a white living being. The belief that God’s knowledge of
contingents is itself contingent and not necessary was commonly held

107 Robert Grosseteste, De libero arbitrio, edited in L. Baur, Die philosophischen Werke

108 Bonaventure, Commentaria in quattuor libros Sententiarum, Lib. 1, d. 38, a. 2, q. 2,

109 Richard of Mediavilla, Super quattuor libros Sententiarum, Lib. 1, d. 38, a. 1, q. 6, ad

110 Ad Claras Aquas 1882, 678f. (Opera omnia, 1).

111 Brescia 1591, reprinted Frankfurt am Main 1963, fol. 342a; Duns Scotus, Lectura, Lib. 1, d.

112 n. 80, 505f.: ‘Deus non scit necessarium ‘a’

113 fore, quia determinat necessitas actus scienti ut transit in objectum non-necessarium (…).”
among the fourteenth century theologians. It is defended by William of Ockham, Gregory of Rimini, Peter of Ailly, and Marsilius of Inghen.

2.2.2. The Ghent Boethius

The author of the Ghent Boethius adheres to the view of Boethius and Thomas Aquinas, not to that of Robert Grosseteste and Bonaventure. The known object is necessary when referred to God’s knowledge, even if the object is contingent. God’s knowledge, so the author explains, bestows on the object ‘a sort of necessity’ (eene maniere van noodsaken). All things are present according to God’s eternal mode of being. And because things that are present cannot be when they are present, all things that are known by God are in a way necessary.  

This line of reasoning is similar to the one that is put forward by Thomas Aquinas in his commentary on the Sentences. Things that are contingent can be known with certainty when they exist, since it is impossible that they do not exist, when they do exist. God in his eternal mode of being knows contingencies as existing. Therefore, they are necessary and can be known with certainty, when related to God’s knowledge. Thomas refers in this connection to the teachings of Boethius in the Consolatio. He considers his treatment of the problem as in line with and corroborated by Boethius. The same goes for the author of the Ghent Boethius and his explanation of the issue.

There is a second indication that our author is following the line of Thomas Aquinas, directly or indirectly. As we have seen, Boethius distinguishes between objects that are necessary (the rising of the sun) and those that are contingent (the walking of the neighbor). Both kinds of objects are known by God’s eternal mode of being. Boethius does not

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11 Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum, Lib. 1, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, c. (ed. Mandonnet), 910 and 912 (ad tertium).

12 Ibid., 911: “(...) Quod qualifier sit, evidenter doctet Boethius in fine de consolatione.”

13 Ghent Boethius (Den Haag, KB, 171 A 2), Lib. 5, pros. 6, fol. [S]v-b.

14 Boethius, Philosophiae conclusiones, 496a, cols. 1083-1084.

15 Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum, Lib. 1, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, c. (ed. Mandonnet), 910 and 912 (ad tertium).


17 Ghent Boethius (Den Haag, KB, 171 A 2), Lib. 5, pros. 6, fol. [S]v-b.}

THE TRANSITION between the two is based on a necessary distinction between necessity and contingency. Necessity is linked to the eternal mode of being, whereas contingency is based on free will. This distinction is further developed in the context of the discussion of the free will and divine epistemology. Naturally, they should be considered to be inherently related, as in the ephemeris of Boethius, the causes of events are necessarily decided before they happen. The author of the Ghent Boethius discusses this in his commentary on the Sentences. Things that are contingent can be known with certainty when they exist, since it is impossible that they do not exist, when they do exist. God in his eternal mode of being knows contingencies as existing. Therefore, they are necessary and can be known with certainty, when related to God’s knowledge. Thomas refers in this connection to the teachings of Boethius in the Consolatio. He considers his treatment of the problem as in line with and corroborated by Boethius. The same goes for the author of the Ghent Boethius and his explanation of the issue.

There is a second indication that our author is following the line of Thomas Aquinas, directly or indirectly. As we have seen, Boethius distinguishes between objects that are necessary (the rising of the sun) and those that are contingent (the walking of the neighbor). Both kinds of objects are known by God’s eternal mode of being. Boethius does not discuss the difference between necessity and contingency. Necessity is linked to the eternal mode of being, whereas contingency is based on free will. This distinction is further developed in the context of the discussion of the free will and divine epistemology. Naturally, they should be considered to be inherently related, as in the ephemeris of Boethius, the causes of events are necessarily decided before they happen. The author of the Ghent Boethius discusses this in his commentary on the Sentences. Things that are contingent can be known with certainty when they exist, since it is impossible that they do not exist, when they do exist. God in his eternal mode of being knows contingencies as existing. Therefore, they are necessary and can be known with certainty, when related to God’s knowledge. Thomas refers in this connection to the teachings of Boethius in the Consolatio. He considers his treatment of the problem as in line with and corroborated by Boethius. The same goes for the author of the Ghent Boethius and his explanation of the issue.

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14 Boethius, Philosophiae conclusiones, 496a, cols. 1083-1084.

15 Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum, Lib. 1, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, c. (ed. Mandonnet), 910 and 912 (ad tertium).


17 Ghent Boethius (Den Haag, KB, 171 A 2), Lib. 5, pros. 6, fol. [S]v-b.
is defended by William of Ockham and Marsilius of Inghen.

In the view of Boethius and Duns Scotus, and later, Wyclif and Bonaventure, God’s knowledge, even to God’s knowledge, even to the knowledge of the definite contingent, is necessary and determined. So the author explains, because it is God’s will that it be so (met maniere van noodsgenootszaak). God’s knowledge of the contingent is not a potential mode of being. And again: “Know this, that when they are present, all knowables are known and not unnecessary.” This line of reasoning was developed by Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologica, where he defines knowledge as the contingent can be known as necessary. This is possible that they do not exist in the same way as being known. God’s knowledge is necessary and can be known, as the author explains. Thomas refers in particular to the sun in the Consolatio. He concludes in the same way, with and corroborated by the example of the sun, the Ghent Boethius and his Boethius as a friend.

The author is following the line of thought we have seen, Boethius distinguishes the sun (the rising of the sun) and the moon (the neighbor). Both kinds of knowledge are necessary. The author says the Ghent Boethius and his Boethius as a friend.

