

# Language and Reference

## Lenguaje y referencia\*

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### Resumen

Al igual que la cognición, el lenguaje en el que se expresa la cognición tiene en principio una función de la síntesis, es decir, una función de conectar el sujeto conocedor con el objeto de la cognición. El lenguaje permite al sujeto humano tener acceso epistémico al objeto, que en su forma y función constituye la referencialidad necesaria del lenguaje mismo. La cognición debe referirse inevitablemente al objeto de conocimiento en el modo de accesos pre-lingüístico-sensoriales y abstracto-conceptuales, como lo destaca claramente Kant en su noción básica de la naturaleza sintética y la estructura del conocimiento conceptual. Esto apunta a una ambigüedad aporética de la referencialidad epistémica del lenguaje. En el proceso de cognición, el sujeto debe tener un acceso epistémico a lo particular. Sin embargo, la cognición conceptual se aparta de lo particular y se dirige a una idea universal general. La ambigüedad entre el acceso referencial y la salida referencial en la cognición requiere una suplementación necesaria de lo abstracto-lógico a través del conocimiento pre-lingüístico-sensorial o estético, como destaca Alexander G. Baumgarten en su doctrina de la cognición sensorial (*cognitio sensitiva*) y de la verdad estética-lógica. Tal suplementación dentro del marco de una teoría de la percepción parece establecer una forma única de referencia epistemológica, en la que el acceso epistémico-subjetivo al objeto particular no termina en la finalidad ontológica de un concepto o cognición conceptual, sino que trasciende la cognición al infinito de una percepción estética.

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## **Palabras clave**

Aporía de la lengua, acceso epistémico, referencialidad de la cognición, cognoscibilidad y existencia, individuación lingüística.

## **Abstract**

Like cognition, the language in which the cognition finds expression has, in principle, a function of synthesis, that is, a function of connecting the cognizing subject with the object of cognition. Language enables the human subject to have epistemic access to the object; in its form and function this epistemic access constitutes the necessary referentiality of the language itself. Cognition must inevitably refer to the object of knowledge in the mode of pre-linguistic-sensory and abstract-conceptual accesses, as clearly highlighted by Kant in his basic notion of the synthetic nature and structure of conceptual knowledge. This points to an aporetic ambiguity of the epistemic referentiality of language. In the process of cognition, the subject should have an epistemic access to the particular. However, the conceptual cognition departs from the particular and is directed to a general universal idea. The ambiguity between the referential access and the referential departure in cognition necessarily requires a supplementation of the abstract-logical through the pre-linguistic-sensory or aesthetic knowledge, as emphasized by Alexander G. Baumgarten in his doctrine of sensory cognition (*cognitio sensitiva*) and the aesthetic-logical truth. Such a supplementation within the framework of a theory of perception seems to establish a unique form of epistemological reference, in which the subjective-epistemic access to the particular object does not terminate in the ontological finality of a concept or conceptual cognition, but transcends the cognition into the infinity of an aesthetic perception.

## **Keywords**

Aporia of language, epistemic access, referentiality of cognition, cognoscibility and existence, linguistic individuation

## **Introduction**

Language is known to be the bearer of knowledge. The human subject cognizes objects in the world through language or linguistic concepts. The linguistic concepts, in this respect, form epistemic accesses of the subject to the objects that are cognized or judged. This synthetic function of the linguistic concept, to which Kant points in the propaedeutic part of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, in the *Transzendentaler Elementarlehre*, relates to a necessary reference or referential relationship of language to the real world, which is linguistically and conceptually known. However, the subject or the term has a significantly different existential mode compared to individual objects, which, as objects of reference, must participate in the linguistic-conceptual reference in the cognitive process. In addition to this ontological problematic of language and its reference to the world of particular objects, a fundamental epistemic ambiguity of linguistic reference -to extra-linguistic objects- seems to contribute significantly to the aporetic character of language. Cognition mainly implies the epistemic access to the particular, but conceptual cognition is clearly a way of deviating from the particular and orienting towards abstract and universal ideas, which alone are legitimized as knowledge. Through senses we perceive the

particular, but we cognize a general and abstract-universal idea. This problematic ambiguity of the epistemic reference that emerges in each cognitive process ultimately points to an objective-phenomenal aporia, that is, to the ambiguous ways of knowing the object of cognition as concrete-particular and abstract-universal, a common problem in the disputes over universals in Middle Ages, which historically goes back to the philosophy of Plato. Furthermore, this epistemic-referential ambiguity indicates the very aporia of phenomenal individuation, which for a long time was debated within the framework of medieval scholastic philosophy, and which was strategically suppressed by Descartes while establishing the philosophical modernity. The Cartesian-epistemological turn in early modernism used the method of epistemological negation and the appropriation of sensory qualities and subjective attributes in the object and, subsequently, the axiomatization of basic scientific concepts within the framework of mechanical philosophy. The axioms as final justifications imparted an epistemological and ontological finality to basic scientific conceptions, which eliminated the aporetic discourses of natural philosophy (*philosophia naturalis*) of medieval scholasticism in favor of the apodicticity of modern axiomatic sciences.

However, the axiomatization of the otherwise aporetic knowledge inevitably led to the aforementioned problem of the epistemological reference of scientific knowledge. The aporia of objectively phenomenal individuation complicates the process of cognition from the outset, that the epistemic-referential access ends in an apparently final linguistic-conceptual knowledge. In addition, the ambiguity of epistemic access in any cognitive process points to a general aporia of linguistic-conceptual knowledge and its reference to particular objects. This epistemic ambiguity in the referentiality of conceptual knowledge requires a renewed consideration of the cognitive potential of the sensorial sphere, which is otherwise strategically subordinated in the modern epistemology to the mental sphere. In the history of modern philosophy, several attempts have been made to systematically address the problem of ambiguity in the epistemic referentiality of conceptual knowledge. Kant hierarchized the elementary faculties of the subject, sensibility (*Sinnlichkeit*) and understanding, in an epistemological system, by subordinating sensibility, in which alone the objects are given, to the understanding. However, the essential ambiguity of the epistemic reference, such as the sensory access to the particular and the departure of the mind from the particular and its orientation towards abstract universal ideas, does not require a hierarchical order, but rather a certain equality of the more participatory epistemological functions of sensibility and understanding in the cognitive process. This requires a certain revival of the teachings of Alexander G. Baumgarten, that is, of 'sensory cognition' (*cognitio sensitiva*), 'aesthetic-logical truth', etc., which seems to have been paradigmatically suppressed by the prevailing modern epistemology, introduced by Descartes and significantly expanded by Kant.

