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A Pindaric Feature in the Poems of Callimachus

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Callimachus expounds his poetic program mainly in the prologue to the *Aetia*, in *Epigr.* 27 and 28 P., and in the *Hymn to Apollo* 105–12. There he makes it clear that in his poetry he aims at stylistic refinement and technical polish (λεπτότης) on the one hand, and at ὀλιγοστιχία on the other hand. It is understood that this implies the discontinuity of form consisting of a more or less loose series of units of a few lines and the organisation of the material into short sections rather than continuous narrative. With the words σικχαίνω πάντα τὰ δημόσια (*Epigr.* 28.4 P.) he announces his intention to avoid subject-matter which has been treated over and over again by the poets. On the other hand his poems show that he knew the earlier poetry very thoroughly since he constantly alludes to it. He culls a striking feature out of it or applies a well known word, metaphor, or scene to a new context and, by so doing, appeals to the intellectual acuteness of his readers. In the prologue to the *Aetia*, he says that he wants his poetry (σοφίη) to be measured not quantitatively, by the Persian league (σχοίνῳ Περσίδι), but by τέχνη (frag. 1. 17f.). It seems that the term τέχνη includes these various connotations of stylistic refinement, discontinuity in narrative, preference for unusual elements, and allusiveness, which together make up Callimachus' σοφίη.²

In this paper the character of this τέχνη is examined mainly in four passages from Callimachus' poems. Each is a digression in the sequence of the narrative where Callimachus either rejects or wants to conceal a particular myth or version of a myth. As will be shown, in each case he uses a Pindaric feature, namely Pindar's habit of digressing in order to alter, reject, or break off certain myths. In Pindar's poems these passages have the rhetorical purpose of introducing subject-matter which has to be avoided for reason of religious propriety and encomiastic suitability. By explicitly stating what he

¹ I am very much indebted to Andrew M. Miller of the University of Pittsburgh and to Anthony W. Bulloch of the University of California, Berkeley for advice on this article.

² Cf. H. Herter, "Kallimachos," *RE* suppl. 13 (1973) 250–3; R. Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship* (Oxford 1968) 25 and 137f.; C.O. Brink, "Callimachus and Aristotle: An Inquiry into Callimachus' Πρὸς Πραξιφάνην," *CQ* 40 (1946) 17ff.; A.W. Bulloch, "Hellenistic Poetry" in P.E. Easterling & B.M. Knox, eds., *The Cambridge History of Classical Literature*, vol. I: *Greek Literature* (Cambridge 1985) 559–61.

wants to deal with and what he wants to avoid, Pindar can highlight the value of his poems and present himself as a poet of piety and religious respect. This digressive or intrusive display of poetical craftsmanship evidently impressed Callimachus and was exploited by him for his own poetry. As we will see, however, Callimachus' concern in his handling of the device reveals some characteristic differences.

In *Olympian* 1 Pindar links praise of Hieron as victor in the Olympic horse race with the myth of Pelops, with whom Poseidon fell in love when, after his birth (or rebirth), Clotho drew him out of the bowl or cauldron (25f.). If, as some interpreters believe, Pindar is intending his reader to take the familiar version as a point of departure, he announces his change at the beginning: when Pelops was born, he already had his ivory shoulder as a birth-mark and therefore did not receive it as a substitute for what Demeter had eaten by mistake (27). According to the other view, Pindar describes Pelops' rebirth in 25f., and the λέβης is the cauldron in which he was presented to the gods as a meal and was also restored to life.³ If one accepts this view, what Pindar does is *first* to give us the common version and *then* to reject it in the following break off (28f.). Under either interpretation, Pindar gives an explanation for the discrepancy in this broken off passage: The more common story is false, Pindar says, and its speciousness is deceptive. Later on in the poem Pindar gives the reasons for rejecting the story and for distancing himself from other poets:

ἔστι δ' ἀνδρὶ φάμεν εἰκότος ἀμφὶ δαι-
μόνων καλὰ· μείων γὰρ αἰτία.
οὐὲ Ταντάλου, σὲ δ' ἀντία προτέρων φθέγξομαι (35–6)

It is fitting for a man to speak fair words concerning the gods; for then his blame is less. Son of Tantalus, I will tell of you a tale contrary to the poets of old

According to Pindar, Pelops was carried off by Poseidon to Olympus and, to account for his disappearance, a φθονερός γέγων (47) made

³ Cf. D. E. Gerber, *Pindar's Olympian One. A Commentary* (Toronto 1982) 55f., who summarizes the different views.

up the story of Tantalus' meal. But Pindar does not approve of calling the gods gluttons:⁴

ἐμοὶ δ' ἄπορα γαστρίμαρ-
γον μακάρων τιν' εἰπεῖν· ἀφίσταμαι· (52)

It is impossible for me to call any of the blessed gluttonous; I stand apart.