Boethius, Pros. 6, fol. [S6]a. (20) “(...) want niet geseheid, moet emmer als ghe-

schenheit hem eene maniere van

de aldus alle dijghen overminds dat

geschenheit in ordene van zyns god-

bloem present has a certain necessity goes

Aristotle on

Philosophy, 6 (1986), 167-187, esp.


114 Ghent Boethius (Den Haag, KB, 171 A 2), Lib. 5, pros. 6, fol. [S5]b: “Ende omme dit wat claerdere te verste, so suldej weden dat de selve dync te geshchien ghesloten es: of utter noodsgenootszaak van haren causen, of bider jeghewoordigheyt van haren wesene.”

115 Ibid.

discuss the difference between these objects. He only mentions that the necessity is linked to the nature of the necessary object and that the contingency is based on free will. Thomas Aquinas, however, goes much further. He relates the necessity and contingency of an object or event to its cause and makes these observations in connection with divine epistemology. Natural causes, so he argues, produce their effect necessarily, as in the eclipse of the sun. This means that knowledge of the causes implies knowledge of the effects. Even when the effects do not exist yet, they can necessarily be known in their causes which are determined to cause the effects: ‘in istic seibaus esser curtum et determinatum’. On the other hand, contingent effects that are caused by free will cannot possibly be known beforehand when they are still contained in their causes. This sets them apart from necessary effects that can indeed be known in their causes. The intelligibility of a thing, according to Thomas, follows the nature of its being. What is as yet indeterminate in its being can only be known in an indeterminate way. We do not know beforehand whether John will be walking, but we do know that he will be either walking or not. This uncertainty with regard to future contingents caused by the will is absolute. According to Thomas, this applies to human knowledge as well as to God. The effect of a free act of will can only be know with certainty once it has actually been realized. Its being has then become determinate, and even necessary, for that which is not known not to be. As a determinate being it has lost its mutability, and can be an object of intellectual knowledge.
the further course of the commentary, the author connects the necessity or contingency of a thing to the nature of its cause. Necessary things will happen with certainty, because they are produced by a cause that generates its effects necessarily, even if God would close his eyes and not see it: ‘al waert dat god, per impossibile ghestelt, dat niet en saghe met zyn oghen loke’. On the other hand, things that are contingent have a natural possibility for not-being: ‘eene nauuerlike moghelichheit van niet gheshiene’. Their being is indeterminate, as long as they do not actually exist. Only when their existence is referred to divine knowledge, is their being determined (ghedetermineert) and necessary.\(^{119}\)

Finally, there is a third hint that the author of the Ghent Boethius is dependent on Thomas Aquinas in his explanation of Boethius. In his dealing with the problem that some sentences concerning God’s foreknowledge can be understood in two different ways, he quotes from the *Summa contra gentiles* of Thomas Aquinas to give the reader some further examples.\(^{120}\) The passage that immediately precedes this reference is based mainly on the commentary of Reinier of St Truiden.\(^{121}\) Yet, in the work of Reinier their is no mention of Thomas. This means that the reference to the *Summa contra gentiles* is added by our author. He therefore must have been familiar with the work of Thomas. Or he may have used a source that contained this reference to Thomas. But even in that case it is clear that he thought it appropriate to complete the quotations from Reinier with the authority of Thomas Aquinas. Obviously, he held the *doctor sanctus* in high esteem.

In writing the passage prior to this reference, the author had the commentary of Reinier at his desk. There, he deals with an analysis of the following syllogistic argumentation. Everything that cannot not happen, happens necessarily (*MaP*). Now, everything that is known by God to happen, cannot not happen (*MiP*). Therefore, everything that is known by God to happen, will happen necessarily (*Con*).\(^{122}\)

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\(^{119}\) Ibid., fol. T2\(^{b}\) T2\(^{a}\). Reinier of St Truiden also distinguishes between determinate and indeterminate being. Yet his treatment was not the source of the Ghent Boethius. See Liège, Bibliothèque de l’Université, Cod. 348C, fol. 163\(^{b}\) 164\(^{a}\). ‘(...) omnia enim prooisa pro certo euenient. Sed quoddam eorum descendit de necessitate rerum, scilicet quod habet causas determinatas ad hunc effectum. Aliud vero est in potestate faciencium, scilicet quod prouenit ex arbitrio et voluntate, que voluntas de se non est ante actum determinata magis ad hoc quam ad illud.’

\(^{120}\) Ibid., fol. S6\(^{a}\). ‘(...) also thomas in summa contra gentiles libro 2 seft (...)’

\(^{121}\) Compare ibid., fol. S6\(^{b}\) S6\(^{a}\) to Reinier of St Truiden, Liège, Bibliothèque de l’Université, Cod. 348C, fol. 162\(^{b}\) 163\(^{a}\).

\(^{122}\) Ibid., fol. S6\(^{b}\) S6\(^{a}\) and Reinier of St Truiden, ibid., Cod. 348C, fol. 162\(^{b}\).

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To evaluate this argument further, the propositions *MiP* and *MaP* are conditioned or in the divided sense: ‘de dicto’ and ‘de dicti’. The conclusion, however, the conclusion is true in the divided sense, not in the absolute sense. God’s knowledge of the contingent objects in the sense, the conclusion is true, but a false premise give a false conclusion.\(^{123}\)

Again, the conclusion would be taken in the complete sense of the divided sense, since then the conclusion would be true, and that is the first. Taken in the complete sense, the two premises *MaP* and *MiP* and *Con* are not the same, nor the same as they are not on the level of a contingency, on the level of a particular, and that is the first. Taken in the complete sense, the two premises *MaP* and *MiP* and *Con* are not the same, nor the same as they are not on the level of a contingency, on the level of a particular, and that is the first. The author of the Boethius is quoting from the interesting addition. Reinier refers to the *compositionem*. Our author’s conclusion na den verscheidenen zin, cie die de logicien hieten fallaciae, diu si praejudicium duidio, tunc non uaele consequencia, tunc non uaele consequencia, tunc non uaele consequencia.\(^{124}\)

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\(^{123}\) Ibid., fol. S6\(^{a}\) and Reinier of St Truiden, ibid., Cod. 348C, fol. 163\(^{a}\).