### **Aporia of the language**

Knowledge is always synthetic, that is, it connects a cognizing subject with an object of cognition. Since the mode of cognition is usually linguistic-conceptual, this connection, in which each cognition takes place, points to a nexus between a sphere of language and a purely objective sphere of reality. Knowledge is based on linguistic concepts, but this construction necessarily implies an extra-linguistic reference of the concept to an object that, as Nietzsche (1999) has radically problematized, belongs to a fundamentally different sphere. The linguistic concept originally contains a synthesis between two completely different spheres, namely the sphere of the subject and the sphere of the object, between which "there is no causality, no correctness, and

no expression; there is, at most, an aesthetic relation".<sup>i</sup> On the part of the language and the maker of a language, the subject, the aporia of language, insinuated in this observation of Nietzsche can in principle be considered as an aporia of linguistic-conceptual cognition, which is revealed with each one of the necessarily intuitive references of the concept to the cognized object. Intuition, as a means to this necessary connection of cognition with the object, was already established propaedeutically by Kant (1998) at the beginning of his opus magnum, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, with the doctrine *Transzendente Elementarlehre*:

Auf welche Art und durch welche Mittel sich auch immer eine Erkenntnis auf Gegenstände beziehen mag, so ist doch diejenige, wodurch sie sich auf dieselbe unmittelbar bezieht, und worauf alles Denken als Mittel abzweckt, die Anschauung. (Kant, 1998, p. 93)

The reference of the cognitive subject to the object is a relation whose basic trait is obviously an epistemic access. Through the intuition that arises from sensibility, the subject seeks an epistemic access to the object that, in turn, is ontologically separate from it and exists as such. This epistemological access can be called a form of reference because the reference points to the reference of a subjective knowledge of an object or of an objective existence. Thus, epistemic-referential access implies that the subject refers to an external object in cognition. While the subjective mode of cognition is a linguistic concept, the sensory intuition, as Kant points out, forms the mode of reference. In the cognitive process, the referential process develops from the subject referring to an objective referent, towards which the subjective-epistemic access is oriented.

Although the subject as the referring agent and the object as an object of reference turn out to be ontologically different, but absolutely stable entities, the conceptual reference as the necessary epistemic access is still a problem, in reality it is an aporia. These two ontologically different spheres, namely, the linguistic concept and sensory intuition, are synthesized here, which for Nietzsche is an impossibility. Furthermore, this inability to properly synthesize is based on the ontological difference mentioned above between the subject who cognizes and the object to be cognized. However, the knowing subject is manifested in linguistic-conceptual knowledge. Therefore, one can correctly accept the linguistic term as the one that is referred here. In cognition a concept is associated with an objective referent through intuitive reference, in which each epistemic access ends.

Sensory intuitions as the necessary epistemic access to objects of cognition can be easily understood, because only in them can objects be given, as Kant emphasizes, and they are experienced in everyday life. However, the aporias of this reference come to light when through this reference the referential term is linked to the objective referent, as the linguistic concept ontologically demonstrates a completely different entity in relation to the objective referent. In addition, each concept points to a general and universal idea, while sensory intuition -as an epistemic-referential access- is inevitably directed to individual objects. With naked eyes one can see only a particular object, but one recognizes a general conceptual idea. This ambiguity of the epistemic reference - in the mere intuition and in the synthetic cognition - is ultimately the aporia of the language itself, since only in the framework of it can objects be cognized.

If the concept is like the subject it refers to, it is tacitly attributed with an ontological autonomy. In other words: as a referent, the term has a special ontological status. Consequently, the following questions can be asked: What are terms? or, how do concepts exist? -in the same way that we ask these questions about objective existence. The existence of the concept implies an ontological aporia as against the material objects, as well as mathematical objects, to which

Plato seemed to attribute an intermediate ontological status -that is, an ontological status between the objects of senses and the eternal ideas. This seems to have resulted from the ambiguity of an epistemic reference. How can a general term epistemologically represent an individual object? Obviously, a particular object, in addition to the term, is predicated and specified by additional spatial and temporal factors: as "the mango tree in the middle of our garden, in which we played during our childhood". The ambiguity of the reference remains, through which this generic term can access a single object existing in the past. From the generic concept to the concept of species and finally to the individual concept, this epistemic ambiguity becomes increasingly smaller, but it remains an inevitable residue, even if a single concept, like a proper noun, can represent a single object. The Kantian differentiation between analytic and synthetic judgments also ultimately refers to the object-reference or to the nature of the epistemic reference to a predicated object. This differentiation does not appeal much to the self-referentiality of the concept (although the so-called analytical judgments give the impression of the self-referentiality of the concept, as a subject). An example given by Kant (1998) in the introduction to the *Critique of Pure Reason* (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*) for a priori analytic judgments, namely that all bodies are extended, barely points to an epistemic reference that is strictly included in the concept of a body. Because extension as primary spatial quality necessarily requires a clear reference that goes beyond the scope of a self-referentiality. Therefore, in the framework of the Kantian transcendental philosophy the concept itself, as well as the 'thing in itself' (*Ding an sich*), seem to form an aporia to which sufficient epistemic access cannot be found. According to Kant, the concepts without intuition are empty. The indispensable element of intuition, therefore, must essentially determine and guarantee the ontic status of the concept. However, intuition, as an indispensable remnant is always binding in the concept; and, in doing so, it breaks with the self-referentiality of the concept (which is the basis of the autonomy of the concept itself) and necessarily reaches a referent in an extra-verbal object.

### **Existence and cognoscibility**

The problem of the existence of concepts was expressed most clearly in the well-known disputes of universals, which prevailed in medieval scholastic philosophy. The universals are actually abstract-linguistic concepts that represent particular objects. The same term - tree, table, plant or human - means a particular object in concretion and a general idea in abstraction. A particular object is recognized through a universal concept. According to Plato, in cognition a particular object participates in an eternal, perfect and universal idea that the term embodies. The particular comes from this process of partaking.<sup>ii</sup> Both in Platonic philosophy and in the disputes over universals in the Middle Ages, the issue of existence predominates. Platonic ideas are not mere constructions of thought, but exist as eternal ideas, whose imperfect images constitute the totality of the perceptible singular objects. The participation of individual objects in general and universal ideas certainly take place within the framework of an epistemological process, but cognition here is based on the existence or ontological predetermination of ideas and objects of the senses. A similar case would be the primacy of existence over cognoscibility, hence the primacy of ontology over epistemology, as is generally assumed in medieval scholastic philosophy. Kenneth Barber (1994) sees the predominance of ontology -or at least the parallelism between ontology and epistemology- in the Middle Ages as a natural consequence of the predominant discourse on individuation in scholastic philosophy.