The juxtaposition of the two versions of the myth in 37–51, framed by the two rejections of the Tantalus meal as impious (35f. and 52), is a clear and vivid demonstration of the poet's concern: he does not want the poem to deal with what he regards as immoral and blasphemous. By telling the "false" myth and rejecting it explicitly, he makes this concern much more manifest than it would have been had he simply concealed it and given the approved version.⁵ The effect of the alteration is an enhancement of Pelops by connecting him closely with the gods, and consequently it is an enhancement of the victor too. For Pelops' achievements are the heroic model for Hieron's Olympic success, and to serve the needs of a fitting parallel for Hieron, Pindar has to free the myth from gluttonous gods.⁶ The purpose of the intrusion is therefore not just to demonstrate piety. But when he chooses a myth which has to be "corrected" before it meets the encomiastic needs of an epinician ode, he manages at the same time to define the character of his poetry.⁷ He wants the poem

⁴ On similar views expressed by Xenophanes and Heraclitus cf. M. R. Lefkowitz, "The Poet as Hero: Fifth-Century Autobiography and Subsequent Biographical Fiction," *CQ* 28 (1978) 463. Cf. also E. *IT* 380–91, where the passage from *O.* 1 is directly alluded to and used to reject the belief that Artemis enjoys θυσίαι βροτοκτόνοι.

⁵ Cf. H. Maehler, *Die Auffassung des Dichterberufs im frühen Griechentum bis zur Zeit Pindars* (Göttingen 1963) 96–100; W. Kraus, "Die Auffassung des Dichterberufs im frühen Griechentum," *WS* 68 (1955) 84–7; H. Gundert, *Pindar und sein Dichterberuf* (Frankfurt 1935) 64.

⁶ Cf. A. Köhnken, "Pindar as Innovator: Poseidon Hippios and the Relevance of the Pelops Story in *Olympian* 1," *CQ* 24 (1974) 199–206, esp. 203f.; cf. also L. Illig, *Zur Form der Pindarischen Erzählung* (Berlin 1932) 13–17.

⁷ Strictly speaking, the meaning of such passages can not be interpreted as a *direct* announcement by the poet because the first person represents the speaker's voice. Yet we may understand them as *indirect* statements by Pindar. The fictional person of the speaker serves to motivate a deviation from the course of the ode or a break in the thought-sequence (cf. M. Lefkowitz, "ΤΩ ΚΑΙ ΕΓΩ: The first person in Pindar," *HSCP* 67 (1963) 181f.). But it is the poet Pindar himself who underlies the

to contain what is καλόν from both an encomiastic *and* a moral point of view.⁸

Callimachus evidently noted the theoretical importance of this Pindaric passage and used it as a model in lines 57ff. of his *Hymn to Zeus*.⁹ There he rejects the traditional myth according to which Zeus gained possession of his kingship only after he and his two brothers had cast lots. Callimachus points out in lines 57–9 that he is going to tell a story which is different from what one would expect: There was no question but that, among the three brothers, Zeus would be the one to get the οὐρανός, since his superiority was obvious. And now Callimachus explicitly states that his version of the myth is different from the common tradition:

δηναιοὶ δ' οὐ πάμπαν ἀληθείας ἦσαν αἰδοί·
φάντο πάλον Κρονίδῃσι διάτριχα δώματα νείμει·
τίς δέ κ' ἐπ' Οὐλύμπῳ τε καὶ Ἄιδι κλῆρον ἐρύσσαί,
ὅς μάλα μὴ νενίηλος; ἐπ' ἰσαίῃ γὰρ ἔοικε
πήλασθαι' τὰ δὲ τόσσον ὅσον διὰ πλείστον ἔχουσι.
ψευδοίμην αἰώντος ἅ κεν πεπίθοιεν ἀκουήν. (60–5)

Therefore, the bards of old did not always tell the truth; they said that lot had appointed three domains to the sons of Cronus, one for each; yet who would cast lots for Olympus and for Hades, unless a total fool? For it is plausible that one cast lots on equal terms; but these are as far apart as possible. May I tell lies that persuade the listener's ear.

Like Pindar, who wrote ἀντία προτέρων (*O.* 1.36), Callimachus will not follow the δηναιοὶ αἰδοί. The story told by these poets, namely that the Κρονίδαι cast lots for their realms (cf. *Il.* 15.187ff.), is false,

concept set forth in this passage from *Olympian* 1 and in each of the passages that will be treated below. Cf. G. M. Kirkwood, "Pythian 5. 72–76, 9. 90–92, and the Voice of Pindar," *ICS* 6 (1981) 15f; T. C. W. Stinton, "'Si Credere Dignum Est': Some Expressions of Disbelief in Euripides and Others," *PCPS* 202 (1976) 74.

⁸ Cf. E. Thummer's "Aufwertung des Lobes der Dichtung" (*Die isthmischen Gedichte*, vol. 1 (Heidelberg 1968) 82–102). The more general view that poets should conceal what is πονηρόν and say only what is χρηστόν is put in Aeschylus' mouth by Aristophanes in *Ra.* 1053–6. This seems to indicate that such thoughts were current in the fifth century.