\(^{124}\) Ibid., fol. S6\(^{a}\) and Reinier of St Truiden, ibid., Cod. 348C, fol. 163\(^{a}\).

\(^{125}\) Ibid., fol. S6\(^{a}\); ‘Item, nec in fallaciae, diu si praejudicium duidio, tunc non uaele consequencia, tunc non uaele consequencia, tunc non uaele consequencia.’

\(^{126}\) See the text quoted in the previous page.
To evaluate this argumentation, two different readings are distinguished. The propositions $MaP$, $MiP$, and $Con$ can be taken in the compounded or in the divided sense, a distinction that is similar to the one between ‘de dicto’ and ‘de re’, which we saw earlier. If the premises $MaP$ and $MiP$ and the conclusion $Con$ are taken in the compounded sense, the conclusion is true, since in that case the modal operator is related to the proposition, not to the things in reality. Consequently, the infallibility of God’s knowledge does not imply the necessity of the known objects. In this sense, the conclusion $Con$ reads: ‘It is necessary: everything that is known by God to happen will happen’.\(^\text{123}\)

Taken in the divided sense, the major premise $MaP$ is true, but the minor premise $MiP$ is false, since there are objects known by God that happen contingently and thus may not happen. Consequently, the conclusion $Con$, which in the divided sense would read ‘Everything that is known by God will necessarily happen’, is false as well, since a true and a false premise give a false conclusion.\(^\text{124}\)

Again, the conclusion would be false if the premises $MaP$ and $MiP$ would be taken in the compounded sense and the conclusion $Con$ in the divided sense, since then there is fallacy of speech, an illegitimate jump from the one sense to the other. This fallacy, so our author adds, is called by the logicians the fallacy of the divided and compounded sense.\(^\text{125}\) Thus, there is only one true reading of the above argumentation, and that is the first. Taken in this sense, divine knowledge does not render necessary the things that are known. The necessity expressed in the premises $MaP$ and $MiP$ and the conclusion $Con$ is only on the propositional level, not on the level of the nature of the things known.

In the discussion of the above argumentation, the author of the Ghent Boethius is quoting from the commentary of Reimier, but with an interesting addition. Reimier refers to the ‘fallacia secundum divisionem et compositionem’. Our author, however, adds that it is the fallacy that logicians call ‘fallacia divisionis et compositionis’.\(^\text{126}\) Apparently, he was unsure as to whether or not his readers were able to locate the prove-

\(^{123}\) Ibid., fol. [S6]\(^a\) and Reimier of St Truiden, ibid., fol. 162\(^b\).

\(^{124}\) Ibid., fol. [S6]\(^a\) and Reimier of St Truiden, ibid., fol. 162\(^b\).

\(^{125}\) Ibid., fol. [S6]\(^a\): “Item, neemt men de premissen na den vergaderden zyn ende de conclusion na den verschependen zyn, so no deocht de consequentie niet ende behezt eene fallacie de de logiciene hieten fallaciai divisionis et compositionis.” Compare Reimier of St Truiden, ibid., fol. 162\(^b\): “Item, si premisse capiantur in sensu composito et conclusio in sensu diviso, tunc non uelta consequentia, sed est fallacia secundum compositionem et divisionem.”

\(^{126}\) See the text quoted in the preceding note.
nance of the fallacy. Yet, he borrows the whole technical analysis from
the work of Reiner. He seems not to have any objections to difficult
logical details, although he expects not all of his public to be familiar
with them.

This and earlier passages seem to suggest that the scholastic reason-
ing in the Ghent commentary goes back to Reiner of St Truiden. Yet,
this is only partially true. After quoting Reiner, our author again dis-
cusses the logical aspects of the problem and used scholastic terminol-
ogy such as ‘major’ (maior), ‘inconvenient’ (inconveniens), and
‘distinguere’ (distinguere). He tries to show that logical contradic-
tions will arise if, in analyzing propositions concerning divine fore-
knowledge, one does not distinguish between the two kinds of necessity
mentioned by Boethius: absolute and conditional necessity.

Distinguishing different meanings of a proposition is a typical activ-
ity of the scholastic tradition. It received special attention in the mid-
fourteenth century. A comparable propositional treatment fails in the
commentary of Reiner. This suggest that our author was interested in
the logical aspects of the problem of divine foreknowledge and that he
used logic to prevent possible mistakes and errors, more than Reiner
did. He shows a similar attitude in his commentary on the third prose,
where the logical side of the problem is discussed at great length as
well.

127 Also in the comments on the two sorts of necessity that are mentioned by Boethius,
our author used the commentary of Reiner, quoting it verbatim. See ibid., fol. [S6] and
Reiner, ibid., fol. 163v.

128 On the use of scholastic terminology in Middle Dutch, see S. Axters, Scholastiek Lex-
icon, Antwerpen 1937, 3v-197v (Introduction), which is still very informative.

129 Ibid., fol. T1v (italics are mine): “In deze mateire vallen onder de logicien ende an-
deren vele subtiler argumenten, daerken heen af wachten moet, die men nooit meten onder-
scheide van desen twee noodzakeheden wel soveren mach, als of ensen argueridea aldus
(...)” Voort aldus nemende de conclusie van desen argumente ende danof makende de major
van eenen nieuen argumente aldus (...). Ende dat es groot inconvenient (...). Ende
daerome voneder vele glorereen machmen de major vanden argumente distinguere, daert se
(...).” This part of the commentary is different from that referred to in foregoing notes.

130 See most recently Z. Kaluza, ‘Les sciences et leurs langages. Note sur le statut du 29
Décembre 1340 et le prétendu statut perdu contre Ockham’, Filosofia e teologia nel trecento.

131 An edition of the commentary on the third prose (Book 5) is given in the Appendix at
the end of this volume.

2.2.3. Pseudo-Thomas and L.

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132 Pseudo-Thomas, Scholium de
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 CHAPTER III

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39 langages. Note sur le statut du 29

17, Filosofia e teologia nel trecento.