These two concerns, ontological and epistemological, are uneasily linked in the history of philosophy. In an ideal world, philosopher's heaven as it were, the marriage of ontology and epistemology would be completely harmonious in that all the entities catalogued and classified by the ontologist would meet with approval by the epistemologist and in turn all items on the epistemologist's short list of knowable entities would be sufficient for the ontologist's account of the world. In a less than ideal world, however, the two concerns are often at odds; the epistemologist complains about the cavalier attitude of his ontologically inclined brethren who generate entities and distinctions in an unconscionable manner, while ontologist in turn dismisses the epistemologist as one blinded to the richness of the universe through a neurotic fixation on a few favorite sense organs. (...) Less dramatically, but more sharply focused, epistemology and ontology can be related in two ways. On what I call the *Strong Model* of their relation, epistemological considerations serve as criteria for the adequacy of an ontological system: putative candidates for inclusion in the catalogue of existents must first pass a test for knowability and, once included, their classification in terms of categorical features must again meet the same rigorous standard. Failure to pass these tests is, or ought to be, sufficient reason for discarding all or parts of the ontology in question, no matter how firmly entrenched the latter may have been in a philosophical tradition. On what I term the "weak model", epistemology and ontology are understood to be parallel methods of investigation having in common only the fact that their respective inquiries are directed toward the same classes of objects. While the ontologist asks what it is *in objects* that *individuates* those objects, the epistemologist searches for features *in experience* that allows us to *discern* the difference among objects. (Barber, 1994, p. 4).

Individuation - from material objects to metaphysical ideas - is, in principle, an ontological problem. Existence (including the existence of God) must be cognized, but this presupposition cannot invalidate the existence, as it must guarantee the individuation. This dogmatic predetermination was rejected by the early Cartesian modernism, in which the long-standing discourse on individuation ceased more or less abruptly, and consequently the primacy of existence over cognoscibility was reversed. In Cartesian philosophy, epistemology had a clear primacy over ontology. Consequently, every form of existence - from the individual objects to God - can be accepted only when it is sufficiently cognized. Instead of the parallelism between ontology and epistemology, as prevailed in the Middle Ages, the Cartesian-epistemological turn of the early modern age led to a hierarchical primacy of epistemology over ontology.

Broadly speaking, the weak model is dominant in medieval philosophy. Epistemological concerns are subordinate or at best parallel to ontological concerns. The existents, beginning with God, are given as are the categories available for their analysis. The task of the epistemologist is to support not to challenge the schema, and any attempt to reverse the subordinate role assigned to epistemology (or to advocate the Strong Model) would have been regarded not as indication of philosophical acumen but rather as a potential source of heresy.

By 1641, however, the strong model has replaced its weaker medieval counterpart. In the opening paragraphs of the *Meditations* Descartes announces that he will suspend belief in the existence of anything not known with certainty. Ontological claims concerning the existence of material objects, of God, and even the self, must be subjected to a most rigorous epistemological scrutiny before one (or at least Descartes) is entitled to accept those claims. (Barber, 1994, p. 5)

However, the cognoscibility of a phenomenon depends on its mode of existence. Through the epistemological method of negation, Descartes (2009) reduces the experiential reality to two final modes of existence, namely, the thinking substance (*res cogitans*) and the extended substance (*res extensa*). This reduction is followed by the famous Cartesian dictum: *ego cogito, ergo sum* (I think, therefore, I am). It refers to the perfect ontological difference between the existence of the soul and the existence of the body. According to Descartes (2009), the soul and the body, to which the human body belongs, point to completely different modes of being, because they are known in different ways. Here the difference in cognoscibility presupposes the

difference in the form of existence. However, the paradigmatic pre-eminence of Descartes's precedence, that is, the primacy of cognoscibility over existence -accordingly, the primacy of epistemology over ontology- can easily be reversed. Compared to the materially extended body, the thinking soul, as *res cogitans*, is known in a completely different way (as shown by Descartes in his method of epistemological doubt, in which all the subjective-sensory qualities and mental attributes of the body are denied and epistemically isolated from the body), because the soul can exist without corporeal matter. That is to say, the cognition of the soul - as *res cogitans* - and its absolute differentiation from the cognoscibility of the materially extended body are presupposed by the existence of the soul, which is completely independent of the existence of the body (as Descartes thinks), and not the other way around. The existence of a phenomenon here, in turn, has a clear primacy over its cognoscibility, something that even Descartes seemed unable to overcome through his strategic preference for epistemology.

### **The ontological basis of epistemology**

The primacy of epistemology over ontology - as a doctrine of existence - was for Descartes a clear strategy in early modernism to overcome once and for all the predominance of ontology passed down from the medieval scholastic philosophy that had dominated for several centuries in aporetic discourses - within the framework of natural philosophy and metaphysics. The predominance of ontology in the medieval scholastic philosophy was tacitly supported and guaranteed through the theological assumptions or dogmas propagated by the church, that is, the necessary existence of God, the eternity of the soul, etc., as Barber (1994) suggests in the aforementioned observation. The philosophical basis of these and such infallible assumptions was established in a dominant discourse throughout the history of medieval scholasticism, namely, in the discourse on the phenomenon of individuation. Scholasticism has for a long time and incessantly pondered on the problem of individuation, in particular, on the principle of individuation (*principium individuationis*) (Gracia, 1984, pp. 36-39). The basic questions that were asked in this discourse were: How are the phenomena individualized? What is the basic principle of individuation?

The individuation of physical, mental and metaphysical phenomena is obviously an ontological problem. The basic questions mentioned above from the discourse on individuation indicate it clearly. However, in the medieval scholastic discourse on individuation, the problem of individuation was never solved completely, but was repeatedly discovered as an indissoluble aporia. The discourses on individuation thus obtained the basic characteristic of aporetics, which never ceases or ends in a final justification.

Cartesian modernism wanted to replace precisely this incessant discourse from the medieval scholasticism in favor of the emerging primacy of epistemology over ontology. Barber (1994) describes how the scholastic discourse on individuation, which prevailed throughout the Middle Ages, ended abruptly in the sixteenth century:

Some philosophical problems, by virtue of their importance relative to a philosophical system, are widely discussed by those safely within the parameters of a system —solutions are contested, distinctions are generated, and the promise of eventual resolution is entertained by all. Once the system comes under attack, however, leading either to its piecemeal or even wholesale rejection, those problems formerly of consummate importance may reduce to minor irritants mainly of antiquarian interest. [...] One issue constituting the theme of this volume apparently shares the same fate, namely, the problem of individuation (or, more accurately, the cluster of related problems discussed under that heading) whose contending solutions were debated with much vigor during the medieval era, but to which only passing reference is

made by philosophers in the early modern period. Thus, while Francisco Suárez in 1597 devotes 150 pages to the problem of individuation in his *Disputationes metaphysicae*, the seminal work in early modern philosophy appearing a mere forty-four years later, Descartes's *Meditations*, not only fails to advance Suárez's discussion but refuses to acknowledge the existence of the problem. Although this neglect is rectified to an extent elsewhere in Descartes and in the later Cartesians, the problem of individuation is never restored by the Cartesians to the place of prominence it formerly held in medieval philosophy. (Barber, 1994, p. 1)

The disappearance of the discourse on individuation was a natural consequence of the Cartesian epistemological turn, in which the precedence of cognizing the existence was almost paradigmatically established. In the Cartesian philosophical system, introduced in his main works *Discours de la Méthode*, *Les Méditations métaphysiques* and *Les Principes de la Philosophie*, the physical, mental and also metaphysical 'existences' were secured and accepted as such due to their apodictic cognoscibility. The unquestionable acceptance of existence -from material objects to God-, particularly represented in the accentuation of individuation without its sufficient cognition, has been banished in philosophy and, subsequently, in all the emerging sciences.