⁹ M. T. Smiley, "Callimachus' Debt to Pindar and Others," *Hermathena* 18 (1914) 51, was the first to see the similarity of the two passages but did not try to explain it. Cf. Stinton (n. 7 above) 69.

as Callimachus points out again in 66f. ("Not lots made you king of the gods, but the deeds of your hands, and your might," etc.). It is a fairly common device in Greek poetry for the poet or the speaker to distance himself from an utterance by pointing out that it has been told by others before him.¹⁰ Yet by criticizing the old version, by explicitly denying its truth, and by telling a different story for whose truthfulness specific arguments are given, Callimachus exhibits the same sequence of argument that we find in Pindar's *O.* 1 and goes beyond that mere demonstration of distance.¹¹ There are, however, some important differences in intention between the two passages. Does Callimachus give the same reasons for the alteration to tradition as did Pindar, namely a concern for religious propriety? Does Callimachus show any serious concern for the idea that the future king of the gods should have attained his rule by mere random chance? Lines 66f. might suggest that he does, since the picture of Zeus' power and superiority which they offer seems to point to a motivation similar to Pindar's, who regards his gods as being beyond any such fault as gluttony. Callimachus also adopts the encomiastic technique of the older poet. He uses the device as a rhetorical means to praise Zeus, and, if one wishes to see Callimachus suggesting a parallel between Zeus and the king praised in lines 85ff., to praise that ruler.¹² Just as Pindar's alteration of the current version of the Pelops myth has the effect of emphasizing the hero's and, consequently, the victor's greatness, so one might say that Callimachus stresses Zeus' qualities in order to praise the king of Egypt. Yet lines 62–65 suggest that there is a striking difference between the Callimachean and the Pindaric passages. Callimachus gives an explanation

¹⁰ Cf. Stinton (n. 7 above) 65f. and 72–84 for other examples, esp. from tragedy. Callimachus makes use of this device in *Lav. Pall.* 56: μῦθος οὐκ ἐμός, ἀλλ' ἐτέρων; cf. *Aet.* frag. 178. 27–9; *Sos.* 384. 47–9; frag. 257. 33 *SH*. Pindar too often points out that what he is telling is not his own invention: *N.* 3. 52f., *O.* 7. 54–7; *N.* 6. 53f.

¹¹ Signs of a critical discussion of the *πρωτότερον ἔπος* can be found in *A. R.* 4. 988–90, where two possibilities are given for the origin of the sickle that lies under the island of Drepane. But Apollonius simply offers two different *aitia* without indicating which one he regards as preferable.

¹² Some scholars think that Callimachus stresses those abilities which predestined Zeus to be the king of the gods because the poet wants to suggest a parallel with either Ptolemy Philadelphus or Soter. Cf. G. R. McLennan, *Callimachus, Hymn to Zeus, Introduction and Commentary* (Rome 1977) 99, and, most recently, J. J. Clauss, "Lies and Allusion: The Addressee and Date of Callimachus' *Hymn to Zeus*," *ClAnt* 5 (1986) 155–170. Cf. also Stinton (n. 7 above) 69f.

for altering the myth which differs from what the learned reader who recognizes the Pindaric feature would expect. How could anyone be so stupid (νενήλος), Callimachus asks, as to cast lots for two things of such unequal worth as Olympus and Hades? The myth has to be rejected, not because it is not καλόν, as Pindar says in *O.* 1.35, but because it is implausible (cf. 63: ξοικε) that the gods would act so foolishly. When Callimachus implies that Zeus would not have been such a fool as to leave the seizure of power to chance, he bases his disapproval of the older poets' tale on rationalistic considerations. The motivation for disapproving the story is not primarily a moralistic concern but intellectual reasoning. The objection to the δηναῖοι αἰοιδόι is not only that they failed to do justice to Zeus' might but also that they failed to see the implausibility of such a tale. Although Callimachus praises Zeus very effectively by means of this device, his chief interest appears to be not the religious issue but displaying his wit and sophistication.¹³

Such a bringing together of tradition and novelty, the infusion of a feature of earlier poetry with a new and unexpected purpose, seems to be part of the τέχνη which makes up his σοφίη. At the same time Callimachus achieves something else that is characteristic of his approach to poetry: the replacement of straightforward narrative by effects of discontinuity and ἀσυμμετρία in the sequential unfolding of a poem.¹⁴ The result is something diametrically opposed to πάντα τὰ δημόσια and to poetry measured by the Persian league. And in this respect Callimachus again comes close to Pindar, whose narrative is usually not "epic" but "lyric" in its stress on particular details, its

¹³ On the character of Callimachus' wit cf. A. W. Bulloch, "Callimachus' *Erysichthon*, Homer and Apollonius Rhodius," *AJP* 98 (1977) 112 and 114; H. Lloyd-Jones, "A Hellenistic Miscellany," *SIFC* 77 (1984) 67. On the question of Callimachus' attitude to religious issues, cf. P. M. Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria*, vol. 1: *Text* (Oxford 1972) 662f. and 665f., as against, e.g., A.W. Bulloch, "The Future of a Hellenistic Illusion," *MH* 41 (1984) esp. 229; Herter (n. 2 above) 255f.; Lloyd-Jones 65f. In the *Hymn to Artemis* Callimachus seems to contradict what Pindar claimed for the gods in *O.* 1, namely that they cannot be γαστρίμαργοι. There he concludes the very amusing episode about Heracles devouring the beasts shot by the goddess with the statement in lines 159–61 that Heracles, even when he was a god, did not refrain from ἀνηφαγίη.