La-Neuve 1994, 197-238.

Book 5) is given in the Appendix at

2.2.3. Pseudo-Thomas and Denys the Carthusian

The author of the Ghent Boethius is more technical in his analysis of the problem in comparison to Pseudo-Thomas and Denys the Carthusian. Yet, all these writers defend the position of Boethius and Thomas Aquinas: God's knowledge of the contingent is necessary. There is no indication of any criticism as it was put forward in many fourteenth century commentaries on the Sentences. The discussion in the commentaries on Boethius is focussed mainly on the dialogue between the two kinds of necessity that Boethius used to solve the problem of the modality of God's knowledge and its object.

In this connection, a remark by Pseudo-Thomas deserves our attention. After introducing the distinction of Boethius between the 'necessitas simplex' and the 'necessitas conditionis', he points out that others (alii) solve the problem by distinguishing between the compounded and the divided sense. He thus differentiates between two strategies. On the one hand is the tradition that remains with the distinction made by Boethius. On the other hand is a purely logical and propositional approach. These two strategies differ in philosophical outlook. The distinction made by Boethius is of an ontological nature. It stresses the difference between a thing when considered in itself and a thing when considered in connection with something else. The distinction between the divided and the compounded sense, however, is logical and concerned with the analysis of propositions, not with things.

Also in the commentary of Denys, a distinction is made between different methods for solving the puzzle of modality. He adds a third approach, which distinguishes between a thing taken 'materialiter' and a thing taken 'materialiter'. The former parallels the compounded sense or the 'necessitas conditionis'. In this case the thing is referred to the divine knowledge. The latter is equivalent to the divided sense or the 'necessitas absoluta'. It considers the thing in itself. According to Denys, the approach that uses the distinction between 'materialiter' and 'formaliter' is more philosophical than the one proposed by Boethius.

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132 Pseudo-Thomas, In Boethii De consolatione philosophiae, Lib. 5, 172a: "(...) notandum, secundum intentionem boetii, ista ratio, quia quiquis est provisum a deo necessario eventum: scivitur dicendo, quod verum et quod necessario eventi necessitate conditionata, sed non necessitate absoluta. aliis igitur solvant: quod illa propositione est vera in sensu composito, sed falsa in sensu diviso. unde cum dicitur: quia quiquis provisum est necessario eventum: verum est in sensu composito: quia impossibile est provisum a deo non eventi: tamen in sensu diviso falsa est: quia eventus est saltem contingens in se non est necessarius."
The reason why, however, remains unclear. Denys does not discuss the matter any further. Yet, the remarks by Denys and Pseudo-Thomas make clear that in the commentaries the distinction of Boethius was expressed with different analytical tools and that these different approaches were seen as related, but not as identical.

2.3. Man’s influence on divine knowledge

In the third and final section, we want to discuss a problem that was hotly debated in the fourteenth century, namely the question of whether or not man has the power to change the divine foreknowledge. This issue was broached in the Consolatio. There, Boethius reflects on the problem of whether man by his free will can alter God’s knowledge. It is in the disposition (potestas) of man to change his intentions and to act differently. If man does change his plans, God will have known something different from what will actually happen. Also, there is the related question of whether or not God’s knowledge is subject to change each time man alters his plans. The issue at stake here is, to what extent God is dependent on his object, more specifically, on the free will of human beings.

In his response, Boethius leaves no doubt at all. God is omniscient and has knowledge of all human plans and decisions to the smallest details. Even if man changes his mind, God knows of this change beforehand. He is not dependent on his object and his knowledge is immutable, since he knows everything in his eternal presence.

133 Denys the Chartusian, Enarrationes seu commentaria, Lib. 5, pros. 6, a. 12, 621aC-bA: “Vera et catholica ista solutio superius habita est per distinctionem magis philosophica (philosophicam, ed.), qua est dictum, quod de praevitis, praecognitioni, praestentatianis, praecognitio, de electis, de virtuosis et vitiosis, possimus loqui dupliciter: primo formaliter, utip secundum quod tales sunt; secundo formaliter, prout sunt creaturae quaedam secundum se consideratae, libero arbitrio decoratae. Itaque primo modo de eis loquendo, non possunt non evenire, se non salvati aut non damnari, secundum quod a Deo praecognitum est: sic enim constitutur per relationem ad providentiam seu praecodinantiam, et sortiuntur necessitatem conditionalem. Porro materialiter de ipsis loquendo, possunt alter evenire, et possit praecognitutus damnari ac virtuus perire, vitiosus quoque poenitore et adipti salutem.”

134 Undoubtedly, the developments of medieval logic play a decisive role in the emergence of these different approaches. For further details, see the literature referred to in note 106 above.

135 Boethius, Philosophae consolatio, Lib. 5, pros. 6, n. 37-43, 104f.

136 Ibid., n. 36 and 40f., 104.

THE TRANSITION

2.3.1. The discussion in the fourteenth century

In the fourteenth century, these questions became popular because of theological and practical reasons. The free human beings, but because of their free will, they are no longer the content and nature of the theological and formal aspects. This was not only to the issue of divine knowledge but also to the fields. It formed part of a broader controversy after about 1315 and in Paris.

In the works of Richard of Campsal, the approach was applied to the problem of the time. The question of whether a proposition is true was not solved by posing a number of conditions. The proposition true, and if A will be, will have been true from eternity. A proposition true, and if A will always have known that. For example, the proposition p will not be.

As a result of this approach, divine foreknowledge is the subject of a proposition determines whether it is known by God, and if human knowledge. A clear example of such a proposition is the one concerning with things that depend on whether or not that man can bring about (potestas de rebus contingentibus). A proposition true. Since man is not able to bring about a change (potestas de rebus contingens), the proposition will be untrue, and so on.