The primacy of cognoscibility over existence was achieved in Cartesian philosophy by the method of doubt, which was fundamentally the questioning of objective existences, and the subsequent denial and separation of all subjective *qualia* and attributes from the object. Here one can clearly see how the Cartesian-epistemological method of negation and separation opposed the principle of individuation, which had prevailed during the Middle Ages. Individuation implies the accommodation of all the qualities of the object<sup>iii</sup>, which are perceived by the subject, in the object itself. After the complete separation of all the *qualia* and other properties that Descartes only attributes to the subject, nothing remains in the object except a mere extension: the *res extensa*. Descartes (2009), in the famous parable of wax in *Meditations*, shows how the original qualities of raw wax in nature, namely, color, taste, smell and sound are lost when heated, leaving a mere material extension. The original qualitative individuation is here epistemologically negated, since the subject separates and appropriates all the subjective *qualia* of the object. Subsequently, there remains only a mere extension, a *res extensa*, which Descartes attributes to the extra-subjective object as its only certain characteristic. The Cartesian method of negation and epistemological segregation could thus almost completely eradicate the ontological principle of individuation and, consequently, invalidate it in favor of a strict and prevailing epistemology.

What Descartes denies in his strictly epistemological method of doubting and separates from the object and finally attributes to the subject alone, are the essential features of objective individuation themselves. The epistemological negation and the separation of objective qualities are processes that, in principle, complement the necessary epistemological access of the subject to the object. However, these epistemological processes seem to contradict each other. That is to say, the Cartesian-epistemological method of negation and separation, by means of which Descartes seeks to establish the primacy or even the hegemony of epistemology over ontology, inevitably poses an epistemological problem of sufficient epistemological access of the subject to the object. The epistemic-referential access ends in aporetic modes of existence, which in turn do not guarantee any finality or final justification of scientific knowledge.

However, the Cartesian method of epistemological doubt and the consequent negation and separation of all subjective qualities and attributes from the object are tacitly based on the above-discussed original correlation between epistemology and ontology, in which epistemology is based on ontology. The Cartesian mode of epistemic access is, without doubt, the systematic



negation of all the subjective qualities of the object and its subjective appropriation, so that a final ontic entity, the *res extensa*, objectively remains. This means that the epistemic-referential access ends in a secure and final mode of existence of the object, so that knowledge is ultimately justified by an epistemic finality and its apodicticity. In summary, modern epistemology requires the finality or the ending of epistemic-referential access, which also presupposes the ontological finality of the object of knowledge. That is, the finality of the mode of existence of the object determines the epistemic finality in each ultimate justification, which is the end -the terminus- of the epistemic referential access itself.

The ultimate justification (*Letztbegründung*), in which the epistemic-referential access ends, is an irreducible reality that, as such, cannot be traced back to another, deeper cause. Here the reality of the phenomenon forms its ultimate causal basis. Reality without causality, or an ontological state in which reality and causality are unified, constitutes a phenomenal aporia. Such phenomenal aporias<sup>iv</sup> were numerous in the aporetic discourses of medieval scholasticism in the field of *philosophia naturalis*, such as space, time, movement, impetus, infinitesimal, place, gravity, etc.; as Pierre Duhem in his seminal work *Le système du monde: histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic* discussed in detail. The aporicity of these phenomenal and mechanical individuations was the reason why the discourses on the modes of existence and the causes of these aporias continued incessantly throughout the Middle Ages. In aporia, the epistemic-referential access cannot end or achieve any finality. The causal finality of the phenomena, which determines its ultimate epistemological justification, is in fact the ontological finality of its individuation, and of its existence. The epistemological finality that gives rise to ultimate axiomatic knowledge presupposes in this way the ontological finality of the cognized phenomenon.

Cartesian modernism wanted to axiomatically end the incessant continuity of the aporetic discourses mentioned above in order to establish stable foundations for philosophy and science. For sciences cannot be based on aporias or aporetic propositions of basic phenomena; they presuppose the ontological finality of the individuation or mode of existence of the phenomenon, in which the epistemic-referential access ends. The method for solving the prevailing aporias of *philosophia naturalis* of scholasticism was the axiomatization of the basic mechanical phenomena. Axioms as causal final justifications of mechanical phenomena could give the sciences such a basis, and indeed a basis of ontological finality. Since axiomatization is a final causal justification, axioms are mere statements about the reality of phenomena without any reference to a deeper causality.

Descartes, Newton and other founders of early modern mechanical philosophy reduced the aforementioned aporetic discourses of the natural philosophy of medieval scholasticism to axioms, upon which the early modern mechanical philosophy was built. Newton axiomatized space, time and movement in his classical mechanics as absolute space, absolute time and absolute movement. Similarly, the enigmatic notions of particular gravities of celestial bodies (proposed by Kepler, Hooke, Roberval, and others) were rejected by Newton; he postulated in their place the boundless universal gravity that he could axiomatize mathematically. However, the principle of inertia was the most appropriate example of the final axiomatic explanation of a fundamentally aporetic phenomenon:

That each thing remains in the state in which it is so long as nothing changes it. [...]

That every body which moves tends to continue its motion in a straight line. (Descartes, 1955, pp. 84-85)

Every body continues in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it. (Newton, 1974, p. 13)

The Cartesian or Newtonian principle of inertia is, in the final analysis, a mere statement without a reference to causality. Such an axiomatic statement conceals in principle the aporia of impetus long debated as a causal principle underlying any free movement. As is known, Newton sought to discover the true cause of magnetic and gravitational attraction, that is, the magnetic or gravitational action at a distance. Finally, he had to abandon his research and be content with the reality of these mechanical phenomena, in particular, with 'the reality' of gravity. This was the basis for Newton's famous saying: *'Et satis est quod gravitas revera existat'*. This conviction of Newton was obviously based on his problematic axiomatization of gravity as universal gravity at the level of reality alone that he could easily mathematize.