¹⁴ E. Diehl, "Der Digressionsstil des Kallimachos," *Abhandlungen der Herder-Gesellschaft und des Herder-Instituts zu Riga* 5 (Riga 1937) 12 and 25; Herter (n. 2 above) 413.

disconnectedness, and its allusiveness.¹⁵ Thus it was probably not just the Pindaric device of discussing two different versions of a myth that appealed to Callimachus and prompted him to adapt it to his own purposes. When he used Pindar's technique of interweaving personal statements into the narrative, he achieved the complexity of structure which he seems to be proclaiming when he rejects the unity of a *ἔν ἄεισμα διηγεγκές* (*Aet.* 1.3).

There is one more aspect to be discussed which shows that the Callimachean is modeled on the Pindaric passage. Both Pindar and Callimachus accuse the earlier poets of telling lies (*Pi. O.* 1.28f. and *Call. Jov.* 60). Pindar criticizes the deceptiveness (29: *ἐξαπατῶντι*) of certain myths that are embellished with cunning lines (*δεδαιδαλμένοι ψεύδεσι ποικίλοις*), a deceptiveness which he attributes to *Χάρης*.¹⁶

Χάρης δ', ἅπερ ἅπαντα τεύχει τὰ μείλιχα θνατοῖς,
ἐπιφέρεισα τιμὰν καὶ ἄπιστον ἐμήσατο πιστόν
ἔμμεναι τὸ πολλάκις· (30–2)

For Charm who fashions all delights for mortal men, by bringing honor, many a time contrives that even the incredible be credible.¹⁷

The charm of a thrilling tale makes the hearer believe even what is *ἄπιστον*. Callimachus, on the other hand, makes quite the opposite point, denying the rejected tale all plausibility with the words:

ψευδοίμην αἰόντος ἃ κεν πεπίθοιεν ἀκουήν. (65)

May I tell lies that persuade the listener's ear.

¹⁵ Cf. G. Norwood, *Pindar* (Berkeley 1945) 80f.; W. J. Slater, "Pindar's Myths. Two Pragmatic Explanations," in *Arktouros: Hellenic Studies Presented to Bernard M. W. Knox* (Berlin 1979) 64f.

¹⁶ Cf. Hesiod *Th.* 27f. who says that poets can both lie and tell the truth; Sol. frag. 21, and the comment in Plato *R.* 377d4ff. Cf. also Gorg. *Hel.* 8f. and 13 on the deceptiveness of poets and the power of words.

¹⁷ Pindar makes a similar statement in *N.* 7. 20–3. The *ποινὰν μαχανά* of the *ἀδυσπής* Ὀμηρος enhances the glory (*λόγος*) of Odysseus in excess of what he actually deserves (*πᾶθα*). Homer's deceptive σοφία led the audience astray (*παράγοισα*) just as the seductive qualities of the tale of Pelops' murder did.

If lies are going to be told, they should at least be persuasive.¹⁸ The tale of the gods casting lots for unequal stakes, however, is inherently unbelievable *in addition* to being untrue (60: οὐ πάμπαν ἀληθείες), lacking even those attributes of charm (*O.* 1.30: Χάρις) and sweetness (τὰ μέλιχα) which, according to Pindar, can deceptively persuade an audience (29: ἐξαπατῶντι).

Callimachus stresses the importance of common-sense reasoning even more explicitly at the beginning of the same hymn. It will be maintained that there too the Pindaric device of rejecting one version of a tale in favor of another was in Callimachus' mind. Already the first three lines most probably draw directly on a prosodion by Pindar and thus give a first hint of Pindaric influence on the hymn.¹⁹ In the following six lines, then, there is a whole cluster of allusions to various poets that need not be discussed here.²⁰ In line 4 the poet asks, in the manner of the traditional hymnal question addressed to the gods, à propos of Zeus: "Just how will we sing of him, as Dictaeon or Lycaean?" The answer that he gives makes clear that his ἀπορία is different in character from that propounded in the rhapsodic poems, the effect of which is to emphasize the vastness of the theme.²¹ In Callimachus' case the question leads to the following discussion of Zeus' proper epithet:

ἐν δοιῇ μάλα θυμός, ἐπεὶ γένος ἀμφήριστον.
 Ζεῦ, σὲ μὲν Ἰδαίοισιν ἐν οὔρεσσι φασὶ γενέσθαι,
 Ζεῦ, σὲ δ' ἐν Ἀρκαδίῃ· πότεροι, πάτερ, ἐψεύσαντο;
 "Κρήτες ἀεὶ ψεύσται." καὶ γὰρ τάφον, ὦ ἄνα, σεῖο
 Κρήτες ἐτεκτίναντο· σὺ δ' οὐ θάνες, ἔσοι γὰρ αἰεὶ. (5–9)

¹⁸ Cf. J. K. Newman, "Pindar and Callimachus," *ICS* 10 (1985) 185: "The poet is opening himself to the charge that persuasion rather than truth is his aim." On the surface, however, it is not evident that Callimachus himself aims at credibility rather than truth. Personally he might well have been of the opinion that the altered myth was not really true either, but with ψευδοίμην he does not say that he too actually is lying. Cf. N. Hopkinson, "Callimachus' *Hymn to Zeus*," *CQ* 34 (1984) 144.

¹⁹ Lines 1–3 seem to be modeled after Pindar's frag. 89a (prosodion to Artemis?). Since Pindar's "aporetic" question is squarely in the hymnal tradition, Callimachus can easily draw on the prosodion for the beginning of his hymn. Cf. K. Ziegler, "Zum Zeushymnus des Kallimachus," *RhM* 68 (1913) 352f.; Smiley (n. 9 above) 48–50.