2.3.1. The discussion in the fourteenth century

In the fourteenth century, these questions were raised again, not so much because of theological and philosophical thoughts about the power of free human beings, but because of logical and semantical developments. In the commentaries on the Sentences, the focus of attention was no longer the content and nature of divine foreknowledge, but rather its logical and formal aspects. This logico-semantic approach was not confined only to the issue of divine knowledge, but manifested itself also in other fields. It formed part of a broad orientation that took place in England after about 1315 and in Paris in the 1340s.\(^{137}\)

In the works of Richard of Campsal and William of Ockham, this approach was applied to the problem of divine foreknowledge for the first time.\(^{138}\) The question of whether God has knowledge of the future was solved by posing a number of logical rules: If A will happen, God will have had knowledge of A from eternity, because God knows everything that is true and if A will be, the proposition \(p\) ‘A will be’ will always have been true from eternity. On the other hand, if A will not be, God will always have known that A will not be, because in that case the proposition \(\neg p\) ‘A will not be’ has always been true from eternity.

As a result of this approach, the relationship between free will and divine foreknowledge again could come to the fore. If the truth value of a proposition determines whether the thing signified by the proposition is known by God, and if human beings can change the truth value of a proposition because of their free will, then also they might change the objects the divine foreknowledge.

A clear example of such a consideration can be found in the Sentences commentary of the English theologian Adam Wodeham. In dealing with things that depend on the free will of human beings, he claimed that man can bring about (potest facere) that God knows something from eternity or not. Since man is free and is able to act otherwise than he actually does, he can bring about that a true proposition \(p\) ‘Socrates will run’ will become untrue, and vice versa. Consequently, he also has the

\(^{137}\) See W. J. Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, 250-306.

possibility to change the divine foreknowledge. He can bring about that God knows something that he did not know before, and vice versa.\textsuperscript{139}

Similar thoughts were put forward in the \textit{Sentences} commentary of Gregory of Rimini, one of the first works on the Continent in which the new approach was adopted. Although a proposition $p$ has an unchanging truth value from eternity, this does not mean, so he argued, that proposition $p$ is necessarily true. Any event that will happen in the future is contingent and might possibly not happen. And just like man can bring about that a future event will not happen, so he can also bring about that God never has known that this future event would have happened.\textsuperscript{140}

It goes without saying that these thoughts evoked strong reactions, since they claim that man can have an effect on the divine knowledge. A first reply came from John of Ripa, a Parisian theologian from the 1350s, who said that the view that man can make it happen that God foreknows something was advocated by many theologians: \textquote{hoc dicunt multi reputati et famosi}. He nonetheless chose to disagree with it, finding it totally absurd (\textquote{nimis absurdum}), and a view to be despised and derided by every theologian a philosopher. How could what is eternal and immutable ever fall under the power of what is created and mutable? Although created will is able to act, it is not within its province to make this act be known and willed by God.\textsuperscript{141}

At the end of the fourteenth century, similar thoughts were voiced by the theologian Marsilius of Inghen. He distinguished two different ways of seeing human causality in relation to divine knowledge. On the one hand, one might claim that man may act in such a way as to change God's foreknowledge itself: \textquote{agere circa providentiam}. Quite different, on the other hand, is the claim that whichever way man acts, the act is also foreknown by God from eternity: \textquote{facere aliquid ad quod sequitur Deum ab aeterno praescire}. According to Marsilius, only the second interpretation can be admitted. Human sins are committed in freedom, so depending on whether man chooses to sin or not, the corresponding proposition $p$ about God's foreknowledge is made either true or false. What is changed by man is not God's knowledge itself, but only the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{139}] Adam Wodeham, \textit{ordinatio Oxoniensis}, Lib. 3, q. 2, Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, Cod. 915, fol. 175\textsuperscript{v}.
\item[\textsuperscript{140}] Gregory of Rimini, \textit{Lectura}, Lib. 1, d. 38, q. 2, ed. A. Trapp and V. Marcolino, vol. 3, Berlin 1984 (Spätmittelalter und Reformation, 8), 203.
\item[\textsuperscript{141}] The relevant passages are quoted in H. Schwann, \textit{Magistri Ioannis de Ripa OFM doctrina de praescientia divina}, Rome 1930 (Analecta Gregoriana, 1), 64 (John of Ripa, \textit{Sent.}, Lib. 1, d. 39, a. 1).
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truth value of $p$ about God’s knowledge. God in his ‘immensitas’ has knowledge of what man will do and therefore knows which proposition will be true, without depending on man in any way whatsoever.\textsuperscript{142}

In the course of his investigation, Marsilius used the term ‘lustrare’ to refer to the act of divine knowing, where other authors in their commentaries on the Sentences would have written ‘scire’ or ‘videre’. The term ‘lustrare’ occurs in Boethius’ discussion of God’s knowledge.\textsuperscript{143} The use of this term by Marsilius seems to suggest that for him there is a connection between the question of human causality as discussed by his contemporaries and the problem raised in the Consolatio of Boethius. This is also implied by his use of the Boethian concept ‘potestas’ and his response, which is completely in line with that of Boethius. God in his eternal mode of being sees every future things and every movement of the human will, without receiving anything from them.\textsuperscript{144}

As a result of the logico-semantic approach of the fourteenth century, the Boethian issue of human causality in relation to divine knowledge moved to the center of attention in the scholastic commentaries on the Sentences. The question that suggests itself now is, in what way the issue was discussed in the non-academic commentaries on the Consolatio.

2.3.2. The Ghent Boethius

The Ghent Boethius treats the issue at great length. The author is in his response direct and unambiguous: human beings can have no influence on the divine knowledge. That man can change his decisions is no threat to the infallibility of the divine. God knows exactly when and how a human being will alter his plans. His knowledge encompasses everything, not only the visible actions of man, but also his inner thoughts and ponderings.\textsuperscript{145}

\textsuperscript{142} Marsilius of Inghen, \textit{Questiones}, Lib. 1, q. 40, a. 2, fol. 176\textsuperscript{b}. This distinction goes back to John Hiltaligen of Basel, as is clear from the text cited in Schwamm, \textit{Magistri Ioannis de Ripa}, 210.