Mathematical sciences such as mechanics and optics were developed in the early phase of modern mechanical philosophy. The basic phenomena in these sciences, such as forces, movement, inertia, gravity, the phenomenon of light and dioptric phenomena such as reflection and refraction, etc., can be easily represented in geometric forms and structures. The mathematical formalism imparts these mechanical and optical phenomena an ontological finality. For mathematics (geometry, arithmetic, algebra, etc.) have final forms and structures at its disposal, which are causally irreducible. Mathematical formalism, which had a substantial influence on the thinking of mechanical philosophers such as Descartes, Galileo, Kepler, Newton, Huygens and others, and which, therefore, became a decisive foundation of the epistemology of mathematical sciences, actually masked the aporias of the mechanical phenomena that prevailed in the medieval scholastic natural philosophy. The ontological finality and irreducibility of geometrical-mathematical forms and structures enabled the natural philosophers to axiomatize these and other essentially aporetic natural phenomena and their laws. Axioms, as fundamental principles, also show the epistemological finality as the termination of epistemic-referential access, and the ontological finality and irreducibility of the object of knowledge. Axioms disguise in this way the phenomenal aporia. In other words: Many axioms are graves of scientific aporias! The axiomatization was a measure and a necessary strategy in modern age, as the modern sciences could not be based on the aporetic discourses passed down from the *philosophia naturalis* of medieval scholasticism. The aporetic discourses of medieval-scholastic natural philosophy should cease, so that the modern axiomatic sciences could emerge.

### **Linguistic individuation**

As mentioned earlier, scientific axioms are final statements without an additional causal explanation, a matter that Bertrand Russel found problematic. That is to say, axioms are the scientific knowledge finally justified, in which the epistemic-referential access ends. The basis of the final epistemological justification is the ontological finality of the axiomatized object of cognition. The ontological finality of the objects of science refers to the finality of phenomenal individuation. In contrast, the correlative epistemological finality -that is, the termination of the epistemological access- seems to be accomplished by the finality of certain concepts, for example, the principle of inertia postulated by Newton and Descartes, as cited above. These axiomatic principles describe the phenomenon of inertia in the static and dynamic states of a body.

The linear and uniform inertial movement of a body (on which no external force acts) is not causally explained in this principle. That is, the principle of inertia does not explain *why* a moving body continues its movement infinitely, linearly and uniformly, as long as no external force (such as air resistance or gravity) acts on it. Faced with such a question about a causal explanation, the ghost of the impetus from the scholastic philosophy of nature reappears as the mysterious cause of the free movement of the body. The impetus as an aporetic causal principle was strategically suppressed in the Cartesian-Newtonian law of inertia, or even buried under a perfect geometric-mechanical form of inertial movement. The axiomatically described inertial movement must, therefore, represent an ontologically final individuation of a mechanical phenomenon.

However, the axiomatization of inertial motion in early modernism could hardly exclude the aporia of this mechanical-phenomenal individuation. In the linear and uniform inertial movement of a body, the problem of the unity of opposites reappears: a *coincidentia oppositorum*, that is, the aporetic unity of static and dynamic states. In the case of inertial movement, the body rests on itself -or remains static; it also moves in relation to an external frame of reference. Furthermore, the infinitely linear-uniform movement of the body in its dynamic state of inertia cannot be causally explained. Therefore, the axiomatic principle of inertia is scarcely free from the aporia of impetus as identified by the scholastic philosophers of nature in the free movement of a body.

However, the Newtonian principle of inertia implies a causal principle of the state of static and dynamic inertia in the form of an ontological principle, meaning, the inertia of the material body itself. Therefore, inertia, as an intrinsic quality of the body, can be an ontologically final or limiting phenomenon that cannot be traced back to any other cause, but at the same time does not refer to a sufficient causal principle. For the mechanical individuation of inertia is incomprehensible in comparison with the individuation of mechanical inertial motion. Here, a certain linguistic individuation, that is, inertia as the causal basis of the static and dynamic inertial states, seems to contribute significantly to the axiomaticity of the mechanical individuation of inertial states.

In comparison with the concretion of the inertia of the static state and the inertia of the state of motion, the physical quality of the inertia seems to exhibit a certain linguistic individuation. In the same way, Newton's law of gravitation tacitly presents the cause of gravitational attraction as a fundamental mechanical phenomenon of gravitation itself. The idea of the absolute functions in a similar way in the axiomatic conceptions of absolute space, absolute time and absolute motion, and the idea of infinitesimal in potential and actual infinity in the conception of infinitesimals - within the framework of the differential and integral calculus of Newton and Leibniz. The linguistic possibility of a greater conceptual abstraction - as represented in terms such as inertia (of the static and dynamic states of the bodies) or the infinite (to which the infinite movement of the diminution or enlargement of magnitudes tends) - seems to complement the epistemological finality of axiomatic ideas, including protecting them and preserving them from axiomatically masked mechanical phenomena.<sup>v</sup>

However, concepts such as linguistic individuations with epistemological finality seem to be the basic principle of the origin of a language itself. The Latin word for 'word' or 'term' is *terminus* - in German *der Terminus* - which, unchanged or with some modifications (like *term* in English), exists in many modern European languages. *Terminus* means at the same time concept and final (like 'terminal stop' or 'final station'), something that apparently has the end of an original epistemic access, that is, the finality of an epistemological process. Similarly, the

axiomatic definition, which is finally justified and cannot be traced back to any other cause, indicates the *finis* - a Latin term for 'final' or 'limit' - of a cognitive process. In an analogous manner, the German '*Begriff*' (concept), which the cognitive subject has under control (*den das Subjekt im Griff hat*), points to the end or finality of an epistemological apprehension. Previously, it has been analyzed how the epistemological finality of knowledge presupposes the ontological finality of the object of knowledge as a reference. By analogy, the epistemological finality of the concept, as subject or referent, determines its ontological finality that is necessarily based on the existential autonomy of the concept as linguistic individuation.

Concepts as existential and autonomous linguistic individuations form an ontological framework in which they seem to overcome their usual epistemic-referential directionality and limits. For, as autonomous-existential individuations, the concepts -as referents- acquire a significantly different referentiality or reference to abstract ideas; they make little reference to the individual things that, as referents, are cognized in concepts. The higher the conceptual abstraction and, therefore, the autonomy of linguistic individuations, the more distanced is their reference to concrete individual objects, which become accessible only to immediate sensory perceptions. Therefor the knowledge of an object presupposes an epistemological ambiguity or an ambiguity of the epistemic-referential access, namely that an object is directly and specifically perceived in the particular, but at the same time it is conceptually known only in an indirect and abstract way as general idea.

The ambiguity of the epistemic reference as a problem in epistemology, however, goes beyond the scope of language. It extends to the sphere of pre-logical and pre-linguistic sensibility. This ambiguity is determined by the difference in the directions of the subject's epistemic-referential access. In the initial and pre-linguistic sensibility, the subject that perceives focuses on the individual object. This constitutes the necessary preliminary phase of knowledge. In understanding, however, the subjective-linguistic concept focuses on a general idea. While the subject orients epistemically and referentially through the senses towards the individual object, it moves away conceptually, that is, in the case of conceptual cognition, from the individual object, as presupposed in abstract cognition. In *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Kant (1998) presents a compositional structure of knowledge, in which the concept and intuition are synthesized:

Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind. Daher ist es eben so notwendig, seine Begriffe sinnlich zu machen (d. i. ihnen den Gegenstand in der Anschauung beizufügen), als seine Anschauungen sich verständlich zu machen (d. i. sie unter Begriffe zu bringen). (Kant, 1998, p. 130).