²⁰ There are allusions to Hesiod, Homer, the first Homeric hymn, Epimenides (Κρήτες ἀεὶ ψεύσται), Antagoras, and possibly Euhemerus in lines 5–9. Cf. McLennan (n. 12 above) 30 and 35f.; Hopkinson, "Hymn to Zeus" (n. 18 above) 140.

²¹ Cf. E. L. Bundy. "The 'Quarrel Between Kallimachos and Apollonios', Part I: The Epilogue of Kallimachos' *Hymn to Apollo*," *CSCA* 5 (1972) 69f.

My mind is very much in doubt, for his birth is debatable. Zeus, some say you were born on the Idaean mountains, others say, Zeus, in Arcadia; which, father, have lied? 'Cretans are always liars': yes, O Lord, Cretans built your tomb; but you did not die, for you are forever.

There are two different versions in the tradition, and Callimachus feigns not to know which is the true one. He asks the god himself: *πότεροι ἐψεύσαντο*; (7), but then he makes his decision based on his own learning and logic. Not only are Cretans notorious liars according to the literary tradition (cf. note 20), they even built a tomb for Zeus despite the fact that he is immortal. Thus the unreliability of the Cretans is proved, and the usually accepted claim that Crete is Zeus' birthplace must be false. Therefore Zeus must have been born in Arcadia. In this rationalistic and intellectualized rejection of mythographic tradition there is again a reminiscence of Pindaric practice.²² As he does in lines 57ff., Callimachus here rejects one version of a myth in favor of a less usual alternative, a feature that has been characterized as being Pindaric. Pindar is not the only one to acknowledge that poets can lie (cf. note 16), but Pindar alone, before Callimachus, attaches the label of "lie" to a definite myth and contrasts that lie with his own "true" version. Whereas Pindar dismisses the one story as false on moralistic grounds, Callimachus assumes that the truth can be ascertained by means of acuity and logic. But although Callimachus arrives at his conclusion in favor of the Arcadian version through purely intellectual arguments, his starting-point—the given and irrefutable fact of Zeus' immortality—is no less a matter of religious belief than Pindar's ethical conviction that a *μάκαρ* cannot be a *γαστρίμαργος*. As when, later on in the hymn, Callimachus approves of a version of events that attests to Zeus' innate superiority and in so doing seems to share Pindar's moralistic stance, so here he does not want to question Zeus' immortality and therefore rejects the story of the Cretans who dared to claim that Zeus had died. Like the *πότεροι* (*O.* 1.36) and the *δηναιοὶ αἰοιδοί* (*Jov.* 60), the Cretans are guilty of blasphemy. And again, by favoring that version of a myth which refrains from attributing any fault to the god—in the case of Pindar's *O.* 1 it was a hero—the poet adds to Zeus' excellence and also adopts the encomiastic purpose of the Pindaric model.

²² Cf. Ziegler (n. 19 above) 352.

Thus the reader becomes familiar with two characteristics of the poem right at the beginning, namely its specific indebtedness to Pindaric poetic techniques and, more generally, its critical and allusive treatment of subject-matter. In the first nine lines of the hymn Callimachus can display his knowledge of the hymnal tradition, his awareness of falsehood in myths as both a reality and a poetic *topos*, and his own logic and learning.²³

In the passages considered thus far, both the Callimachean and the Pindaric, a certain well known version or aspect of an old myth is rejected as false and is then told differently. In Pindar's *O.* 9 we find yet another rejection of a myth, but one that exhibits important differences.

Pindar starts telling the story of Heracles' combat against the gods (29–35) but then dismisses it with the following words:

ἀπό μοι λόγον
 τοῦτον, στόμα, ῥίπον·
 ἐπεὶ τό γε λοιδορῆσαι θεούς
 ἐχθρὰ σοφία, καὶ τὸ καυχᾶσθαι παρὰ καιρόν
 μανίαισιν ὑποκρέκει.
 μὴ νῦν λαλάγει τὰ τοι-
 αῦτι'· ἔα πόλεμον μάχαν τε πάσαν
 χωρὶς ἀθανάτων· (35–41)

Reject this story, my mouth; since to revile the gods is a hateful skill, and to boast inopportunist is tantamount to madness. Do not prattle such things now; keep all war and battle far from the immortals.

Here Pindar does not give a different account of events, nor does he call the account he does give a *ψεῦδος*, as it was the case in *O.* 1. But he makes his disapproval of the myth clear by stopping abruptly and saying that it is an *ἐχθρὰ σοφία* to attribute war and battle to the gods. As in *O.* 1 he is proclaiming that his poem should be free of impiety. The following aetiological tale of the Opountians' origin

²³ Cf. also *Iamb.* frag. 202.15–20 P. It seems that there too Callimachus wants to show that he knows of certain lies in mythology. He gives two examples of false myths, one of which (line 16) is the same as at the beginning of the *Hymn to Zeus*. His intention might be to lay stress on his truthfulness before he begins to tell the story of Hebe's birthday party.

(41ff.) meets this demand.²⁴ Thus Pindar, with his claim for piety, points to the divine merit of the victor's people, but at the same time he enhances the quality of his own poetry. His σοφία avoids such unpleasant topics (and therefore is an adequate means of praising an individual, a city, etc.).