\textsuperscript{143} Boethius, \textit{Philosophiae consolatio}, Lib. 5, pros. 6, n. 18, l02: “Quid igitur postulas ut necessaria fiant quae diuino lumine lustrentur (…).” See Marsilius of Inghen, ibid., fol. 176\textsuperscript{b}: “Abyssum enim scientiae divinae sine hoc quod dependeant a veintante simul sci quid voluntas eliget, quasi omnia lustrando antequam fiant (…).”

\textsuperscript{144} Marsilius of Inghen, ibid., fol. 176\textsuperscript{b}. The concept of ‘potestas’ also occurs in the commentaries of Adam Wodeham and Gregory of Rimini.

\textsuperscript{145} Ghent Boethius (Den Haag, KB, 171 A 2), I, b. 5, pros. 6, fo. T2\textsuperscript{b}: “(…) Eunde dit menghy merken bi dien dat god niet alleene de ghewerkern der meinschen, maer ooc alle hare yderlike heimelike ghepeinsen ende ghedochten kent.”
If man changes his mind, the divine knowledge will not alter, since God knows everything in an immutable manner. His way of knowing is different from that of man. It is part of his eternal mode of being and thus not subject to change. Everything is present in the mirror of his eternity. God knows from eternity, those that will be saved and those that will be damned. Yet, this in no way comes into opposition with human liberty. Human beings act freely. But God knows what they will do. Therefore, the author adds, it is important to act prudently and to put our hope in God, who will reward the good and punish the evil.146

The latter point, that it is important to lead a virtuous life and to hope, is elaborately discussed with references to the Scripture and the Church Fathers. The commentator anticipates the ending of the Consolatio, which is devoted to that issue.147 The certainty about God’s infallible knowledge is the best assurance for our hope. If God has foreknowledge, there will be remunerations to the good and castigations to the evil.148

In discussing the immutability of divine knowledge, the author does not mention the problem of the human causality as it is discussed in the commentaries on the Sentences. Yet, he deeply enters into the causality of the divine knowledge, highlighting that God is the cause of the things he knows, and that the things he knows have no influence on his knowledge. There is a manifest connection with the problem put forward by Boethius.149 Human beings have no impact on the divine, since the essence of God has no cause, but exists by itself. God is not dependent on creation, but creation is dependent on God, who is the first cause. Our author starts his exposition with a long anonymous quotation from Reinier of St Truiden, in which the Boethian text is paraphrased and it is argued that God in his knowledge is not controlled by others.150

Next, he raises the question of how God can be the cause of the things he knows. His knowledge has causative power insofar as it is connected with the divine will. God not only has in his mind the ability to produce it.151 I with references to the Summa references are not taken from absent, as is the whole discourse. They underscore again the Ghent Boethius.

Referring to Thomas Aquinas between the divine intellect and knowledge of creation, because he deals with the distinction again mentioning Thomas Aquinas, essence, without being dependent he receives his knowledge from of the scholastic jargon appears verbatim. He paraphrases and utility that elsewhere in the context “zo soldij weten”, a translation scholastic treatises is a standard.

The further course of the commentary There our author discusses a question in the commentaries on the issue of Boethius, such as the question of whether he knows the evil. This lines. Although there cannot be known the infinite being. And God has knowledge of the evil as well as the being of the good.153 In the

146 Ibid., fol. T3r-vb.
147 Cf. Boethius, Philosophiae consolationis, Lib. 5, pros. 6, n. 46f., 105.
148 Ghent Boethius (Den Haag, KB, 171 A 2), Lib. 5, pros. 6, fol. T3r-vb. T4r-vb.
149 See Boethius, Philosophiae consolationis, Lib. 5, pros. 6, n. 42, 104f.
150 Ghent Boethius (Den Haag, KB, 171 A 2), Lib. 5, pros. 6, fol. T5r-sa: “Hier stelt philosophie de solucion van eenen poen dat boven ghenoemt e (…) Of philosophie seghen wilde dat kennis an de dyghen niet en hancet, noch vanden selvo niet en ontleeu, maer soude den toecommenden dijghen wat schuldich wesen, waer dat zij haers causen waren (…)” and Reinier of St Truiden, Liège, Bibliothèque de l’Université, Cod. 348C, fol. 164r-b: “Hic philosophia ex istis inducit solucionem unius superius tacti (…). Quasi diceret quod ipsa nichil ab eis reputat. Tunc enim futuris rebus debitrix fieret dei proudicia, si ipse cause forent ipsius proudensc(e) (…)”

152 In this part of the commentary, fol. [T5]r-sa: “Voort, onme te verklaren de toecommende dyghen, die noch te lijken een coonsternaer de dyghen van aard zijn.”
knowledge will not alter, since nature. His way of knowing is eternal mode of being and present in the mirror of his will that will be saved and those whom into opposition with humanity. God knows what they will do, so act prudently and to put our evil to punish the evil.146

ad a virtuous life and to hope, the Scripture and the Church teach the ending of the Consolatio, eternity about God's intransigent will. If God has foreknowledge, excessive castigation to the evil.148

The knowledge, the author does say as it is discussed in the reply enters into the causality of God. The cause of the things has no influence on his knowledge, the problem put forward by the author on the divine, since the theism of itself. God is not dependent on the first cause. Our anonymous quotation from a text is paraphrased and it is trusted by others.150

God can be the cause of the effective power insofar it is connected with the divine will. God can be compared to a craftsman, who not only has in his mind the idea of the product he makes, but also has the ability to produce it.151 Interestingly, the discussion is punctuated with references to the Summa contra gentiles of Thomas Aquinas. These references are not taken from Reiner, in whose commentary they are absent, as is the whole discussion about the causality of God's knowledge. They underscore again the Thomistic background of the author of the Ghent Boethius.