However, the aforementioned ambiguity of the epistemic reference in cognition seems barely resolved by such synthesis of concept and intuition, as they have ontologically different forms of existence. Kant manages to introduce synthesis by integrating sensibility and understanding in a hierarchical order. The sensibility is reduced to a mere means, whose function is to supply the raw material to the intellect, which only conceptually cognizes. This hierarchization of Kant corresponds to the process of cognition, which appears more or less uniformly from sensibility, in which alone objects are given, to understanding which conceptually cognizes the objects given in sensibility. Beyond this limited function of a medium between mind and object, Kant does not attribute an epistemic potential to sensibility. According to Kant, the senses accomplish only intuition and not cognition, which only the intellect performs on the basis of language. Through this strategic hierarchization of intellect and sensibility within the framework of his epistemology, in which the epistemic intellect clearly prevails over sensibility, Kant, as is known, tried to overcome a notion of the cognitive potential of senses which had certain

recognition in his time. Alexander G. Baumgarten, Kant's famous predecessor in the field of aesthetics, developed his theory of sensory cognition, *cognitio sensitiva*, originally from an idea in the Leibniz-Wolffian system, that is, senses as a lower imperfect faculty of cognition. Baumgarten (1750/58) tries to epistemologically equate sensory cognition with *cognitio abstractiva*, the abstract intellectual cognition.

Der Begründer der Ästhetik als philosophischer Disziplin stützt sich zwar in seiner Aesthetica (1750/58) weitgehend auf die überlieferte Poetik und Rhetorik, aber es geht ihm in erster Linie darum, das Eigenrecht der sinnlichen Erkenntnis zur Geltung zu bringen. Er hält sich dabei genau an die Grundbedeutung des Wortes ästhetisch (.....): die Empfindung und Wahrnehmung betreffend, für die Sinne faßbar. Seine Ästhetik ist also eine Philosophie der sinnlichen Empfindung und Wahrnehmung, und sie nimmt die Aktivität der Sinne nicht als äußeren Reiz und als Material für den Verstand, sondern als eine besondere Art der Erkenntnis ernst. Sie wird daher als Wissenschaft der sinnlichen Erkenntnis definiert. Baumgarten postuliert damit für diejenige geistige Tätigkeit, die er nach der Terminologie seines Lehrers Chr. Wolff dem unteren Erkenntnisvermögen zurechnet, eine eigene, von der Logik, ihrer älteren Schwester, unabhängige Wissenschaft. (Schweizer, 1983, p. VIII)

According to Baumgarten (1750/58), the senses have an epistemic access to objects, which is quite similar to the abstract-conceptual knowledge of the intellect. The senses, like the intellect, are capable of knowing without presupposing a logical-conceptual form. Through the legitimation of sensibility as an autonomous cognitive faculty, which is inferior but comparable with the intellect, Baumgarten tries to develop a science of sensory cognition, which forms an analogy with the traditional science of logic. For the legitimation of a science of aesthetics - as a doctrine of sensibility and sensory cognition - Baumgarten seeks to go back to the ancient-Greek and medieval-scholastic differentiation between *aistheta* and *noeta*.

Die Theorie der Sinnlichkeit, die der Einundzwanzigjährige am Ende seiner 1735 veröffentlichten *Meditationes de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus* zur besseren Begründung der Poetik fordert, erscheint ihm zunächst als Aufgabe der Logik im allgemeinen Sinne. Aber gleich anschließend fragt er sich, ob es nicht „eine Wissenschaft geben könne, die die Aufgabe hat, das untere Erkenntnisvermögen zu leiten, oder eine Wissenschaft vom sinnlichen Erkennen (*scientia sensitiva quid cognoscendi*). Entsprechend wird im nachfolgenden Paragraphen die Ästhetik der Logik an die Seite gestellt: Schon die griechischen Philosophen und die Kirchenväter haben immer genau zwischen *aistheta* und *noeta* unterschieden...Es sind also die *noeta* als das, was mit Hilfe des oberen Erkenntnisvermögens erkannt wird, Gegenstand der Logik; die *aistheta* gehören der ästhetischen Wissenschaft, oder der Ästhetik an. (Schweizer, 1983, p. VIII)

Sensory cognition has access to aesthetic truth, which underlies the aesthetic experience of poetry and arts. “Die ästhetische Wahrheit ist die Wahrheit, soweit sie sinnlich erkennbar ist” (Baumgarten 1750/58, trans. Schweizer, 1983, p. 53). From Descartes to Leibniz and Wolff, the participation of the senses in the cognitive process was subordinated to understanding, since only the intellect can process sensory perceptions that are unclear, confused and epistemically neutral into clear and conceptual knowledge. The Cartesian criteria for knowledge were, therefore, clear and distinct (*clara et distincta*), which were denied to sensory perceptions. Baumgarten (1750/58) describes the necessary clarity and distinction as *claritas intensiva*, which only the abstract and conceptual knowledge can claim. In contrast, sensory knowledge has an extensive clarity (*claritas extensiva*).

Baumgarten suggests that the extensive clarity (*claritas extensiva*) of sensible representations be taken as the standard for the perfection of sensible cognition in the *Reflections on Poetry*, as well as the *Metaphysica*. According to Baumgarten, extensive clarity is a kind of clarity which gathers together as

many confused representations as can be combined in a particular sensible representation. Extensive clarity is made the standard of perfection for sensible cognition because it is clear, while remaining indistinct. It is clear because “more is represented in a sensible way” in extensively clear representations than it is in representations which are extensively unclear. Yet extensively clear representations fall short of distinctness, because they are not “complete, adequate, profound through every degree”. (McQuillan, 2011, p. 6).

While the intensive clarity of abstract-conceptual cognition is inevitably at the expense of sensory impressions (which abstraction requires), the extensive clarity of sensory cognition is based on a large number of sensory impressions that seem confused and unstructured due to their abundance, but allows the subject the true aesthetic experience and, therefore, the epistemic access to the aesthetic truth.

The clarity and distinction of a logical-conceptual cognition point to a certain ending, or rather to a finality of cognition; Clarity implies the emergence of an adequate final state of a process of cognition, which arises here through the epistemic finitude of the concepts. In contrast, the extensive clarity (*claritas extensiva*) of sensory cognition, which gives abundance to rich but vague and confused sensory impressions, seems to indicate an aesthetic-epistemic infinity or an infinite epistemic-referential access.