This mode of breaking off a myth was again observed and adopted by Callimachus. Once again it is important to note the variations as well as the parallelisms. In *Aet.* frag. 75 of the elegy of Acontius and Cydippe we hear about Cydippe's προνύμφιος ὕπνος with a παῖς ἀμφιθαλής. Callimachus begins to give an *aition* for this custom but then breaks off:

Ἥρην γάρ κοτέ φασι—κύον, κύον, ἴσχεο, λαιδρέ
 θυμέ, σύ γ' αἰεῖσθαι καὶ τὰ περ οὐχ ὁσίη·
 ὦναο κάρτ' ἔνεκ' οὐ τι θεῆς ἴδες ἱερὰ φρικτῆς,
 ἐξ ἂν ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν ἥρυγες ἱστορίην.
 ἦ πολυιδρεῖη χαλεπὸν κακόν, ὅστις ἀκαρτεῖ
 γλώσσης· ὥς ἔτεόν παῖς ὄδε μαῦλιν ἔχει. (4–9)

Hera, they say, once—you dog, stop, you dog, my shameless mind, you will sing even what it is not lawful to tell; lucky for you that you have not seen the rites of the Fearful Goddess, since you would have blurted out their story too. Indeed, much knowledge is a dangerous evil for him who does not control his tongue; he really is a “child with a knife.”

There are several similarities between these lines and *O.* 9. 29ff. which suggest that Callimachus used the Pindaric passage as a model. For Pindar it is an ἐχθρὰ σοφία and tantamount to madness to speak ill of the gods; in the same way Callimachus calls πολυιδρεῖη a χαλεπὸν κακόν if it is not restrained. Pindar's notion of σοφία includes reverence for the gods and an ability to recognize καιρός, that is, to avoid or conceal those elements in a myth that are unacceptable from an ethical and an encomiastic point of view.²⁵ Callimachus too says that

²⁴ Cf. Illig (n. 6 above) 84–6; E. L. Bundy, *Studia Pindarica*,² (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1986) 9. Whereas Bundy takes the Opountians' divine merit as a point of comparison with Heracles, Stinton (n. 7 above) 68, sees the relevance of the passage in the contrast of the piety of Deucalion and Pyrrha with the impiety of the Heracles myth.

²⁵ For two different interpretations of καιρός cf. Gundert (n. 5 above) 63–5, and Bundy, *Stud. Pind.* (n. 24 above) 73, who stresses its encomiastic relevance.

he does not want to go on with the tale because it is οὐχ ὀσίη. Yet the *aposiopesis* is clearly intended to remind the reader of the sexual relationship between Hera and Zeus before their marriage (cf. *Il.* 14.294–6).²⁶ By rebuking his θυμός (cf. Pindar's apostrophe to his στόμα) and even humorously exaggerating his self-reproach (6f.) for having almost told that piquant story Callimachus makes clear that his reticence is not genuinely motivated by religious scruples. He does not have the same moralistic concerns as Pindar but he uses the same technique of breaking off a story by means of self-address and self-reproach. There also seems to be a correspondence between the two passages regarding their function. The Pindaric passage is, by contrast, a demonstration of the poet's σοφία, and the passage in the *aition* of Acontius and Cydippe seems to have a similar intention. This break off itself serves as a display of πολυδρεΐη used in combination with κάρτος γλώσσης, by a virtuoso poet such as Callimachus appears to be himself. For if learning and erudition are not combined with skill and cleverness, the poetry becomes perhaps dry and boring. In contrast, this passage is an example of wry and sophisticated learning *par excellence*. Callimachus can demonstrate his art of allusion, hinting not only at the ἱερὸς γάμος myth but also at the passage in Pindar's *O.* 9. Not only does he use its technique but he also exploits its function of expressing the poet's conception of poetry. And again, like the passage in the *Hymn to Zeus* (60–65), the intrusion interrupts the sequence of events in the narrative.²⁷ As has been suggested above, this effect too may have led Callimachus to adopt the Pindaric

²⁶ Cf. also *Epigr.* 52. 3f.:

οὐράνιε Ζεῦ
καὶ σὺ ποτ' ἠράσθης—οὐκέτι μακρὰ λέγω.

²⁷ Cf. Diehl (n. 14 above) 23; Bulloch, "Hellenistic Poetry" (n. 2 above) 562. It is interesting to note that Horace apparently recognized the relationship between Callimachus and Pindar. The break off passage in *Carm.* 3.2. 25–8 has been identified as being Pindaric by G. Davis, "Silence and Decorum: Encomiastic Convention and the Epilogue of Horace *Carm.* 3.2," *ClAnt* 2 (1983), 9–26. But the words that follow the break off, *vetabo, qui Cereris sacrum/vulgarit arcanae, sub isdem/sit trabibus*, are reminiscent not only of Callimachus' *Aet.* frag. 75. 6f. but also of statements like *Cer.* 116f. (Δάματερ, μὴ τήνος ἐμὴν φίλος, ὅς τοι ἀπεχθής/εἶη μὴδ' ὁμότοιχος· ἐμοὶ κακογείτονες ἐχθροὶ) or *Dian.* 136.

device. Here he even seems to outdo himself, for the *aition* which he is about to tell in line 4 would already be a digression.