Referring to Thomas Aquinas, our author discusses the relationship between the divine intellect and the divine will. God has complete knowledge of creation, because his will is the cause of everything. Also, he deals with the distinction between divine and human knowledge, again mentioning Thomas Aquinas. God knows creation by knowing his essence, without being dependent on what he knows. Man, however, receives his knowledge from outside. Interestingly, in this section he employs the scholastic jargon again. His quotations from Thomas are not verbatim. He paraphrases and summarizes his source, using a vocabulary that elsewhere in the commentary is rarely employed, such as 'zo suldij weten', a translation of the Latin 'sciedendum est', which in scholastic treatises is a standard turn of phrase.152

The further course of the commentary deserves our attention as well. There our author discusses a number of issues that normally are treated in the commentaries on the Sentences, not in the commentaries on Boethius, such as the questions whether God knows the infinite and whether he knows the evil. These questions are solved along traditional lines. Although there cannot exist a infinite being except for God, God may know the infinite being, because his understanding is unlimited. And God has knowledge of the evil because he knows how much it lacks the being of the good.153 In this connection, he again refers to Thomas, 151

151 Ibid., fol. [T3v]9*: '(... de scientie Gods es cause der dynghen, ghelicij de coomst des wercmans cause syns weres of werken es, want (also sene Jan seijt) 'bij hem zyn alle dys- ghens ghemaect', dats bij zier scientie.'
152 In this part of the commentary, the image of the craftsman is again mentioned. Ibid., fol. [T5r]9*: 'Voort, omme te vertieren einige pointen boven vechelt, zo seijtij weten dat god de toememme dynghen, die noch ter tijd in ghevallen wesene zijn, kend of wees also ghelijck een coonstenaer de dynghen van zier coomsten doet, die noch te voorschijne met commen zijn.'
153 Ibid., fol. [T3r]9*: 'Hij kent ooc wel onhendelijk dynghen; niet bij dat hijse ziet, want ghene dyne onhendelie es dan bij: Ende dit en bejeghet zijner edelhiet niet. Want zo eene uige werk ende cracht stuerken of meerder es, zo sou voorder ende breeder werken machi. Nu, de goedelijke verstande es onhendelie, ende dus krejt sou alle dynghen hoe verre zij strecken of
without quoting him word for word. 154 Perhaps he used a third source. More important, however, is the fact that he brings up these and other issues from the traditional stock of questions dealt with in the commentaries on the Sentences. These issues are not discussed by Reinier, Pseudo-Thomas, or Denys the Carthusian. In this respect, the author of the Ghent Boethius is unique. He is indebted to the scholastic theological tradition, notwithstanding the fact that he is writing in the vernacular.

2.3.3. The other commentaries

The other commentaries give far lesser attention to the problem raised by Boethius. In the commentary of Reinier, only the opinion of Boethius is mentioned. There is no dealing with the issue of human causality and divine knowledge. 155 The same goes for the commentaries of Pseudo-Thomas and Denys the Carthusian. There are no hints that the authors had knowledge of the scholastic debate on the issue similar to what we have found concerning the nature of the things that are present in God’s eternal mode of being. Perhaps the discussion was too recent or too elite to be included. The commentary of Pseudo-Thomas remains very close to the text of Boethius. If man changes his intentions, God will have known this from eternity. God will have known the initial plan, the changing of it, and the action that eventually will take place. He is omniscient and nothings escapes from his view. 156 Also, the author deals briefly with the nature of divine knowledge. God knows the future by having knowledge of himself, not by looking outside, as man does. His nature is undivided and therefore everything is present to him. He is not dependent on creation, but creation is dependent on him. 157

In the commentary of Denys, the point that God knows creation by knowing his essence is put forward as well. Many philosophical and theological authorities are mentioned to strengthen this view, among which are Aristotle, Proclus and the Liber de causis. 158 This is not an un-

154 Thomas Aquinas discusses these issues in the Summa contra Gentiles, Lib. 1, c. 69. 71
155 Reinier of St Truiden, Liège, Bibliothèque de l’Université, Cod. 348 C, fol. 163vb.
156 Pseudo-Thomas, In Boethii De consolatione philosophiae, Lib. 5, 172b.
157 Idem.
158 Denys the Chartusian, Enarrationes seu commentaria, Lib. 5, pros. 6, a. 12, 623b.

THE TRANSITIC

At the outset of the paper it Consolatio an important knowledge from academic to of divine foreknowledge is a Now we can draw some conc:

1. The vernacular language thinking as it was developed is of a high intellectual level. It discusses the logical structure more elaborately than a laatio studied. Its treatment of the treatise is composed in the vernacular, a more simple or less specialised genre written in Latin, the lan

2. Although the Ghent Boethius, the divine foreknowledge in it and arrangement. The typical c as the ‘quaeestio’ and the ‘not structure in the different parts. Reinier and Pseudo-Thomas, academic commentary, but an they comment upon than major sities of the fourteenth and it does not necessarily determine

3. The Ghent Boethius rep has been influenced by him, even sanctus. The other commentaries followed in the exposition an tury, the writings of Thomas. There also circulated abstracts...
The transition of academic knowledge is an important source for the study of the transition from academic to non-academic circles and that the problem of divine foreknowledge is a good example for studying this transition. Now we can draw some conclusions.

1. The vernacular language is no barrier for the reception of scholastic thinking as it was developed at the universities, even if this knowledge is of a high intellectual level. The Ghent Boethius is a case in point here. It discusses the logical aspects of the problem of the divine knowledge more elaborately than any of the Latin commentaries on the Consolation studied. Its treatment of the problem is similar to that in the academic commentaries on the Sentences and the De interpretatione. That a treatise is composed in the vernacular therefore does not mean that it is more simple or less specialized than the writings of the same literary genre written in Latin, the language of the universities.

2. Although the Ghent Boethius matches the level of the discussion of the divine foreknowledge in academic writings, it has a different format and arrangement. The typical elements of a scholastic commentary, such as the 'expositio' and the 'notabilia', seldom occur. There is no uniform structure in the different parts of the commentary. The commentaries of Reinier and Pseudo-Thomas, on the other hand, bear the mark of the academic commentary, but are less ambitious and stay closer to the text they comment upon than many of the treatises composed at the universities of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The content therefore does not necessarily determine the format, nor vice versa.