However, the linguistic concepts harbor the general, universal and platonic ideas, which do not imply the finitude and termination of cognition, but point to an epistemic infinity. That is to say, the apparent epistemic finality of concepts and conceptual predicates mark the infinity of ideas, as represented in their existence and cognoscibility. From this it can be concluded that the concepts also hide a vagueness and indetermination analogous to sensory impressions. Thus, the abundance of vague and confused sensory impressions is explicit in the pre-conceptual and pre-logical sphere of senses, while in concepts the infinity of ideas is hidden and, as such, implicit.

In addition to the epistemological autonomy of sensibility within the framework of his doctrine of *cognitio sensitiva*, Baumgarten attempts to integrate sensory and abstract-conceptual cognition, *cognitio sensitiva* and *cognitio abstractiva*, into a unified epistemological system. Consequently, Baumgarten develops the notion of an aesthetic-logical truth represented in an aesthetic-logical cognition. Such systematization of epistemology, in which the epistemological equality between logic and aesthetics is preserved, clearly constitutes an important alternative to conventional epistemologies with a hierarchical order of logic and aesthetics, intellect and senses. However, the epistemological equality of aesthetics and logic seems to complicate their epistemological nexus from the outset, as the senses and intellect have different potentials of cognition. The difference between *cognitio sensitiva* and *cognitio abstractiva* appears in the binary concepts discussed above, which are based on this differentiation, such as *claritas extensiva* and *claritas intensiva*, or aesthetic and logical truth. Another pair of terms that Baumgarten uses in relation to the difference between logical-abstract cognition and pre-logical and purely aesthetic cognition is attention (*attentio*) and abstraction (*abstractio*). The aesthetic process of cognition is determined, therefore, as an interplay of *attentio* and *abstractio*:

Das Zusammenspiel von Aufmerksamkeit und Abstraktion wirft ein Licht darauf, wie Baumgarten den Unterschied und die Beziehung zwischen Sinnlichkeit (*facultas cognoscitiva inferior*) und Verstand (*intellectus*) und damit im weiteren Sinne zwischen ästhetischem und wissenschaftlichem Erkennen in der Psychologie verstanden wissen will. Aufmerksames Achtgeben-auf und abstrahierendes Absehen-von-etwas unterhalten ihr Umkehrverhältnis in beiden Bereichen. Aber sie setzen es unterschiedlich ins Werk. Vereinfachend kann man sagen, dass in der Sinnlichkeit die Aufmerksamkeit im engeren Sinne die Führung innehat. (Campe, 2016, p. 151)

The factum of *attentio* is indeed a well-founded assumption in the context of sensory cognition, but if the *cognitio sensitiva* is synthesized with *cognitio abstractiva* in the framework of an aesthetic cognition and truth, the interplay of *attentio* and *abstractio* inevitably points to an epistemic-referential ambiguity in the cognitive process. How can the opposite epistemic processes, *attentio* and *abstractio*, be integrated into a unified epistemic-referential access, which presupposes synthetic aesthetic-logical knowledge and truth? Can the subject look at an object in perception and at the same time abstain from it in an abstract and conceptual cognition?

The ambiguity of the epistemic reference depends here on the directional nature of cognition, and on the other hand it arises from the inconsistency in the implementation of the epistemic-referential access, that is, the contradictory composition between an aesthetic access to the fullness, confused state and infinity of sensory impressions and a logical-abstract access to the clarity, distinction and above all finality of conceptual knowledge. Could these apparently contradictory epistemic-referential accesses be integrated into a unified system of epistemology? According to Baumgarten (1750/58), such an epistemology should produce aesthetic knowledge and truth. That is to say, the *cognitio sensitiva* must effectively complement the *cognitio abstractiva*. Consequently, the aesthetic truth must enrich the conceptual-abstract truth. The emphasis and priority of sensory cognition and aesthetic truth make Baumgarten reverse the hierarchical order of epistemology that has prevailed since Plato. In Baumgarten, the individual terms that refer to individual objects are aesthetically truer than the generic terms:

Die ästhetikologische Wahrheit des Gattungsbegriffs bedeutet die Vorstellung einer großen metaphysischen Wahrheit, die ästhetikologische Wahrheit des Artbegriffs die Vorstellung einer größeren, die ästhetikologische Wahrheit des Individuellen oder des Einzelnen die Vorstellung der höchsten denkbaren metaphysischen Wahrheit. Die erste ist wahr, die zweite wahrer, die dritte am wahrsten. (Baumgarten 1750/58, trans. Schweizer, 1983, p. 71)

However, the veracity of individual concepts should not supplant the truth of the general and universal ideas, but should complement and enrich them in an aesthetic framework. What resists such a combination of aesthetics and logic in the context of a unified epistemology is the ambiguity of the epistemic-referential access described above, as represented in Baumgarten's system as *attentio* and *abstractio*. How can in a unified process of cognition an epistemic intuition that is directed to a particular object in sensibility be integrated with the abstraction, i.e. turning away from the object in conceptual cognition? Here the ambiguity of the epistemic-referential *directions* is the basis of this epistemological aporia. The two completely different epistemic-referential accesses seem to bring the cognizing subject into a certain aporetic despair.

The same idea of epistemic-referential access seems to offer an adequate solution to this aporia of cognition. Like the impressions of the senses, the general idea inherent in abstract-conceptual knowledge does not indicate an end or finality of the epistemic-referential access, but its infinity, as discussed above. That is to say, the domains of sensibility and that of ideas inherent in concepts have in common the infinite epistemic-referential access. However, linguistic concepts give the impression that the epistemic-referential access ends in them and, as such, attains a finality. Within the framework of the aesthetic cognition and truth, this finality of abstract-conceptual knowledge is dismantled and revealed in the infinity of hidden ideas. The *cognitio sensitiva* complements the *cognitio abstractiva* - by analogy, the aesthetic truth enriches or potentiates the logical truth - in which the division or polarization of the epistemic-referential access - in the context of the sensory and abstract-conceptual cognition - is lifted into the unity of an epistemic infinity. Such a suspension gives the *cognitio sensitiva* and, consequently, the

aesthetic truth a new dimension and potentiality. Instead of becoming obscure and confusing, the *cognitio sensitiva* complements the *cognitio abstractiva* - therefore, the aesthetic truth complements the logical truth - in which the epistemic-referential infinity of the aesthetic perception deconstructs the finality of the logical-abstract concepts. One experiences here the epistemic-referential infinity of aesthetic perceptions directed towards ideas. Only the senses open the windows of concepts, which remained closed for a long time, and enable us the infinite epistemic access to ideas.