There is one more aspect of this broken off passage that still needs to be discussed. In both the Pindaric and the Callimachean passage no alternative version of the tale is offered (as happens in *O.* 1 and the *Hymn to Zeus*), but there is a difference in the treatment of the myth alluded to. Whereas Pindar in *O.* 9 actually recounts Heracles' fights with the gods, if only briefly, Callimachus merely touches on the *ἱερὸς γάμος* as the *aition* for the premarital rite. This technique of employing allusion to reveal what should be hidden is a specific form of a break off which also occurs in Pindar's odes. In *Nemean* 5, in mentioning Phocus together with the other sons of Aeacus, Pindar suddenly makes the audience think of the fratricide committed by Peleus and Telamon, but does so only by concealing the story (14: αἰδέομαι μέγα εἰπεῖν, 16: σιάσομαι). Although he does not recount how Phocus was killed, he hints at this deed (14: ἐν δίκῃ τε μὴ κεκινδυνευμένον) and makes it clear what it is that he wants to conceal. And it is only by making more or less explicit what should not be told that Pindar can motivate his statement of principle in 16–8: sometimes the truth is better not told, and there are certain (unquestioned) facts about which it is advantageous to be silent.²⁸ The same device is used in *O.* 13 where Pindar, after having told the myth of Bellerophontes, just says: διασωπάσομαί οἱ μόρον ἐγώ· (91). So he makes the audience think of the hero's end, which was an unpleasant one because of his ὕβρις (cf. *I.* 7. 44ff.).²⁹ Since such

²⁸ His use of the word σοφώτατον in line 18 (καὶ τὸ σιγᾶν πολλάκις ἐστὶ σοφώτατον ἀνθρώπῳ νοῆσαι) reminds us of the σοφία in *O.* 9.38 that was ἐχθρά when the poet indulged in telling an improper story. Cf. also *O.* 9. 103f., frags. 42, 81, 180, and A. M. Kormornicka, "Quelques remarques sur la notion d' ἀλᾶθεια et de ψεύδος chez Pindare," *Eos* 60 (1972) 246–9.

²⁹ This amounts to a warning of the dangers inherent in great success; but when he makes the chorus restrain themselves from whirling their arrows παρὰ σκοπόν, he also suggests that the topic is not appropriate to the festive occasion. For this duty of the poet to speak κατὰ καιρόν cf. n. 25 above and Lefkowitz, "First person" (n. 7 above) 199–201.

In *P.* 11 the myth of Orestes slaying his mother and Aegisthus is not concealed (34–7). But with a break off Pindar makes clear that such stories are not in keeping with the ὀρθὰ κέλευθος (38–40) that leads him to the victor's praise (41ff.). For the function of this digression as a contrast for the present celebration cf. W. H. Race, "Some digressions and returns in Greek authors," *CJ* 76 (1980) 4–6.

highly suggestive break offs seem to be a significant feature of Pindar's poetry generally,³⁰ it is not necessary to believe that Callimachus in his treatment of Cydippe's προνύμφιος ὕμνος was thinking of any one specific passage aside from *O.* 9. But the examples from *N.* 5 and *O.* 13 illustrate what Callimachus was interested in. Each poet prefers to be silent, although it is precisely this silence that makes the hearer or reader think of what is not said. But again we can see Callimachus taking Pindar's technique and employing it in accordance with his own intentions rather than Pindar's. Pindar demonstratively touches on subject-matter that is inadequate for his laudatory poem. Callimachus, by means of this device, challenges the reader to draw on *his own* erudition and knowledge of mythology to understand the *poet's* learned and witty allusion.

The examples from Pindar's victory odes that have been discussed above all deal with the explicit dismissal of certain elements in a myth on grounds of impropriety. By means of these passages Pindar shows that he wants to avoid unpleasant subject-matter in favor of topics in accordance with the festive mood of the ode and the achievement being celebrated (cf. note 29). This is an effective way of magnifying not only the event but also the poetry itself. For by distancing himself from blasphemy and abominable deeds the

In a passage in *I.* 5 Pindar employs the device of self-interruption to distance himself and his songs from grief and unpleasant *historical* facts. In lines 46–50 he concludes the praise of Aegina and its heroes with a reference to the battle of Salamis. There the city won glory too, he says, but with the consequence that many of its citizens died. This is the point where Pindar breaks off:

ἀλλ' ὅμως καύχασμα κατὰβρεχε σιγῇ· (51)

Yet, none the less (i.e., although the Aeginetans' deeds would be worthy of praise), drown boasting in silence.

Once again we see Pindar reluctant to touch on what might disturb the festive mood of the ode (cf. Lefkowitz, "First person" [n. 7 above] 207–9; Bundy, "Quarrel" [n. 21 above] 80f.). Yet by in fact mentioning the toils of war, he manages to pay honor to the Aeginetans' achievements in the battle of Salamis.