3. The Ghent Boethius repeatedly refers to Thomas Aquinas and has been influenced by him, even where there is no mention of the doctor sanctor. The other commentaries do not have an 'auctoritas', which is followed in the exposition and repeatedly quoted. In the fifteenth century, the writings of Thomas Aquinas were frequently used and cited. There also circulated abstracts of his writings and other tools, that facili-
tated the quoting of his ideas. Yet, it is not self-evident that the Ghent Boethius refers so often to Thomas Aquinas. The late medieval period is characterized by the growth of different schools of thought, among which are the ‘albertistae’, ‘scotistae’, ‘nominalistae’, and ‘thomistae’. They all had their own reading of the traditional texts and their own way of solving philosophical and theological problems, including that of divine foreknowledge. There was a ‘processus albertistarum’ and a ‘processus thomistarum’. The reference to Thomas Aquinas therefore cannot be considered as a neutral act. It may be a sign, that the author reckons himself among the ‘thomistae’ and their way of dealing with philosophical and theological issues.

4. Concerning the three issues explored in the paper, it is striking that only the first, which is about the presence of things in God’s eternal mode of being, shows the influence of academic debate. There are no traces of academic discussions in the exposition of the two other problems. This needs to be explained. It may be due to the historical development of scholastic debate. The discussion about the nature of things that are present to God took place mainly in the period between 1270 and 1310. The opinion that God’s knowledge of the future is contingent and not necessary, which pertains to the second issue, became the received view in the time after about 1320, when Ockham had finished his commentary on the Sentences. The third issue, the problem of man’s influence on divine foreknowledge, was discussed in England from the 1330s (Adam Wodeham) and in Paris from the 1340s (Gregory of Rimini). Only the earliest issue found its echo in the commentaries on the Consolatio. A partial explanation may be the dating of the commentary of Reiniar, which is a product of the fourteenth century. Yet, the observation still remains significant for the other commentaries. The phenomenon therefore must be explained, so it seems, by the aspect of delay mentioned in the introduction above. Academic debates only gradually found their way into the treatises from the outside, if they did at all.

5. The aspect of eclecticism distinguished in the introduction above is clearly visible in the Ghent Boethius. The author combines theoretical analyses of divine knowledge as he found it in the commentary of


160 On these schools, see the reference in note 12 and M. J. F. M. Hoenen, ‘The Reparationes totius philosophiae naturalis (Cologne 1494) as a source for the late medieval debates between Albertistae and Thomistae’, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, 4 (1993), 307-344.

Reinier with long quotations theoretical, but rather an ethical purchase at large from the stay close to the text of Boece commentary by Denys, in which of scholastic authors are put to connect with the commenta-

tory views on how God steers.

6. The writings of Eckhart and of Chaucer are put to depict the role that we have studied of simplification. The logic is posited in a way that is similar to the remaining commentaries. The problem of the distinction between ‘necessitas’ and ‘formaliter’ without discussing the back- ground, but adds no further explication but ‘mutable’ and ‘mutable’ explained either.

7. As has been noted earlier, stay close to the text of the source. In the contrast between these writers, Aristotle and Peter Lombard, we find source. In the academic commenting of divine knowledge in the fourteenth century. The commentaries have the choice of subjects discussed, and the other commentaries do not treat the same. The author used his readership of mainly academic commentary in the native language.

161 This does not mean that these commentaries were adapted or cri-
buted by Goris and Wissink elsewhere: ‘More Platonico loquitur: What Nicholas of ‘Boece’ and the Medieval Tradition of
not self-evident that the Ghent
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the 1340s (Gregory of Ri-
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other commentators. The pheno-
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outside, if they did at all.

In the introduction above the
author combines theoretical
and it in the commentary of
35f. and 88, and Graffmann, Mittel-
and M. J. F. M. Hoenen, 'The Repara-
s for the late medieval debates
illa tradizione filosofica medievale. 4

Reinier with long quotations from the Church Fathers, that have no theo-
etical, but rather an ethical intention. The other commentators hardly
ever quote at large from the works of others, at least not openly. They
stay close to the text of Boethius. An exception is the final part of the
commentary by Denys, in which a number of abstracts from the writings
of scholastic authors are put together. These abstracts are not organically
connected with the commentary itself, but serve as a collection of impor-
tant views on how God steers and governs creation.

6. The writings of Eckhart and Tauler are a good example of the as-
pect of simplification. Academic theories are adapted to a vernacular
public with almost no university training. Yet, in the vernacular com-
mentary that we have studied, the Ghent Boethius, there is no question
of simplification. The logical aspects of the divine knowledge are ex-
plored in a way that is similar to discussions in the academic writings. In
the remaining commentaries, on the other hand, simplification plays a
role. Pseudo-Thomas mentions two different traditions with regard to
the distinction between 'necessitas simplex' and 'necessitas conditionis',
without discussing the background of these differences. He only notes
them, but adds no further explanation. The same goes for distinction be-
tween 'formaliter' and 'materialiter' put forward by Denys, which is not
explained either.

7. As has been noted earlier, the commentators that we have studied
stay close to the text of the Consolatio. In this respect, there is sharp
contrast between these writings and the academic commentaries on Aris-
totle and Peter Lombard, which are much more independent from their
source. In the academic commentaries, the views of Boethius on the
modality of divine knowledge are attacked, especially in the fourteenth
century. The commentaries on the Consolatio, however, never question
or criticize the theories of Boethius, as far as the divine knowledge is
concerned.161 Only the Ghent Boethius seems to be independent in the
choice of subjects discussed, but is in the final analysis no more critical
than the other commentaries. Yet, this does not lower the value of the
treatise. The author used his (most likely) university training to educate
a readership of mainly academic laymen. He wrote his massive com-
mentary in the native language, leaving us a document that gives impor-

161 This does not mean that when dealing with other issues, such as the theory of the soul,
the commentators may correct or criticize the view of Boethius. See in this respect the con-
tribution of Gertis and Wuisink elsewhere in this volume and also A. J. Minnis and L. Nauta,
'More Platonico loquitur: What Nicholas Trevett really did to William of Conches', Chaucer's
'Boece' and the Medieval Tradision of Boethius, ed. A. J. Minnis (Chaucer Studies, 18), 1-33.
tant insights in the reception of academic knowledge in the intellectual
culture and the vernacular tradition of the Low Countries.