The aforementioned aporia of cognition - or the aporia of the epistemic-referential access within the framework of aesthetic-logical cognition - must therefore be detached from its traditional meaning and re-imagined entirely. This aporia does not imply a stagnation of cognition coupled with an epistemic-referential despair, but the continuity and intensification of the epistemic infinity itself. It does not limit the epistemic access or take the cognitive process to any conceptual limit, but it leads us to infinite epistemic access and its infinite experience. Therefore, this aporia does not mark the desperate end of an epistemic access, but its intensification and infinity.

## Conclusion

The relation between language and reality constitutes, above all, an epistemological problem; it is based on the referentiality of language, which defines the epistemic access of the subject that cognizes the object of knowledge. However, the necessary epistemic access of the subject to the object through the medium of language is not unitary. The term refers to a significantly different epistemic access (therefore, to a different referentiality) than a sensory perception, in which the senses are directed to particular objects. While sensory perception has an immediate reference to the particular, in conceptual cognition the particular objects of the senses and the epistemic access to them are tacitly overlooked, and the reference of the subject is directed towards general and universal ideas. The sensory access of the subject to the particular and its abstract-conceptual departure from the particular to the universal demonstrate here an aporetic ambiguity intrinsic to the cognitive process, which as such is the inherent aporia of language itself. The aporia of epistemic referentiality arises here also through the indeterminate finality of the cognitive process. The term only gives the appearance of a possible end of epistemic access.

In fact, epistemic access or epistemic reference cannot end in the term that incorporates a universal idea, nor in particular objects of sensory perception, since the aporia of conceptual-linguistic cognition does not finally reside in the subject, but in the object itself. This generally points to the foundation of the perceptibility of the object in its existence and, therefore, the foundation of epistemology in ontology. In the prevailing modern epistemology, the aporetic ambiguity in the cognitive process is attempted to be suppressed or masked through a hierarchical order of cognition by strategically subordinating sensory perception to conceptual cognition of the mind, as most adequately represented in Kant's transcendental philosophical system. The inherent aporetic ambiguity of epistemic referentiality, ultimately attributable to an objective ontological aporia, necessarily eliminates the predominant hierarchical notion of the system of modern epistemology in such a way that the epistemological access of the senses to the particular and that of the intellect to the universal idea inherent in a term are no longer hierarchically structured, but are presented in a parallel and equivalent manner.

Accordingly, cognition no longer takes place in the framework of a hierarchically structured process, but in an egalitarian and participatory correlation between aesthetic and



logical access or reference of the subject to the particular object. Here, the equivalent participatory cooperation of the senses and the intellect transcends the epistemic finality of linguistic-conceptual cognition, so that the subject approaches a sphere of infinitely aesthetic perception, and even enters it.

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## Notes

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<sup>i</sup>“... zwischen zwei absolut verschiedenen Sphären wie zwischen Subjekt und Objekt gibt es keine Causalität, keine Richtigkeit, keinen Ausdruck, sondern höchstens ein ästhetisches Verhalten, ich meine eine andeutende Uebertragung, eine nachstammelnde Uebersetzung in eine ganz fremde Sprache“ (Nietzsche, 1999, p. 884).

<sup>ii</sup>“For particularity has to do with an individual’s “participation in” or “partaking of” a universal. In this sense the individual is considered as being a part of something else, or as partaking of it. Thus, a man, for example, is particular (*particularis*) in that it participates in man, which itself is not particular” (Gracia, 1984, p. 25).

<sup>iii</sup>“...für die Scholastik entstehen die *qualitates secundae* aus den *primae im Objekt* und nicht erst, wie für die späteren, im wahrnehmenden Subjekt. Ihre Realität wurde darum in der traditionellen Philosophie nie in Zweifel gezogen, und ebenso wenig die Abbildlichkeit der Qualitätsempfindungen. [...] Wie die Qualitäten im einzelnen von den primären abhängen sollen, wird, besonders wenn es sich um die nicht-taktilen handelt, in der älteren Philosophie nur sehr undeutlich gewusst und gesagt. Die Argumentation geht häufig über die Vorzugsstellung des Tastsinns, denn der ist zwar nicht der vornehmste, aber der notwendigste Sinn, der von allen vorausgesetzt wird, selbst aber keinen voraussetzt. Die Betrachtung wird damit auf ein Gebiet hinübergespielt, das vielleicht die stärkste Problematik und die meisten Ansatzmöglichkeiten für die Weiterentwicklung enthielt” (Maier, 1968, p. 18).

<sup>iv</sup>“Die ursprünglichen Vorstellungen von Aporie in der Philosophie von Platon und Aristoteles deuten auf jene Grenzerfahrung im Denken, also auf die Ausweglosigkeit im Denkprozess, in dem man vor allem nach einer Lösung sucht. Allerdings weist Aristoteles darauf hin, dass die Ausweglosigkeit im Denken weiterhin auf das Aporetische an der Sache bzw. an dem Objekt des Denkens zurückzuführen ist: “Wer einen guten Weg finden will, für den ist es förderlich, die Ausweglosigkeit gründlich durchgehalten zu haben. Denn der spätere Weg ist die Lösung dessen, worin man zuvor keinen Weg hatte. Man kann nicht lösen, wenn man den Knoten nicht kennt. Wenn man aber im Denken keinen Weg hat, dann zeigt das diesen Knoten in der Sache an” (Aristoteles, Met. B 1, 995 a24 – b4) (Jacobi, 2008, p. 31). An dieser Stelle gründet Aristoteles die Aporetik – als gedanklichen Lösungsversuch – letztendlich auf die Aporie des Objekts. Die aristotelische Betonung der objektiven Aporie schien in der kartesischen Moderne verkannt zu werden, indem die Aporetik im strengen Rahmen der Epistemologie eingeschränkt wurde” (Thaliath, 2016, p. 280).

<sup>v</sup> In his seminal work *Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne*, Nietzsche considers higher conceptual abstraction as the causal principle of the same concept in the form of a qualitative concretion, such as: Honesty as the cause of a human quality, to be honest: “Wir nennen einen Menschen 'ehrlich' Warum hat er heute so ehrlich gehandelt? fragen wir. Unsere Antwort pflegt zu lauten: seiner Ehrlichkeit wegen. Die Ehrlichkeit! Das heißt wieder: das Blatt ist die Ursache der Blätter. Wir wissen ja gar nichts von einer wesenhaften Qualität, die 'die Ehrlichkeit' hieße, wohl aber von zahlreichen individualisierten, somit ungleichen Handlungen, die wir durch Weglassen des Ungleichen gleichsetzen und jetzt als ehrliche Handlungen bezeichnen; zuletzt formulieren wir aus ihnen eine *qualitas occulta* mit dem Namen: 'die Ehrlichkeit’” (Nietzsche, 1999 p. 880). The result of this investigation is that Nietzsche convincingly demonstrates how the possibility of greater abstraction in language produces autonomous linguistic entities – similar to finished building blocks - over which the sciences construct their safe conceptual columbarium.