³⁰ Cf. also *P.* 11. 34–40 (referred to in n. 29 above) and *Pae.* 7b. 36–41. Cf. Call. *Aet. frag.* 24. 20f. which comes from the scholia to Pindar's *N.* 5 (schol. (BD) Pi N. 5. 25b): ἐκλυε (—), τῶν μηδὲν ἔμοιός δι' ὀδόντας ὀλίσθαι, Πηλεΐς. There is no immediate context. So it is impossible to say how Callimachus devised the passage. It is interesting, however, that the break off seems to be used in connection with the Phocus story.

poet enhances, by contrast, the character and value of his song.³¹ This aspect of the device is exploited by Callimachus in his *Hymn to Demeter*. Having first given us the account of the goddess' wanderings when she was searching for her daughter, 7–16, he then stops himself:

μη μη ταῦτα λέγωμες ἃ δάκρυον ἄγαγε Διοῖ·
 κάλλιον, ὥς πολίεσσιν ἐαδότα τέθμια δῶκε·
 κάλλιον, ὥς καλάμαν τε καὶ ἱερὰ δράγματα πρᾶτα
 ἀσταχύων ἀπέκοψε καὶ ἐν βόας ἤκε πατήσαι,
 ἀνίκα Τριπτόλεμος ἀγαθὸν ἐδιδάσκετο τέχνην·
 Κάλλιον, ὥς, ἵνα καὶ τις ὑπερβασίας ἀλέηται,
 π ἰδέσθαι (17–23)

No, no! let us not speak of what brought tears to Deo: rather, of how she bestowed fair laws on cities; rather, of how she first cut straw and handfuls of corn-ears and set oxen to thresh them, when Triptolemus was taught the goodly art; rather, of how (so that one may avoid transgression) she [punished Erysichthon].³²

With a hint of self-reproach, Callimachus breaks the initial tale off and offers a choice of themes that reflects the hymnist's conventional ἀπορία when faced with an abundance of topics. But once again Callimachus' handling of poetic convention is characteristically his own. While manifesting his poetic skill and learning by showing that he is familiar with the hymnal tradition of ἀπορία, he also combines it with the Pindaric rejection of an improper and inappropriate story and thus adds to the novelty with which he has treated the traditional hymnal elements.³³ Like Pindar, he makes it clear, by first mentioning and then dismissing the unpleasant elements, that his praise has to be free of them. But again there might be an additional motivation behind the passage. Insofar as it rejects the well known story of Demeter's search for Coré in favor of the recondite episode of Erysichthon's heinous deed and his punishment by the goddess, the

³¹ Cf. n. 8 above.

³² I give the translation by N. Hopkinson, *Callimachus, The Sixth Hymn* (Cambridge 1984) 63. On p. 95, ad l. 17, he refers to Callimachus' *Aet. frag.* 75. 4f. and *Iamb. frag.* 194. 59, and to *Epigr.* 52.4 Pf.: "The device is as old as Pindar (*O.* 1. 52–3)."

³³ Cf. Bundy, "Quarrel" (n. 21 above) 70–2, esp. 70: "*H. Cer.* 17–23 combines the rhapsodic technique with a 'corrective' technique common in Pindar [Bundy refers to *O.* 1. 26ff.]."

break off can also be interpreted as expressing Callimachus' desire to avoid whatever is too familiar and has been treated over and over again in earlier poetry.³⁴ In this light μὴ μὴ ταῦτα λέγωμες is to be understood as the refusal of a tale which not only could annoy the goddess but also, having rather too much of the character of τὰ δημόσια (*Epigr.* 28.4), is not the kind of subject-matter that Callimachus as a poet wants for his hymn. With the repeated phrase κάλλιον ὥς . . . Callimachus leads to the third and final topic proposed, namely the remote myth of Erysichthon.³⁵ Once again Callimachus takes advantage of the fact that such authorial intrusions allow the poet to illustrate the exceptional quality of his poem.

In every case where Pindar or Callimachus make use of an intrusion of the kind discussed above, the audience's or reader's attention is drawn to what follows much more emphatically than would be the case if the sequence of the narrative were continuous and not interrupted.³⁶ This Pindaric technique is adopted by Callimachus in four passages of his extant poems. In the case of the *Hymns to Zeus* and *to Demeter*, Callimachus exploits its encomiastic function, but in all four passages he uses it to present the character of his σοφίη: it is poetry in which wit, learning and erudition, acuteness of mind, allusiveness, and selectivity play an important role.³⁷

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³⁴ Cf. also *Pi. I.* 7.1–21, where the hymnal ἀνορία is used to contrast well known mythical topics (16f.: παλαιὰ χάρις) with praise of the victor Strepsiades. Cf. Bundy, "Quarrel" (n. 21 above) 65f. and 87f.

³⁵ Bulloch, "Erysichthon" (n. 13 above) 114f., and Hopkinson, *The Sixth Hymn*, (n. 32 above) 18–31.

³⁶ Cf. also *N.* 4. 33ff.; *N.* 3. 26ff.; *P.* 4. 246ff.; *N.* 8. 19ff.; *P.* 10. 4ff. and 51ff.; *N.* 6. 53ff.; *N.* 7. 52ff.; etc. Cf. Bundy *Stud. Pind.* (n. 24 above) 9, and Gerber (n. 3 above) 70.

³⁷ Little work on the subject of the influence of Pindar on Callimachus has been done since Smiley's article appeared in 1914 (n. 9 above) although the matter is touched on by M. Poliakoff, "Nectar, Springs and the Sea: Critical Terminology in Pindar and Callimachus," *ZPE* 39 (1980) 41–7, and, most recently, in the article by J. K. Newman (n. 18 above).